Ao longo da Metafísica e dos tratados de filosofia natural, Aristóteles toma os organismos vivos como os exemplos paradigmáticos de οὐσίαι (substâncias) naturais. No entanto, além dos organismos vivos, em certas passagens o filósofo menciona, também, as partes dos viventes e os elementos como exemplos de substâncias. Contudo, em outras passagens, Aristóteles parece considerar que as partes dos seres vivos e os corpos elementares não representariam, genuinamente ou propriamente, entidades substanciais. Por outro lado, em nenhum momento, o filósofo parece indicar (...) expressamente os corpos homogêneos inanimados (metais e minerais), tratados no livro IV dos Meteorológicos, enquanto tipos de seres substanciais. Neste artigo, pretendo, então, examinar se as partes do vivente e os elementos poderiam, de fato, contar ou não como exemplares genuínos de substâncias naturais; e em que medida os corpos homogêneos inanimados, a despeito de não serem explicitamente citados na condição de entes substanciais, poderiam, a partir do exame de suas naturezas composicionais, sustentarem, de uma maneira estrita, o título de οὐσίαι naturais. (shrink)

Em Aristóteles, o processo de constituição dos seres naturais envolve um conjunto de causas, delimitadas de acordo com a teoria da matéria e forma. A matéria é causa enquanto suporte composicional pelo qual os seres são gerados; e a forma é causa enquanto fator responsável pelas características essenciais do ente natural, bem como por originar uma série de movimentos coordenados, que irá resultar na composição substancial. Neste artigo, pretento, em um primeiro momento, argumenar no sentido de que entre os dois (...) tipos de causalidades fundamentais, isto é, por um lado, aquele associado à natureza material, e, por outro, à natureza formal, haveria uma primazia explanatória relativamente ao segundo, pois em uma explicação mais completa, envolvendo esses dois aspectos causais, a causalidade material seria subordinada e subsumida pela causalidade em termos formal-finais. Em um segundo momento, procurarei estabelecer um contraste entre as causas naturais e a causa espontânea, examinando aos casos nos quais as relações causais não ocorrem devido a uma determinação teleológica, mas por uma mera conjunção de fatores concomitantes. A geração espontânea é um exemplo de eventos como este, pois, neste caso, a constituição do organismo não seria presidida por uma causalidade de tipo formal-final, a qual administrasse um conjunto de séries causais, interdependentemente relacionadas entre si. (shrink)

The manufacture of humanoid robots with embedded artificial intelligence and for sexual purposes has generated some debates within bioethics, in which diverse competing views have been presented. Themes such as sexuality and its deviations, the objectification of women, the relational problems of contemporary life, loneliness, and even the reproductive future of the species constitute the arguments which have emerged in relation to this subject. Based on these themes, this article presents the current state of the use of female sex robots, (...) the bioethical problems that arise, and how bioethics could serve as a medium for both thinking about and resolving some of these challenges. (shrink)

The original publication contained a mistake. The department name of the 1st author E.C. Carvalho should be “Postgraduate Program of Bioethics”. The institutions of the second author E. da Silva should be Centro Universitário Serra dos Órgãos.

The present paper aims at examining the characteristics that determine the essential nature of the homogeneous bodies in Aristotle, from an analysis of Meteorology IV.12, which would at the same time establish a certain relationship with other treatises of natural philosophy and also in particular with books VII and VIII of Metaphysics. With this investigation, I will delineate a certain line of argument that goes against a reading perspective considered as traditional, with certain interpretive variants, according to which Aristotle would (...) have adopted the idea of ​​a universal teleology, in the general sense that all natural bodies would be generated for a specific goal, or for a natural purpose. According to a certain view, linked to this perspective, the teleological character of functional type of vital activities, notably expressed by the compositional arrangement of the non-homogeneous parts in the living being's complexion, would be somehow involved in the constitution of the homogeneous bodies considered in themselves and for themselves. In contrast to such a view, I will examine, in a precise way, to what extent the homogeneous bodies would comprise a certain formal factor directly involved in the characterization of their constitutional particularities, taking into account a comparative examination with other kinds of natural compositions, namely, elemental aggregates and living organisms. Thus, through this examination, I will explore the question of whether, in function of this formal factor, such bodies could present some teleological character trait, distinct from the functional type, characteristic of organic-animate constitutions. (shrink)

Kant clearly endorses some version of the ‘old formula of the schools’, according to which all volition is sub ratione boni. There has been a debate whether he holds this only for morally good actions. I argue that a closer look at the distinction between the good and the agreeable does not support this conclusion. Considering Kant’s account of the detrimental and the correct use of this thesis, I argue that rational beings always will sub ratione boni, even when they (...) act immorally, because they act on principles. I argue that Kant’s accounts of self-love and self-conceit support this view. (shrink)

Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant (...) to one's motivations. (shrink)

Demonstrative thoughts are distinguished by the fact that their contents are determined relationally, via perception, rather than descriptively. Therefore, a fundamental task of a theory of demonstrative thought is to elucidate how facts about visual perception can explain how these thoughts come to have the contents that they do. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how cognitive psychology may help us solve this metasemantic question, through empirical models of visual processing. Although there is a dispute between attentional and (...) non-attentional models concerning the best metasemantic mechanism for demonstrative thoughts, in this paper I will argue in favor of a hybrid model, which combines both types of processes. In this picture, attentional and non-attentional mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and each plays a specific role in determining the singular content of demonstrative thoughts. (shrink)

Este livro aborda a Filosofia Clínica, método criado pelo psicanalista e filósofo Lúcio Packter, que direciona os procedimentos de diagnose e tratamento a partir da metodologia filosófica. A elaboração da obra conta com dois procedimentos distintos - o desenvolvimento de conferências e estudos apresentados sobre o assunto e uma entrevista com a Assessoria Virtual do Instituto Packter. Nesse sentido, o objetivo do autor é mostrar que a Filosofia Clínica consiste em uma técnica de ajuda pessoal, que respeita o sofrimento e (...) o mundo singular dos indivíduos. (shrink)

Os textos reunidos neste livro foram originalmente apresentados no Colóquio Internacional Kátharsis, realizado pelo programa de pós-graduação em Filosofia da FAFICH/UFMG. Os textos têm como tema compartilhado o conceito de catarse e apresentam perspectivas bem distintas - vão desde a origem do conceito na Grécia antiga até sua atualidade no mundo contemporâneo, levando em consideração seus diferentes momentos e apresentando grande diversidade nos enfoques adotados pelos colaboradores.

In this chapter, I put forward and sustain an articulation of the notion of bodily skill based on ecological psychology, and I show how it is relevant for the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about skillful coping and also for the debate about whether know-how is reducible or not to propositional knowledge. The right metaphor to understand bodily skills is not the computer metaphor but the radio metaphor. These skills result from a process of organism attunement to its environment.

It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they are experienced. People consider that (...) emotions are not just about feeling in certain ways, but also about feeling the right way. (shrink)

Can we experience emotion without the feeling of accelerated heartbeats, perspiration, or other changes in the body? In his paper “What is an emotion”, William James famously claimed that “if we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind” (1884, p. 193). Thus, bodily changes are essential to emotion. This is known as the Subtraction Argument. The Subtraction Argument is still (...) used to support Embodied theories of emotion. Proponents of Disembodied theories, however, have different intuitions regarding the role of bodily changes in the experience of emotion. In order to advance this debate, I conducted a series of studies testing people’s intuitions regarding the Subtraction Argument. Results show that, against James’ claims, most people consider that their hypothetical (Study 1) and actual (Study 2) emotions persist in the absence of bodily feelings. Furthermore, Study 1 found that participants’ responses were not related to individual differences in reflection or interoceptive awareness. These results pose a problem for Embodied theories of emotion and challenge extant explanations for the persistence of emotional experience in cases of impaired interoception. (shrink)

Emergency situations require individuals to make important changes in their behavior. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, official recommendations to avoid the spread of the virus include costly behaviors such as self-quarantining or drastically diminishing social contacts. Compliance (or lack thereof) with these recommendations is a controversial and divisive topic, and lay hypotheses abound regarding what underlies this divide. This paper investigates which cognitive, moral, and emotional traits separate people who comply with official recommendations from those who don't. In (...) four studies (three pre-registered) on both U.S. and French samples, we found that individuals' self-reported compliance with official recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic was partly driven by individual differences in moral values, disgust sensitivity, and psychological reactance. We discuss the limitations of our studies and suggest possible applications in the context of health communication. (shrink)

College students have become more representative as blood donors, mainly to help other people. This study ascertained the association between spirituality and adherence or intention to donate blood in post-graduate students. In this quantitative and cross-sectional study, participants were 281 students from a post-graduate programme at a Brazilian public university. After complying with ethical requirements, data were collected through a questionnaire for sociodemographic characterization and identification of blood donation practices, followed by the Spiritual Well-Being Scale. Descriptive statistics and parametric tests (...) were used for data analysis. A total of 74% of the participants were female and 26% were male. Previous experience and/or intention to donate blood were found in 75.3%; 14.3% donated blood periodically. In addition, 12.2% were not adept to donation and 12.5% were inapt. Spiritual Well-Being scores were similar between individuals who are not adept and those who donate periodically. In conclusion, in the sample, spirituality and blood donation are not associated, but spiritual well-being and gender are. To enhance blood donation, further research is needed. (shrink)

v. 1. Introducción a la filosofía del derecho -- v. 2. Introducción a la ciencia del derecho.

Neste texto inrodutório, apresento brevemente o que normalmente se entende pelo velho problema da indução e, em seguida, apresento um pouco mais detidamente, acentuando as diferenças e semelhanças, o novo enigma da indução.

En Ciencia de la lógica, Hegel finaliza la lógica objetiva con un largo estudio de las categorías modales (realidad, necesidad y posibilidad). Nuestra propuesta es que tal estudio hay que entenderlo en confrontación directa con la situación dejada por Kant en los principios del entendimiento puro de KrV. Para defender tal tesis expondremos, en primer lugar, la exposición kantiana del problema; en segundo lugar, el desarrollo de la lógica de la esencia dentro de la obra; y, por último, la nueva (...) interpretación que propone Hegel de las categorías modales. (shrink)

I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.

A widespread conception of anger both within and outside academia proposes to interpret it (along with other emotions) as an adaptive response to certain recurrent problems in our evolutionary past, which implies interpreting anger as a discrete, basic, innate and adaptive emotion. In view of the crisis that the Basic Emotions thesis is going through, and taking into account a number of important objections that have been raised to the idea that anger represents a discrete emotion, I will suggest that (...) the definitive abandonment of the concept of anger (and its close relatives, rage and indignation) has important hermeneutical advantages, including the possibility of approaching the problem of the phylogenesis of our sense of justice from a perspective that avoids the rupturist and continuist extremes that rely on a discrete conception of the emotions. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience can bear rational relation to our empirical thought. In the first part, I elaborate two claims that are central for the justificational role of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is independent from belief. At first sight, these claims seem not to be compatible, since the first one seems to require the truth of content conceptualism, (...) while the second one seems to require its falsity. In the second part, based on Alva Noë's actionist theory of perception, I argue in favor of a less intellectualist interpretation of the first claim, uncommitted to content conceptualism, and then I show how it can be reconciled with the second claim. Finally, I explain how perception holds rational relationships with our empirical thought through the exercise of observational concepts. These concepts link what I propose to call 'space of actions' to the logical space of reasons. (shrink)

En este trabajo examinamos el tópico de la responsabilidad en el derecho penal internacional a la luz de la filosofía de John Searle, y del fallo dictado por la Corte Penal Internacional en el caso de Thomas Lubanga. En el primer acápite analizamos la declaración de responsabilidad penal en función de la teoría de actos de habla de Austin y de Searle, tratándola como un acto ilocucionario cuyo significado es dependiente de un marco institucional específico. Luego, en el segundo acápite, (...) mostramos de qué forma tal marco puede reconstruirse como un ejemplo paradigmático de la realidad social construida descrita por Searle, especialmente en virtud del nexo entre mente, lenguaje y sociedad. A nuestro juicio, los conceptos de intencionalidad colectiva, atribución de funciones de estatus y poderes deónticos son fundamentales para entender tal nexo. En efecto, tal como argumentamos en la tercera sección, los sistemas de poderes deónticos asociados al derecho internacional no solo explican la aparición de Tribunales penales internacionales, como la Corte Penal Internacional, sino además el carácter imprescriptible de los crímenes de lesa humanidad. Los acuerdos internacionales que promueven y protegen los derechos humanos, y que tratan la imprescriptibilidad de aquellos crímenes, son objeto de análisis en la sección final, en donde exponemos algunas reflexiones finales a partir del caso Lubanga. (shrink)

The initial problem which motivated the writing of this thesis arose from reading of Emile by Rousseau. In this work, it was possible to detect the influence of different theoretical approaches, such as rationalism and empiricism, inspiring the development of the educational plan designed by Rousseau for his imaginary student (Emile). The very core question of the present thesis regards to whether there was a theory of knowledge pertaining to Rousseau’s philosophical thinking and, if so, how it was related to (...) his theories of education. In the set of his oeuvre, Rousseau’s affiliation to authors like Descartes, Leibniz, Locke and Malebranche, as well as Condillac, Diderot, D’Holbach and Helvétius was discovered. As the reading of the great philosophical work of Rousseau progressed, an original knowledge theory was discovered, of the kind which accepts the coexistence of opposite thoughts. Pedagogy, in the context of (the work) Emile, arose out of the miscellany of such theories and also for the intense philosophical maturing process on the core of Rousseau’s thinking. This study intended, therefore, to understand the origin and development of Rousseau’s theory of knowledge, and also to figure out how the philosopher formulated his theories on Education, especially in Emile. The object of this research, materialized through the extensive bibliography of the Swiss philosopher, was intensively read and analyzed. The methodology used was that of comparative, descriptive and critical documentary research of the mentioned authors. This research is divided into three sections: the first one intends to investigate the philosophical influence from different authors on the foundations of Rousseau’s epistemology; the second section addresses Rousseau’s theories of Education; the third and final part investigates the link between theory of knowledge and Education within Rousseau’s philosophical thought. -/- . (shrink)

The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.

Do moral beliefs motivate action? To answer this question, extant arguments have considered hypothetical cases of association (dissociation) between agents’ moral beliefs and actions. In this paper, I argue that this approach can be improved by studying people’s actual moral beliefs and actions using empirical research methods. I present three new studies showing that, when the stakes are high, associations between participants’ moral beliefs and actions are actually explained by co-occurring but independent moral emotions. These findings suggest that moral beliefs (...) themselves have little or no motivational force, supporting the Humean picture of moral motivation. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i.e. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather (...) by factors that are independent of consciousness. Whether people hold problem intuitions, and what factors drive those intuitions, are largely empirical questions. However, there is a lack of empirical research on these issues to date. The results of four studies will show that (1) problem intuitions are not widespread, and (2) when they arise, they do so because of factors that are unrelated to the nature of consciousness. This suggests that consciousness is, after all, not so problematic. (shrink)

ECONOMIA CRIATIVA: CONCEITO E RELAÇÃO COM O DIREITO.

Stephen Hetherington é um dos mais proeminentes epistemólogos a defender que é possível ter conhecimento segundo as condições de crença verdadeira e justificada, apesar dos contraexemplos elaborados por Edmund Gettier. Ele fundamentou sua perspectiva no pressuposto de falibilidade do conhecimento e naquilo que ele chamou de "falácia de contrafactuais epistêmicos", segundo a qual não se deve assumir impossibilidade do conhecimento factual apenas em virtude da sua impossibilidade contrafactual - o que é reiterado por Anthony Booth. As críticas apresentadas por Brent (...) Madison, John Turri e Duncan Prtichard apontaram para a relevância das suas ideias, mas também para o fato de que Hetherington ignorou que há diferentes tipos de sorte que podem interferir no processo de aquisição de conhecimento. Palavras-chave: Falácia de contrafactuais epistêmicos. Falibilismo. Infalibilismo. Sorte epistêmica. Stephen Hetherington. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 6, Page 60-62, June 2011.

At a time when ideas of crisis and critique are at the forefront of public discourse, this article seeks to understand moments of crisis vis-à-vis critique as a key feature of critical social theory. It addresses Jürgen Habermas’s strong claim that this relationship accounts for a ‘model of analysis’ concerned with grasping the ‘diremptions’ of social life. To elaborate this reading, the article pays attention to the main problems Habermas identifies in conventional ways of understanding the concepts of ‘crisis’ and (...) ‘critique’ in social theory. The aim is to examine the mode in which he reconsiders each of these terms and then reasserts the dialectical link between them. I reconstruct this relationship by taking as cases two of his most substantive works of social theorizing: The Theory of Communicative Action, and Between Facts and Norms. Based on this interpretation, I suggest that though Habermas contributes to resituating the practice of critique as a communicative translation of objective crisis, he does not adequately account for another key movement: when critique actually initiates, enacts and furthers the moment of crisis. (shrink)

Testimonial injustices occur when individuals from particular social groups are systematically and persistently given less credibility in their claims merely because of their group identity. Recent “pluralistic” approaches to folk psychology, by taking into account the role of stereotypes in how we understand others, have the power to explain how and why cases of testimonial injustice occur. If how we make sense of others’ behavior depends on assumptions about how individuals from certain groups think and act, this can explain why (...) speakers are given different degrees of credibility depending on their group identity. For example, if people assume that women are more emotional than men, they will systematically give less credibility to women’s claims. This explanation involves three empirical claims: people assume that women are more emotional than men, people assume that emotionality hinders credibility, and people give less credibility to women’s claims. While extant studies provide some support for and, no study to date has directly tested. In two different studies, we tested all these three claims. The results from both studies provide support for, as we found significant negative correlations between emotionality and credibility attributions. However, in contrast to what some accounts of folk psychology posit, we did not find any significant difference in people’s attributions of emotionality and credibility towards women versus men speakers. We hope that our studies here pave the way for further empirical studies testing the phenomenon of testimonial injustice in a context-sensitive way, in order to have a better understanding of the conditions in which testimonial injustices are likely to happen. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, pretendemos avaliar criticamente algumas das teses de John McDowellsobre a natureza da virtude, tal como expostas em seu artigo “Virtue and Reason” e, ao fazê-lo,expor algumas de suas limitações. Mais especificamente, tratarei o que vejo como problemas emsua apresentação da virtude como uma forma de conhecimento, e sua proposta – corporificada natese da unidade das virtudes – de que as virtudes comumente reconhecidas deveriam ser vistascomo manifestações parciais da virtude enquanto tal. Também enfocarei a assertiva de McDowellde que (...) o conhecimento que constitui a virtude não pode ser visto como tendo um conteúdoproposicional que se preste a uma codificação em princípios de conduta – a tese de nãocodificabilidade– e a relação da postura pessoal de McDowell com a empreitada mais ampla daética de virtudes. (shrink)