Arthur Schopenhauer (born 1788 in Danzig, died 1860 in Frankfurt am Main), was the son of Heinrich Floris Schopenhauer, a wealthy merchant, and Johanna Trosiener, who was later to become a well‐known member of Goethe's circle in Weimar and, subsequently, a popular novelist whose collected works, published in 1831, filled twenty‐four volumes. The death of his father (a probable suicide) in 1805 led to the future philosopher's ultimate abandonment of the plan that he should enter business. After further study, he (...) attended the University of Göttingen in 1809 where he studied with G. E. Schulze, whose Aenisidisumus (1796), with its critique of Kant's conception of the thing‐in‐itself, had played a crucial role in the early development of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. It was through Schulze that he became acquainted, not only with Kant, but with Plato and Schelling (see Hübscher 1989, pp. 159ff). The connection between Plato and Kant, a crucial thesis of his philosophy as a whole, is the subject of some of his earliest and most penetrating notebook entries (Schopenhauer 1988, vol. I, nos 17, 228, 442). Schopenhauer left Göttingen for Berlin to attend Fichte's lectures. Despite apparently serious attempts, testified by his voluminous notebooks (preserved in Schopenhauer 1988, vol. II), Schopenhauer found himself deeply out of sympathy with the Fichtean philosophy of reflection, and his distaste for German idealism, which only increased with the years, dates from this encounter. On the heels of Napoleon's invasion of Berlin, Schopenhauer retired to a small town outside of Weimar, where (June‐November 1813) he wrote his dissertation On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, whose simplification and transformation of the Kantian doctrine of the concepts of the understanding into a third “form of intuition” next to space and time forms the basis of his distinctive epistemology and its difference from Kant's. (This difference is most clearly expressed in §21; see also the “Critique of Kantian Philosophy”, the Appendix to The World as Will and Representation, vol. I, pp. 437–451). The “ideality of sensation” is the theme of On Vision and Colors, written in 1815 under the influence of his encounter with Goethe's Farbenlehre (a sympathy not reciprocated by Goethe for the younger man's contribution). At this time, Schopenhauer moved to Dresden, where for four years he worked out The World as Will and Representation in intellectual isolation. In addition to the dual influence of Plato and Kant, Schopenhauer had also been introduced to doctrines of Eastern religion by F. Meyer in Weimar (1813), and is often said to be the first Western philosopher seriously to incorporate Eastern thought into his system (see Schopenhauer 1988, vol. I, no. 564). The “work” is announced in a note that is even earlier, from 1813, which begins. (shrink)

The place of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in the history of contemporary thought and in that of the problematic of nihilism has been relatively unexplored, despite its well-known relation to Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, two of the dominant figures of contemporary philosophy and culture. “The Metaphysics of Nullity”, after an introductory section on the connection of German idealism and nihilism, examines Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and particularly its principle of “self-negation of the will”, as a nihilistic metaphysics that is an outgrowth of traditional conceptions of (...) desire and consciousness which becomes involved in the classical difficulties of self-reflection and self-manifestation. The incoherencies that beset Schopenhauer’s thought are fully examined and their implications are discussed. (shrink)

The place of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in the history of contemporary thought and in that of the problematic of nihilism has been relatively unexplored, despite its well-known relation to Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, two of the dominant figures of contemporary philosophy and culture. “The Metaphysics of Nullity”, after an introductory section on the connection of German idealism and nihilism, examines Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and particularly its principle of “self-negation of the will”, as a nihilistic metaphysics that is an outgrowth of traditional conceptions of (...) desire and consciousness which becomes involved in the classical difficulties of self-reflection and self-manifestation. The incoherencies that beset Schopenhauer’s thought are fully examined and their implications are discussed. (shrink)

DESCARTES IS USUALLY CREDITED WITH THE INAUGURATION of modern philosophy. This inauguration consists in a mathematical-mechanical understanding of physics and a concern with human self-consciousness. The Passions of the Soul treats, however, fleetingly, that being which can be regarded as both an object of the mathematical physicist and of the speculative philosopher—“de toute la nature de l’homme.” The peculiarity, if not uniqueness, of this subject, who is discontinuous with the rest of nature, implies that Descartes’ words in the preface—“mon dessein (...) n’a pas est d’expliquer les Passions en Orateur, ny mesme en Philosophe moral, mais seulement en Physicien”—cannot be wholly accurate, if only because man is not simply a physical being in the Cartesian sense. Cartesian physics does away with the final cause an explanation in physics: yet the final cause, the end, is fundamental to any discussion of desire, which is essentially futural, that is, goal directed or purposive. And it is only by virtue of desire that any action results from the passions of the soul. It is thus not simply efficient causation that regulates the activity of man taken as a whole: Descartes speaks of “le machine de nostre corps” but not of “la machine qui est l’homme.”. (shrink)

More than sixty years after its first publication in Germany in 1935 by its then emigré author, and more than thirty-five years after its republication in Germany by an author who had returned via Italy, Japan, and the United States, Löwith’s classic study has finally been translated into English. His work thus joins that of Karl Jaspers and of his teacher, Martin Heidegger, all central interpretations of Nietzsche’s work written by his compatriots during the decade that witnessed the collapse which (...) his works so insistently and uncannily prophesied, if not encouraged. It is thus not merely an important interpretation, but itself part of our fast-closing century’s intellectual history. Löwith’s view of Nietzsche as the philosopher who undertakes “the anti-Christian repetition of antiquity on the peak of modernity” or who attempts to overcome nihilism by affirming an “eternally recurring existence amidst the naturelike world of all that is”, has in fact been accessible to readers before the translation of the present book. It figures prominently in From Hegel to Nietzsche, and in Meaning in History whose final section is entitled “Nietzsche’s Revival of the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence.” Although the main lines of Löwith’s interpretation have not changed, there is no denying the value of having his detailed interpretation finally available to English readers. The work’s lengthy third chapter, “The Unifying Fundamental Idea in Nietzsche’s Philosophy,” is its indispensable core, detailing the eternal recurrence as the fundamental idea of Nietzsche’s philosophy through an analysis of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and outlining two conflicting interpretations of this idea, the “anthropological”, with its focus on “willing the idea,” and the “cosmological”, where the idea reintegrates humanity into an ever-recurring world indifferent to its projects. The two chapters preceding it characterize Nietzsche’s philosophical discourse as a paradoxical “system in aphorisms” ; and present the familiar tripartite periodicization of Nietzsche’s philosophy, with Zarathustra as the apogee. The chapters that follow it do not have quite the unity or philosophical penetration of the first three. Chapter 4 concerns itself with the relation of Nietzsche’s rejection of Christianity to his affirmation of a Greek and specifically Heraclitean nature. Chapter 5 discusses the way in which the problems of history and fate and freedom and necessity are dealt with in some of Nietzsche’s early writings, laying the groundwork for the problem of “willing necessity” that seems present in the eternal recurrence. In the following chapter we are presented with a history of modern philosophy from Descartes to Marx as a history of the “loss of the world” by a humanity lost in the “desert of its freedom”. We are then offered, in the seventh chapter, a detailed analysis of Kierkegaard’s conception of “repetition” and Otto Weininger’s ethical conception of “recollection” as alternatives to Nietzsche’s conception of eternal recurrence. It is not at all clear that this last maintains its interest sixty years later, and the same doubt arises regarding several, though certainly not all of the books reviewed in his Appendix, “On the History of the Interpretation of Nietzsche ”. The work’s final chapter, “The Critical Yardstick for Nietzsche’s Experiments,” summarizes the significance of Nietzsche’s project as a “return to nature,” to the “physis of the world,” once the metaphysical God is gone as a support for any teaching about man. Löwith concedes that Nietzsche failed fully to separate himself from the Christianity that haunted him as a negation, but implies that his program, determined by the fact that “he decided against God and for the world”, is of enduring significance. (shrink)

Jonathan Lear, member of the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago, psychoanalyst, and author of works on Aristotle’s logic and epistemology and a philosophical interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis, has compiled a collection of 12 essays, all but three previously published, reflective of his varied training and talents. The essays themselves range from a piece in The New Republic on the “Freud-bashing” that led to the cancellation of the Library of Congress’s exhibition “Sigmund Freud: Conflict and Culture” late (...) in 1995 to fairly technical pieces written for the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Phronesis, and the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Original dates of publication range widely as well, from 1984 to 1996, and would seem to mark the author’s intellectual pilgrimage, outlined in his Preface: from the preserves of analytic philosophy, often identified by him with professional philosophy simpliciter, to the more “open-minded” concern with the history of philosophy and Freudian psychoanalysis. He contrasts his own concern with the Platonic problem, “giving a logos of the psyche” or “working out the logic of the soul,” to the computationism of modern psychology departments and to “ersatz philosophy.” Ersatz philosophy is exemplified, in his interpretation by Oedipus’ thoughtless, self-oblivious argumentation which, according to a footnote, may count its “modern descendants in verificationism, Popperianism, ordinary-language philosophy”. In a passage that explains the book’s title, Lear affirms the truth that he believes Socrates’ life represented: “that we have the capacity to be open minded: the capacity to live nondefensively with the question of how to live”. (shrink)

This book consists of ten chapters, an Introduction, and an Appendix. Of these twelve sections, eight have appeared previously. Although in the Acknowledgments he writes that "the essays have been revised for publication in this volume," the Introduction is more honest when it admits the failure of his "original plan... to rewrite essays in order to relate a coherent narrative". The disdain for coherence and narrative unity is of course part of what Bernstein calls the "'modern/postmodern' Stimmung", and the title's (...) use of composite terms, as well as the guiding concepts of "constellation" and "force-field" borrowed from the Frankfurt School via Martin Jay demonstrate the author's attempts at a sympathetic engagement with a direction of thought that is obviously at odds with his deepest philosophical impulses. Viewed as a whole, the book bears a strong resemblance to the The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity of Habermas, a philosopher with whose work Bernstein has long been identified and who is prominently mentioned in the Acknowledgments. Three introductory chapters precede a chapter on Heidegger in which a lengthy and sympathetic textual discussion is followed by a shorter, harsh judgment of Heidegger's silence concerning the criminality of the National Socialist regime, and of the connection of this ethical failure with his philosophy. Bernstein follows, as does Habermas, with chapters on Foucault and Derrida, in addition to one on the Derrida-Habermas controversy itself which arose from the publication of Habermas's book. Rather than treating Bataille, Bernstein devotes two chapters to the political implications of Richard Rorty's recent writings, and Bernstein also concludes with two chapters on his own position, the first proposing a rehabilitation of determinate negation, and the second outlining his pragmatic "engaged fallibilistic pluralism" based on a "model of dialogical encounter". Nietzsche, for Habermas the "turning point" of modernity, is thematically absent from Bernstein's book. This is emblematic of the collection as a whole, robbing postmodernism of its philosophical point and encouraging treatment of it as a "pervasive, amorphous mood". The thrust of Bernstein's analysis is less theoretical than Habermas's though often dependent on Habermas's conclusions. Replacing his previous focus on praxis with one on ethos, Bernstein is especially concerned with ethical and political implications of the positions he examines. The level of Bernstein's ethical-political "analysis," however, is concrete in what often seems to be an arbitrary way. He is indulgent of Foucault and Derrida, but Rorty is warned about his similarity to "neo-conservatives" and "[Daniel] Bell and his fellow travelers". Nothing is said about Derrida's ambiguous apologias for Heidegger and Paul de Man as exercises in the ethics of deconstruction. Bernstein notes similarities between Rorty's irony and Mussolini's cynicism, but is silent about Foucault's advocacy of Khomeini's Islamic revolution. Perhaps most bizarrely, Bernstein notes at the beginning of chapter 4 that "throughout his writings, Heidegger typically uses masculine forms of speech. To avoid artificiality, I have followed his usage". Needless to say, this "usage" is not "typical" only of Heidegger. The question of the ethical and political implications of postmodernism is certainly a deeply significant one. But this is philosophy that is "political" in a way that many will find repugnant as well as unedifying. Despite all talk of a "new constellation" and "openness to the Other," many--not only those who are familiar with Bernstein's previous publications--who sit down with this book will find themselves faced with the same old thing.--Robert Rethy, Xavier University. (shrink)