Through statistical analysis of datasets describing single cell shape following systematic gene depletion, we have found that the morphological landscapes explored by cells are composed of a small number of attractor states. We propose that the topology of these landscapes is in large part determined by cell‐intrinsic factors, such as biophysical constraints on cytoskeletal organization, and reflects different stable signaling and/or transcriptional states. Cell‐extrinsic factors act to determine how cells explore these landscapes, and the topology of the landscapes themselves. Informational (...) stimuli primarily drive transitions between stable states by engaging signaling networks, while mechanical stimuli tune, or even radically alter, the topology of these landscapes. As environments fluctuate, the topology of morphological landscapes explored by cells dynamically adapts to these fluctuations. Finally we hypothesize how complex cellular and tissue morphologies can be generated from a limited number of simple cell shapes. (shrink)

Das primäre Ziel dieses Open-Access-Buches besteht in der Entwicklung einer Theorie pluraler epistemischer Autoritäten. Epistemische Autoritäten spielen in unserer durch Spezialisierung geprägten und hochgradig arbeitsteilig organisierten modernen "Informations-" oder "Wissensgesellschaft" eine zentrale Rolle. Die Philosophie hat diesem Umstand in den letzten Jahren durch eine zunehmend intensive Diskussion Rechnung getragen. Ein entscheidendes Defizit dieser Debatte besteht nach Diagnose des Autors allerdings darin, dass sie sich fast ausschließlich auf individuelle epistemische Autoritäten konzentriert hat. In unserer epistemischen Praxis sind plurale epistemische Autoritäten - (...) d.h. wissenschaftliche Gemeinschaften, Expertengremien, Geschworenenjurys usw. - aber mindestens genauso bedeutsam. Wir berufen uns auf "wissenschaftlichen Konsens", orientieren uns an "herrschenden Meinungen" usw. und stützen uns damit auf plurale epistemische Autoritäten. Das Buch möchte die Potentiale, aber auch die Herausforderungen und Fallstricke analysieren, die diese Praxis des Sich-Stützens auf plurale epistemische Autoritäten mit sich bringt. Der Autor Rico Hauswald ist Privatdozent am Institut für Philosophie der TU Dresden und Teilprojektleiter im BMBF-geförderten interdisziplinären Forschungsvorhaben "Verantwortungsvoller Umgang mit künstlicher Intelligenz in der Medizin". Arbeitsschwerpunkte liegen u. a. in der Wissenschafts-, Erkenntnis- und Medizintheorie. (shrink)

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to explain cross-cultural differences in online self-disclosure between Indonesians, who live in a highly collectivist culture, and Poles – a hierarchical individualist culture. Various psychological factors have been taken into consideration, such as the need for popularity, the need to belong and self-esteem. Design/methodology/approach – This study was designed as a quantitative study. First, a one-way ANOVA was performed to compare online SD and specific behaviours online between Indonesians and Poles. Second, correlational (...) analysis between online SD and other psychological factors was conducted. Findings – Indonesians were more likely than Poles to disclose information on Facebook. On the other hand, Poles showed a tendency to disclose more positive content than Indonesians. It was also found that SE was significantly correlated with positive content of online SD for both countries. Furthermore, online SD on Facebook is more closely associated with NfP than NtB. Research limitations/implications – This study possesses several limitations in regard to the lack of generalization; this is due to the choice in scales and the sampling procedure. Thereby, further studies must take into consideration the proportion of genders, the differences in the construction of the “self” between individualist and collectivist cultures and the interpretation of culture orientation based on the primary data. Furthermore, several results related to the online SD would need to be verified by further studies to get a holistic explanation. Originality/value – The current research is for all means and purposes original, as it investigates the differences of online behaviours between cultures – Polish and Indonesian – basing on the premise that there are crucial differences between collectivist and individualist cultures. No prior articles attempted the comparison between those nationalities in online behaviour. (shrink)

This essay focuses on how we embody the language we speak: how an audience "reads" the body of a speaker as it both constructs the positionality of that speaking subject and construes that subject's discursive authority. Building on the work of Linda Brodkey and Michelle Fine, I explore what is at stake when university students harass a faculty member by accusing that teacher of not embodying authority in the proper form (body).

Drawing on the relevant alternatives framework and Mary Kate McGowan’s work on conversational scorekeeping, I argue that usage of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ in ordinary language and public discourse typically entails the performance of what I call a dismissive conversational exercitive, a kind of speech act that functions to exclude certain propositions from (or prevent their inclusion in) the set of alternatives considered relevant in a given conversational context. While it can be legitimate to perform dismissive conversational exercitives, excluding alternatives (...) that deserve to be taken seriously can be highly problematic for a variety of reasons. For one, it can give rise to what I call the problem of premature conclusions when subjects illegitimately dismiss certain propositions as irrelevant and, as a result, prematurely take certain conclusions or claims to be warranted. Depending on the kind of conclusion or claim, the problem can come in different variants, three of which I shall examine in more detail: the problem of premature knowledge claims, the problem of premature causal claims, and the problem of premature generic generalizations. (shrink)

The objective of the present research was two-fold: to provide a new definition of ethical competence, and to clarify the influence of empathy, personal values, and the five-factor model of personality on ethical competence. The present research provides a comprehensive overview about recent approaches and empirically explores the interconnections of these constructs. 366 German undergraduate students were examined in a cross-sectional study that investigated the relationship of empathy, personal values, and the five-factor model of personality with moral judgment competence and (...) counterproductive work behavior as indicators of moral judgment and behavior. We found self-transcendence values to be related to both, high levels of empathy and ethical competence, in contrast to self-enhancement values. Multiple mediation analysis revealed unique effects of empathy on ethical competence through values as mediators. Affective empathy transmitted its effect on ethical competence through benevolence, conformity, tradition, power, and hedonism. Most importantly, perspective taking lost its predictive power when investigated alongside affective empathy dimensions. These results converge to an important role of affective empathy, in particular empathic concern, with regard to personal values and ethical competence. Furthermore, the five-factor model of personality explained variance in measures of ethical competence. Our research suggests that organizational decision makers should consider the role of empathy, personal values, and the five-factor model in their human resource management in order to select employees with high ethical competence. (shrink)

El espacio humano.--Los sentidos del alma.--Estudio sobre la metáfora.--La memoria en la conciencia mítica.--La danza de Civa.--Sinopsis sobre el tema del tiempo.

Pyrrhonian skepticism is usually understood as a form of quietism, since it is supposed to bring us back to where we were in our everyday lives before we got disturbed by philosophical questions. Similarly, the ‘therapeutic’ and ‘resolute’ readings of Wittgenstein claim that Wittgenstein’s ‘philosophical practice’ results in the dissolution of the corresponding philosophical problems and brings us back to our everyday life. Accordingly, Wittgenstein is often linked to Pyrrhonism and classified as a quietist. Against this reading, I will employ (...) Laurie Paul’s notion of epistemically transformative experience and argue that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be interpreted as a philosophical practice that changes our self-understanding in significant ways. I will argue that this practice can evoke transformative experiences and is thereby able to yield a non-propositional insight into the finitude of the human condition. This shows that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy go beyond quietism. (shrink)

Since antiquity, philosophy has aimed not only at theoretical insight, but also at personal development and transformation. This implies a new relationship to the self and the world, which can result, for example, from existential experiences triggered by the engagement with philosophical problems. Drawing on the examples of facticity and scepticism, this paper develops the thesis that transformative philosophical experience and a corresponding new view of the world can be accompanied by a new understanding of the philosophical problem that triggered (...) the experience. This would involve a non-propositional form of knowledge that is more than practical or phenomenal knowledge. A precise model of such a form of non-propositional insight could shed new light on the transformative dimension of philosophy and, with respect to, e. g., facticity and scepticism, provide a better understanding of limits of knowledge. (shrink)

Cantor argued that absolute infinity is beyond mathematical comprehension. His arguments imply that the domain of mathematics cannot be grasped by mathematical means. We argue that this inability constitutes a foundational problem. For Cantor, however, the domain of mathematics does not belong to mathematics, but to theology. We thus discuss the theological significance of Cantor’s treatment of absolute infinity and show that it can be interpreted in terms of negative theology. Proceeding from this interpretation, we refer to the recent debate (...) on absolute generality and argue that the method of diagonalization constitutes a modern version of the vianegativa. On our reading, negative theology can evoke an attitude of humility with respect to the boundedness of the human condition. Along these lines, we think that the foundational problem of mathematics concerning its domain can be addressed through a methodological attitude of humility. (shrink)

In this paper, I clarify Descartes’s account of belief, in general, and of judgment, in particular. Then, drawing upon this clarification, I explain the type of direct doxastic voluntarism that he endorses. In particular, I attempt to demonstrate two claims. First, I argue that there is strong textual evidence that, on Descartes’s account, people have the ability to suspend, or to withhold, judgment directly by an act will. Second, I argue that there is weak and inconclusive textual evidence that, on (...) his account, people have the ability to form a judgment directly by an act will. I conclude by suggestion that understanding the position Descartes actually endorses (which I call ‘negative direct doxastic voluntarism’) has implications, more broadly, for contemporary participants in the doxastic voluntarism debate. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Hume’s account of sympathy is substantially unchanged from the Treatise to the second Enquiry. I show that Hume uses the term ‘sympathy’ to refer to three different mental phenomena (a psychological mechanism or principle, a sentiment, and a conversion process) and that he consistently refers to sympathy as a cause of benevolent motivation. I attempt to resolve an apparent difficulty regarding sympathy and humanity by explaining how each is an ‘original principle’ in Hume’s sense. (...) I conclude by suggesting how my interpretation might make a contemporary evaluation of Hume’s account of benevolent motivation possible. (shrink)

The distinction between institution types and institution tokens plays an important role in Francesco Guala’s philosophy of institutions. In this commentary, I argue that this distinction faces a number of difficulties that are not sufficiently addressed in Understanding Institutions. In particular, I critically discuss Guala’s comparison between the taxonomy of organisms and the taxonomy of institutions, consider the semantics of institution terms on different levels in this taxonomy, and argue for an alternative solution to the problem of how to reconcile (...) reformism and realism about institutions like marriage. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to explain Hume’s account of the way both the scope and the degree of benevolent motivation is limited. I argue (i) that Hume consistently affirms, both in the Treatise and in the second Enquiry, that the scope of benevolent motivation is very broad, such that it includes any creature that is conscious and capable of thought, and (ii) that the degree of benevolent motivation is limited, such that a person is naturally inclined to feel (...) benevolence more strongly for one with whom he or she has a ‘connexion’—e.g., a family member or friend. (shrink)

Mit dem Begriff der Theoriennachbarschaft und einer darauf aufbauenden neuen Definition von Reduktion ermöglicht diese Arbeit eine angemessene Beschreibung und Einteilung der vielen diffizilen Beziehungen zwischen physikalischen Theorien. Mithilfe dieser Konzepte wird in drei Fallstudien exemplarisch gezeigt, dass moderne physikalische Theorien zwar meist benachbart zueinander sind, aber nicht so aufeinander reduzierbar, dass eine reduzierte Theorie für die wissenschaftliche Beschreibung der Welt entbehrlich wäre. Die Einheit der Physik kann daher nicht auf eliminativen Reduktionen auf fundamentale Theorien beruhen, lässt sich aber dennoch (...) mit zahlreichen Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen begründen. (shrink)

I examine situations in which we say that different subjects have ‘different’, ‘competing’, or ‘conflicting understandings’ of a phenomenon. In order to make sense of such situations, we should turn our attention to an often neglected ambiguity in the word ‘understanding’. Whereas the notion of understanding that is typically discussed in philosophy is, to use Elgin’s terms, tethered to the facts, there is another notion of understanding that is not tethered in the same way. This latter notion is relevant because, (...) typically, talk of two subjects having ‘different’, ‘competing’, or ‘conflicting understandings’ of a phenomenon does not entail any commitment to the proposition that these subjects understand the phenomenon in the tethered sense of the word. This paper aims, first, to analyze the non-tethered notion of understanding, second, to clarify its relationship to the tethered notion, third, to explore what exactly goes on when ‘different’, ‘competing’, or ‘conflicting understandings’ clash and, fourth, to discuss the significance of such situations in our epistemic practices. In particular, I argue for a version of scientific pluralism according to which such situations are important because they help scientific communities achieve their fundamental epistemic goals—most importantly, the goal of understanding the world in the tethered sense. (shrink)

According to preemptionism, a layperson should treat the fact that an epistemic authority believes p as a reason to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. Many authors have found the unqualified version of preemptionism, as defended by Linda Zagzebski, too strong. At the same time, a number of them have recently advocated weakened or qualified preemptionist accounts. In this paper, I criticise these accounts. I argue that some of (...) them cannot explain the possibility of rational persistent disagreements between laypeople and epistemic authorities, while those that can explain it fail to account either for the extent to which justification is a holistic phenomenon or for the role of what I call ‘control reasons’ in the laypeople's epistemic conduct. (shrink)

This introduction highlights two of Mondzain's contributions in the chapter reproduced here, “Iconic Space and the Rule of Lands.” The first is her discussion of a link between images and power, which stresses the formal characteristics of paintings rather than their narratives. The second is her examination of the specific task which representation is called on to perform in religious as opposed to secular contexts, where spiritual, otherworldly figures are given physical shape and form.

According to Kant's most important definition an analytic judgement obtains when the predicate of a judgement is already contained intensionally in the subject. It has been objected (most recently by Robert Hanna) that whereas this containment is a sufficient criterion, nevertheless there are analytic judgements that do not have a corresponding conceptual content. In these cases one needs to add an extensional criterion. The chief goal of this essay is to examine this argument critically and to reject it on the (...) grounds that although an analytic judgement can be defined extensionally, this does not achieve anything more than a conventional intensional definition. To this end Kant's argumentation on intension and extension will be reconstructed and this distinction will then be set in relation to the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. This discussion requires especially a clarification of the role of modality. (shrink)

My aim, in this chapter, is to outline the key details of this particularly interesting aspect of Hume's philosophical system. My presentation will be threefold. In the first section of the paper, I will elucidate the nature of sympathy, drawing upon some of the more recent ways in which Hume's commentators have attempted to resolve the interpretive puzzles Hume's works present. In the second section, I will explicate some of the functions sympathy has in Hume's philosophy, including not only three (...) that have been particularly prominent in the secondary literature, but also two others that have received considerably less attention. In the final section, I will summarize Hume's account of the nature and functions of sympathy and briefly suggest some of the ways in which these aspects of Hume's moral psychology seem to be supported by contemporary psychological research. (shrink)

Doxastic voluntarism is the philosophical doctrine according to which people have voluntary control over their beliefs. Philosophers in the debate about doxastic voluntarism distinguish between two kinds of voluntary control. The first is known as direct voluntary control and refers to acts which are such that if a person chooses to perform them, they happen immediately. For instance, a person has direct voluntary control over whether he or she is thinking about his or her favorite song at a given moment. (...) The second is known as indirect voluntary control and refers to acts which are such that although a person lacks direct voluntary control over them, he or she can cause them to happen if he or she chooses to perform some number of other, intermediate actions. For instance, a person untrained in music has indirect voluntary control over whether he or she will play a melody on a violin. Corresponding to this distinction between two kinds of voluntary control, philosophers distinguish between two kinds of doxastic voluntarism. Direct doxastic voluntarism claims that people have direct voluntary control over at least some of their beliefs. Indirect doxastic voluntarism, however, supposes that people have indirect voluntary control over at least some of their beliefs, for example, by doing research and evaluating evidence. This article offers an introductory explanation of the nature of belief, the nature of voluntary control, the reasons for the consensus regarding indirect doxastic voluntarism, the reasons for the disagreements regarding direct doxastic voluntarism, and the practical implications for the debate about doxastic voluntarism in ethics, epistemology, political theory, and the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

In this fine collection, Bob Dylan at 80, Gary Browning and Constantine Sandis have curated a book which is Janus-faced. It develops a simple premise, to reflect on the career of Dylan and the mult...

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 67 Heft: 3 Seiten: 373-391.

‘Het Goede als het Oneindige heeft geen ander ; niet omdat het zelf alles zou zijn, maar omdat het het Goede is en omdat niets aan zijn goedheid ontsnapt’ .In dit artikel wordt nagegaan hoe zich bij Levinas ethiek tot mystiek verhoudt. Anders dan de apert antimystieke uitspraken van Levinas suggereren, is deze verhouding complexer dan op het eerste gezicht lijkt.

“God beyond Being”: the vertigo of Marion’s famous phrase entails serious questions. Aiming at piety and respect as to God’s alterity, it seems to end in a hazardous neglect of incarnation. Is it ‘Jewish’ thinking that has to remind a ‘Christian’ thinker of incarnational necessity? First, attention is drawn towards Marion’s critique of Heidegger and his rejection of the Heideggerian condition imposed upon divine Revelation: the condition of having to give in to ontological difference. Next, Marion’s critique of Derrida is (...) subjected to a more detailed study. The author attempts to make clear that, according to Marion, Derrida, while pretending to go behind Heideggerian ontological difference, falls back behind it. The Derridean concept of différance, says Marion, might be seen as just a contemporary figure of an underlying, more fundamental, ontological difference. Finally, a Derridean stance is adopted in a formulation of some serious questions as to Marion’s theo-phenomenological project itself. In particular, it is asked whether Marion’s project avoids what will be termed an ‘incarnational’ necessity, imposed by philosophical rigour and also inscribed within the Christian tradition. (shrink)