Theories of rational decision making often abstract away from computational and other resource limitations faced by real agents. An alternative approach known as resource rationality puts such matters front and center, grounding choice and decision in the rational use of finite resources. Anticipated by earlier work in economics and in computer science, this approach has recently seen rapid development and application in the cognitive sciences. Here, the theory of rationality plays a dual role, both as a (...) framework for normative assessment and as a source of scientific hypotheses about how mental processes in fact work. The latter project, often called rational analysis, depends for its success on a fine-grained characterization of the computational problem facing a decision maker, which may in turn depend on realistic assumptions about what the relevant agent is like. As a consequence, resource rationality involves a delicate, but often fruitful interplay between the normative and the descriptive. (shrink)

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 528-549, July 2022.

Lieder and Griffiths introduce resource-rational analysis as a methodological device for the empirical study of the mind. But they also suggest resource-rationality serves as a normative standard to reassess the limits and scope of human rationality. Although the methodological status of resource-rational analysis is convincing, its normative status is not.

How much would you pay to play a lottery with an “infinite expected payoff?” In the case of the century old, St. Petersburg Paradox, the answer is that the vast majority of people would only pay a small amount. The authors seek to understand this paradox by providing an explanation consistent with a broad, process‐level model of human decision‐making under risk.

This paper stems from the current global worsening of the scarcity of resources for healthcare, which will deepen even more in future public emergencies. This justifies strengthening the reflection on the allocation of resources which, in addition to considering technical issues, should also involve ethical concerns. The two plans in which the allocation of resources develops—macro and micro—are then systematized, both requiring the identification of ethical criteria for the respective complex decision-making. Then, we describe how the complexity at the macro (...) level focuses on the joint consideration of the rectitude of the principles, the goodness of the ends, and the integrity—respectively the deontological, teleological, and procedural perspectives; and at the micro level, it focuses in prioritizing people, which can result in the exclusion of some, as happened with the elderly during peaks of COVID-19. The main objective of this article is to show that, in public health emergency situations, in which the daily criteria for prioritizing access to health care are not efficient, it is possible not only to ration the available means but also to rationalize them. We argue that rationing and rationalization are different concepts, entail different consequences, have different ethical foundations, and draw different guidelines for patient care. We apply them to the distribution of intensive care and vaccines to the elderly thus demonstrating the ethically legitimate domain of implementation of each of these two prioritization criteria. We conclude that rationalization respects more strictly the core ethical principles of our common morality. (shrink)

Marr's levels of analysis—computational, algorithmic, and implementation—have served cognitive science well over the last 30 years. But the recent increase in the popularity of the computational level raises a new challenge: How do we begin to relate models at different levels of analysis? We propose that it is possible to define levels of analysis that lie between the computational and the algorithmic, providing a way to build a bridge between computational- and algorithmic-level models. The key idea is to push the (...) notion of rationality, often used in defining computational-level models, deeper toward the algorithmic level. We offer a simple recipe for reverse-engineering the mind's cognitive strategies by deriving optimal algorithms for a series of increasingly more realistic abstract computational architectures, which we call “resource-rational analysis.”. (shrink)

Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” effects where the mind updates in a direction opposite the one it should? We present two phenomena — belief polarization and the size-weight illusion — that are not obviously explained by performance- or resource-based constraints, nor by the authors’ brief discussion of reference repulsion. Can resource rationality accommodate them?

. This work will be useful to all who wonder what to do about the largely negative results of postmodern thought.Ó ÑJoseph C. Flay The Resources of Rationality addresses the postmodernist assault on the claim of reason and develops a ...

Driven by interests in workforce planning and patient safety, a growing body of literature has begun to identify the reality and the prevalence of missed nursing care, also specified as care left undone, rationed care or unfinished care. Empirical studies and conceptual considerations have focused on structural issues such as staffing, as well as on outcome issues – missed care/unfinished care. Philosophical and ethical aspects of unfinished care are largely unexplored. Thus, while internationally studies highlight instances of covert rationing/missed care/care (...) left undone – suggesting that nurses, in certain contexts, are actively engaged in rationing care – in terms of the nursing and nursing ethics literature, there appears to be a dearth of explicit decision-making frameworks within which to consider rationing of nursing care. In reality, the assumption of policy makers and health service managers is that nurses will continue to provide full care – despite reducing staffing levels and increased patient turnover, dependency and complexity of care. Often, it would appear that rationing/missed care/nursing care left undone is a direct response to overwhelming demands on the nursing resource in specific contexts. A discussion of resource allocation and rationing in nursing therefore seems timely. The aim of this discussion paper is to consider the ethical dimension of issues of resource allocation and rationing as they relate to nursing care and the distribution of the nursing resource. (shrink)

Budgets of governments and private insurances are limited. Not all drugs and services that appear beneficial to patients or physicians can be covered. Is there a core set of benefits that everyone should be entitled to? If so, how should this set be determined? Are fair decisions just impossible, if we know from the outset than not all needs can be met? While early work in bioethics has focused on clinical issues and a narrow set of principles, in recent years (...) there has been a marked shift towards addressing broader population-level issues, requiring consideration of more demanding theories in philosophy, political science, and economics. At the heart of bioethics' new orientation is the goal of clarity on a complex set of questions in rationing and resource allocation. Rationing and Resource Allocation in Healthcare: Essential Readings provides key excerpts from seminal and pertinent texts and case studies about these topics, contextualized by original introductions. The volume is divided into three broad sections: Conceptual Distinctions and Ethical Theory; Rationing; and Resource Allocation. Containing the most important and classic articles surrounding the theoretical and practical issues related to rationing and how to allocate scare medical resources, this collection aims to assist and inform those who wish to be a part of bioethics' 21st century shift including practitioners and policy-makers, and students and scholars in the health sciences, philosophy, law, and medical ethics. (shrink)

Public health interventions, particularly in low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMICs), are implemented with the never‐ending challenge of limited resources and the ever‐present challenge of choosing between interventions. While necessary, the application of ethical analysis is absent in most of such decision‐making, resulting in fewer favourable consequences. In applying ethical principles to the saving of women from the burden of cervical cancer, I argue in favour of saving statistical lives (investing in prevention) in LMICs, by mapping the principles of justice in (...) resource allocation to the prevailing circumstance. The key facts in this circumstance are that providing treatment (which is saving identified lives), involves mostly providing palliative treatment, which is associated with a high likelihood of death among the identified lives while undergoing treatment or shortly thereafter. I focus on the dilemma of having a national cancer prevention program versus the expansion of cancer treatment facilities. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to construct an implementable theory of rational decision-making for cognitive agents subject to realistic resource constraints. It is argued that decision-making should select actions indirectly by selecting plans that prescribe them. It is also argued that although expected values provide the tool for evaluating plans, plans cannot be compared straightforwardly in terms of their expected values, and the objective of a realistic agent cannot be to find optimal plans. The theory of Locally Global (...) planning is proposed as a realistic alternative to standard "maximizing" theories of rational decision-making. (shrink)

In an article titled, "Who Shall Live When Not All Can?", James Childress proposes a system for allocating scarce lifesaving medical resources based on random selection procedures. Childress writes of random selection procedures, [They] "cannot be dismissed as a ‘non-rational’ and ‘non-human’... without an inquiry into the reasons, including human values which might justify it." My thesis is that once we concentrate on determining the rationality of random selection procedures, we will see that Childress's claim that we cannot dismiss (...) such procedures as ‘non-rational’ is open to question. My claim will be that while both random selection and social worth procedures are rationally defensible systems, random selection procedures easily lead to specific choices that are objectively irrational, apart from the limited perspective of the random selection process itself. Keywords: allocation, random selection, rationality, rational decision-making, scarce resources, social worth CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This paper examines the law relating to healthcare resource allocation in England. The National Health Service Act 1977 does not impose an absolute duty to provide specified healthcare services. The courts will only interfere with a resource allocation decision made by an NHS body if that decision is frankly irrational is engaged). Such irrationality is very difficult to establish. The ECHR has made no significant contribution to domestic English law in the arena of healthcare provision. The decision of (...) the European Court in the Yvonne Watts case establishes that, in relation to the question of entitlement to seek treatment abroad at the expense of the NHS, a clinical judgment about the urgency of treatment trumps an administrative decision about waiting list targets. That decision goes against the grain of domestic law about healthcare allocation, but is not likely to have wide ramifications in domestic law. (shrink)

Issues of resource allocationResource allocation, triageTriage, and rationingRationing decisions are common in the context of disasters and public healthPublic health emergencies, such as pandemics. However, to date, the majorityMajority of the literature focuses on an adult population with very little attention given to a pediatric population or to a population that may be mixed: adults and children. Furthermore, decisions of rationingRationing scarce resources do not only occur during disasters and other wide-scale emergencies. Such decisions are commonplace in pediatric organ (...) transplantation and can creep into areas of experimental medicine, such as xenotransplantation. This chapter explicates differences between pediatric and adult triageTriage decisions by first looking at the trifold issues of resource allocationResource allocation, triageTriage, and rationingRationing decisions mainly in the context of a disaster situation or public healthPublic health emergency. However, the issues of pediatric organ transplantation, health disparitiesHealth disparities, and experimental medicine will also be covered. (shrink)

Robert Fogelin argued that the efficacy of our acts of reasons-giving depends on the normalcy of our discourse—to the extent that discourse is not normal disagreements occurring in it are deep; and to the extent that disagreements are deep, they are not susceptible to rational resolution. Against this, Maurice Finocchiaro argues that meta-argumentation can contribute to the rational resolution of disagreements having depth. Drawing upon a competency view of reasons-giving, this article conducts an inventory and audit of meta-argumentation’s resolution resources (...) for disagreements having depth. It concludes that, because Finocchiaro mischaracterizes the relationship between meta-argumentation and normalcy in the underlying discourse, he systematically overstates the rational resolution value of meta-argumentation. To the extent that meta-argumentation can contribute to the rational resolution of disagreements, those disagreements are normal, not deep. According to the competency view, the only way to resolve depth in disagreement is to first re-establish its normalcy. (shrink)

Rationing is the allocation of a good under conditions of scarcity, which necessarily implies that some who want and could be benefitted by that good will not receive it. One reflection of our ambivalence towards health care rationing is reflected in our resistance to having it distributed in a market like most other goods—most Americans reject ability to pay as the basis for distributing health care. They do not view health care as just another commodity to be distributed by markets. (...) Despite this widespread view, we are the only developed country without some form of universal health insurance, and so for the 46 million Americans without health insurance their access to health care often does depend on their ability to pay for it. Rationing largely remains a topic that the public, their elected leaders, and many health care professionals prefer to avoid. Ever-growing costs of health care will increasingly force the practice and issue of health care resource prioritization and rationing into the open for public, professional, and political attention. This paper explores some of the features of those practices and issues that make them especially ethically and politically difficult. Those issues will not be easily resolved, but avoiding them will not avoid the need or reality of rationing, it will only mean that it will go on covertly and unexamined. That will lead neither to better or more legitimate prioritization and rationing decisions. (shrink)

Resource constraints in developing countries compel policy makers to ration the provision of healthcare services. This article examines one such set of Guidelines: A patient dialysing in the state sector in South Africa may not refuse renal transplantation when a kidney becomes available. Refusal of transplantation can lead to exclusion from the state-funded dialysis programme. This Guideline is legally acceptable as related to Constitutional stipulations which allow for rationing healthcare resources in South Africa. Evaluating the ethical merit of the (...) Guideline, and exploring the ethical dilemma it poses, proves a more complex task. We examine the actions of healthcare professionals as constrained by the Guideline. From a best interests framework, we argue that in these circumstances directing patient decision making is not necessarily unethical or unacceptably paternalistic. We then scrutinise the guideline itself through several different ethical ‘lenses’. Here, we argue that bioethics does not provide a definitive answer as to the moral merit of rationing dialysis under these circumstances, however it can be considered just in this context. We conclude by examining a potential pitfall of the Guideline: Unwilling transplant recipients may not comply with immunosuppressive medication, which raises questions for policies based on resource management and rationing. (shrink)

With a global commitment to scaling up AIDS care and treatment in resource-poor settings for some of the most HIV-affected countries in Africa, availability of antiretroviral treatment is no longer the principal obstacle to expanding access to treatment. A shortage of trained healthcare personnel to initiate treatment and manage patients represents a more challenging barrier to offering life-saving treatment to all patients in need. Physician-centered treatment policies accentuate this challenge. Despite evidence that task shifting for nurse-centered AIDS patient care (...) is effective and can alleviate severe physician shortages that currently obstruct treatment scale-up, political commitment and policy action to support task shifting models of care has been slow to absent. In this paper we review the evidence in support of task shifting for AIDS treatment in Africa and argue that continued policy inaction amounts to unwarranted healthcare rationing and as such is ethically untenable. (shrink)

People sometimes knowingly undermine the achievement of their own goals by, e.g., playing the lottery or borrowing from loan sharks. Are these agents acting irrationally? The standard answer is “yes.” But, in a recent award-winning paper, Jennifer Morton argues “no.” On her view, the norms of practical reasoning an agent ought to follow depend on that agent’s resource context (roughly, how rich or poor they are). If Morton is correct, the orthodox view that the same norms of practical (...) class='Hi'>rationality apply to all agents needs revision. I argue that Morton’s arguments fail on empirical and philosophical grounds. What’s at stake? If Morton is correct, poverty relief agencies ought to re-design their incentives so resource-scarce agents can rationally respond to them. If I’m correct, resource-scarce agents do act irrationally in the cases under discussion, and we shouldn’t be shy about saying so. Instead of declaring them rational, we should try to understand the causes of their irrational behavior and help them better succeed by their own lights. (shrink)

Rationing is the allocation of a good under conditions of scarcity, which necessarily implies that some who want and could be benefitted by that good will not receive it. One reflection of our ambivalence towards health care rationing is reflected in our resistance to having it distributed in a market like most other goods—most Americans reject ability to pay as the basis for distributing health care. They do not view health care as just another commodity to be distributed by markets. (...) Despite this widespread view, we are the only developed country without some form of universal health insurance, and so for the 46 million Americans without health insurance their access to health care often does depend on their ability to pay for it. Rationing largely remains a topic that the public, their elected leaders, and many health care professionals prefer to avoid. Ever-growing costs of health care will increasingly force the practice and issue of health care resource prioritization and rationing into the open for public, professional, and political attention. This paper explores some of the features of those practices and issues that make them especially ethically and politically difficult. Those issues will not be easily resolved, but avoiding them will not avoid the need or reality of rationing, it will only mean that it will go on covertly and unexamined. That will lead neither to better or more legitimate prioritization and rationing decisions. (shrink)

Australia, along with other countries, has introduced New Public Management (NPM) into public sector hospitals in an effort to contain healthcare costs. NPM is associated with outsourcing of service provision, the meeting of government performance indicators, workforce flexibility and rationing of resources. This study explores the impact of rationing of staffing and other resources upon delivery of care outside of business hours. Data was collected through semistructured interviews conducted with 21 nurses working in 2 large Australian metropolitan hospitals. Participants identified (...) four strategies associated with NPM which add to workload after‐hours and impacted on the capacity to deliver nursing care. These were functional flexibility, vertical substitution of staff, meeting externally established performance indicators and outsourcing. We conclude that cost containment alongside of the meeting of performance indicators has extended work traditionally performed during business hours beyond those hours when less staffing and material resources are available. This adds to nursing workload and potentially contributes to incomplete nursing care. (shrink)

In all western countries health care budgets are under considerable constraint and therefore a reflection process has started on how to gain the most health benefit for the population within limited resource boundaries. The field of ethics of resource allocation has evolved only recently in order to bring some objectivity and rationality in the discussion. In this article it is argued that priority setting is the prerequisite of ethical resource allocation and that for purposes of operationalization, (...) instruments such as need assessment and health technology assessment (HTA) are essential worktools for making more rational decisions. Thresholds (deduced from the need assessment and HTA) are - within this context - guiding but not binding principles. -/- Discussion of theoretical concepts of not only priority setting, need assessment and HTA complemented by practical examples for showing the challenges and the need, but also the chances of a more explicit and transparent policy of resource allocation in health care. Results: Priority setting in health care is based on the values of equity, justice and solidarity. Health packages decisions are determined from medical need (the severity of the condition) and/or the appropriateness of medical interventions (their cost-effectiveness). With growing awareness that originally effective and cost-effective services and programmes are eventually provided inappropriately, the focus is shifting towards the organisational aspects of provision and application. Therefore, need assessment is based on the distinction of health care needs from demand, supply, or actual care. Additionally HTA provides the evidence on health care interventions in a way that it becomes obvious who benefits from an intervention and who definitely does not benefit, but eventually is harmed. -/- Health services research on effective and cost-effective interventions and research/monitoring of performance that the effective and cost-effective services are provided appropriately are of increasing importance for guiding the decision-making process on priority setting and need assessment. Effective healthcare for all is sustainable, if we start to put expenditures in perspective and focus health policies and research strategies on managing expectations through patient information and a more realistic notion of medical advancements and, on the other hand, on encouraging need-based and cost-effective innovations. (shrink)

This article brings interconnects three debates to show what this might imply for the ‘redemocratisation’ of UK society and for pedagogical reform. One debate concerns deliberative types of democratic reform, arguing in favour of a ‘creative agnosticism’ towards the two philosophical frameworks which dominate this literature. This leads into a discussion of education and critical rationality, arguing for an aptitude-based account of moral agency, one which relates to the sociocultural resources we inherit from the past. The final debate therefore (...) concerns social memory. I do not offer a theory of social memory but critique various commentators in arguing for what I call a ‘multipolar analysis’. This both describes the analytical method adopted in this article and the skills and capacities which a system based upon ‘education for discourse’ would need to facilitate. The article therefore proposes that democracy, education and memory—deliberativeness, critical rationality and social remembering—be brought closer together for the mutual benefit of each debate. (shrink)

This article approaches the ethical dilemma of healthcare allocation and rationing from the perspective of pragmatist ethics, mainly following John Dewey’s ethics. The moral dilemma of healthcare allocation arises whenever we allocate limited resources, and rationing is a necessary option for distributing available resources. In a broader sense, the moral problems of healthcare allocation also encompass the issue of access to primary healthcare, especially for low-income sections of communities. In this sense, allocation always entails rationing – denying service to someone (...) for the benefit of others. Such aspects of allocation and rationing and the relational aspect of disease and health make the problem morally controversial, which makes it difficult to agree on a principle or principles of allocation and rationing applicable across different contexts. Hence, this paper argues that moral challenges of healthcare rationing ought not to be addressed through the appeal to principles, but rather through deliberation that embraces a more pragmatic and democratic approach to negotiating health resource allocation and rationing. However, this does not mean that moral principles and values are insignificant in healthcare allocation. (shrink)

Intelligence can be understood as a form of rationality, in the sense that an intelligent system does its best when its knowledge and resources are insufficient with respect to the problems to be solved. The traditional models of rationality typically assume some form of sufficiency of knowledge and resources, so cannot solve many theoretical and practical problems in Artificial Intelligence (AI). New models based on the Assumption of Insufficient Knowledge and Resources (AIKR) cannot be obtained by minor revisions (...) or extensions of the traditional models, and have to be established fully according to the restrictions and freedoms provided by AIKR. The practice of NARS, an AI project, shows that such new models are feasible and promising in providing a new theoretical foundation for the study of rationality, intelligence, consciousness, and mind. (shrink)

Prior to Citizen’s United, particular types of corporate spending for purposes of influencing US-election-outcomes were limited due to an inherent skepticism of corporate influence in American politics. It was presumed that where corporations accessed wealth and resources for purposes of electing candidates that best serve corporate interests, American politics would be corrupted—indeed: democracy that is bought and sold. In the US, the juridical is entirely systematized by the ethos of the legal profession: legalism. It is the way in which the (...) law is supposed to be reasoned upon, deliberated upon, and decided upon. Although the Majority in Citizens expressed its reversal of law that limits corporate influence in American politics in legalese—the terminology within the system of legalism, the conservative Majority took an opportunity to establish conservative ideology as law—an ideology that subscribes to the equivocation between corporations and individuals, and, corporate spending with protected free-speech. (shrink)

When constrained by limited resources, how do we choose axioms of rationality? The target article relies on Bayesian reasoning that encounter serioustractabilityproblems. We propose another axiomatic foundation: quantum probability theory, which provides for less complex and more comprehensive descriptions. More generally, defining rationality in terms of axiomatic systems misses a key issue: rationality must be defined by humans facing vague information.

Pandemic plans are increasingly attending to groups experiencing health disparities and other social vulnerabilities. Although some pandemic guidance is silent on the issue, guidance that attends to socially vulnerable groups ranges widely, some procedural (often calling for public engagement), and some substantive. Public engagement objectives vary from merely educational to seeking reflective input into the ethical commitments that should guide pandemic planning and response. Some plans that concern rationing during a severe pandemic recommend ways to protect socially vulnerable groups without (...) prioritizing access to scarce resources based on social vulnerability per se. The Minnesota Pandemic Ethics Project (MPEP), a public engagement project on rationing scarce health resources during a severe influenza pandemic, agrees and recommends an integrated set of ways to attend to the needs of socially vulnerable people and avoid exacerbation of health disparities during a severe influenza pandemic. Among other things, MPEP recommends: 1. Engaging socially vulnerable populations to clarify unique needs and effective strategies; 2. Engaging socially vulnerable populations to elicit ethical values and perspectives on rationing; 3. Rejecting rationing based on race, socioeconomic class, citizenship, quality of life, length of life-extension and first-come, first-served; 4. Prioritizing those in the general population for access to resources based on combinations of risk (of death or severe complications from influenza, exposure to influenza, transmitting influenza to vulnerable groups) and the likelihood of responding well to the resource in question. 5. Protecting critical infrastructures on which vulnerable populations and the general public rely; 6. Identifying and removing access barriers during pandemic planning and response; and 7. Collecting and promptly analyzing data during the pandemic to identify groups at disproportionate risk of influenza-related mortality and serious morbidity and to optimize the distribution of resources. (shrink)

If we accept the premise that some sort of rationing of access to health care resources is necessary to contain escalating health care costs effectively, then we need to ask how that rationing might be accomplished most fairly. Calabresi and Bobbitt have argued in their book Tragic Choices that there is no 'perfectly fair' or even 'reasonably fair' way to bring this about.

Are DRGs just? This is the primary question which this essay will answer. But there is a prior methodological question that also needs to be addressed: How do we go about rationally (non-arbitrarily) assessing whether DRGs are just or not? I would suggest that grand, ideal theories of justice (Rawls, Nozick) have only very limited utility for answering this question. What we really need is a theory of “interstitial justice,” that is, an approach to making justice judgments that is suitable (...) to assessing the social practices and institutions that comprise the interstices of our social life as opposed to its basic structure. Rawls's appeal to “our considered moral judgments” provides us with a useful starting point for this task, which we shall discuss in the first part of this essay. In the second part, we shall actually assess DRGs from the perspective of interstitial justice. What we shall show is that DRGs violate a large number of our considered judgments regarding a just approach to financing health care for the elderly in a cost-effective manner. This is true to such an extent that efforts to reform DRGs and make them fairer, such as the recent effort by Robert Veatch, should be abandoned. In the concluding section of the essay we discuss one especially pernicious feature of DRGs, namely, that they represent an invisible approach to rationing access to health care. In the minds of many this is one of the virtues of DRGs. That claim needs critical examination. (shrink)

Normativism, the approach that judges human rationality by comparison against normative standards, has recently come under intensive criticism as unsuitable for psychological enquiry, and it has been suggested that it should be replaced with a descriptivist paradigm. My goal in this paper is to outline and defend a meta-theoretical framework of such a paradigm, grounded rationality, based on the related principles of descriptivism and (moderate) epistemic relativism. Bounded rationality takes into account universal biological and cognitive limitations on (...) human rationality. Grounded rationality accepts universal constraints but adds cognitive variability: Within-individual variability (dual processing), and individual as well as cultural differences. I discuss the implications of grounded rationality to dual processing, proposing that investing limited cognitive resources in analytic processing might be less instrumentally rational for individuals with low cognitive ability. (shrink)

This monograph is a critical assessment of the foundations of microeconomic theory, rationality, welfare resource allocation and capital reproduction. It examines the various concepts of rationality that have been constructed by 20th-century economists.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Rational Agents and the Conceptual Background Beyond Homo economicus Informational Resources A Poisoned Chalice? What Is to Be Done? References.

This article evaluates alternative models for explaining human behavior. In particular, it compares the resourceful, evaluative, maximizing model (REMM) with the economic (or money maximizing) model of human behavior. The theoretical framework is developed to enhance our understanding of "individual value creation" and to seek an economically rational explanation to: Why Warren Buffett is giving his money away to charity? The article develops a framework of biological, material, and immaterial sources of value. The article additionally extends the existing REMM and (...) finds several economically rational reasons for him to give away his money including the present value of help and goodwill, gained control, and lowered transaction costs. (shrink)

In business ethics research, little is known about why and how employees engage in unethical behavior, especially unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB) and unethical pro-family behavior (UPFB). Based on cognitive-affective personality system theory and conservation of resources theory, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying the effects of workplace bullying, as a negative event, on UPB (Study 1) and UPFB (Study 2). In Study 1, workplace bullying negatively correlated with UPB where emotional exhaustion and organization-oriented moral disengagement played chain-mediating roles (...) in this relationship. In Study 2, workplace bullying positively correlated with UPFB where emotional exhaustion and family-oriented moral disengagement played chain-mediating roles in the relationship. In both studies, perceived forgiveness climate, as a conditional factor, was found to weaken the positive impact of workplace bullying on both emotional exhaustion and the chain-mediating effect of emotional exhaustion and moral disengagement in the relationship between workplace bullying and UPB/upfb. Overall, this study explains why, how, and when employees exhibit UPB and UPFB. The implications for theory and practices that could enable organizations to reduce employees’ unethical behavior are discussed. (shrink)

Public discussions of political and social issues are often characterized by deep and persistent polarization. In social psychology, it’s standard to treat belief polarization as the product of epistemic irrationality. In contrast, we argue that the persistent disagreement that grounds political and social polarization can be produced by epistemically rational agents, when those agents have limited cognitive resources. Using an agent-based model of group deliberation, we show that groups of deliberating agents using coherence-based strategies for managing their limited resources tend (...) to polarize into different subgroups. We argue that using that strategy is epistemically rational for limited agents. So even though group polarization looks like it must be the product of human irrationality, polarization can be the result of fully rational deliberation with natural human limitations. (shrink)

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, shortages of scarce healthcare resources consistently presented significant moral and practical challenges. While the importance of vaccines as a key pharmaceutical intervention to stem pandemic scarcity was widely publicized, a sizable proportion of the population chose not to vaccinate. In response, some have defended the use of vaccination status as a criterion for the allocation of scarce medical resources. In this paper, we critically interpret this burgeoning literature, and describe a framework for thinking about vaccine-sensitive (...) class='Hi'>resource allocation using the values of responsibility, reciprocity, and justice. Although our aim here is not to defend a single view of vaccine-sensitive resource allocation, we believe that attending critically with the diversity of arguments in favor (and against) vaccine-sensitivity reveals a number of questions that a vaccine-sensitive approach to allocation should answer in future pandemics. (shrink)