A Resource‐Rational, Process‐Level Account of the St. Petersburg Paradox

Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (1):417-432 (2020)
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Abstract

How much would you pay to play a lottery with an “infinite expected payoff?” In the case of the century old, St. Petersburg Paradox, the answer is that the vast majority of people would only pay a small amount. The authors seek to understand this paradox by providing an explanation consistent with a broad, process‐level model of human decision‐making under risk.

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