In this paper, we compare the two Global Reporting Initiative reporting standards, G3.1, and the most current version G4.0. We do this through the lens of political corporate social responsibility theory, which describes the broadened understanding of corporate responsibility in a globalized world building on Habermas’ notion of deliberative democracy and ethical discourse. As the regulatory power of nation states is fading, regulatory gaps occur as side effects of transnational business. As a result, corporations are also understood to play a (...) “political role” to fill regulatory gaps and contribute to a global governance system by voluntarily engaging in self-regulation. Such corporate political action, however, is not always legitimate as it suffers from a democratic deficit. Consistent with scholars in the field of political CSR, this paper argues that only by means of communication and discourse can this drawback be avoided. That is why CSR reporting and guidelines for standardizing the disclosed CSR information is key for political CSR. By comparing the GRI standards from a political CSR perspective, one can see whether these often-used reporting guidelines fulfill the communicative requirements and whether they are adequate tools to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. We present results from a theory-derived and criteria-driven comparison of the two guidelines. Indication of the effectiveness of voluntary self-regulation is, for example, important considering the 2014 directive of the European Union to make CSR reporting mandatory. We offer a guideline-based view on current CSR theory as well as CSR reporting practice. We discuss implications for CSR theory, particularly the appropriateness of deliberation in the Habermasian sense, which is the basis of political CSR theory. We do so by introducing the notion of “uncommitted deliberation” with regard to the refined concept of materiality in GRI 4.0, which induces subjectivity and reduces data-driven comparability. Finally, we address the limitations of this research as well as research questions for future studies. (shrink)

I explore, from a proof-theoretic perspective, the hierarchy of classical and paraconsistent logics introduced by Barrio, Pailos and Szmuc in (Journal o f Philosophical Logic,49, 93-120, 2021). First, I provide sequent rules and axioms for all the logics in the hierarchy, for all inferential levels, and establish soundness and completeness results. Second, I show how to extend those systems with a corresponding hierarchy of validity predicates, each one of which is meant to capture “validity” at a different inferential level. Then, (...) I point out two potential philosophical implications of these results. (i) Since the logics in the hierarchy differ from one another on the rules, I argue that each such logic maintains its own distinct identity (contrary to arguments like the one given by Dicher and Paoli in 2019). (ii) Each validity predicate need not capture “validity” at more than one metainferential level. Hence, there are reasons to deny the thesis (put forward in Barrio, E., Rosenblatt, L. & Tajer, D. (Synthese, 2016)) that the validity predicate introduced in by Beall and Murzi in (Journal o f Philosophy,110(3), 143–165, 2013) has to express facts not only about what follows from what, but also about the metarules, etc. (shrink)

This article characterizes the varieties of four - dimensionalism and provides a critical overview of the main arguments in support of it.

The only anthology available on material constitution, this book collects important recent work on well known puzzles in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. The extensive, clearly written introduction helps to make the essays accessible to a wide audience.

In the present article, he explains why divine silence poses a serious intellectual obstacle to belief in God, and then goes on to consider ways of overcoming that obstacle. After considering several ways in which divine silence might actually be beneficial to human beings, he argues that perhaps silence is nothing more or less than God’s preferred mode of interaction with creatures like us. Perhaps God simply desires communion rather than overt communication with human beings, and perhaps God has provided (...) ways for us to experience God’s presence richly even amidst the silence. (shrink)

Four dimensionalism, as it will be understood in this article, is a view about the ontological status of non-present objects. Presentists say that only present objects exist. There are no dinosaurs, though there were such things; there are no cities on Mars, though perhaps there will be such things. Four-dimensionalists, on the other hand, say that there are past or future objects (or both); and in saying this, they mean to put such things ontologically on a par with present objects. (...) According to the four-dimensionalist, non-present objects are like spatially distant objects: they exist, just not here, where we are. (shrink)

Recourse to a being’s moral status is the ‘nuclear option’ of moral theorising—it tells us not only what obligations we have and to what degree, but whether we have obligations to them in the first place and whether their moral concern trumps concern for other beings simply in virtue of the kind of being they are. As such, we should only explain obligations in terms of a being’s moral status if doing so is principled and necessary to defend that obligation. (...) In ‘Pregnancy and Superior Moral Status: A Proposal for Two Thresholds of Personhood’, Robinson1 argues that pregnant women achieve a second and therefore superior threshold of moral status to ‘mere persons’. She insists that this is not a view about the woman and the fetus together but that ‘the pregnant woman herself is more than one individual’. This gives us strong reason to re-balance the imbalanced burdens experienced by women due to pregnancy. I will argue her proposal is neither principled nor necessary. We can explain special obligations to pregnant women without appealing to a distinct moral status, without reaching for the ‘nuclear option’. First, consider Robinson’s1 claim that pregnant women ‘are performing a role which is of supreme importance: that of creating new human life, and maintaining the survival of the human species’. …. (shrink)

In this paper, I will examine the notion of an epistemic dilemma, its characterizations in the literature, and the different intuitions prompted by it. I will illustrate that the notion of an epistemic dilemma is expected to capture various phenomena that are not easily unified with one concept: while some aspects of these phenomena are more about the agent in a certain situation, other aspects seem to be more about the situation as such. As a consequence, incompatible intuitions emerge concerning (...) the transparency of epistemic dilemmas as well as regarding the role that doxastic suspension plays in resolving cases of epistemic dilemma. I suggest to distinguish between the mental state of agents who find themselves in an epistemic dilemma and the normative situation that gives rise to a dilemma. I will refer to the agent’s mental state as epistemic conflict and will reserve the term epistemic dilemma for evidential situations in which epistemic principles either recommend incompatible doxastic responses or render all options impermissible. The concept of epistemic conflict not only captures the mental state of agents who find themselves in a genuine epistemic dilemma but also applies to agents who face difficult epistemic choices that they cannot resolve without substantial cognitive (and often pragmatic) effort, for example, via doxastic suspension. (shrink)

Philosophical naturalism, according to which philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences, has dominated the Western academy for well over a century; but Michael Rea claims that it is without rational foundation, and that the costs of embracing it are surprisingly high. Rea argues compellingly to the surprising conclusion that naturalists are committed to rejecting realism about material objects, materialism, and perhaps realism about other minds. That is surely a price that naturalists are unwilling to pay: this philosophical orthodoxy should (...) be rejected. (shrink)

Divided into two parts this book examines the train of social theory from the 19th century, through to the `organization of modernity', in relation to ideas of social planning, and as contributors to the `rationalistic revolution' of the `golden age' of capitalism in the 1950s and 60s. Part two examines key concepts in the social sciences. It begins with some of the broadest concepts used by social scientists: choice, decision, action and institution and moves on to examine the `collectivist alternative': (...) the concepts of society, culture and polity, which are often dismissed as untenable by postmodernists today. This is a major contribution to contemporary social theory and provides a host of essential insights into the task of social science today. (shrink)

Philosophical naturalism, according to which philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences, has dominated the Western academy for well over a century; but Michael Rea claims that it is without rational foundation, and that the costs of embracing it are surprisingly high. The first part of World Without Design aims to provide a fair and historically informed characterization of naturalism. Rea then argues compellingly to the surprising conclusion that naturalists are committed to rejecting realism about material objects, materialism, and perhaps (...) realism about other minds. This conclusion is striking, largely because naturalism is often simply identified with materialism, and the remaining two theses are ones that naturalists very typically want to endorse. Rea goes on to examine two alternative research programs: intuitionism and supernaturalism, and argues for the conclusion that intuitionism, under certain circumstances, is self-defeating.World Without Design offers a provocative challenge to philosophical orthodoxy. It will make uncomfortable reading for many philosophers. (shrink)

Research integrity is a continuously developing concept, and increasing emphasis is put on creating RI promotion practices. This study aimed to map the existing RI guidance documents at research performing organisations and research funding organisations. A search of bibliographic databases and grey literature sources was performed, and retrieved documents were screened for eligibility. The search of bibliographical databases and reference lists of selected articles identified a total of 92 documents while the search of grey literature sources identified 118 documents for (...) analysis. The retrieved documents were analysed based on their geographical origin, research field and organisational origin of RI practices, types of guidance presented in them, and target groups to which RI practices are directed. Most of the identified practices were developed for research in general, and are applicable to all research fields and medical sciences. They were mostly written in the form of guidelines and targeted researchers. A comprehensive search of the existing RI promotion practices showed that initiatives mostly come from RPOs while only a few RI practices originate from RFOs. This study showed that more RI guidance documents are needed for natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities since only a small number of documents was developed specifically for these research fields. The explored documents and the gaps in knowledge identified in this study can be used for further development of RI promotion practices in RPOs and RFOs. (shrink)

David Chalmers has distinguished the “hard” and the “easy” problem of consciousness, arguing that progress on the “easy problem”—on pinpointing the physical/neural correlates of consciousness—will not necessarily involve progress on the hard problem—on explaining why consciousness, in the first place, emerges from physical processing. Chalmers, however, was hopeful that refined theorizing would eventually yield philosophical progress. In particular, he argued that panpsychism might be a candidate account to solve the hard problem. Here, I provide a concise stock-take on both the (...) empirical-neuroscientific and philosophical-conceptual progress on consciousness. It turns out that, whereas empirical progress is indisputable, philosophical progress is much less pronounced. While Chalmers was right, I argue, in distinguishing distinctive types of problems of consciousness, his prediction of progress on the hard problem was overly optimistic. Empirical progress and philosophical progress are essentially uncoupled; a more skeptical perspective on progress in philosophy in general is appropriate. (shrink)

In May 2010, philosophers, family and friends gathered at the University of Notre Dame to celebrate the career and retirement of Alvin Plantinga, widely recognized as one of the world's leading figures in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Plantinga has earned particular respect within the community of Christian philosophers for the pivotal role that he played in the recent renewal and development of philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Each of the essays in this volume engages with some (...) particular aspect of Plantinga's views on metaphysics, epistemology, or philosophy of religion. Contributors include Michael Bergman, Ernest Sosa, Trenton Merricks, Richard Otte, Peter VanInwagen, Thomas P. Flint, Eleonore Stump, Dean Zimmerman and Nicholas Wolterstorff. The volume also includes responses to each essay by Bas van Fraassen, Stephen Wykstra, David VanderLaan, Robin Collins, Raymond VanArragon, E. J. Coffman, Thomas Crisp, and Donald Smith. (shrink)

In this paper, the relationship between the e-value of a complex hypothesis, H, and those of its constituent elementary hypotheses, Hj, j = 1… k, is analyzed, in the independent setup. The e-value of a hypothesis H, ev, is a Bayesian epistemic, credibility or truth value defined under the Full Bayesian Significance Testing mathematical apparatus. The questions addressed concern the important issue of how the truth value of H, and the truth function of the corresponding FBST structure M, relate to (...) the truth values of its elementary constituents, Hj, and to the truth functions of their corresponding FBST structures Mj, respectively. (shrink)

The jargon of Japanese art criticism has always had an abundance of unique terms, categories, and concepts. This is not only true when discussing traditional Japan, since there are just as many new terms today as there were in the past. Some of the new terms have developed or evolved from old ones, while others have appeared with no seeming connection to any traditional tendency. Yet, only a few of these terms can be considered for the meta-level discussion of Aesthetics, (...) whether or not they can be linked with a certain historical linage, as they have a simple descriptive function. This article will first try to discern between aesthetic and non-aesthetic terms that are at the core of Japanese discourse today. Second, and accordingly, following the footsteps of the renowned modernist aesthetician Kuki Shūzō, this article will also try to convey a single linguistic map of the distinctive cultural Aesthetic that is in motion in Japan today. (shrink)

Substructural solutions to the semantic paradoxes have been broadly discussed in recent years. In particular, according to the non-transitive solution, we have to give up the metarule of Cut, whose role is to guarantee that the consequence relation is transitive. This concession—giving up a meta rule—allows us to maintain the entire consequence relation of classical logic. The non-transitive solution has been generalized in recent works into a hierarchy of logics where classicality is maintained at more and more metainferential levels. All (...) the logics in this hierarchy can accommodate a truth predicate, including the logic at the top of the hierarchy—known as CMω—which presumably maintains classicality at all levels. CMω has so far been accounted for exclusively in model-theoretic terms. Therefore, there remains an open question: how do we account for this logic in proof-theoretic terms? Can there be found a proof system that admits each and every classical principle—at all inferential levels—but nevertheless blocks the derivation of the liar? In the present paper, I solve this problem by providing such a proof system and establishing soundness and completeness results. Yet, I also argue that the outcome is philosophically unsatisfactory. In fact, I’m afraid that in light of my results this metainferential solution to the paradoxes can hardly be called a “solution,” let alone a good one. (shrink)

Conferralism is the view that social properties are neither intrinsic to the things that have them nor possessed simply by virtue of their causal or spatiotemporal relations to other things, but are somehow bestowed (intentionally or not, explicitly or not) upon them by persons who have both the capacity and the standing to bestow them. We argue that conferralism faces a dilemma: either it is viciously circular, or it is limited in scope in a way that undercuts its motivation.

In the past quarter century C. B. MacPherson's reading of Locke has enjoyed a wide appeal. We are all by now familiar with Locke as the ardent proponent of possessive individualism, with its accompanying acquisitive tendencies and egoism. To be sure, MacPherson's interpretation has not gone unopposed. Of late it has been challenged in all its fundamentals by the scholarly and ingenious work of James Tully. Far from seeing Locke as providing the theoretical underpinnings for unbridled capitalism, Tully puts forward (...) the view that Locke was sympathetic to the possibility of radical redistributive measures. That is, that he was not in principle opposed to rights to welfare. (shrink)

Over the past sixty years, within the analytic tradition of philosophy, there has been a significant revival of interest in the philosophy of religion. More recently, philosophers of religion have turned in a more self-consciously interdisciplinary direction, with special focus on topics that have traditionally been the provenance of systematic theologians in the Christian tradition. The present volumes Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, volumes 1 and 2 aim to bring together some of the most important essays on six central topics (...) in recent philosophical theology. Volume 1 collects essays on three distinctively Christian doctrines: trinity, incarnation, and atonement. Volume 2 focuses on three topics that arise in all of the major theistic religions: providence, resurrection, and scripture. (shrink)

I introduce a novel and quite intuitive interpretation of the ternary relation that figures in the relational semantics of many relevance logics. Conceptually, my interpretation makes use only of incompatibility and parthood relations, defined over a set of states. In this way, the proposed interpretation—of the ternary relation and the conditional—extends Dunn’s and Restall’s works on negation and the Routley star operator. Therefore, the interpretation is unified, and hence not only intuitive but also parsimonious. Additionally, the interpretation provides us with (...) a cogent argument to the effect that a ternary relation is indispensable, and we cannot merely do with a binary relation. (shrink)

Taking his critique of totalitarianizing conceptions of community as a starting point, this text examines Jean-Luc Nancy's work of an ‘ontology of plural singular being’ for its political implications. It argues that while at first this ontology seems to advocate a negative or an anti-politics only, it can also be read as a ‘theory of communicative praxis’ that suggests a certain ethos – in the form of a certain use of symbols (which is expressed only inaptly by the word ‘style’) (...) that would render the ontological plurality of singulars perceptible and practically effective. Finally, some recent texts by Nancy even sidestep the ontology of being-with and face the question of what politics, faced with demands of justice, could be and what a democratic politics could provide. Both of these aspects in Nancy's work, however, still remain to be spelled out more politically. (shrink)

The use of models to assign truth values to sentences and to counterexemplify invalid inferences is a basic feature of model theory. Yet sentences and inferences are not the only phenomena that model theory has to take care of. In particular, the development of sequent calculi raises the question of how metainferences are to be accounted for from a model-theoretic perspective. Unfortunately there is no agreement on this matter. Rather, one can find in the literature two competing model-theoretic notions of (...) metainferential validity, known as the ‘global’ notion and the ‘local’ notion. In this article, I argue that, given certain plausible considerations about metainferential validity, the global notion collapses into the local notion. (shrink)

Several authors maintain that we are capable of having inconsistent intentional states, either in cases of illusion, in certain cases of imagination, or because the observable world is (partly) inconsistent and we perceive it as such. These views are all premised on the assumption that inconsistent intentional states—even if acknowledged—are peculiar and have nothing essential to do with our perceptual capacities. In the present article, I would like to present, and argue for, a much stronger thesis: that inconsistent intentional states (...) underlie the possibility of having intentional content in mind. I argue for this thesis based on a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of our grasp of objects, which I formulate in terms of incompatibility semantics. (shrink)

Part I: Dimensions of time's enigma -- Is time real? -- Eleaticism, temporality, and time -- The makings of a temporal universe -- Pastness and futurity -- Synchronicity and synchronicity -- Temporal pace and measurement -- Presentness or the present -- Aristotle's real account of time -- Parmenidean time and the impossible now -- Cosmic motion and the speed of time -- Time as the motion of the cosmos -- Time as the cosmos itself -- Time as motion and all (...) change -- Temporal cognition and the return of the now -- Real temporality in an Aristotelian world -- Does Aristotle refute eleaticism? -- Bisection argument I -- Bisection argument II -- Bisection argument III -- Plotinus' vitalistic platonism and the real origins of time -- Temporality, eternality, and Plotinus' new metaphysic -- Plotinus' critique of Aristotelian motion -- Indefinite temporality and the measure of motion -- Plotinus' neoplatonic account of time. (shrink)

In the 1920s, Carnap and Schlick both made an important use of definitions in their main publications: Schlick, in his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918, 2nd ed. 1925) and Carnap in Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928, mostly written by 1925). In this paper, we first provide an analysis of the kinds of definitions that are distinguished in these books and a few other papers, and we then propose a systematic comparison of Schlick’s and Carnap’s diverging conceptions of definitions in the 1920s, (...) relating them, in both cases, to their respective philosophical projects in the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre and in Der logische Aufbau der Welt. (shrink)

A clear, concise and often humorous alphabetically-guided tour of the world of economics and high finance. The lively style of this book makes it an appropriate up-to-date reference source for anyone interested in economics.

Quels rapports, depuis les commencements, les philosophes ontils noués avec la science? Il ne s'agit pas ici de dresser l'inventaire des problèmes philosophiques que soulèvent les sciences ou la science, ni d'évaluer les réponses qui y furent apportées, mais, à l'inverse, de s'interroger sur les manières multiples dont les philosophes se sont représenté la science - état d'un sujet connaissant ou activité savante - système d'énoncés ou méthode de recherche, voire ensemble de disciplines constituées - et les problèmes afférents à (...) chacune de ces représentations. A l'exhaustivité historique, il a été préféré le questionnement philosophique. L'ouvrage se déploie à partir de quatre grandes problématiques : " La science "? (Platon ; Descartes, Newton ; Leibniz ; L'Encyclopédie ; Carnap) ; Critiques et limites de la science (empirisme et scepticisme anglais ; Kant ; Bergson, Brunschvicg ; Heidegger ; Wittgenstein) ; Science et naturalisme (Aristote ; Mach ; Bolzano ; Husserl ; Quine) Science, histoire et société (Comte ; Durkheim ; l'école de Francfort ; Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault ; logique de la science et révolutions scientifiques). (shrink)

Philosophy in the English-speaking world is dominated by analytic approaches to its problems and projects; but theology has been dominated by alternative approaches. Many would say that the current state in theology is not mere historical accident, but is, rather, how things ought to be. On the other hand, many others would say precisely the opposite: that theology as a discipline has been beguiled and taken captive by 'continental' approaches, and that the effects on the discipline have been largely deleterious. (...) The methodological divide between systematic theologians and analytic philosophers of religion is ripe for exploration. The present volume represents an attempt to begin a much-needed interdisciplinary conversation about the value of analytic philosophical approaches to theological topics. Most of the essays herein are sympathetic toward the enterprise the editors are calling analytic theology; but, with an eye toward balance, the volume also includes essays and an introduction that try to offer more critical perspectives on analytic theology. (shrink)

En palabras del rector de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, coeditora de este libro, quien lea estas páginas podrá apreciar cómo Alberto Wagner de Reyna, alumno del filósofo alemán, nos aproxima a una renovada comprensión de los temas que cautivaron la reflexión de Heidegger, y nos invita a adentrarnos con él por esas "sendas del bosque" en las que el hombre que busca su autenticidad celebra la fiesta de la meditación serena.

Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: ‘If, after thinking hard, we can't think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason’. Sceptical theists, us included, say that this inference is not a good one and that evidential arguments from evil that depend on it are, as a result, unsound. Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy have argued (in a previous issue of this journal) (...) that Michael Bergmann's way of developing the sceptical theist response to such arguments fails because it commits those who endorse it to a sort of scepticism that undermines ordinary moral practice. In this paper, we defend Bergmann's sceptical theist response against this charge. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Identitet učitelja inoga jezika nedovoljno je istražen koncept na području Republike Hrvatske. Stoga se u ovome radu navedeni koncept ponajprije teorijski razmatra, a potom se prikazuju rezultati istraživanja profesionalnog identiteta učitelja francuskoga jezika u RH. U istraživačkome dijelu rada razmatramo mijenjaju li učitelji francuskog jezika svoj profesionalni identitet ili ne mijenjaju, a ako mijenjaju, u kojoj je to mjeri i koji su razlozi tomu. Rezultati su pokazali kako učitelji svoj učiteljski identitet najčešće mijenjaju sudjelujući na lokalnim stručnim usavršavanjima, a najmanje (...) sudjelovanjem u organiziranim e-tečajevima. Glavnim razlogom za sudjelovanje u aktivnostima stručnoga usavršavanja pokazao se njihov unutarnji poticaj, dok su se glavnim razlogom za nesudjelovanjem pokazali financijski čimbenici. Dulje radno iskustvo, članstvo u Hrvatskoj udruzi profesora francuskoga jezika i obvezni status jezika pokazali su se faktorima koji statistički značajno pozitivno utječu na osjećaj pripadnosti zajednici učitelja francuskoga jezika u Republici Hrvatskoj. The identity of foreign language teachers is an under-researched concept in Croatia. This paper thus focuses on this concept foremost from a theoretical position, followed by a description of the results of research into the professional identity of French teachers in Croatia. The research considers whether French teachers change their professional identity or not, and if they do, to which extent and for what reasons. The results show that teachers most often change their teaching identity by participating in local professional training courses, and least often by participating in organised e-courses. The main reason for participating in professional training activities proved to be internal motivation, while the main reason for not participating proved to be financial factors. A longer work history, membership in the Croatian Association of French Language Teachers, and status as a compulsory language proved to be statistically significant factors influencing feelings of belonging to the community of French teachers in Croatia. (shrink)

The identity of foreign language teachers is an under-researched concept in Croatia. This paper thus focuses on this concept foremost from a theoretical position, followed by a description of the results of research into the professional identity of French teachers in Croatia. The research considers whether French teachers change their professional identity or not, and if they do, to which extent and for what reasons. The results show that teachers most often change their teaching identity by participating in local professional (...) training courses, and least often by participating in organised e-courses. The main reason for participating in professional training activities proved to be internal motivation, while the main reason for not participating proved to be financial factors. A longer work history, membership in the Croatian Association of French Language Teachers, and status as a compulsory language proved to be statistically significant factors influencing feelings of belonging to the community of French teachers in Croatia. (shrink)

Minimally inconsistent LP (MiLP) is a nonmonotonic paraconsistent logic based on Graham Priest's logic of paradox (LP). Unlike LP, MiLP purports to recover, in consistent situations, all of classical reasoning. The present paper conducts a proof-theoretic analysis of MiLP. I highlight certain properties of this logic, introduce a simple sequent system for it, and establish soundness and completeness results. In addition, I show how to use my proof system in response to a criticism of this logic put forward by JC (...) Beall. (shrink)

Conventionalism about logic is the view that logical principles hold in virtue of some linguistic conventions. According to explicit conventionalism, these conventions have to be stipulated explicitly. Explicit conventionalism is subject to a famous criticism by Quine, who accused it of leading to an infinite regress. In response to the criticism, several authors have suggested reconstructing conventionalism as implicit in our linguistic behaviour. In this paper, drawing on a distinction from proof theory between derivable and admissible rules, I argue that (...) implicit conventionalism has not been stated in a sufficiently precise way, as it leaves open what one needs to say about admissible yet underivable rules. Moreover, it turns out that this challenge cannot be easily met, and that any attempt to meet the challenge makes conventionalism much less attractive a thesis. (shrink)

Graham Priest has formulated the minimally inconsistent logic of paradox (MiLP), which is paraconsistent like Priest’s logic of paradox (LP), while staying closer to classical logic. We present logics that stand to (the propositional fragments of) strong Kleene logic (K3) and the logic of first-degree entailment (FDE) as MiLP stands to LP. That is, our logics share the paracomplete and the paraconsistent-cum-paracomplete nature of K3 and FDE, respectively, while keeping these features to a minimum in order to stay closer to (...) classical logic. We give semantic and sequent-calculus formulations of these logics, and we highlight some reasons why these logics may be interesting in their own right. (shrink)

Philosophical naturalism, according to which philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences, has dominated the Western academy for well over a century, but Michael Rea claims that it is without rational foundation. Rea argues compellingly to the surprising conclusion that naturalists are committed to rejecting realism about material objects, materialism, and perhaps realism about other minds.