This paper explores the ethical obligations of pharmaceutical companies to charge fair prices for essential medicines. The moral issue at stake here is distributive justice. Rawls'' framework is especially germane since it underlines the material benefits everyone deserves as Kantian persons and the need for an egalitarian approach for the distribution of society''s essential commodities such as health care. This concern for distributive justice should be a critical factor in the equation of variables used to set prices for pharmaceuticals.

This paper uses two recentworks as a springboard for discussing theproper contours of intellectual propertyprotection. Professor Lessig devotes much ofThe Future of Ideas to demonstrating howthe expanding scope of intellectual propertyprotection threatens the Internet as aninnovation commons. Similarly, ProfessorLitman''s message in Digital Copyright isthat copyright law is both too complicated andtoo restrictive. Both authors contend that asa result of overprotecting individual rights,creativity is stifled and the vitality of theintellectual commons is in jeopardy. It isdifficult to evaluate the claims and policyprescriptions (...) of these books without someappreciation for the moral foundations ofintellectual property. The utility and labordesert theories remain the two most prominentin the Anglo-American tradition. Afterexploring those theories, we argue for a secureregime of protection based on the Lockeanvision that property rights are justly deservedas a reward for labor that creates value. However, as Locke''s famous proviso implies,even a natural property right is not absoluteand must be balanced by regard for the publicdomain. But a natural right cannot besacrificed simply to advance technologicalinnovation or to achieve marginal social andeconomic gains. While we agree with Lessig andLitman that recent legislation goes too far weconclude the essay by attempting to illustratethat some of their policy recommendations errin the opposite direction by underprotectingvalid property rights. (shrink)

The primary theme of this paper is the normative case against ownership of one's genetic information along with the source of that information (usually human tissues samples). The argument presented here against such “upstream” property rights is based primarily on utilitarian grounds. This issue has new salience thanks to the Human Genome Project and “bio-prospecting” initiatives based on the aggregation of genetic information, such as the one being managed by deCODE Genetics in Iceland. The rationale for ownership is twofold: ownership (...) will protect the basic human rights of privacy and autonomy and it will enable the data subjects to share in the tangible benefits of the genetic research. Proponents of this viewpoint often cite the principle of genetic exceptionalism, which asserts that genetic information needs a higher level of protection than other kinds of personal information such as financial data. We argue, however, that the recognition of such ownership rights would lead to inefficiency along with the disutility of genetic discoveries. Biomedical research will be hampered if property rights in genes and genetic material are too extensive. We contend that other mechanisms such as informed consent and strict confidentiality rules can accomplish the same result as a property right without the liabilities of an exclusive entitlement. (shrink)

The Internet presents opportunities for corporations to efficiently build their brands online and to enhance their global reach. But there are threats as well as opportunities, since anti-branding and free-riding activities are easier in cyberspace. One such threat is theunauthorized incorporation of a trademark into a domain name. This can lead to trademark dilution and cause consumer confusion. But some users claim a right to use these trademarks for the purpose of parody or criticism. Underlying these trademark conflicts is the (...) familiar tension between property rights and free speech rights. While some trademark scholars are reluctant to consider a trademark as property, we find strong support for the property paradigm in Hegel’s philosophy. Assuming that a trademark is an earned property right, we propose that a trademark owner should be allowed to control the permutations of its trademark incorporated into domain names unless a reasonable person would not confuse that domain name with the company’s mark. But we also conclude that there must be latitude to employ a domain name for negative editorial comment, so long as the source and purpose of that domain name is plainly apparent. (shrink)

The Internet presents opportunities for corporations to efficiently build their brands online and to enhance their global reach. But there are threats as well as opportunities, since anti-branding and free-riding activities are easier in cyberspace. One such threat is theunauthorized incorporation of a trademark into a domain name. This can lead to trademark dilution and cause consumer confusion. But some users claim a right to use these trademarks for the purpose of parody or criticism. Underlying these trademark conflicts is the (...) familiar tension between property rights and free speech rights. While some trademark scholars are reluctant to consider a trademark as property, we find strong support for the property paradigm in Hegel’s philosophy. Assuming that a trademark is an earned property right, we propose that a trademark owner should be allowed to control the permutations of its trademark incorporated into domain names unless a reasonable person would not confuse that domain name with the company’s mark. But we also conclude that there must be latitude to employ a domain name for negative editorial comment, so long as the source and purpose of that domain name is plainly apparent. (shrink)

This paper reviews Facebook's controversial privacy policies as a basis for considering how social network sites can better protect the personal information of their users. We argue that Facebook's architecture leaves its users too exposed, especially to online surveillance. This architecture must be modified and Facebook must be more proactive in safeguarding the rights of their customers as it seeks to find the proper balance between user privacy and its commercial interests.

After reviewing some of the difficulties caused by spam and summarizing the arguments of its defenders, this paper will focus on its present legal status. It will then dwell on spam from a moral point of view and address some of the ethical implications associated with transmitting this unsolicited commercial e-mail. It will attempt to sort out the conflicting rights involved and develop a viable case that even if we prescind from its social costs, spam is ethically questionable under certain (...) conditions. Moreover, given the current volume of spam and its negative impact on the Internet environment, the transmission of spam can also be characterized as an asocial act primarily because of the significant externalities which it generates. As a result, spam cannot be justified from the perspective of duty-based moral philosophies that emphasize the need to conform to the legitimate norms of the community. (shrink)

The web creates manyopportunities for encroachment on intellectualproperty including trademarks. Our principaltask in this paper is an investigation into anunusual form of such encroachment: theimproper use of metatags. A metatag is a pieceof HTML code that provides summary informationabout a web page. If used in an appropriatemanner, these metatags can play a legitimaterole in helping consumers locate information. But the ``keyword'' metatag is particularlysusceptible to manipulation. These tags can beeasily abused by web site creators anxious tobait search engines and bring (...) scores ofvisitors to their sites. The law aboutmetatags is far from settled and many legalscholars are uncomfortable with the conclusionthat the unauthorized use of a trademark in ametatag represents infringement. How should weassess this practice known as ``spamdexing'' froma normative perspective? Is it commercial fairplay or something more sinister? We make thecase here that there are salient moral problemswith spamdexing since it exploits thereputational goodwill of trademark owners andconfuses consumers. It violates basic moralduties and it flouts the golden rule principle. Hence unauthorized use of a competitor'strademark in a metatag is not morallyacceptable. (shrink)

The RIAA v. Verizon case offers an opportunity to analyze the scope of an Internet service provider’s responsibility to help deter copyright infringement. In this case, the RIAA served Verizon with a subpoena requesting the identity of two users who were making available copyrighted recordings for downloading on peer‐to‐peer networks. The main axis of discussion is whether or not Verizon has a moral obligation to reveal the names of these individuals. Should Verizon cooperate with the RIAA or should it seek (...) to shield the identity of these users in order to protect their anonymity and privacy? A secondary theme concerns Verizon’s prospective responsibility to curtail infringement. We will argue that Verizon and other ISPs have a limited obligation to assist copyright holders by disclosing the identity of infringers, but we contend that any prospective responsibility is constrained by law and technological capability. (shrink)

What exactly is Cyberethics? How did the field develop? What are some of the central issues and themes in this field, and what methodologies are used by those working in this area of applied ethics? These and related questions are considered in the readings included in Chapter 1. It is perhaps important to note at the outset that the field that many are now beginning to refer to as "cyberethics" has until quite recently been referred to by the more general (...) label "computer ethics." Other expressions that are also now used to refer to ethical issues involving computing and Internet technologies are "information ethics," "information technology ethics," "information and communication technology ethics," "global information ethics," and "Internet ethics." As in the case of "Internet ethics," "cyberethics" is intended to refer to ethical concerns involving the Internet, in particular. And it is primarily with ethical issues involving that particular medium that we will be concerned in this textbook of readings. It is also important to note that the expression "computer ethics" describes better the impact that computing technology in general has had for ethics as well as for our social and political institutions. Although our main concern will be with those ethical issues involving the Internet, many of the readings included in Chapter 1 are also concerned with ethical issues in a broader sense of computing technologies. Hence, the expressions "cyberethics" and "computer ethics" may, at times, be used interchangeably in this chapter. (shrink)

This paper reviews the intriguing history of information and computer ethics. Information ethics began as a branch of applied ethics concerned with the responsible management of information resources, while computer ethics was originally concerned with the training of computer professionals. Thanks to the Internet and the Web, these two fields merged together as access and communications issues became more prominent. In more recent years, responding to the ongoing debate about this discipline's structural foundations, philosophers like Floridi have given information ethics (...) a new meaning by focusing on information's ontological status and the intrinsic worth of all information objects. (shrink)

The United States recognized intellectual property rights from its earliest days and included, in its constitution, a clause which expresses this, "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." These few words found in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 have grown into a massive body of laws that govern works that were unimaginable to Thomas Jefferson and his contemporaries. Our question (...) today is very simple: is the latest metamorphosis of copyright law, the Digital Millennial Copyright Act of 1998, prudent policy? Specifically, we are concerned with three issues which critics have raised regarding this act: chilling effects on fair use, suppression of innovation, and overreach. We will also touch on the criticism which stresses that the DMCA further expands a system which increasingly and unfairly favors the content industries. This will be limited to illustrating extant tensions between copyright owners and society and also the difficulties law faces in keeping pace with the current, rapid and overwhelming technological and cultural change. We rely primarily on leading cases to establish the impact on fair use and innovation or to demonstrate over reach. (shrink)

As the World Wide Web has grown in popularity, the propriety of linking to other web sites has achieved some prominence as an important moral and legal issue. Hyperlinks represent the essence of Web-based activity, since they facilitate navigation in a unique and efficient fashion. But the pervasive activity of linking has generated notable controversies. While most sites welcome and support incoming links, others block them or seek to license them in some way. Particularly problematic are so-called 'deep links,' which (...) bypass the home page along with the extensive advertising and promotional material that is usually found there. While some contend that a site's mere presence on the web is implicit permission for virtually any form of linking, others argue that at least in some circumstances deep linking is unfair and constitutes misappropriation of intellectual property.In this paper we will explore the issue of deep linking from a distinctly moral vantage point. While legal scholars have vigorously debated this issue, it has received little attention from moralists. But deep linking raises a plethora of complex property issues with subtle moral implications, and hence it deserves our careful scrutiny. The most fundamental question concerns the appropriate scope of property rights for a web site and how those rights can be properly balanced against the common good of free and open communications on the Web. It is our contention that there is no presumptive claim to the liberty of deep linking at will, since it may be disrespectful of property rights in certain situations. In order to defend this position we first make the case that a web site is a form of intellectual property, drawing support from the major theories that justify property ownership. Once we have established that a web site is really property, we consider the specific rights implied by such ownership. We conclude that on the basis of those rights, a prima facie case can be made that because of the potential for negative effects, users should not presume that deep linking is acceptable unless they first seek out the permission of the target web site.We also fully appreciate the dangers inherent in propertizing the web and the need to encourage the most flexible forms of linking. Therefore, we argue that any arbitrary or unnecessary restrictions against deep linking should be eschewed for the sake of the common good of open communications, flexibility, and maximum porosity in the Internet environment. While web site authors may indeed have a property right in their creative work they have a correlative obligation to promote the sharing and free flow of information when their specific ownership rights are not put in jeopardy by deep linking. (shrink)

Pope St. John Paul II’s work on the Theology of the Body is well known among his many followers. Less well known is his conception of the human soul. Karol Wojtyla’s intricate philosophy of the soul fully endorses Aristotelian Thomistic psychology. Wojtyla’s main contribution is a phenomenological description of human action, which provides a credible basis for inferring the soul’s necessity. In the papal writings, John Paul II develops other resourceful doctrines, especially about the timing of ensoulment. His unelaborated notion (...) of the genealogy of the person has implications for ethics. Following in the tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas, John Paul II presents an integrated wisdom about the soul that weaves together Christian revelation, modern science, and different modes of philosophical reflection. (shrink)

The future of the free market depends on fair, honest business practices. Business Ethics: Contemporary Issues and Cases aims to deepen students’ knowledge of ethical principles, corporate social responsibility, and decision-making in all aspects of business. The text presents an innovative approach to ethical reasoning grounded in moral philosophy. Focusing on corporate purpose—creating economic value, complying with laws and regulations, and observing ethical standards—a decision-making framework is presented based upon Duties-Rights-Justice. Over 40 real-world case studies allow students to grapple with (...) a wide range of moral issues related to personal integrity, corporate values, and global capitalism. Richard A. Spinello delves into the most pressing issues confronting businesses today including sexual harassment in the workplace, cybersecurity, privacy, and environmental justice. (shrink)

This essay is a critique of LarryLessig's book, Code and other Laws ofCyberspace (Basic Books, 1999). Itsummarizes Lessig's theory of the fourmodalities of regulation in cyberspace: code,law, markets, and norms. It applies thistheory to the topics of privacy and speech,illustrating how code can undermine basicrights or liberties. The review raisesquestions about the role of ethics in thismodel, and it argues that ethical principlesmust be given a privileged position in anytheory that purports to deal with the shapingof behavior in cyberspace. Finally, (...) itproposes a philosophy of ethicalself-regulation instead of an over-reliance ongovernment policy to deal with certainimproprieties and negative externalities thattend to disrupt the Net. (shrink)

The browser wars case is a useful springboard for considering the principle of positive competition and the proper regulation of platform technologies. There are lessons to be culled about policy, the application of antitrust law, and the parameters of fair competition. We argue that despite Microsofts opportunistic exploitation of its proprietary code, policy makers should resist the temptation to mandate an open source code model. Vigilant anti-trust enforcement is a preferable alternative. But courts must refrain from using antitrust law to (...) favor small innovators or to constrain the economic protections inherent in intellectual property rights, since those rights are still needed to encourage innovation. On the other hand, despite the exigencies of competition, platform leaders should respect the norm of fair competition and refrain from the impulse to tilt the platform in their favor. Preservation of robust intellectual property rights, deft application of antitrust statutes, and principled competition represent the best prescription for social wealth in the New Economy. (shrink)

As the notion of artificial moral agency gains popularity among ethicists, it threatens the unique status of the human person as a responsible moral agent. The philosophy of ontocentrism, popularized by Luciano Floridi, argues that biocentrism is too restrictive and must yield to a new philosophical vision that endows all beings with some intrinsic value. Floridi’s macroethics also regards more sophisticated digital entities such as robots as accountable moral agents. To refute these principles, this paper turns to the thought of (...) Karol Wojtyla, who argued cogently for an intimate correlation between personal action (actus personae) and moral agency. By examining the distinguishing characteristics of personal action, we can ascertain the necessary conditions of moral agency and demonstrate why artificial entities do not meet those condi­tions. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 479–501. (shrink)

The Internet presents opportunities for corporations to efficiently build their brands online and to enhance their global reach. But there are threats as well as opportunities, since anti-branding and free-riding activities are easier in cyberspace. One such threat is theunauthorized incorporation of a trademark into a domain name. This can lead to trademark dilution and cause consumer confusion. But some users claim a right to use these trademarks for the purpose of parody or criticism. Underlying these trademark conflicts is the (...) familiar tension between property rights and free speech rights. While some trademark scholars are reluctant to consider a trademark as property, we find strong support for the property paradigm in Hegel’s philosophy. Assuming that a trademark is an earned property right, we propose that a trademark owner should be allowed to control the permutations of its trademark incorporated into domain names unless a reasonable person would not confuse that domain name with the company’s mark. But we also conclude that there must be latitude to employ a domain name for negative editorial comment, so long as the source and purpose of that domain name is plainly apparent. (shrink)

The principal theme of this paper is secondary liability ‐ to what extent should we hold those who cooperate in wrongdoing and illicit behavior accountable? We probe this question by considering a lawsuit filed by the entertainment industry against the file‐swapping services of Grokster and StreamCast. Our focus is on the legal and moral implications of this case. We argue that the courts, which have so far ruled in favor of the defendants, have misapplied the socalled Sony precedent for two (...) reasons. The business model of these companies depends on copyright infringement with advertising volume directly proportionate to the level of that infringement. Also, Sony’s safe harbor should not apply if there is active inducement of infringement. The key ethical question is the extent to which technological innovators must design and write their code to deal with infringement ex ante. We argue that purveyors of peerto‐ peer technology are formal cooperators in wrongdoing if they deliberately configure their system to enable the illicit copying of copyrighted music and movie files. We also consider the conditions for unjustifiable material cooperation, and propose these conditions as a normative standard especially relevant for software vendors. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

According to its supporters open source software is more secure and reliable than proprietary code, and even tends to foster more innovation. Its technical superiority can be linked to the ongoing peer review process which typifies the open source model. In addition, programs such as Linux offer a potential challenge to the hegemony of Microsoft. Open source holds out the possibility of restraining platform leaders such as Microsoft from acting opportunistically. Some even argue that the open source code model is (...) ethically superior to the proprietary model because of its transparency. Given these economic and social benefits, should government policy makers intervene, by tilting the playing field to open source programs? Would such government intervention truly be welfare‐enhancing? Before answering that question we note that some of the presumed technical and economic benefits of open source software are open to question. At the same time, the claims of moral superiority or social desirability are inflated and discount incentives necessary for software development. But even if this software were technically and morally superior, there is still no basis for government intervention. Our position is simple: the invisible hand of the market and not the visible hand of government should decide the fate of open source code. There is no identifiable market failure for the government to fix nor is there any plausible policy justification for giving open source software preferential treatment. (shrink)

Review of Rupert M. Scheule, Rafael Capurro and Thomas Hausmanninger : Vernetzt gespalten: Der Digital Divide in ethischer Perspektive München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2004.