The aim of this paper is to present lucid and sympathetic approach to Heraclitean paradoxes. I do not intend to resolve them in terms of Aristotelian logic. Instead, I attempt to reveal their connection with language, their dependence on Greek semantics and syntax. From such a point of view one may eventually see the great significance of language in general as an epistemic guide in Heraclitus' philosophical investigations.

The paper deals with the mythological background for the philosophical concept of being. Against this background the early development of this concept and its conditions are shown. Also, some attention will be paid to certain linguistic aspect behind this process.

The main goal of this article is to show diverse approaches in political culture and some of the problems arising from this, as well as to point out the differences between the two perspectives – theories of political science and political philosophy. The author starts by analysing the classic definition of political culture developed by Gabriel Almond and presents the critique of this definition. He also describes a new approach proposed by researchers, such as Władysław Markiewicz, Andrzej W. Jabłoński and (...) Zbigniew Blok. The main problem with Almond’s concept – as the political scientists indicate – is that it is of little relevance for empirical studies. The researchers try to make this concept more useful as a research tool for examining political reality. On the other hand, Cezary Kościelniak and Janusz Wiśniewski attempt to define political culture in political philosophy’s terms. Their intention is to make this concept work as a counterfactual conceptualization of political reality. (shrink)

The book is devoted to the thought of one of the 20th century's most interesting philosophers of religion. Heschel, a traditional Polish Jew who became a modern thinker, was also an impressive prophet of interreligious dialogue.

Context is essential in virtually all human activities. Yet some logical notions seem to be context-free. For example, the nature of the universal quantifier, the very meaning of “all”, seems to be independent of the context. At the same time, there are many quantifier expressions, and some are context-independent, while others are not. Similarly, purely logical consequence seems to be context-independent. Yet often we encounter strong inferences, good enough for practical purposes, but not valid. The two types of examples suggest (...) a general problem: how to characterise the context-free logical concepts in their natural environment, that is, in the field of their context-dependent associates. A general Thesis on Quantifiers is formulated: among all quantifiers, the context-free ones are just those definable by the universal quantifier. The issue of inferences is treated following the approach introduced by Richard L. Epstein: valid ones are an extreme case, the result of the disappearance of context-dependence. This idea can be applied to an analysis of a form of abduction, called “reductive inference” in Polish literature on logic. A tentative Thesis on Inferences identifies the validity of a strong inference that is context-independent. (shrink)

This paper undertakes the question concerning methodological consequences of understanding phenomenology from the viewpoint of the category of the gift. In regard to the philosophical enterprise of Jean-Luc Marion, manifestation is understood as an act of givenness, which has a radically non-objective character. Next, this paper points out the classical source of the concept of givenness. It also mentions that givenness is a result of material interpretation of the Husserlian term “Gegebenheit.” Then, givenness is presented as a figure that requires (...) a phenomenological method to bracket mere terms that phenomenology employs. This mechanism helps to describe reduction as a radical method of bracketing metaphysics. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss the “multimedia encyclopedia” genre launched in the 1980s, the era of “the multimedia revolution.” Encyclopedias of this kind were released on CD-ROM by several well-respected encyclopedia publishers and were widely discussed as an innovation which would lead to information and communication technologies extending rather than replacing the Gutenberg Galaxy. While discussing the launch of multimedia encyclopedias I aim to show how the culture of the printed word was perceived in “the information revolution” (...) discourse of the time by relevant cultural intermediaries. (shrink)

The volume is a collection of essays about prominent Polish 20th century philosophers of science and scientists who were concerned with problems in the philosophy of science. The contribution made by Polish logicians, especially those from the Lvov-Warsaw School, like Lukasiewicz, Kotarbiński, Czeżowski or Ajdukiewicz, is already well known. One of the aims of the volume is to offer a broader perspective. The papers collected here are devoted to the work of such philosophers as Zawirski, Metallmann, Dąmbska, Mehlberg, Szaniawski and (...) Giedymin as well as to the work of such scientists as Smoluchowski, Fleck, Infeld and Chyliński. The introduction to the volume, written by the editor and Jacek Jadacki, presents an overview of the history of the Polish philosophy of science from the foundation of the Cracow Academy (in 1364) to the present. (shrink)

The article puts forward the thesis that Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics can be useful for conceptualising the issue of the Anthropocene. Both speculative features of hermeneutics generally and specific Gadamerian insights are helpful for this matter. As for the speculative features of hermeneutics, the concept of understanding may be used, as well as Gadamer's analysis of prejudices and of the history of effect. Further, Gadamer's ecological insights anticipated some problems raised by the philosophy of the Anthropocene and are therefore also helpful (...) in our current articulation of the concept. (shrink)

In the article we study the existence predicate \(\varepsilon\) in the context of semantics for first-order modal logic. For a formula \(\varphi\) we define \(\varphi^{\varepsilon}\) - the so called existence relativization. We point to a gap in the work of Fitting and Mendelsohn concerning the relationship between the truth of \(\varphi\) and \(\varphi^{\varepsilon}\) in classes of varying- and constant-domain models. We introduce operations on models which allow us to fill the gap and provide a more general perspective on the issue. (...) As a result we obtain a series of theorems describing the logical connection between the notion of truth of a formula with the existence predicate in constant-domain models and the notion of truth of a formula without the existence predicate in varying-domain models. (shrink)

The General Formal Ontology is a top-level ontology that is being developed at the University of Leipzig since 1999. Besides introducing some of the basic principles of the ontology, we expound axiomatic fragments of its formalization and present ontological models of several use cases. GFO is a top-level ontology that integrates objects and processes into a unified framework, in a way that differs significantly from other ontologies. Another unique selling feature of GFO is its meta-ontological architecture, which includes set theory (...) into ontology and which accounts for its specific role in common representation approaches. The second level of that architecture starts from the distinction of categories and individuals, which forms the backbone of the world’s structure. Furthermore, GFO comprises several kinds of categories, among them universals and concepts, and it considers several ontological regions and levels. In the context of this special issue paper, we study five pre-determined use cases from the perspective of GFO. The results of these analyses yield insights into how the ontology treats several important notions. Very abridged, this covers material objects and their composition; roles and social entities; properties with their relations to objects and processes, and their changing; changes of processes, including a functional perspective; and, eventually, the nature and changing of concepts as well as terminology. A final part summarizes application projects that use GFO in various contexts. (shrink)

Contacts between Polish historians, French historians and French centers of historiography – espcially with the prestigious milieu of Fernand Braudel's Annales – were unusual and extraordinary in comparison with other forms of scientific cooperation with foreign countries: both with the West and the “friendly countries.” Because of the undeniable uniqueness of these relations many scholars from various countries claim that the annalistic methodology “influnced” Polish historiography. What is characteristic, however, is that these statements are most often completely a priori. This (...) paper is a reflection on the nature of the methodological influence of one historical school on the other and discusses such a possibility, taking into consideration models of circulation of ideas proposed by Pierre Bourdieu and Jerzy Maternicki. It is also an attempt at answering whether historical sciences are able to freely interfere on a supra-national level or whether they are by nature characterized by provincialism, understood here as a limitation to national frameworks outside of which they cannot be understood. (shrink)

The paper is a critical reaction to Marcin Trepczyński article “Thomas Aquinas Non-Monotonically” (Filozofia Nauki 2/2011). It is shown that the author misunderstood the real forms of Thomas Aquinas reasoning. I present arguments which show why these reasonings are monotonic by analyzing some of the examples which Trepczyński is using to justify the opposite thesis.

Tematem artykułu jest tom poetycki Tomasza Bąka XXI. Nagi wodnik w śródmieściu (2021). Autor interpretuje go jako zawoalowaną próbę wyjścia z realizmu kapitalistycznego, która odbywa się pod pretekstem opowieści o jednym aspekcie katastrofy klimatycznej: wzroście poziomu morza. Bąk wydaje się traktować ów „potop” jako swego rodzaju interwencję Realnego, które coraz silniej przebija spod szczelin kapitalistycznej zasady rzeczywistości. Strategia poetycka Bąka polega na odnajdywaniu tego rodzaju szczelin w samym środku realizmu kapitalistycznego i wykonywaniu pracy żałoby po świecie, który już się skończył.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Critical Conditions: Postmodernity and the Question of FoundationsBruce KrajewskiCritical Conditions: Postmodernity and the Question of Foundations, by Horace L. Fairlamb; xii & 271 pp. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, $59.95 cloth, $17.95 paper.Some theories might be in critical condition, but others are terminal, run aground by their own illogic, according to Horace Fairlamb. Despite some theories’ terminal state, Fairlamb still senses dangers, for as he says in (...) his introduction: “If critical authority cannot turn to metaphysical permanence, transcendental subjectivity, scientific objectivity, formal systematicity, methodological closure, or any other transcending constraints for its authority, are we not left with nothing firmer than Nietzschean perspectivism and an anarchy of wills to power? Might not the respectable looking Trojan Horse of philosophical hermeneutics be filled with sophists, gamesters, and fascists?” Well, yes and no and maybe.Fairlamb explores the issue of foundationalism, later called foundationism, in eight chapters, an introduction, and a conclusion. Most of the eight chapters are labeled as devoted to single contemporary thinkers and theorists, all male: Stanley Fish, Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas. Fairlamb has problems with all these people, and he is very good at laying out objections, based in logic, that arise from the main positions of each. He wants to provide “an analysis of how certain strategies fail to address foundational problems” (p. xi).This analysis consists mainly of turning positions back on themselves, so that when Fish or Habermas or any one of the people addressed in the book makes a claim that indicates an anti-foundational position, Fairlamb jumps in to ask: where is the foundation for the anti-foundational positions? This tactic fills the book, and becomes the driving force of a number of questions and assertions that follow a similar pattern. For instance: “Fish’s radical hermeneutics condemns universalism, but constantly practices it” (p. 40), or “Gadamer’s vision of philosophical hermeneutics must have non-historical authority lest it reduce to his historically bound prejudices” (p. 127). At the end, Fairlamb feels he has demonstrated the logical paradoxes and argumentative blind spots of the various theorists and thinkers mentioned above, and he proposes instead what he calls “a heterological foundationism [that] is able to account for both what changes and what stays the same, and thereby account for the failure of both reductive foundationism and relativism” (p. 263).While I can applaud Fairlamb the logician, I cannot recommend the book. The deck is stacked from the beginning, as he admits early on: “I do not claim to represent the entire range of these authors’ works and thought, nor all their subsequent revisions and recantations” (p. xi). The game here is not to think about the thinkers at all, which is perhaps why Fairlamb rehearses some knee-jerk positions, such as an attack (p. 25) on Derrida’s too-famous statement “there is nothing outside the text.” While he cites (p. 266) Rodolphe Gasché’s [End Page 271] The Tain of the Mirror, Fairlamb apparently refuses Gasché’s reading of the sentence that “does not permit the conclusion that there is nothing else but texts, or for that matter, that all is language” (Tain, p. 281).By dealing only with the logic of some works, Fairlamb unburdens himself of the need, for instance, to attend to Gadamer’s Gesammelte Werke, or to any of the thinkers’ writings in their original languages, a task even some postmodernists agree is foundational for basic scholarship. One can only guess that the universal language of logic has no patience with foreign languages, except to lay bare the inconsistencies and paradoxes of selected bits of syntax.Bruce KrajewskiLaurentian UniversityCopyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

This paper discusses the conditions under which an agent is rationally permitted to leave some uncertain propositions relevant to her decision out of her deliberation. By relying on the view that belief involves a defeasible disposition to treat a proposition as true in one’s reasoning, we examine the conditions under which such a disposition can be overridden and under which an agent should take into account her uncertainty as to a proposition she believes in the course of a particular deliberation. (...) We argue that, in some contexts, an agent can be faced with the choice of either accepting or not accepting a proposition she believes in the course of her deliberation. We provide a description of such higher-order deliberations within the framework of expected utility theory and draw conclusions regarding the phenomenon of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. (shrink)

FRAGMENT OR THE BORDERLANDS OF PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE IN EMIL CIORAN’S WRITINGS This article concerns fragmentary writing of Emil Cioran. The author tries to show that the fragment is a specific type of artistic creativity that is situated between literature and philosophy. The initial part of the article deals with the problem of modern fragmentarism that was born in the times of German romanticism. Then, the author investigates the causes of Cioran’s fragmentary writing, which are: the opposition to systematic philosophy, (...) the opposition to modern idea of a literary „work” and the intellectual honesty which shows heterogeneity of life. All this makes the fragment very difficult to interpret: we wish to adopt the whole sense of it, but we cannot do this. Also, the title issue turns out to be unsolvable. Cioran escapes fixed categories. And fragment, as an unsuccessful, fractured discourse, can be both literature and philosophy, or none of them. That makes it similar to Jacques Derrida’s ideas of farmakon, aporia or différance. (shrink)

The dynamics of ancient civilisations according to credited historians can be explained by means of a simple linear time-invariant feedback model whose loop only consists of a first-order process and a pure time delay. It is shown that, despite its simplicity, this model can give rise to a variety of responses, either oscillatory or aperiodic, such as those envisaged by A. Toynbee. Since modern civilisations are characterised by fast parameter variations, their description calls instead for a time-variant model. Simulations with (...) the linear parameter-varying model obtained from the aforementioned LTI model by letting its parameter vary are carried out to show the influence of different scenarios on the system response. Even if this model is elementary, it is believed that it may serve as a stimulating “tool for thought” in the ever-popular debate on the growth and decline of civilisations. (shrink)

The idea of applying biomimicry to cities is attracting increasing attention as a way of achieving sustainability. Undoubtedly the most frequently evoked natural model in this context is the forest, though it has not yet been investigated with any great scientific rigour. To overcome this lacuna, we provide: first, a justification of the model of the forest via what we call the arguments from “fittingness”, “scale”, and “complexity”; second, an exploration of various key innovations made possible by this model in (...) the fields of urban planning, urban water systems, urban energy and transport systems, and urban food and nutrient systems. (shrink)

_Brings together all of Gadamer's published writings on Celan's poetry, and makes them available in English for the first time. This is accessible commentary on a notoriously difficult poet._.

This book is devoted to the problems of the growth of science. These prob lems, neglected for a long time by the philosophers of science, have become in the 60's and 70's a subject of vivid discussion. There are philosophers who stress only the dependence of science upon various sociological, psycho logical and other factors and deny any internal laws of the development of knowledge, like approaching the truth. The majority rejects such nihilism and searches for the laws of the (...) growth of science. However, they often overlook the role of the Correspondence Principle which connects the suc cessive scientific theories. On the other hand, some authors, while stressing the role of this principle, overlook logical difficulties connected with it, e. g. the problem of the incompatibility of successive theories, of the falsity of some of their assumptions, etc. I believe the Correspondence Principle to be a basic principle of the pro gress of contemporary physics and, probably, of every advanced science. How ever, this principle must be properly interpreted and the above-mentioned logical difficulties must be solved. Their solution requires, as it seems, revealing the idealizational nature of the basic laws of science, in any case of the quantitative laws of advanced sciences. This point has been recently emphasized by some Polish philosophers, especially in Poznan. (shrink)

In his ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’, Lewis argued that a particular kinematical model for chances follows from his principal principle. According to this model, any later chance function is equal to an earlier chance function conditional on the complete intervening history of non-modal facts. This article first investigates the conditions that any kinematical model for chance needs to satisfy to count as Lewis’s kinematics of chance. Second, it presents Lewis’s justification for his kinematics of chance and explains why (...) it is bound to be problematic. Third, it gives an alternative justification for Lewis’s kinematics of chance that does not appeal to the principal principle. Instead, this justification appeals to a well-supported requirement for chance, according to which any prior chance function must be a convex combination of the possible posterior chance functions. It is shown that under a plausible assumption, Lewis’s kinematics of chance is equivalent to this requirement. Finally, by focusing on this requirement, it is explained why the so-called self-undermining chances fail to obey Lewis’s kinematics of chance. (shrink)

This paper shows how a particular resiliency-centered approach to chance lends support for two conditions characterizing chance. The first condition says that the present chance of some proposition A conditional on the proposition about some later chance of A should be set equal to that later chance of A. The second condition requires the present chance of some proposition A to be equal to the weighted average of possible later chances of A. I first introduce, motivate, and make precise a (...) resiliency-centered approach to chance whose basic idea is that any chance distribution should be maximally invariant under variation of experimental factors. Second, I show that any present chance distribution that violates the two conditions can be replaced by another present chance distribution that satisfies them and is more resilient under variation of experimental factors. This shows that the two conditions are an essential feature of chances that maximize resiliency. Finally, I explore the relationship between the idea of resilient chances so understood and so-called Humean accounts of chance—one of the most promising recent philosophical accounts of chance. (shrink)

The standard principle of expert deference says that conditional on the expert’s credence in a proposition _A_ being _x_, your credence in _A_ ought to be _x_. The so-called Adams conditionalization is an attractive update rule in situations when learning experience prompts a shift in your conditional credences. In this paper, I show that, except in some trivial situations, when your prior conditional credence in _A_ obeys the standard principle of expert deference and then is revised by Adams conditionalization in (...) response to a shift in your conditional credence for a proposition _B_ given _A_, your posterior conditional credence in _A_ cannot continue to obey that principle, on pain of inconsistency. I explain why this tension between Adams conditionalization and the standard principle of expert deference is puzzling and why the option of rejecting the update rule appears problematic. Finally, I suggest that in order to avoid this inconsistency, we should abandon the standard principle of expert deference and think of an expert’s probabilistic opinion as a constraint on your posterior credence distribution rather than your prior one. (shrink)

This paper introduces the special issue on the Concept of God of the Journal of Applied Logics (College Publications). The issue contains the following articles: Logic and the Concept of God, by Stanisław Krajewski and Ricardo Silvestre; Mathematical Models in Theology. A Buber-inspired Model of God and its Application to “Shema Israel”, by Stanisław Krajewski; Gödel’s God-like Essence, by Talia Leven; A Logical Solution to the Paradox of the Stone, by Héctor Hernández Ortiz and Victor Cantero; No New (...) Solutions to the Logical Problem of the Trinity, by Beau Branson; What Means ‘Tri-’ in ‘Trinity’ ? An Eastern Patristic Approach to the ‘Quasi-Ordinals’, by Basil Lourié; The Éminence Grise of Christology: Porphyry’s Logical Teaching as a Cornerstone of Argumentation in Christological Debates of the Fifth and Sixth Centruies, by Anna Zhyrkova; The Problem of Universals in Late Patristic Theology, by Dirk Krasmüller; Intuitionist Reasoning in the Tri-unitrian Theology of Nicolas of Cues, by Antonino Drago. (shrink)

In sequential decision problems, an act of learning cost-free evidence might be symptomatic, in the sense that performing this act itself provides evidence about states of the world it does nothing to causally promote. It is well known that orthodox causal decision theory, like its main rival evidential decision theory, may sanction such acts as rationally impermissible. This paper shows that, under plausible assumptions, a minimal version of ratificationist causal decision theory, known as principled ratificationism, fares better in this respect, (...) for it never labels symptomatic acts of learning cost-free evidence as rationally impermissible. (shrink)

We explore the question of whether cost-free uncertain evidence is worth waiting for in advance of making a decision. A classical result in Bayesian decision theory, known as the value of evidence theorem, says that, under certain conditions, when you update your credences by conditionalizing on some cost-free and certain evidence, the subjective expected utility of obtaining this evidence is never less than the subjective expected utility of not obtaining it. We extend this result to a type of update method, (...) a variant of Judea Pearl’s virtual conditionalization, where uncertain evidence is represented as a set of likelihood ratios. Moreover, we argue that focusing on this method rather than on the widely accepted Jeffrey conditionalization enables us to show that, under a fairly plausible assumption, gathering uncertain evidence not only maximizes expected pragmatic utility, but also minimizes expected epistemic disutility. (shrink)