Resumen: Las nuevas tecnologías biomédicas han planteado la posibilidad de intervenir en la capacidad de decisión sobre el bien y el mal, es decir, en la evaluación de la moralidad de los actos humanos. Aunque estas intervenciones (genéticas o neurológicas) no pretenden alterar la identidad del individuo, sus planteamientos no lo descartan. En consecuencia, el dilema entre terapia y mejora, en el contexto moral, adquiere especial relevancia. Aunque la terapia intentaría restaurar la capacidad individual para decidir entre el bien y (...) el mal, la mejora biomédica plantea otros objetivos para los que es necesario abordar los fundamentos de la entidad humana, en particular algunos conceptos filosóficos como la identidad y la autonomía. Desde la filosofía moral, el desarrollo del individuo debe estructurarse fuera del campo tecnológico y abordar una perspectiva que considere el factor relacional y la existencia del otro como elemento fundamental para alcanzar la plenitud del ser humano. Abstract: The new biomedical technologies have raised the possibility of intervening in the decision-making capacity regarding good and evil, that is, in the evaluation of the morality of human acts. Although these interventions (genetic or neurological) do not intend to alter the identity of the individual, their approaches do not rule it out. Consequently, the dilemma between therapy and improvement, in the moral context, acquires special relevance. Although the therapy would try to restore the individual capacity to decide between good and evil, biomedical enhancement raises other objectives for which it is necessary to address the foundations of the human entity, in particular some philosophical concepts such as identity and autonomy. From moral philosophy, the development of the individual must be structured outside the technological field and approach a perspective that considers the relational factor and the existence of the other as a fundamental element to achieve the fullness of the human being. (shrink)

The moral debate on living-donor organ transplantation historically focused on how to overcome the problem of the mutilation inherent in such a medical operation. In time, theologians began proposing justifications of LDOT that assumed that “mere removals” did not constitute mutilation. The example of mutilation as an “intrinsically evil act” in Veritatis splendor would seem to have closed the debate. Nevertheless, many theologians continue to address LDOT as a question of justifying a mutilation. The authors provide a brief summary of (...) the major contributors before and after Veritatis splendor to show that confusion still exists, and then propose new approaches to help resolve this important bioethical issue. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 13.3 : 427–436. (shrink)

The use of sedation at the end of life is proving a difficult topic of bioethical debate. In spite of efforts to reach agreement on definitions and guidelines, the practice most commonly known as palliative, or terminal, sedation remains a source of ambiguity and confusion. The goal of this article is to offer the reader a primer on the topic of palliative sedation. Two specific objectives are proposed: first, to orient the reader to some of the principal elements of the (...) clinical and bioethical literature on palliative sedation; and second, to describe what we believe to be some of the principal sources for a theological understanding and evaluation of the use of sedation at the end of life. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 12.2 (Summer 2012): 263–281. (shrink)