In his lectures, Kant suggested to his students that the freedom of a divine holy will is “easier to comprehend than that of the human will,”(28:609) but this suggestion has remained neglected. After a review of some of Kant’s familiar claims about the will (in general), and about the divine holy will in particular, I consider how these claims give rise to some initial objections to that conception. Then I defend an interpretation of Kant’s conception of the divine will, and (...) of its historical development in relation to Leibniz and Spinoza, that identifies the content, origin, and role of God’s representations in a way that is responsive to some of the historical and contemporary problems. Finally, I trace a few of the implications of this account of the divine will for our understanding Kant’s account of freedom more generally, including human freedom. (shrink)

Kant’s claims about supersensible objects, and his account of the epistemic status of such claims, remain poorly understood, to the detriment of our understanding of Kant’s metaphysical and epistemological system. In the Critique of Practical Reason, and again in the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that we have practical cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen) of the moral law and of our supersensible freedom; that this cognition and knowledge cohere with, yet go beyond the limits of, our theoretical cognition; and that (...) this knowledge grounds rational belief (Vernunftglaube) in the existence of God, the immortality of our soul, and the real possibility of the “highest good.” This essay untangles some of these claims about practical cognition, practical knowledge, and practical belief and their relation to Kant’s account of theoretical cognition and theoretical knowledge. There is a core conception of cognition and knowledge underlying the accounts of theoretical cognition and practical cognition, which allows for a principled distinction between cases of practical knowledge and practical belief. Kant’s doctrine of the “fact of reason” turns out to be crucial to his claims about legitimacy of and distinction between the two forms of practical cognition, one which constitutes knowledge and another which cannot. (shrink)

Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists on challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution. Three main questions are addressed: Can one reasonably maintain one's moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society's moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting (...) one or both of those belief sources? Should evolutionary accounts of the origins of our moral beliefs and our religious beliefs undermine our confidence in their veracity? This volume places challenges to moral belief side-by-side with challenges to religious belief, sets evolution-based challenges alongside disagreement-based challenges, and includes philosophical perspectives together with theological and social science perspectives, with the aim of cultivating insights and lines of inquiry that are easily missed within a single discipline or when these topics are treated in isolation. The result is a collection of essays--representing both skeptical and non-skeptical positions about morality and religion--that move these discussions forward in new and illuminating directions. -/- Contributors: Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame; Michael Bergmann, Purdue University; Sarah Brosnan, Georgia State University; William FitzPatrick, University of Rochester; John Hare, Yale University; Timothy P. Jackson, Emory University; Patrick Kain, Purdue University; Jordan Kiper, University of Connecticut; Dustin Locke, Claremont McKenna College; Charles Mathewes, University of Virginia; Mark C. Murphy, Georgetown University; John Pittard, Yale Divinity School; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Duke University; Richard Sosis, University of Connecticut; Sharon Street, New York University; Joshua Thurow, University of Texas at San Antonio; Ralph Wedgwood, University of Southern California. (shrink)

Kant famously insisted that “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will” is the supreme principle of morality. Recent interpreters have taken this emphasis on the self-legislation of the moral law as evidence that Kant endorsed a distinctively constructivist conception of morality according to which the moral law is a positive law, created by us. But a closer historical examination suggests otherwise. Kant developed his conception of legislation in the context of his opposition to (...) theological voluntarist accounts of morality and his engagement with conceptions of obligation found in his Wolffian predecessors. In order to defend important claims about the necessity and immediacy of moral obligation, Kant drew and refined a distinction between the legislation and authorship of the moral law in a way that precludes standard theological voluntarist theories and presents an obstacle to recent constructivist interpretations. A correct understanding of Kant's development and use of this distinction reveals that his conception of legislation leaves little room for constructivist moral anti-realism. (shrink)

Kant's lectures on anthropology capture him at the height of his intellectual power. They are immensely important for advancing our understanding of Kant's conception of anthropology, its development, and the notoriously difficult relationship between it and the critical philosophy. This 2003 collection of essays by some of the leading commentators on Kant offers a systematic account of the philosophical importance of this material that should nevertheless prove of interest to historians of ideas and political theorists. There are two broad approaches (...) adopted: a number of the essays consider the systematic relations of the anthropology to critical philosophy, especially speculative knowledge and ethics. Other essays focus on the anthropology as a major source for the clarification of both the content and development of Kant's work. The volume also serves as an interpretative complement to the translation of the lectures in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. (shrink)

Within the theory of rational agency found in Kant's anthropology lectures and sketched in the moral philosophy, prudence is the manifestation of a distinctive, nonmoral rational capacity concerned with one's own happiness or well-being. Contrary to influential claims that prudential reasons are mere prima facie or "candidate" reasons, prudence can be seen to be a genuine manifestation of rational agency, involving a distinctive sort of normative authority, an authority distinguishable from and conceptually prior to that of moral norms, though still (...) overridable by them. The anthropology lectures make an important contribution to the understanding of Kant's account of the distinctive prudential task: despite Kant's familiar complaints about human finitude and the natural dialectic of our desires, Kant offers useful suggestions about how prudential reflection can generate genuine practical guidance. Even with several significant developments in Kant's anthropological theory over time, prudential norms can still be regarded as distinctive and conceptually independent of morality. (shrink)

A better appreciation of Kant’s commitments in a variety of disciplines reveals Kant had a deeper understanding of human and non-human animals than generally recognized, and this sheds new light on Kant’s claims about the nature and scope of moral status and helps to address, at least from Kant’s perspective, many of the familiar objections to his notorious account of “duties regarding animals.” Kant’s core principles about the nature of moral obligation structure his thoughts about the moral status of human (...) beings and non-human animals. Kant’s commitments in biology, psychology, anthropology and physical geography support his account of the nature of and distinction between humans and non-human animals. This account supports Kant’s judgment that we have duties to every human being and significant duties regarding non-human animals, duties which involve direct concern for animals because of their nature. A comparison of Kant’s account with some recently proposed Kantian alternatives provides additional perspective on some of the distinctive features, and strengths and weaknesses, of Kant’s approach. (shrink)

The determination of individual moral status is a central factor in the ethical evaluation of controversial practices such as elective abortion, human embryo-destructive research, and the care of the severely disabled and those in persistent vegetative states. A review of recent work on Kant reveals the need for a careful examination of the content of Kant ’s biological and psychological theories and their relation to his views about moral status. Such an examination, in conjunction with Kant ’s practical-metaphysical analysis of (...) the origins of freedom, reveals Kant ’s principled basis for his contention that all human beings possess moral status. (shrink)

This critical survey of recent work on Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason and his doctrine of the practical postulates (of freedom, God, and immortality) assesses the implications of these doctrines for the debate about realism and antirealism in Kant's moral philosophy. Section 1 briefly surveys some salient considerations from the first Critique and Groundwork. In section 2, I argue that recent work on the role, content, "factual" nature, and epistemic status of the fact of reason does not support (...) an anti-realist interpretation of Kant's ethics. In section 3, I argue that recent work on the derivation and epistemic and ontological status of the practical postulates does not support an anti-realist interpretation of Kant's ethics. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on Kant’s position concerning the nature of nonhuman animals and the moral obligations that humans have toward animals. It begins by describing Kant’s account of the nature of animals and the distinction between humans and nonhuman animals. It then moves on to explaining Kant’s account of the nature of moral obligation and his oft-misunderstood contention that we do not have “duties to” nonhuman animals but only “duties with regard to” these animals. The chapter corrects the orthodox reading (...) of Kant’s position, which has it that he considers benevolence toward animals to be justified only by the effects of brutality on the human who commits brutal acts. Instead Kant argues that animals are worthy of admiration, love, sympathy and gratitude, despite not being “ends in themselves” like humans. Finally, the chapter considers Kant’s position in relation to that of another important eighteenth-century moral theorist, Francis Hutcheson. (shrink)

A Study of the Phenomenology of Spirit Philip J. Kain. more important than the object. The object is nothing but an object-of-my- desire (A, I, 36/SW, XII, 64-5). Strangely enough — and this is another reason why desire is such an excellent ...

FOR NIETZSCHE, THERE IS NO TRUTH. WHAT THEN ARE WE TO SAY OF HIS DOCTRINES OF WILL TO POWER AND ETERNAL RECURRENCE WHICH SEEM TO BE HELD AS TRUTHS? THEY TOO ARE ILLUSIONS. BUT, IF SO, HOW CAN ONE HOLD THAT THESE ILLUSIONS ARE TO BE PREFERRED TO OTHER ILLUSIONS? BECAUSE THE HIGHEST STATE IS TO BE THE SOURCE OF ALL VALUE AND MEANING ONESELF WITHOUT RELYING ON AN INDEPENDENT STANDARD OF TRUTH.

This book traces the development of Marx's ethics as they underwent various shifts and changes during different periods of his thought. In his early writings, his ethics were based on a concept of essence much like Aristotle's, which Marx tried to link to a principle of universalization similar to Kant's "categorical imperative." In the period 1845-46, Marx abandoned this view, holding morality to be incompatible with his historical materialism. In the later work he was less of a determinist. Though he (...) no longer wished to reject morality, he did want to transcend a morality of burdensome obligation and constraint in order to realize a community built upon spontaneous bonds of solidarity. (shrink)

Aesth. Hegel, Aesthetics Aesth. Ed. Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man CI1PR Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right Civil War Marx, The Civil War in France CPE Marx, Critique of Political Economy Em. Hegel, Enzyklopadie der ...

On what might be called a Marxist reading, Hegel’s analysis of civil society accurately recognizes a necessary tendency toward a polarization of classes and the pauperization of the proletariat, a problem for which Hegel, however, has no solution. Indeed, Marxists think there can be no solution short of eliminating civil society. It is not at all clear that this standard reading is correct. The present paper tries to show how it is plausible to understand Hegel as proposing a solution, one (...) that is similar to that of social democrats, and one that could actually work. (shrink)

In this paper, I advocate a value realist interpretation of Kant’s ethics by examining, in some detail, both Kant’s discussion of the grounding of the moral law in Groundwork II and his discussion of the “paradox of method” in the Critique of Practical Reason. On a plausible reading of both the Groundwork and second Critique, Kant maintains that human beings, and more generally, rational beings, have dignity or inner worth. We cognize through the moral law that our existence and inner (...) value is the objective ground of the law and that we are the “subject[s] of the moral law.” This dignity of rational beings is fundamental and irreducible. This qualifies as a distinctive kind of value realism. (shrink)

Several interpretive disagreements about Kant's theory of divine commands (esp. in the work of Allen Wood and John E. Hare) can be resolved with further attention to Kant's works. It is argued that Kant's moral theism included (at least until 1797) the claim that practical reason, reflecting upon the absolute authority of the moral law, should lead finite rational beings like us to believe that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and holy being who commands our obedience to the moral law (...) and proportions happiness to virtue. Kant's apparently contradictory claims about the relationship between morality and religion reflect his view that our acceptance of the authority of the moral law is incomplete or rationally unstable absent such a theological postulate. (shrink)

Nietzsche believed in the horror of existence: a world filled with meaningless suffering_suffering for no reason at all. He also believed in eternal recurrence, the view that that our lives will repeat infinitely, and that in each life every detail will be exactly the same. Furthermore, it was not enough for Nietzsche that eternal recurrence simply be accepted_he demanded that it be loved. Thus the philosopher who introduces eternal recurrence is the very same philosopher who also believes in the horror (...) of existence. In this groundbreaking study, Philip Kain develops an insightful account of Nietzsche's strange and paradoxical view that a life of pain and suffering is perhaps the only life it really makes sense to want to live again. (shrink)

This article examines Hegel's treatment of Antigone and of women in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I differ from many other scholars in arguing that Antigone ought to be understood as like the Hegelian slave—both were dominated and oppressed, but, through that very domination and oppression, they subverted the master and ultimately made as significant a contribution to culture as he did. Antigone represents a form of individualism which, unlike liberal individualism, is compatible with the Sittlichkeit that Hegel wants to achieve (...) for the modern world. Despite the fact that many of Hegel's views on women are not acceptable, he nevertheless has some things to say that can be of value for feminists. Certainly, his views are not as objectionable as the ones he seems to hold in the Philosophy of Right, and the latter should not be projected back into the Phenomenology. (shrink)

This book traces the development of Marx's ethics as they underwent various shifts and changes during different periods of his thought. In his early writings, his ethics were based on a concept of essence much like Aristotle's, which Marx tried to link to a principle of universalization similar to Kant's "categorical imperative." In the period 1845-46, Marx abandoned this view, holding morality to be incompatible with his historical materialism. In the later work he was less of a determinist. Though he (...) no longer wished to reject morality, he did want to transcend a morality of burdensome obligation and constraint in order to realize a community built upon spontaneous bonds of solidarity. (shrink)

This article introduces the volume, "Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution," which contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists addressing the following three challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution: Can one reasonably maintain one’s moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society’s moral (...) intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting one or both of those belief sources? Should evolutionary accounts of the origins of our moral beliefs and our religious beliefs undermine our confidence in their veracity? By considering together both evolution-based and disagreement-based challenges to both moral and religious belief from a variety of perspectives and disciplines, this volume cultivates insights on developing these objections and responding to them—insights that would be missed with a more narrowly focused approach. After explaining the rationale for the volume, this introductory article summarizes the contents of each of the volume’s chapters and then makes some suggestions for future research on the volume topics. (shrink)

Nietzsche believed in the horror of existence—in a world filled with meaningless suffering. He also believed in eternal recurrence—that our lives will repeat infinitely and that in each life every detail will be exactly the same. Furthermore, it was not enough that eternal recurrence simply be accepted—Nietzsche demanded that it be loved. Thus the philosopher who introduces eternal recurrence is the very same philosopher who also believes in the horror of existence—a paradox that is completely overlooked by commentators (who thus (...) fail to adequately understand Nietzsche). All of this demands careful explanation. (shrink)

I would like to offer an interpretation of the Genealogy of Morals, of the relationship of master morality to slave morality, and of Nietzsche's philosophy of history that is different from the interpretation that is normally offered by Nietzsche scholars. Contrary to Nehamas, Deleuze, Danto, and many others, I wish to argue that Nietzsche does not simply embrace master morality and spurn slave morality.1 I also wish to reject the view, considered simply obvious by most scholars, that the iibermensch develops (...) out of, or on the model of, the master, not the slave.2 And to make the case for all of this, I want to explore the relationship between Hegel's master-slave dialectic and the conflict Nietzsche sees between master morality and slave morality. That Nietzsche does not intend us to recall the famous master-slave dialectic of Hegel's Phenomenology as we read the Genealogy of Morals, I find difficult to believe. Yet very few commentators ever notice, let alone explore, this connection. (shrink)

For different feminist theorists, housework and child rearing are viewed in very different ways. I argue that Marx gives us the categories that allow us to see why housework and child care can be both a paradigm of unalienated labor and also involve the greatest oppression. In developing this argument, a distinction is made between alienation and oppression and the conditions are discussed under which unalienated housework can become oppressive or can become alienated.

Within Rousseau scholarship there is serious disagreement concerning the correct way to understand Rousseau's social and political thought. For many, Rousseau does not allow for individual liberty, and also, for many, he is a muddled, confused, and inconsistent thinker. I would like to argue that Rousseau does allow for individual liberty and that his major social and political doctrines are much more consistent than is usually thought to be the case. In my view, Rousseau is a very careful thinker, but (...) his thought is difficult to understand and it is often misunderstood. (shrink)

The article focuses on philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's commitment to a virtue ethic and his belief in the horror of existence. It talks about the Nietzsche view on the need to construct a meaning for suffering in order to obscure the meaninglessness of existence. The philosophical implications that follow from the horror of existence and the need for virtue to be compatible with happiness are discussed. The article also explores the need for power to create and maintain illusions related to virtue (...) ethic and existence. (shrink)

This essay addresses the relationship between Kant's theory of moral motivation and theories of normativity. Constructivist or "ideal agent" theories of normativity claim that what makes a principle normative is that rational agents endorse or possess a motive of a certain kind to comply with it, or that they endorse or possess such a motive to comply with it insofar as they are rational. Korsgaard has argued that Kant's "motivational analysis" of the concept of obligation in Grundlegung I provides an (...) argument for such a constructivist theory of normativity. In this examination of Korsgaard's argument, I defend two important modifications of the concept of "intrinsic normativity" and suggests that once these modifications are made, the motivational analysis argument fails to establish the constructivist claim that the normative authority of the supreme principle of morality is constituted by or depends solely upon agents' motivational states. While Kant's motivational analysis helps to reveal the nature of the alleged internal relation between the supreme principle of morality and the nature of the rational will, it does not demand the adoption of a constructivist theory of normativity. (shrink)

Hegel is not a democrat. He is a monarchist. But he wants monarchy because he does not want strong government. He wants to deemphasize power. He develops an idealist conception of sovereignty that allows for a monarch less powerful than a president—one whose task is to expresses the unity of the state and realize the rationality inherent in it. A monarch needs to be a conduit through which reason is expressed and actualized, not a power that might obstruct this process.

Philip J. Kain deftly demonstrates the historical antecedents to and continuing relevance of Karl Marx's thought. Kain reveals the unappreciated pluralism of Marx, how it has endured and how it will continue to adapt to the challenges of modern day thought such as feminist theory.

All three believed that the modern world could be remade according to this model, though none succeeded in his endeavor. At times Schiller seemed to recognize the failure of the model; in his mature writing Hegel dropped the model; and Marx, as he grew older, fundamentally modified the model. Nevertheless, focusing upong their attempts and failures allows an explanation of certain aspects of one of the fundamental concerns of current Marx studies: Marx's humanism and the relationship between his earlier and (...) later thought. Using this approach, Kain shows that Marx's development cannot be divided into two neat periods - an early humanistic or philosophical period and a later scientific period - as some scholars argue, nor can one argue for an essential unity to his thought as other scholars do. Instead Kain finds Marx continually shifting his views in his attempt to come to grips with the issues that concern him. But Kain also finds a deep-seated humanism in Marx's later writings which grows out of, but differs from, the humanism of his early work. (shrink)

Marx has been criticized by feminists for many reasons, much of it based upon a misunderstanding of Marx. Many feminists take Marx's view to be that the family, gendered division of labor, and male domination are determined by either purely economic factors of natural biological factors. I try to show that Marx holds neither of these views. I also try to show that reproduction and the oppression of women that arises from men's control of private property, which are often claimed (...) to be matters of peripheral interest to Marx, are, in fact, conceptually most central and important for him. (shrink)

FOR HEGEL, ALIENATION ("ENTAUSSERUNG") IS NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH ESTRANGEMENT ("ENTFREMDUNG"). ALIENATION CAN LEAD TO ESTRANGEMENT; IT CAN WORK TO OVERCOME ESTRANGEMENT; OR IT CAN SIMPLY BE POSITIVE AND DESIRABLE ON ITS OWN. WHILE ESTRANGEMENT IS NECESSARY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURE, ULTIMATELY IT IS NEGATIVE AND IS TO BE OVERCOME; ONLY POSITIVE ALIENATION WILL THEN REMAIN. FOR THE YOUNG MARX, ALIENATION NEVER OVERCOMES ESTRANGEMENT, AND ALIENATION IS NEVER POSITIVE. ALIENATION ALWAYS LEADS TO ESTRANGEMENT AND BOTH ARE TO BE (...) OVERCOME COMPLETELY. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IT BECOMES POSSIBLE TO STUDY THE DIFFERENT WAYS IN WHICH THESE CONCEPTS OPERATE. (shrink)

Schweickart and I both discuss market socialism. Neither of us accepts the traditional Marxist view that market economies necessarily produce contradictions that drive them toward collapse. Both of us think the socialist experiments of the twentieth century show that markets cannot successfully be eliminated. Thus, for market socialism, we keep a market and we work to prevent it from producing contradictions, alienation, and collapse. One question that arises here concerns the role of labor unions. Should they play a major role (...) in market socialism, or are there respects in which they would obstruct it? There is another important issue that Schweickart should discuss. Market socialism, given its commitment to a market, must face the issue of market generated alienation or fetishism. Can market socialism avoid such problems? And if so how? (shrink)

In the concluding section of his *Anthropology* textbook, Kant offers the outlines of a portrait of the human race and of its collective character and vocation. The section is of interest for students of Kant’s Geschichtsphilosophie because of what it reveals about Kant’s conception of human progress, and the processes responsible for it. On Kant’s view, we can only expect collective progress through incremental political reform, and our expectation of progress rests significantly upon our own, specifically moral, reflections upon human (...) activity. (shrink)

THE FIRST STAGE OF COMMUNISM, FOR MARX, IS A MODIFIED EXCHANGE ECONOMY. THUS IT SHOULD BE MARKED BY ALIENATION OR FETISHISM. BUT MARX DENIES THIS IN CHAPTER 1 OF VOLUME I OF "CAPITAL". THE REASON BEING THAT THE WORKERS WOULD BE IN CONTROL OF THEIR EXCHANGE RATHER THAN CONTROLLED BY IT. IN EARLIER WRITINGS, THIS CONTROL SEEMED TO REQUIRE A POWERFUL STATE APPARATUS, AND THUS POLITICAL ESTRANGEMENT. IN SOME, BUT NOT ALL, OF HIS LATER WRITINGS, MARX ARGUES THAT SUCH A (...) STATE APPARATUS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. THIS CONFLICT IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT MARX EMPLOYS TWO DIFFERENT MODELS FOR THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM. (shrink)

The question has been raised whether Nietzsche intends eternal recurrence to be like a categorical imperative. The obvious objection to understanding eternal recurrence as like a categorical imperative is that for a categorical imperative to make any sense, for moral obligation to make any sense, it must be possible for individuals to change themselves. And Nietzsche denies that individuals can change themselves. Magnus thinks the determinism “implicit in the doctine of the eternal recurrence of the same renders any imperative impotent…. (...) How can one will what must happen in any case?” At the other end of the spectrum, those who do hold that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative, for their part, tend to ignore or deny the determinism involved in eternal recurrence. This article explores the extent to which it can be claimed that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative without downplaying Nietzsche's dterminism. (shrink)

The question has been raised whether Nietzsche intends eternal recurrence to be like a categorical imperative. The obvious objection to understanding eternal recurrence as like a categorical imperative is that for a categorical imperative to make any sense, for moral obligation to make any sense, it must be possible for individuals to change themselves. And Nietzsche denies that individuals can change themselves. Magnus thinks the determinism “implicit in the doctine of the eternal recurrence of the same renders any imperative impotent…. (...) How can one will what must happen in any case?” At the other end of the spectrum, those who do hold that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative, for their part, tend to ignore or deny the determinism involved in eternal recurrence. This article explores the extent to which it can be claimed that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative without downplaying Nietzsche's dterminism. (shrink)

While many philosophers have found Hegel's critique of Kantian ethics to be interesting in certain respects, overall most tend to find it rather shallow and to think that Hegel either misunderstands Kant's thought or has a rather crude understanding of it. For example, in examining the last two sections of Chapter V of the Phenomenology - 'Reason as Lawgiver' and 'Reason as Testing Laws' (where we get an extended critique of the categorical imperative)- Lauer finds Hegel's treatment to be truncated (...) and inadequate.1 The only trouble, though, is that like most other readers of the Phenomenology, Lauer does not recognize that Hegel had been examining and criticizing Kantian ethics throughout a much greater part of-indeed, more than half of-Chapter V. Once we do understand this, I think we must concede that Hegel's treatment is hardly truncated and that it cannot be described as shallow or inadequate. I will try to show that Hegel demonstrates a rather sophisticated understanding of, and gives a serious and thorough critique of, Kantian practical reason. (shrink)

THE EARLY MARX'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE DOES NOT INVOLVE THE ACCEPTANCE OF AN UNKNOWN THING-IN-ITSELF AND DOES NOT IMPLY THAT WE CAN ONLY KNOW OBJECTS AS THEY HAVE BEEN CONSTITUTED FOR-US. WE CAN KNOW THINGS AS THEY ARE IN-THEMSELVES. TO SHOW THIS, WE MUST ALSO SEE THAT THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE IS BOTH CONSTITUTED AND THAT IT REFLECTS OR COPIES THINGS AS THEY ARE IN THEMSELVES.

HEGEL'S POLITICAL THOUGHT COMBINES ROUSSEAU'S POLITICAL THEORY AND KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. IT COMBINES (1) RATIONAL FREEDOM REALIZED THROUGH A GENERAL WILL OR CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE, (2) A THEORY OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT LIKE KANT'S WHERE CONFLICTING PARTICULAR INTERESTS LEAD TO A MORAL SOCIETY, (3) AND CUSTOM, TRADITION, OR COMMUNITY LIKE THAT FOUND IN ROUSSEAU. TO DO THIS HEGEL MUST REJECT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF ROUSSEAU AND KANT AND EXPLAIN HOW COMMUNITY INSTEAD OF BEING CORRUPTED BY PARTICULAR INTERESTS, AS ROUSSEAU THOUGHT IT WOULD, (...) CAN COME TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH THEM. THE KEY TO THIS WILL BE HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF SPIRIT. (shrink)

One of Hegel's major concerns is to decide the place, importance, and scope of reason. Grand claims have traditionally been made on its behalf--that it is the highest form of knowledge capable of knowing all that can be known. This article examines the central role that theoretical reason plays, for Hegel, in leading us toward idealism, its failure to live up to its grand claims, its failure to adequately establish idealism, and the way in which this failure, oddly enough, turns (...) into a success by preserving idealism from solipsism. (shrink)

To understand Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) and the role that love and marriage play in it, we must understand his concept of recognition. It is a mistake, however, to think as some do that mutual recognition between equals is sufficient for Sittlichkeit. Rather, for Hegel, the more significant and powerful the recognizer, the more real the recognized. Ultimately recognition must come from spirit (Geist). Understanding this will allow us to see, despite Hegel, that he can capture, better than (...) other theorists, many of the central concerns of contemporary same-sex marriage proponents and help provide them a philosophical underpinning. (shrink)

If it were possible to have organized experience without bringing the categories of the understanding into play, the Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason would be doomed to failure. In several places, however, Kant seems to admit that organized experience is, in fact, possible without the categories. The most important of these cases is that of aesthetic judgments--judgments of the beautiful and of the sublime--which clearly involve ordered experience and seem to occur without employing the categories. I argue (...) that this contraction is merely apparent and I try to resolve it. (shrink)