Michael T. Ferejohn presents a new analysis of Aristotle's theory of explanation and scientific knowledge, in the context of its Socratic roots. Ferejohn shows how Aristotle resolves the tension between his commitment to the formal-case model of explanation and his recognition of the role of efficient causes in explaining natural phenomena.

THE problem to be considered here is but a small corner of a much wider difficulty that has persistently impeded the attempt to develop a firm and full understanding of the theory of scientific explanation set out in Aristotle's Analytics. This broader difficulty is precipitated by the existence of two rather substantial groups of texts which seem to point in opposing exegetical directions.

This chapter contains sections titled: I II III IV Notes Bibliography.

Scholars of classical philosophy have long disputed whether Aristotle was a dialectical thinker. Most agree that Aristotle contrasts dialectical reasoning with demonstrative reasoning, where the former reasons from generally accepted opinions and the latter reasons from the true and primary. Starting with a grasp on truth, demonstration never relinquishes it. Starting with opinion, how could dialectical reasoning ever reach truth, much less the truth about first principles? Is dialectic then an exercise that reiterates the prejudices of one's times and at (...) best allows one to persuade others by appealing to these prejudices, or is it the royal road to first principles and philosophical wisdom? In From Puzzles to Principles? May Sim gathers experts to argue both these positions and offer a variety of interpretive possibilities. The contributors' thoughtful reflections on the nature and limits of dialectic should play a crucial role in Aristotelian scholarship. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV V VI VII.

BOOK REVI~WS 137 Gail Fine. On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv + 4oo. Cloth, $55.oo. To many readers it will no doubt seem odd at first that an author could spend over four hundred printed pages discussing a portion of a treatise comprising just a scant five pages of Greek text, even supposing that the work faithfully reports Aristotelian doctrine. However, in working through Fine's book , one comes to (...) see that it contains not only a thorough treatment of the first book of the Peri Ide0n, but also comprehensive interpretations of the metaphysical systems of Socrates, Plato , and Aristotle, and the parallels and differences among these systems. The book also contains clearheaded and instructive accounts of so-called "Third Man" arguments, and critical discussion of some influential interpretive hypotheses put forward in the writings of G. E. L. Owen. In the end, it is actually something of a marvel.. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Grades of Epistemological Involvement The Socratic Certification Program The General Account‐Requirement Definitional and Explanatory Accounts Chronic and Episodic Perspectives on Knowledge The Formal Aitia Metaphysics and Epistemology in the Republic The Simple and Subtle Aitiai in the Phaedo “Analytic” Formal Accounts in the Late Dialogues Note.

This is a book of prodigous proportions. It is intended as nothing less than a fully comprehensive treatment of every important discussion of its two principal topics in ancient Greek texts from the works of Homer until the closing of the philosophical schools in the sixth century A.D. Moreover, Hankinson’s sources are not limited just to philosophical writers; he also deftly extracts definite positive views on these subjects from the ancient medical literature as well as from the quasi-legal discourses of (...) the fifth century B. C. sophistical movement. But this is no pedestrian lock-step survey governed mechanically by chronological order. To the contrary, various subthemes are constantly interwoven throughout, as issues raised in earlier chapters reappear to be developed and augmented in later ones, which gives the progression of the book as a whole a rich and nuanced character. (shrink)

BOOK REVI~WS 137 Gail Fine. On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv + 4oo. Cloth, $55.oo. To many readers it will no doubt seem odd at first that an author could spend over four hundred printed pages discussing a portion of a treatise comprising just a scant five pages of Greek text, even supposing that the work faithfully reports Aristotelian doctrine. However, in working through Fine's book, one comes to see (...) that it contains not only a thorough treatment of the first book of the Peri Ide0n, but also comprehensive interpretations of the metaphysical systems of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and the parallels and differences among these systems. The book also contains clearheaded and instructive accounts of so-called "Third Man" arguments, and critical discussion of some influential interpretive hypotheses put forward in the writings of G. E. L. Owen. In the end, it is actually something of a marvel... (shrink)

The central aim of this short and pithy book is to challenge the widely held view that the concepts expressed by Aristotelian modal idioms are essentially temporal modalities, by which is meant that they can be defined wholly by means of non-modal and temporal idioms. More specifically, Waterlow contends that two notorious Aristotelian theses, if it is possible that p, then at some time it is the case that p, and if it is always the case that p, then it (...) is necessary that p, are not to be understood, even in restricted forms, as analytic outfall of the very nature of Aristotle's modalities. Rather, she argues, they are viewed by Aristotle himself as substantive principles whose truth he undertakes to establish in De Caelo 1.12 by means of an assortment of premises, some of which do flow from the nature of the modalities involved, but others of which pertain to the peculiar metaphysical setting in which the arguments occur. Now since, on Waterlow's account, this metaphysical setting centrally involves the notion of omnitemporality, and inasmuch as she also endeavors to explain how these same modalities operate in Aristotle's discussion of future contingents in De Interpretatione 9, her basic thesis is that for Aristotle, modal and temporal notions never merge, but occasionally mingle. (shrink)