Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics has always proved to be fertile ground for at times needless textual emendation. I provide a translation and running commentary on Eudemian Ethics II 2 1220a39–b6 in accordance with the MSS text.

As regular readers of The Pluralist are aware, there appeared in 2008 an issue devoted to Jan Olof Bengtsson's The Worldview of Personalism.1 The issue included five articles, each concerned with a different aspect of the book; and after each article, there was a "Reply" by Bengtsson. In what follows, I shall say something about Bengtsson's reply to my own contribution, "Absolute and Personal Idealism." However, first let me briefly describe that article's argument.In "Absolute and Personal Idealism," I examined the (...) personalist attack on absolutism as formulated by Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison in two works: Hegelianism and Personality and The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy. In the first section of .. (shrink)

This paper intends to explore whether and how the quality of participation experiences is associated with political efficacy and the disposition of migrant and non-migrant young people to becoming involved. The sample includes 1010 young people of Portuguese, Angolan and Brazilian origin, aged between 15 and 29 years old. The results reveal that the quality of participation experiences is related to political efficacy and dispositions to becoming involved, but different groups seem to react differently to different forms of political action.

Tomás de Aquino defende que a alma e as partes corpóreas humanas são subsistentes por si, levando a duas dificuldades. Primeiro, algo é classificado como subsistente por si quando não existe enquanto parte constituinte de uma substância. Assim, a subsistência por si refere-se às substâncias e não às suas partes. Segundo, Tomás defende que a subsistência por si da alma humana permite inferir a sua incorruptibilidade, mas que a subsistência por si das partes corpóreas não permite semelhante conclusão. Assim, dever-se-ia (...) distinguir os significados de ‘subsistência por si’ quando aplicada à alma humana e às partes corpóreas. O presente artigo, portanto, discute estes problemas mediante duas perguntas: (1) Pode-se atribuir a subsistência por si às partes de umasubstância? (2) Há diferença no significado da noção de subsistência por si quando aplicada à alma humana e às partes corpóreas? (shrink)

Desde o início da era moderna, tecnociência e política se tornaram cada vez mais indissociáveis, na mesma medida em que aumentou a nossa capacidade de manipular a matéria em um nível inacessível ao senso comum e, no limite, à própria imaginação humana. A experiência do tempo foi particularmente sensível a esse processo. Por um lado, foi dividida entre um tempo quantitativamente mensurável e um tempo qualitativo vivido . Por outro lado, este último foi crescentemente reduzido a um tempo psicológico e, (...) portanto, insignificante para a física, tal como ficou evidenciado na indiferença de Albert Einstein diante do esforço de Henri Bergson para encontrar a metafísica que envolve a teoria da relatividade. Privada de sua metafísica, a teoria se restringiu a uma sofisticada espacialização do tempo que é inacessível à nossa imaginação. Atualizando o significado do tempo na teoria einsteiniana, Bergson buscava ir além daquilo que aqui chamamos de "experiência antropométrica", rumo a outras contrações da duração acima e abaixo da nossa. A contrapartida filosófica do tempo-medida, no entanto, não ecoou com o mesmo vigor dos desdobramentos tecnológicos da Relatividade, os quais possibilitaram ao homem o controle de quantidades de energia tão grandes quanto pequenos são os núcleos atômicos que as desencadeiam. A ampliação da capacidade humana de ação sobre a matéria para muito além da experiência antropométrica, como já notara Bergson na primeira metade do século XX e como percebemos ainda hoje, não foi acompanhada de um equivalente incremento das reservas de "energia moral". (shrink)

In 1923, Sir Arthur Keith proposed that many common back problems are due to the stresses caused by our evolutionarily novel form of locomotion, bipedalism. In this article, we introduce an updated version of Keith’s hypothesis with a focus on acquired spinal conditions. We begin by outlining the main ways in which the human spine differs from those of our closest living relatives, the great apes. We then review evidence suggesting there is a link between spinal and vertebral shape on (...) the one hand and acquired spinal conditions on the other. Next, we discuss recent studies that not only indicate that two common acquired spinal conditions—intervertebral disc herniation and spondylolysis—are associated with vertebral shape, but also suggest that the pathology-prone vertebral shapes can be understood in terms of the shift from quadrupedalism to bipedalism in the course of human evolution. Subsequently, we place the aforementioned findings under an umbrella hypothesis, which we call the “Evolutionary Shape Hypothesis.” This hypothesis contends that individuals differ in their propensity to develop different acquired spinal conditions because of differences in vertebral shape that relate to the evolutionary history of our species. We end the article with some possible directions for future research. (shrink)

Tomás de Aquino define a alma humana de maneira semelhante a Aristóteles: ela é a forma substancial do corpo humano potencialmente vivo. Todavia, um dos problemas da psicologia tomista consiste, de acordo com D. Abel, em classificar a alma humana por meio de termos comumente utilizados para nomear os compostos hilemórficos, a saber, substância e hoc aliquid. Se a alma humana é parte de um composto, como poderia ser chamada de substância e de hoc aliquid? O objetivo deste artigo consiste (...) em mostrar qual é a estratégia subjacente a esta classificação utilizada por Tomás. Sugerimos que ela remonta a Aristóteles quando ele atribui diferentes significados aos termos substância e hoc aliquid. A novidade de Tomás está em expandir este campo semântico, introduzindo um significado que se aplica exclusivamente à alma humana, a saber, o sentido peculiar. (shrink)

Resumo: Esta é a tradução do texto “L’amplification dans les processus d’information”, conferência ministrada por Gilbert Simondon em 1962, no Colloque de Royaumont sobre “o conceito de informação na ciência contemporânea. Aqui Simondon apresenta, e correlaciona, três “níveis do processo informacional de amplificação”: a amplificação transdutiva “por recrutamento positivo”; a amplificação moduladora “por limitação”; e a amplificação organizadora “por descoberta de um sistema de compatibilidade”. Para cada um dos três níveis, Simondon apresenta exemplos dos mundos físico, vivo, técnico e psicossocial.: (...) This is a Portuguese translation of the paper “L’amplification dans les processus d’information”, presented by Gilbert Simondon in 1962, at the Colloque de Royaumont about “the concept of information in contemporary science”. In this paper, Simondon presents, and correlates, three “levels of the informational process of amplification”: transductive amplification “by positive recruiting”; modulative amplification “by limitation”; and organizing amplification “by discovery of a system of compatibility”. For each one of the three levels, Simondon presents examples of the physical, living, technical and psycho-social worlds. (shrink)

At more than five-hundred pages, this volume — the first in a set of five — is neither a short nor an easy read. Most will, I suspect, treat the book as a reference work, consulting only those sections relevant to their study. But its materials are sometimes demanding; and in several chapters readers will encounter considerable interpretive difficulties. I shall have more to say about these difficulties further down. First, though, a few comments on the book’s contents.

Arguing against those who situate F.H. Bradley as a skeptic, mystic, or empiricist, this book makes a case for understanding his thought firmly in the tradition of rationalistic idealism.

F.H. Bradley has been characterized by many commentators as something of a sceptic. And the reason why Bradley is often cast in this light is, I believe, largely a result of his theory of relations. As even the casual student is aware, the relational nature of all judgment leads, on Bradley’s analysis, to an infinite and, many have claimed, “vicious” regress. And when we add to this Bradley’s claim that all assertion is, at some level, “contradictory”, there seems to be (...) good reason for the sceptical moniker. What I would like to suggest in this paper, though, is that Bradley’s “scepticism” is not what it seems. Hence in what follows I shall argue that Bradley’s views on contradiction and contrariety are actually important aspects of his larger theory of knowledge; and, as such, they should be understood — not as doctrines whose intent is the condemnation of our ordinary inferences — but, rather, as a crucial component in the defense of such practices. What I hope to show, then, is that, far from being an endorsement of radical scepticism, Bradley’s theory of contradiction and contrariety is an effort to preserve the continuity between one judgment and another — a continuity that he sees as necessary to any coherent account of inference. But first some preliminaries. (shrink)

The present article argues that Chrysippus' reply to the objection that Fate does away with that which is up to us (and therefore with justice in honor and punishments) consists in shifting the notion of that which is up to us from one in terms of ultimate origination to one in terms of self-sufficient causation—and thus in shifting the very notion of justice in honor and punishments from one in retributive terms to one in rehabilitative terms.

O envelhecimento da população, ou seja, o peso das pessoas mais velhas no conjunto da população, é uma tendência globalmente partilhada que resulta do fato de as pessoas viverem mais em consequência dos progressos realizados pela humanidade. Não se trata apenas do aumento do peso da população sênior. A extensão da longevidade tem implicado o reforço do grupo de idade mais avançada, a chamada “grande Idade”, colocando a taxa de crescimento do grupo com mais de 85 anos acima da do (...) grupo de 65 ou mais anos. Os seniores não são apenas mais numerosos como cada vez mais velhos. As fronteiras da vida são empurradas para mais longe, acarretando novos desafios para a sociedade. Um desses desafios é precisamente no campo dos direitos. Considerando que o envelhecimento se faz acompanhar por um aumento de situações de vulnerabilidade que podem afetar a dignidade humana, a questão dos direitos que assistem esse grupo é sem dúvida inadiável. À luz dos direitos humanos, o texto desenvolve uma reflexão a respeito dos direitos da “velhice” a partir de alguns documentos que têm proposto uma base para a sua formulação. Palavras-chave: Envelhecimento. Direitos humanos. Envelhecimento ativo. Idadismo. Participação social. (shrink)

Despite renewed interest in T.H. Green’s social and political theory, little attention has as yet been given to his metaphysics and epistemology — even more neglected, though, are his views on logical matters. It is unclear why this is. I suspect that the obscurity of his discussion has much to do with it. Green routinely refers to writers in whom there is little interest today; and a good deal of effort is required to penetrate his technical vocabulary. Still, I believe (...) we miss something important when we ignore his specifically logical writings. Green has much to say about classical syllogism and its influence on his contemporaries. And, while the discussion is always grounded in his own idealist theory of knowledge, Green’s analysis often reveals surprising aspects of the problem being considered. In what follows, then, I shall consider one such analysis: his account of the logical/epistemological doctrine of Sir William Hamilton and H.L. Mansel — individuals whose writings, in Green’s eyes, made apparent all that was wrong with the “formal logic” of the day. (shrink)

This text analyzes Diogenianus’ testimony (apud Eus., Praep. Ev. VI 8) as a source for Chrysippus’ reply to an objection leveled against Stoic Fate-determinism. I argue that the objection addressed by Chrysippus in the testimony bears relation to the Idle Argument as reported by both Cicero and Origen but, unlike the Idle Argument, deals with the notions of “that which depends on us” (τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς), “that which proceeds from us” (τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν), and the issue of accountability.

In view of Alexander of Aphrodisias’s and Porphyry’s respective positions on the issue, I discuss whether logos apophantikos is to be defined, as DI 4 seems to imply, by its being true or false or rather, as DI 5 seems to imply, by its representing the ontological combination/separation of substrate and attribute through the logical combination/separation of subject and predicate.

Aristotle says that a fallacy of accident takes place whenever something is held to belong in the same way to an object and to its accident (SE 5 166b28-30). The Received View among interpreters takes “accident” (συμβεβηκός) in that connection to stand for any predicate that is not identical to its subject, and makes the fallacy consist in mistaking predication for identity. Such an analysis, however, gives “accident” a meaning otherwise unattested in the corpus; makes all cases of the fallacy (...) inconclusive, whereas inferences of the same kind are warranted (with a qualification) at different places in the corpus; does not cover cases which in Aristotle’s view fall under the fallacy of accident, for which a different analysis and solution must be provided; and does not square with Aristotle’s own solution in terms of sameness or difference in substance and being. This chapter presents a new take on the subject, grounded on Aristotle’s expressed views in the Sophistical Refutations and other works, according to which the fallacy takes place whenever a substitution of co-extensives, or even of necessary equivalents, makes reciprocation fail to (necessarily) hold between relata. (shrink)

Desde os anos 1990, Laymert Garcia dos Santos vem, não apenas articulando sinergias consistentes doxamanismo yanomami com a arte contemporânea, como também reiteradamente colocando à prova a hipótese,via de regra formulada nos termos de Gilbert Simondon, de que “o primeiro técnico é o pajé, o medicine man, [...] [o]xamã”, que “traz para sua comunidade um elemento novo e insubstituível produzido num diálogo direto com o mundo,um elemento escondido ou inacessível para a comunidade até então”. Proponho neste texto retomar alguns casosetnograficamente (...) documentados de “xamaquinismos” audiovisuais à luz da hipótese simondoniana reformulada porGarcia dos Santos: se os xamãs são os primeiros técnicos, não seria pelo mesmo motivo que são também os primeirosartistas?, i.e.: por operarem reticularmente, sobre nós de articulação entre realidades normalmente incompatíveis?;por acessar, em bloco e de forma controlada, num aqui-agora singular, a presença de grandes potências normalmentedispersas num alhures-outrora inacessível e incontrolável? (shrink)

In this paper I would like to examine what I believe is an often misunderstood aspect of F.H. Bradley’s philosophy. Specifically, I want to consider Bradley’s views on the relation between perception and what he calls the “feeling base” of experience. Although Bradley’s doctrine of feeling is generally recognized as one of the most distinctive aspects of his thought, his theory of perception is, I believe, also unusual in that it views our perceptual experience as permeated by conceptual identities. As (...) we shall see, Bradley understands perception as essentially ideal. And when he uses this term to describe the contents of our ordinary perceptual awareness, Bradley wants to convey to us his belief that there is something about perception which bears the mark of thought. “Ideal” and “ideality” — terms which signal the presence of thought — are also used by Bradley to indicate that an experience is at least partially abstract and general. Thus when he calls perception ideal he is claiming — contrary to the received view — that perception does not present us with objects that are wholly determinate and particular. (shrink)

In this thesis I focus on F. H. Bradley's theory of judgment and his doctrine of predication. My goal is to present an account of Bradley's views which pays special attention to his belief that all logical predication must necessarily fail to accomplish what it sets out to do. All assertion , we are told, attempts to state truth, whole and complete; but, in the end, it must fall short. All judgment, Bradley claims, must contain an element of untruth or (...) falsity. And the outcome of this theory of predication is a doctrine of "degrees of truth". No truth is understood as entirely true or entirely false; rather, each has a position in a hierarchy of truths with some being truer than others when measured against the theoretical criterion of absolute knowledge. ;But, this is not to be understood as a sceptical doctrine. I argue that Bradley's doctrine of predicative failure should be seen as the only means by which radical scepticism in the theory of knowledge can be avoided. If we were capable of possessing truths which are whole and complete unto themselves then there would exist no legitimate basis upon which the inferential development of thought could expand beyond a self-enclosed circle. ;In this essay I also examine a persisting historical problem. It is my claim that Bradley's theory should be understood as a continuation of and development within the British neo-Kantian tradition. Bradley's association with this tradition has sometimes been questioned based on scattered statements found in the 1883 edition of the Principles of Logic. Collectively these statements have been referred to as the doctrine of "floating ideas". However, I maintain that the doctrine of floating ideas must be distinguished from the theory of predicative failure . I argue that the two theories should in no way be identified and that certain misinterpretations of Bradley's position have resulted from confusing these two incompatible views. (shrink)

Remembered today primarily for his commentaries on Plato, R.L. Nettleship was a fellow and tutor of Balliol College, Oxford, from 1869 to 1892. And, while he was one of the past century’s better known interpreters of Plato, Nettleship’s influence extends well beyond the study of Greek philosophy. Although his life was cut short in its prime and saw the publication of no major works expressive of his own views, it is to Nettleship that we owe the existence of T.H. Green’s (...) collected Works and the book-length “Memoir” that introduces these volumes. And, despite its being ignored by later writers, Nettleship’s “Lectures on Logic” remains one of the most accessible accounts of the idealist theory of knowledge that came to dominate late nineteenth century British philosophy. (shrink)

This volume presents and discusses the theory of rights of the British idealist political philosopher, Bernard Bosanquet. The political philosophy of the British idealists in general and of Bernard Bosanquet in particular, has been the subject of much misunderstanding and prejudice. Bosanquet's theory of rights proposes to provide a response to the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill and the natural rights-based political philosophy of Herbert. The question addressed in this book then, is whether Bosanquet's theory is a (...) plausible alternative to these 'individualist' views. The author believes that a complete statement of Bosanquet's theory of rights requires an elaboration of his "metaphysical theory of the nature of social reality"--his "social ontology."(publisher,edited). (shrink)

Este texto busca narrar o encontro feliz das trajetórias do ativista Cleodon Silva e da instituição Casa dos Meninos, e como esse encontro pode nos ajudar a repensar o papel daquilo que Gilbert Simondon chamou de “mecanólogo” ou “tecnólogo”: aquele que estuda os indivíduos técnicos completos, que introduz na cultura “a consciência da natureza das máquinas, de suas relações mútuas e de suas relações com o homem, e dos valores implicados nestas relações”.

Phillip Ferreira - Perfectionism and the Common Good: Themes in the Philosophy of T.H. Green - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 369-370 David O. Brink. Perfectionism and the Common Good: Themes in the Philosophy of T. H. Green. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. Pp. xiv + 139. Cloth, $27.50. The British idealists have not fared well during the past century. Still, there has been in recent years a renewed interest in the movement's (...) principal figures: F. H. Bradley and T. H. Green. And, while Bradley's polemical style has found a wider audience, Green's work—especially his Principles of Political Obligation—appears to have had the steadier following. Lesser known than Green's political writing, though, is his longer and more difficult Prolegomena to Ethics. And David O. .. (shrink)

If form qualifies as substance, as it is claimed in Metaphysics, then we seem to have a problem: a form appears to be a relative, while evidently no relative is a substance. At any rate, Aristotle had held in the Categories that no primary substance could be a relative; so, if it turns out that form in the Metaphysics is primary substance, then either Aristotle has contradicted himself or else he has revised his categorial ontology to the point where he (...) no longer maintains even that x's being a substance precludes x's being a relative. If, on the other hand, the categories are by the time of the Metaphysics no longer understood to be mutually exclusive of one another, then the categorial framework itself seems fundamentally in jeopardy; that would be in itself an alarming conclusion, since Aristotle appeals to the doctrine of categories repeatedly in the Metaphysics, where the clear impression is that he continues in that work to uphold it in the main. On the entirely credible assumption, then, that the Metaphysics retains the doctrine of categories articulated in the Categories and the Organon, we seem left with the other, unhappy alternative, that form, as primary substance, is a also a relative - if, that is, it can be shown that every form is a relative. (shrink)

While students of idealism will be pleased to see another important text back in print, the Cambridge Scholars Press reissue of F.H. Bradley’s Principles of Logic will, I suspect, find only a limited audience. Although the book is nicely bound and printed on what appears to be a high quality acid-free paper, CSP — surely for reasons of economy — has chosen to compress the text’s original five hundred thirty-four pages to three-hundred fourteen, entirely changing the pagination. What has also (...) changed in the CSP edition are the page headers. Sometimes the CSP edition provides a fuller account of the chapter contents than the original; often, though, the new headers tell us less. (shrink)