In this paper I assume that syntactic structures contain items that function as variables over possible worlds (or things like possible worlds). I show that in certain syntactic positions we can use some variables but not other. I accordingly motivate a "binding theory" for the items that occupy these positions, and I discuss some consequences of this binding theory.

ABSTRACT Since World War II, American presidents have consistently advanced a world free‐trade agenda, despite the fierce opposition of domestic interests threatened by free trade, and despite these interests’ ability to mobilize local pressure and nationalist sentiment against free trade in Congress. A theoretical resolution of these paradoxes would consider both the countervailing pressure of domestic interests that benefit from free trade and an international factor: namely, America’s dominance of world trade. This global dominance gives the United States “superpower” status (...) not only economically, but politically, enabling American presidents to get most of what they want in international trade negotiations. Consequently, they can afford to make tactical concessions to American mercantilist interests—defanging congressional opposition to free trade—because in international negotiations, these concessions can be turned into powerful levers against the barriers to free trade that are erected by countries desiring access to the immense American market. (shrink)

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1964, given by Roderick M. Chisholm (1916-1999), an American philosopher.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This essay uses the phenomenal advent of women's climbing as a paradigm case for integrating feminism and phenomenology, and for analyzing how women experience and evolve free movement and existence. In contrast to the paradigm set by Iris Marion Young's “Throwing like a Girl,” it stresses the category of the lived body over the category of gender, and it reveals how women, by employing and cultivating the body's motility and spatiality, engage and transcend the limits of crux situations.

The purpose of this book is to develop a terminological structure in which private perceptions can be discussed publicly without bringing into existence the usual unnecessary philosophical problems of confused usage of language. chisholm displays an appraisive, quasi-ethical use of language, whereby he claims that a thing has some particular sensible property is to have adequate evidence that it actually does have that property. (staff).

A linear order is -decidable if its universe is and the relations defined by formulas are uniformly computable. This means that there is a computable procedure which, when applied to a formula and a sequence of elements of the linear order, will determine whether or not is true in the structure. A linear order is decidable if the relations defined by all formulas are uniformly computable. These definitions suggest two questions. Are there, for each , -decidable linear orders that are (...) not -decidable? Are there linear orders that are -decidable for all but not decidable? The former was answered in the positive by Moses in 1993. Here we answer the latter, also positively. (shrink)

We study the weak truth-table and truth-table degrees of the images of subsets of computable structures under isomorphisms between computable structures. In particular, we show that there is a low c.e. set that is not weak truth-table reducible to any initial segment of any scattered computable linear ordering. Countable $\Pi _{1}^{0}$ subsets of 2ω and Kolmogorov complexity play a major role in the proof.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

1. I would have said that there is no problem of reconciling the ‘phenomenological’ and ‘analytical’ approaches to the problem of the ego or the person. It is, in part, by doing ‘phenomenology’ that we collect the data for our problem; and it is, in part, by doing ‘philosophical analysis’ that we decide what philosophical significance our data may happen to have. Phenomenology alone, I would have said, cannot supply us with any philosophical conclusions and we cannot be analysts until (...) we have found something to analyze. (shrink)

SummaryThe doctrine of Verstehen is here interpreted as a solution to the problem of other minds. The problem of other minds, which has its analogous for external perception and memory, may be put by asking: By means of what epistemic principles may we exhibit the justification we have for attributing particular thoughts and feelings to persons other than ourselves? It is suggested that such principles will refer to the phenomena of Verstehen.ResumeLa doctrine de la compréhension est interprétée ici comme une (...) solution au problème des autres psychismes, qui a son analogue pour les perceptions externes et pour la memoire et qui peut etre mis sous la forme?une question:Quels sont les principes epistemologiques qui nous permettent de justifier notre attribution de pensées et de sentiments particuliers à des personnes autres que nous‐mêmes?≪. Ľauteur suggère que ces principes se rapporteront au phénomene de la compréhension. (shrink)