This study analyzed the effects of aging on post-error behavioral adjustments from the perspective of cognitive control. A modified error awareness task was administered to young and older adults. In this task, two buttons were placed on the left and right sides in front of the participants, who were instructed to use the right button to perform a go/no-go task, and were notified if they made an error. There were three experimental conditions : participants had to push the right button (...) once in Condition A and twice in Condition B and C when a go-stimulus was presented. Conversely, participants were asked to withhold their response when a no-go stimulus was presented. Response inhibition differed depending on the experimental condition. The participants were asked to push the left button as quickly as possible when an error occurred. The results showed relatively longer reaction times to sudden errors among older adults compared with young adults. Furthermore, the difference in the error responses strongly influenced older adults’ response time after an error. These results suggest that the shift from proactive to reactive control may significantly influence post-error behavioral adjustments in older adults. (shrink)

Although the philosophical literature on social institutions has been insightful for social scientific studies, the application of its core concepts, such as collective intentionality, to real inst...

This is the definitive work on the first and greatest of Japan's twentieth-century philosophers, Nishida Kitaro. Interspersed throughout the narrative of Nishida's life and thought is a generous selection of the philosopher's own essays, letters, and short presentations, newly translated into English.

Although finance is ubiquitous in modern life, its ontological foundation is rarely discussed. This essay considers some key characteristics of finance from a social ontological perspective. It initially argues that money requires some sort of representation, and that financial institutions rely on various forms of cognition as well as documents anchoring representations. From that standpoint, one of the crucial aspects of finance is that it provides reference points through the process of quantification. These reference points are numerical representations that allow (...) people to make comparisons. Comparing numbers inevitably creates different hierarchies. However, a specific hierarchy can become outdated or less significant. In such situations, a heterarchy can be created outside the hierarchy. This essay illustrates the appearance of heterarchy in the recent shift toward impact finance, in which financial hierarchies encompass heterarchical systems that are finally replaced by quantifiable hierarchical metrics. With this example, the present research demonstrates that finance tends to convert heterarchical systems into hierarchical ones by quantification through monetary units. (shrink)

Postmodernists claim that there is no truth. However, the statement 'there is no truth ' is self -contradictory. This essay shows the following: One cannot state the idea 'there is no truth ' universally without creating a paradox. In contrast, the statement 'there is truth ' does not produce such a paradox. Therefore, it is more logical that truth exists.

Although social ontology (SO) has attracted the attention of scholars in various disciplines, how it is applied to social scientific studies is still under-researched. To tackle this issue, this paper initially considers major streams of research on SO. It then argues that one of the aims of SO in the social sciences is to identify the rhetorical expression of social dynamism. To support this argument, the present study introduces a perspective of performativity and proposes that generic performativity should be identified (...) by social scientists. Finally, such an attempt is demonstrated with reference to the global pursuit of financialization. (shrink)

This is the definitive work on the first and greatest of Japan's twentieth-century philosophers, Nishida Kitaro. Interspersed throughout the narrative of Nishida's life and thought is a generous selection of the philosopher's own essays, letters, and short presentations, newly translated into English.

This essay first introduces the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, and clarifies important differences between them. It then examines whether moral judgment based on the moral sense or moral sentiments varies according to one's metaphysical beliefs. For this, the essay mainly applies those theories to such issues as stem cell research, abortion, and active euthanasia. In all three theories, false religious beliefs can distort moral judgment. In Hutcheson's theory, answers to stem cell research, abortion, (...) and active euthanasia do not change according to the spectator's metaphysical beliefs. Yet answers to those issues can change according to the agent's metaphysical beliefs. Hume's theory cannot provide answers to stem cell research and abortion where the embryo or fetus is the receiver (the one affected by the agent's action) and to active euthanasia where the patient is unconscious. It may provide answers to abortion where the pregnant woman is the receiver and to active euthanasia where the patient is conscious. Yet the answers can vary depending on the woman's or the patient's metaphysical beliefs. Smith's theory can provide answers to stem cell research, abortion, and active euthanasia. But the answers can vary depending on the agent's metaphysical beliefs. These show that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant's moral thesis is that reason alone must identify moral laws. Examining various interpretations of his ethics, this essay shows that the thesis fails. G. W. F. Hegel criticizes Kant's Formula of Universal Law as an empty formalism. Although Christine Korsgaard's Logical and Practical Contradiction Interpretations, Barbara Herman's contradiction in conception and contradiction in will tests, and Kenneth Westphal's paired use of Kant's universalization test all refute what Allen Wood calls a stronger form of the formalism charge, they are (...) not free from a weaker form of it. Some philosophers try to avoid both forms of the formalism charge in the following ways: First, some underline the roles of Kant's other formulas. Second, some interpret the Formula of Universal Law teleologically. Third, some claim that a maxim must be something all those potentially affected by it can rationally accept. Fourth, Robert Louden introduces the empirical to evaluate a maxim. All those attempts introduce heteronomy into Kant's ethics. Besides, on the third response, from the fact that all those potentially affected accept a maxim, it does not follow that it is morally right. It is impossible to avoid the formalism charge without making his ethics heteronomous. Thus, Kant's ethics is either empty or heteronomous. Either way it fails to identify moral laws by reason alone. (shrink)

The small connective words “soku” and “sokuhi,” typically found in the writings of the Kyoto school thinkers, have baffled many a Western reader. Describing what he termed the “logic of sokuhi,” Daisetz T. Suzuki famously wrote: “To say ‘A is A’ is to say ‘A is not A.’ Therefore, ’A is A.’” “Soku” is a connective word, meaning “that is,” or “id est”; “hi” negates the compound-word, adding the meaning of “not.” Nishida adopted and situated the “logic of sokuhi” in (...) a philosophical context, especially in his final essay “Bashoteki ronri to shūkyōteki sekaikan” or “The Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview”. This logic of sokuhi, however, came to Nishida’s attention only in the very last years of his life, leaving him very little time to develop it fully. In this paper, I explore the birth of this “logic of sokuhi” in Suzuki’s writings, its context and the import in the Diamond Sūtra, and Nishida’s elaboration of this logic. The goal of this paper is to elucidate this key phrase of Nishida’s thought and to evaluate its philosophical relevance. (shrink)

This essay develops standards for grading religions including various forms of spiritualism. First, I examine the standards proposed by William James, John Hick, Paul Knitter, Dan Cohn-Sherbok, and Harold Netland. Most of them are useful in grading religions with or without conditions. However, those standards are not enough for refined and piercing evaluation. Thus, I introduce standards used in spiritualism. Although those standards are for grading spirits and their teachings, they are useful in refined and piercing evaluation of religious phenomena. (...) The spiritual standards complement James's, Hick's, Knitter's, and Netland's standards. Although most of the spiritual standards are rationally unjustifiable, they have practical value. (shrink)

Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith from the perspective of the is-ought problem, this essay shows that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. According to one interpretation, Hume's or Smith's theory is just a description of human nature. In this case, it does not answer the question of how we ought to live. According to another interpretation, it has some normative implications. In this case, it (...) draws normative claims from human nature. Anyway, the sentiments of anger, resentment, vengeance, superiority, sympathy, and benevolence show that drawing norms from human nature is sometimes morally problematic. The changeability of the moral sense and moral sentiments in Hume's and Smith's theories supports this idea. Hutcheson's theory is morally more appropriate because it bases morality on disinterested benevolence. Yet disinterested benevolence is not enough for morality. There are no sentiments the presence of which alone makes any action moral. (shrink)

This essay shows that a moral sense or moral sentiments alone cannot identify appropriate morals. To this end, the essay analyzes three defenses of Francis Hutcheson's, David Hume's, and Adam Smith's moral sense theories against the relativism charge that a moral sense or moral sentiments vary across people, societies, cultures, or times. The first defense is the claim that there is a universal moral sense or universal moral sentiments. However, even if they exist, a moral sense or moral sentiments alone (...) cannot identify appropriate morals. The second defense is to adopt a general viewpoint theory, which identifies moral principles by taking a general viewpoint. But it needs to employ reason, and even if not, it does not guarantee that we identify appropriate morals. The third defense is to adopt an ideal observer theory, which draws moral principles from sentimental reactions of an ideal observer. Yet it still does not show that a moral sense or moral sentiments alone can identify appropriate morals. (shrink)

“Buddhist philosophy” or Buddhist philosophies may be roughly grouped into two types: those philosophies “influenced” or “inspired” by Buddhist teaching, and those comprising philosophical activities carried out by Buddhist scholars. Due to space constraints, predominant attention will be given in this article to the first type.

For some contemporary liberal philosophers, a huge concern is liberal neutrality, which is the idea that the state should be neutral among competing conceptions of the moral good pursued by the people. In The Morality of Freedom, Joseph Raz argues that we can neither achieve nor even approximate such neutrality. He shows that neutrality and fairness are different ideas. His notion of neutrality is stricter than John Rawls's and Ronald Dworkin's. Raz shows that both helping and not helping can be (...) neutral or non-neutral, thus neutrality is chimerical. Wojciech Sadurski's appeal to rational expectations does not necessarily tell us which action is neutral. Distinguishing between comprehensive and narrow neutrality, Raz also claims that only the former is a proper response to conflicts. Sadurski criticizes it, claiming that conflicts are comprehensive in a sense which does not deny the adequacy of the narrow neutrality. In reality, however, it is almost impossible to achieve even the narrow neutrality. A theory is presented to explain why political neutrality is almost impossible to achieve. Philosophically, there is no neutral ground for neutral politics. (shrink)

According to Agrippa's trilemma, an attempt to justify something leads to either infinite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. This essay examines whether and to what extent the trilemma applies to ethics. There are various responses to the trilemma, such as foundationalism, coherentism, contextualism, infinitism, and German idealism. Examining those responses, the essay shows that the trilemma applies at least to rational justification of contentful moral beliefs. This means that rationalist ethics based on any contentful moral belief are rationally unjustifiable.

The formation of the discipline of intercultural philosophy reveals its “karmic aspects,” in which dynamic encounters of scholars and students lay its future courses and clear unexpected paths. What was it like for a Japanese female Junior Year Abroad Exchange student to be in the American academic environment in the early 1970s, and her subsequent experience at the University of California Santa Barbara? A slice of her early memories, as well as her observations regarding the present and future of Japanese (...) philosophy and intercultural philosophy in Japan and in the global context are presented in this essay, in which, while Raimon Panikkar and Ninian Smart figure largely, Nishida Kitarō is also significantly in the picture. The essay is a “conversation” with an invisible interlocutor. (shrink)

Buddhism’s claim to be a universal religion would seem to be severely compromised by its exclusion of certain groups of people from its scheme of salvation. Women, in particular, were treated at one time or another as less than fit vessels for attaining enlightenment. As is well known, even in the days of Gautama the Buddha, the Buddhist order was not entirely free of misogynist sentiments. Female devotees aspiring to follow the Buddha’s teaching often had to overcome discrimination and negative (...) innuendos from their fellow monks and the monastic institutions. This view of women’s “spiritual inferiority” persisted, casting a long shadow over the Buddhism tradition that took root and developed in Japan. Although the idea of sangha—the community of believers made up of monks, nuns, and laymen and laywomen—was duly embraced in Japan, and although women played a vital role in patronizing Buddhism, the misogynistic view became prevalent around the fourteenth century, with the changes in socio-economic environments. It was only in the last century that the iniquitous treatment of women in Japanese Buddhism came to be critically acknowledged by the ecclesiastical authorities, symbolically marking an important first step for a change. Despite the hard-to -eradicate subtle institutional chauvinism and dubious perceptions concerning women’s spiritual ability, an increasing number of socially engaged and articulate Buddhist women are working on improving their image and their social standing in the last decades. What is still needed, however, is the emancipation of androcentric Buddhist ecclesiastical tradition from the yoke of its past. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Masao Abe: D. T. Suzuki’s Legacies and an “Academic Dharma Lineage” in North AmericaMichiko YusaProfessor Abe is generally regarded as the torch bearer of D. T. Suzuki. But how did that come about? This essay sheds light on the relationship between Suzuki and Abe.Abe’s professor, Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, had come to know Suzuki through his mentor Nishida Kitarō. Suzuki was one of Nishida’s closest friends. It appears that Hisamatsu’s and (...) Suzuki’s cordial relationship became closer after Nishida’s death in 1945. Hisamatsu in turn was the link for Abe to come to know Suzuki. Abe recalls his first encounter with Suzuki, which took place in the winter of 1947, when Suzuki was in bed with a bad cold and Abe was sent by Hisamatsu to make a sick call on his behalf. Abe was then Hisamatsu’s teaching assistant ( joshu). Seeing Suzuki in person for the first time, Abe could not help but feel the unique spiritual presence of this man. At that time, Abe, though a committed follower of Pure Land Buddhism, was deeply troubled with his spiritual quest. Perhaps sensing Abe’s agony, Suzuki gave him a copy of his imperial lecture The Essence of Buddhism, in which he had treated Zen and Pure Land thought as sharing the same Mahayana roots.1Abe’s second visit to Suzuki came in the spring of 1949, when Suzuki was preparing to leave for the United States to spend “the rest of his life in order to bring the message of Zen Buddhism” to the West. At that time Abe was to convey Hisamatsu’s concern that Suzuki ought to remain in Japan and contribute to internationalizing Zen by translating Zen texts into English, for, in Hisamatsu’s mind, there was no one better qualified than Suzuki to carry out that task.2Suzuki was ready to make a bold move, however. Having witnessed Hiroshima-Nagasaki, he was convinced that the message of wisdom and compassion based on the awakening to the “true self” that Zen speaks of was an effective and necessary antidote to the egocentric mindset, which manifested also as national ego-centrism, rampant in the post–World War II world. He was convinced that the message of awakening and compassion would give the humanity a better chance at peace. In fact, by the early 1950s, with the intensification of the Cold War and the turmoil in Korea, there was a palpable fear that World War III might break out any day, and Suzuki certainly shared that ominous sense.3 [End Page 111]Zen Must Adopt New ExpressionsSuzuki left for the United States on June 16, 1949, to attend the Second East-West Philosopher’s Conference and to teach at the University of Hawai‘i in the summer and the fall semesters. Through his interaction with Western and Asian thinkers at the conference as well as with his students at the university, he came to feel strongly that (1) it was important to emphasize compassion (hi) in the face of an excessive Zen emphasis on the koan practice, (2) Zen Buddhists must develop their “logical” expression to articulate Zen teaching in language understandable to Westerners, and, in this connection, (3) it was incumbent on him to introduce the thought of Nishida Kitarō to the West. In Suzuki’s own words, “Contemporary Zen is short of compassion (hi). Therefore, it lacks the momentum to engage society and work from within it. Again, it lacks a logical discourse (riron). This is something Nishida always used to say. In order to make Western thinkers understand Zen teaching, one must have a logical system (ronri).” 4These three points are clearly present and developed in Abe’s works. In his introduction to Zen and Western Thought (1985), Abe wrote that (1) Zen embraces a profound philosophy (echoing Suzuki’s concern for the necessity for logical articulation), (2) the ultimate in Zen and in Buddhism is “absolute Nothingness” or “Emptiness” (echoing Nishida’s philosophy), (3) Buddhism is a radical realism and a compassionate way of life (echoing Suzuki’s concern for compassion), and (4) a new cosmology, not a new humanism, is needed in... (shrink)

David Hume thinks that human affections are naturally partial, while Francis Hutcheson holds that humans originally have disinterested benevolence. Michael Gill argues that Hume's moral theory succeeds over Hutcheson's because the former severs the link between explaining and justifying morality. According to Gill, Hutcheson is wrong to assume that our original nature should be the basis of morality. Gill's understanding of Hutcheson's theory does not fully represent it, since for Hutcheson self-love and self-interest under certain conditions are permissible, or even (...) desirable or necessary for the good of society. There is not much difference between Hutcheson's and Hume's theories in the sense that they both extract impartial morality from human character as it is. Hume's theory does not succeed over Hutcheson's because Hume does not propose a better way of extracting morality nor explain all moral phenomena. (shrink)

David Hume charakterisierte die Menschenneigungen als naturgegeben voreingenommen, während Francis Hutcheson des Dafürhaltens war, die Menschen seien ursprünglich unbefangen gütig. Michael Gill findet, Humes Moraltheorie überwinde jene Hutchesons, dank ihres Abbruchs der Verbindung zwischen der Erläuterung und der Rechtfertigung der Moralität. Gill zufolge irrt sich Hutcheson in der Annahme, unsere originäre Natur habe als Basis der Moralität zu dienen. Gills Lesart der Theorie Hutchesons übermittelt ebendieselbe nicht restlos, da für Hutcheson Selbstliebe einschließlich des Selbstinteresses unter speziellen Umständen zugelassen ist, überdies (...) sogar erwünscht oder unentbehrlich zum Wohlergehen der Gesellschaft. Es besteht keine schwerwiegende Differenz zwischen Hutchesons und Humes Theorien im Sinne, dass beide die unvoreingenommene Moralität aus dem menschlichen Charakter als solchem herleiten. Humes Theorie triumphiert nicht über die Hutcheson-Theorie, weil Hume weder einen angemesseneren Weg der Moralitätsextraktion noch einen besseren Weg der Auslegung sämtlicher Moralphänomene eingeschlagen hat. (shrink)

David Hume je smatrao da su ljudske sklonosti prirodno pristrane, dok je Francis Hutcheson držao da su ljudi izvorno bezinteresno dobronamjerni. Michael Gill tvrdi da je Humeova moralna teorija uspješnija od Hutchesonove jer prekida vezu između objašnjavanja i opravdavanja moralnosti. Prema Gillu, Hutcheson pogrešno pretpostavlja da naša izvorna priroda treba biti temelj moralnosti. Gillovo shvaćanje Hutchesonove teorije ne predstavlja tu teoriju u potpunosti budući da su za Hutchesona ljubav prema sebi i samo-interes dopustivi u određenim okolnostima, ili čak poželjni ili (...) nužni za dobro društva. Nema većih razlika između Hutchesonove i Humeove teorije u smislu da obje izvode nepristranu moralnosti iz ljudske naravi kao takve. Humeova teorija nije uspješnija jer on ne predlaže bolji način izvoda moralnosti niti objašnjenja svih moralnih fenomena. (shrink)

David Hume pense que les affections de l’homme sont naturellement partielles, tandis que Francis Hutcheson considère que l’homme est originellement d’une bienveillance désintéressée. Michael Gill soutient que la théorie morale de Hume l’emporte sur celle de Hutcheson car cette dernière rompt le lien entre l’explication et la justification de la moralité. D’après Gill, Hutcheson a tort d’assumer que notre nature originelle devrait être le fondement de la moralité. La compréhension par Gill de la théorie de Hutcheson ne reflète pas celle-ci (...) complètement puisque l’amour de soi-même et l’intérêt personnel de Hutcheson sont, sous certaines conditions, admissibles, voire souhaitables ou nécessaires pour le bien de la société. Il y a peu de différence entre les théories de Hutcheson et de Hume dans le sens où elles déduisent la moralité impartiale du caractère humain tel qu’il est. La théorie de Hume ne l’emporte pas sur celle de Hutcheson car Hume ne propose pas une meilleure façon de déduire la moralité ni d’expliquer tous les phénomènes moraux. (shrink)

U ovome ogledu najprije uvodim u teorije moralnog osjećaja Francisa Hutchesona, Davida Humea i Adama Smitha te razjašnjavam važne razlike među njima. Potom ispitujem da li moralni sud koji se zasniva na moralnom osjećaju varira ovisno o metafizičkim vjerovanjima. U tu svrhu te teorije uglavnom primjenjujem na pitanja kao što su istraživanje matičnih stanica, pobačaj i aktivna eutanazija. U svim trima teorijama neistinita religijska vjerovanja mogu iskriviti moralni sud. U Hutchesonovoj teoriji odgovori na problem istraživanja matičnih stanica, pobačaja i aktivne (...) eutanazije ne mijenjaju se ovisno o metafizičkim vjerovanjima promatrača. No odgovori na ta pitanja mogu se promijeniti ovisno o djelatnikovim metafizičkim vjerovanjima. Humeova teorija ne može pružiti odgovore na problem istraživanja matičnih stanica i pobačaja kada primatelj (onaj na koga utječe djelatnikova radnja) jest embrij ili fetus, dok odgovor na problem aktivne eutanazije ne može pružiti kada je pacijent nesvjestan. Može pružiti odgovore na problem pobačaja kada je primatelj trudnica, a na problem aktivne eutanazije kada je pacijent svjestan. No odgovori mogu varirati ovisno o ženinim ili pacijentovim metafizičkim vjerovanjima. Smithova teorija može pružiti odgovore na problem istraživanja matičnih stanica, pobačaja i eutanazije. No odgovori mogu varirati ovisno o djelatnikovim metafizičkim vjerovanjima. To pokazuje da sam moralni osjećaj u tim teorijama ne može identificirati primjereno moralno stajalište. (shrink)

In order to clarify Nishida’s notion of topos, I trace its forma­tion, starting with the notion of “pure experience,” of which he says: “To experience is to know the thing as it is.” By taking the act of “to know” as the thread that connects the ideas of pure experience and topos, I examine his early writings leading up to 1929, going beyond 1926, when Nishida’s essay “Basho” was published. Over against the commonly held “objectified” view of the topos as (...) a “location” or “field” in which the individual exists, a radically ontological reading of this notion emerges, requiring us to shift the vantage point from which we approach it. I conclude that Nishida introduced into his philosophi­cal system a locative dimension as an ontological feature, and we, con­scious beings, exist in this world “topologically”. The topos refers to the very logico-ontological mode of our being.In order to clarify what knowledge is, we need to begin with [the investigation of] reflective consciousness, rather than starting out with intellectual judgment. Consciousness pertaining to judgment cannot include the one [who judges] within it. It is an incomplete awareness that looks at the self externally. The explanation of how we know begins with the critical reflection of self-consciousness itself. Therein, we obtain the standpoint of genuine epistemology.Our real knowledge starts out with “I exist.” That “I exist” means that the topos is directly in the topos, and this is the standpoint of both inner perception and actual experience. (shrink)

In the vision of the semantic web, agents are defined as the programs that collect information from diverse sources, process the information, and exchange the results with other programs. In order to extend application areas of the agents from the Internet to the real world, we propose CONSORTS, a multiagent architecture for content managements in ubiquitous computing. In this paper, we, first, describe two important concepts in order to realize the agent-based content managements in ubiquitous computing, ``physically grounding'' and ``cognitive (...) resources managements.'' Second, we describe the outline of the CONSORTS and its RDF-based spatial information representation. Finally, we show an application of the CONSORTS, context-aware information assist services in a museum. (shrink)

In this anthology, works of ten Japanese thinkers, many of whom are no longer alive but who have been household names among the Japanese intellectual community, are selected and translated into English, accompanied by a brief introduction of each thinker. An additional three substantial essays by scholars of Japanese philosophy make this volume a compelling read for anyone interested in the Japanese philosophical endeavor since 1945. This anthology clearly goes beyond the familiar parameter of the Kyoto School of Philosophy.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Awesome Nightfall: The Life, Times, and Poetry of SaigyōMichiko YusaAwesome Nightfall: The Life, Times, and Poetry of Saigyō. By William R. LaFleur. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. Pp. ix + 173. Paper $14.95.A quarter of a century ago William LaFleur published his book on Saigyō, Mirror for the Moon, which the present work, Awesome Nightfall: The Life, Times, and Poetry of Saigyō, thoughtfully and masterfully supersedes. In this connection (...) I may mention the philosopher, Nishida Kitarō, whose Zen no kenkyū (An inquiry into the good) was reprinted in 1936, twenty-five years after its first publication. On that occasion Nishida, deeply moved by the thought that his earliest work was still being read, expressed his sentiment by quoting the last two lines of one of Saigyō's poems: [End Page 270]Toshitaketemata koyubeshitoomoikiyaInochi narikeriSaya no NakayamaDid I ever imagineIn my advanced ageI should cross once againThis mountain pass of Saya-no-Nakayama?Ah, it is all thanks to having lived a long life!1(Saigyō composed this poem on going for the second time to Mutsu, the northern region of Japan, forty-two years after his first visit there.)As LaFleur notes, a number of important works on Saigyō's life and his times have been published in Japan in the last two decades, which these offer us more complete sketches of his life and allow an appreciation of his poetry to a greater depth. In the first part of the book, "The Life and Times of Saigyō," the author succinctly incorporates many of these findings and relates Saigyō's poems both to historical events and to his personal life experience (pp. 1-70). The second half of the book contains LaFleur's translation of over 150 poems by Saigyō, all of which appear to be taken from his earlier book (pp. 73-152).LaFleur shows how Saigyō's life (1118-1190) was closely linked to the historical context. The time was fast changing from the insei system (political administration run by the court of the retired emperor) to the Hōgen and Heiji Disturbances, the fierce power struggle between the Taira and the Minamoto military clans, with the dramatic demise of the former and the end of the Heian period. Saigyō's path crossed with such eminent political figures as Taira no Kiyomori in 1172 and Minamoto no Yoritomo in 1186. By juxtaposing historical events with Saigyō's poems, which often bear headnotes describing the circumstances under which he composed them, a full-fledged biography of Saigyō promises to be in the offing.In the present work, LaFleur sketches Saigyō's life in bold strokes and introduces new findings for the English-reading audience, such as the homoeroticism that dominated the court of the retired Emperor Toba (1103-1156)—although Saigyō himself does not appear to have been a member of this coterie.2 LaFleur also draws our attention to the fact that Saigyō practiced religious austerities at Mt. Kōya and Ōmine (pp. 20-21). Going beyond a rather two-dimensional image of Saigyō as a nature-loving poet of the moon and the flowers, the present study presents a picture of a man caught in an impossible love affair; a highly skilled equestrian, archer, and kemari (a sort of kickball) player; and a man who caused a sensation by renouncing the world at the young age of twenty-three despite his promising career as an imperial guard. Saigyō's mental and physical strength, honed by his mountain asceticism, no doubt was essential in his making extensive journeys far and wide. We also see that the distance Saigyō created from the political arena by becoming a monk gave him a keener eye to assess the fundamental political changes that were then taking [End Page 271] place. The full import of his poems, dealing with warfare, emperors, and the court, cannot be understood when separated from the political events of the day, although Saigyō himself maintained his cool objectivity and distanced himself from them.The tantalizing speculation that Saigyō was infatuated with Empress Taikenmon'in, Emperor Toba's consort and Emperor Sutoku's mother, is highly probable... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-ProsperityMichiko YusaPolitical Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-Prosperity. By Christopher S. Goto-Jones. London and New York: Routledge, 2005. Pp. 192. Hardcover $105.00.If it is the case that scholars who engage the Kyoto School philosophy in any serious manner may risk their reputation by "being tarred with the brush of fascism" (p. 4), then Christopher Goto-Jones is (...) certainly courageous to set out to redress the predicament that Nishida Kitarō 's thought (Nishida tetsugaku) is apparently in. Indeed, Goto-Jones' effort is to be highly commended. He contends that Nishida tetsugaku "ought to have been liberated from the oppression of the ultra-nationalist orthodoxy of wartime Japan" by "the allied victory," but instead it has been "oppressed under the new weight of post-war historiography" (p. 2). The author hopes to help change the present-day academic environment that still condemns Nishida tetsugaku or Kyoto School philosophy for complicity with the agenda of fascists and ultranationalists, a formidable force in Japan from the mid-1930s through the end of the Pacific War.Believing that Nishida tetsugaku qua political philosophy should gain its rightful place in the academic discourse, Goto-Jones embarks on this task. The way to liberate Nishida tetsugaku, he suggests, is to avoid the approach taken by apologists whose arguments, ultimately "unconvincing," were "not finally rooted in Nishida's philosophy but in his diaries and correspondence" (p. 4). He hopes to bring out the "cultural and political pluralism" that is at the heart of Nishida's political philosophy and to demonstrate that the contribution of Nishida's thought is to "relativize the political conceptualizations of Western philosophy" (p. 5). The strategy is to "re-politicize" Nishida tetsugaku and allow his (political) texts to speak for themselves. Goto-Jones contends that Nishida's political philosophy, properly understood, is neither ultranationalism nor liberalism, but "may be termed radical liberalism" (p. 137 n. 11).In chapter 2, the author proposes to situate Nishida's political thought "in the context of some of its earlier formulations," just as "[m]uch of Western political philosophy partakes in conversations initiated by the Greeks" (p. 28). He therefore begins with the seventeen-article constitution of Prince Shōtoku as the Ur-official text, and then turns his attention to the Japanese Buddhist and Confucian traditions. En route, Goto-Jones tries to connect such ideas as the honji suijaku theory with Nishida's dialectics, or the Tendai meditation practice of ichinen sanzen with the ideology of hakkō ichiu. Whether this approach clarifies Nishida's thought or adds further complications is left to the judgment of the reader. [End Page 361]Contrary to the view that Nishida underwent a "turn" in the early 1930s, Goto- Jones attempts to prove in chapters 3 and 4 that Nishida's political philosophy remained consistent throughout his life. To demonstrate this point, he examines the several theories of good discussed by Nishida in part 3 of Zen no kenkyū (An inquiry into the good), written ca. 1906, and the 1937 lecture "Rekishiteki shintai" (Historical body). The author's evidence to sustain his argument seems to rest on Nishida's personal protest against the intervention of the state in the affairs of education, as well as his lament that his thought was never properly understood.Because the scope of the book extends to Nishida's one-time students (such as Tosaka Jun, Miki Kiyoshi, Kōsaka Masaaki, Kōyama Iwao, and Nishitani Keiji as well as Harada Kumao and Kido Kōichi)1 and his colleagues (such as Tanabe Hajime and Watsuji Tetsurō ), to undertake this project Goto-Jones took on the weighty task of studying biographical information about Nishida and his colleagues as well as their vastly varying political approaches. The author's project is far more serious than a mere debate on the semantics of, for instance, the word "liberal," which, when applied to Nishida-and I tend to agree with him here-is "inappropriate and ahistor-ical" (p. 7), or the term "universal(ism)," which seems to have become another term of contention by sheer chance.The fact that... (shrink)

The rights granted to individuals by the legal system are examined with a fundamental distinction as regards their economic value as "property rights" and "personal rights". Property rights, which differ from personal rights in terms of their economic value, are characterized as ‘absolute’ if they can be asserted against everyone and as ‘relative’ if they can only be claimed against the convict on behalf of the debtor. If absolute property rights are based on a tangible (physical) subject, they are referred (...) to as real rights. Real rights and rights of claim that have relative characteristics and can therefore only be used through the act of a specific person constitute two important components of a property. Although various attempts have been made to bring these two types of rights closer together in the historical process, these rights have continued to be considered different in terms of both nature and legal implications. The aforementioned difference arises from the form of dominance over the subject of the right, whether it is direct or indirect, the impact of these rights on the ownership of the property, whether the right is absolute or relative, whether it is continuous or not, and priority/superiority, which will be discussed in detail in the article. The conceptual framework and terms belonging to the Continental European legal system are also found in Islamic legal doctrine in similar or equivalent forms. In this context, the term "milk" has been used in the fiqh literature to encompass all property rights, and terms such as "milk al-ayn," "milk al-manfaa," "milk al-dayn," and "milk al-habs wal-yad" have been developed depending on the nature of the property subject to the right. Real rights and personal rights constitute two important parts of the asset. In some cases where legal interests between people are confronted, it may be necessary to choose between these two types of rights. In such cases, considering the authorities it contains, a kind of priority has been given to real rights over personal rights. One of the cases where this priority is most clearly seen is when a leased property is transferred to third parties while the current lease agreement is in effect. In Islamic law, the authorities granted to the person by the lease contract differ from the Continental European legal system. At this point, the powers granted by the lease contract in Islamic law differ from those in the Continental European legal system. This article argues that the right of the tenant in this regard is considered as real right in Islamic law, unlike in the Continental European legal system. To justify this, the authorities granted to the tenant in Islamic law have been examined in cases where the leased property is transferred to third parties through means that can be interpreted as unlawful acts such as sale, lease, or usurpation during the lease period. In addition, the unique approach of Islamic law on this issue has been expressed by considering both classical and modern fiqh works, and by making comparisons with Turkish law. (shrink)