How is one’s cognitive ability related to the way one responds to strategic uncertainty? We address this question by conducting a set of experiments in simple 2×2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$2 \times 2$$\end{document} dominance solvable coordination games. Our experiments involve two main treatments: one in which two human subjects interact, and another in which one human subject interacts with a computer program whose behavior is known. By making the behavior of the computer perfectly predictable, the (...) latter treatment eliminates strategic uncertainty. We find that subjects with higher cognitive ability are more sensitive to strategic uncertainty than those with lower cognitive ability. (shrink)

By employing binary committee choice problems, this paper investigates how varying or eliminating feedback about payoffs affects: subjects’ learning about the underlying relationship between their nominal voting weights and their expected payoffs in weighted voting games; the transfer of acquired learning from one committee choice problem to a similar but different problem. In the experiment, subjects choose to join one of two committees and obtain a payoff stochastically determined by a voting theory. We found that: subjects learned to choose the (...) committee that generates a higher expected payoff even without feedback about the payoffs they received; there was statistically significant evidence of “meaningful learning” only for the treatment with no payoff-related feedback. This finding calls for re-thinking existing models of learning to incorporate some type of introspection. (shrink)