Recently, the distinction between nature and technology has been increasingly questioned. We are told that the changes to nature made possible by technology had reached such dimensions that it was no longer possible to clearly differentiate between nature and technology. Against the critical voices, I argue for the possibility and necessity of applying a version of the distinction that I call “classical”. I begin by examining selected historical origins of this distinction (...) and thereby discussing some of its critics debated today – namely Hans Blumenberg, Bruno Latour, Donna Haraway and Philippe Descola. In the next section, I introduce a concept of hybrid of nature and technology, which is suitable for delimiting and differentiating the scope of the classical distinction. I also need the concept of hybrid in order to assess the current tendencies in the development of the nature-technology relation, which are the subject of the last section. Against the background of these tendencies, I conclude by compiling some arguments in favour of maintaining the classical distinction between nature and technology. (shrink)

Do the changes that have taken place in the structures and methods of the production of scientific knowledge and in our understanding of science over the past fifty years justify speaking of an epochal break in the development of science? Gregor Schiemann addresses this issues through the notion of a scientific revolution and claims that at present we are not witnessing a new scientific revolution. Instead, Schiemann argues that after the so-called Scientific Revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a (...) caesura occurred in the course of the nineteenth century that constituted a departure from the early modern origins of science. This change was characterized by the loss of certainty on the part of the scientists, by the steadily increasing importance of scientific communities (rather than individuals), and by the systematic intertwinement of scientific and societal development. As to present science, Schiemann admits that important changes have occurred, but he denies the conflation of nature and culture: even the OncoMouse is a natural organism, though a seriously damaged one. (shrink)

Von den zahllosen Vorstellungen, die heute dem öffentlichen Reden über Natur zugrundeliegen, gehört die aristotelische Naturbegrifflichkeit zweifellos immer noch zu den einflußreichsten. Während in der Tradition des aristotelischen Denkens Natur und Technik zwei verschiedene Seinsweisen bezeichnen, verwerfen die Naturwissenschaften jede substantielle Unterscheidung zwischen den beiden Sphären. Die zunehmende Technisierung der Welt macht zudem einen Begriff problematisch, der im wesentlichen das von humanen Eingriffen Ungestörte subsumiert. Kann das öffentliche Verständnis, soweit es aristotelisch geprägt ist, die Tendenz zur Veränderung und (...) Ersetzung von Natur durch Technik überhaupt noch angemessen erfassen? Dieser Frage möchte ich auf zwei Ebenen nachgehen. Zum einen setze ich die aristotelische Unterscheidung von Natur und Technik weitestgehend als Dichotomie voraus, sehe von ihren lebensweltlichen Bezügen ab und konfrontiere sie exemplarisch mit einigen, teils schon vollzogenen, teils zu erwartenden Verschiebungen im Verhältnis dieser beiden Sphären. Insofern die Binnenperspektive der Individuen außer Betracht bleibt und es sich vornehmlich um Prozesse handelt, die die Grundlagen der materiellen Lebensverhältnisse betreffen, könnte man von der „gesellschaftlichen Ebene“ sprechen. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich ein spezieller, zunehmend verengter Kontext, in dem die Entgegensetzung noch sinnvoll Anwendung findet(I). Zum anderen rekonstruiere ich die aristotelische Begrifflichkeit im Horizont eines lebensweltlichen Verständnisses. Hierbei werde ich weniger von einer wechselseitigen Ausschließung der beiden Sphären ausgehen als von der Annahme, daß Natur und Technik die gegenüberliegenden Ränder eines Übergangsfeldes von Zuständen bezeichnen, in denen beide gleichsam gemischt enthalten sind. Die begrifflichen Hilfsmittel für diese Vermittlung finden sich bei Aristoteles selbst. Es handelt sich um die Individuationsprinzipien Stoff und Form, die in ihrer Anwendung auf die Definition von Natur eine differenziertere Wahrnehmung des Technischen gestattet. (shrink)

Im ersten Abschnitt skizziere ich die ursprüngliche aristotelische Unterscheidung von Natur und Technik. Auf die neuzeitliche Kritik an ihr, die sich anschließenden historischen Veränderungen ihrer gesamtgesellschaftlichen Anwendungsbedingungen sowie auf zukünftig mögliche Szenarien des Verhältnisses von Natur und Technik gehe ich im zweiten Abschnitt ein. In den nachfolgenden zwei Abschnitten fokussiere ich meine Ausführungen auf die Lebenswelt und diskutiere exemplarisch die Anwendung der Unterscheidung auf die äußere Wahrnehmung, die Leibwahrnehmung und die Reproduktionstechnologie. Es geht mir in diesen (...) beiden Abschnitten weniger um den Nachweis der durch Technisierungen bedingten Erosion der Lebenswelt als umgekehrt um die Begründung der fortbestehenden Brauchbarkeit der aristotelischen Unterscheidung in der Lebenswelt. (shrink)

Gregor Schiemann verteidigt die Aktualität des aristotelischen und cartesianischen Naturbegriffes, die Natur in Gegensatz zu Nichtnatürlichem definieren. Als gültig könnnen sich diese traditionellen Naturbegriffe jedoch nur noch innerhalb begrenzter Kontexte erweisen. -/- Im ersten Teil seines Buches zeigt der Autor, dass Aristoteles' Bestimmung der Natur als Gegenbegriff zur Technik in der Lebenswelt sowie Descartes' Dualismus von Natur und Geist für das eigene Bewusstseinserleben orientierungsleitend geblieben sind. Dass die Begriffspaare nicht nur in gesonderten Kontexten vorkommen, sondern sich ihre Anwendungen auch (...) wechselseitig durchdringen, führt er im zweiten Teil am Beispiel von Aristoteles' Seelenlehre und Descartes' Mechanismus aus. Die naturphilosophische und erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung verbindet Elemente der analytischen Philosophie mit Ansätzen der Phänomenologie. Sie will zu einem pluralen Verständnis der Natur beitragen, das universelle Geltungsansprüche verabschiedet. (shrink)

Two criteria are proposed for characterizing the diverse and not yet perspicuous relations between nanotechnology and nature. They assume a concept of nature as that which is not made by human action. One of the criteria endorses a distinction between natural and artificial objects in nanotechnology; the other allows for a discussion of the potential nanotechnological modification of nature. Insofar as current trends may be taken as indicative of future development, nanotechnology might increasingly use the model (...) of nature as a point of orientation, while many of its products will continue to be clearly distinguished from nature. (shrink)

Two criteria are proposed for characterizing the diverse and not yet perspicous relations between nanotechnology und nature. They assume a concept or nature as that which is not made by human action. One of the criteria endorses a distinction between natural and artificial objects in nanotechnology: the other allows for a discussion of the potential nanotechnological modification of nature. Insofar as current trends may be taken as indicative of future development, nanotechnology might increasingly use the model (...) of nature as a point of orientation, while many of its products will continue to be clearly distinguished from nature. (shrink)

Certamente, desde que o ser humano existe, a vida nunca esteve isenta de manipulação técnica. Todavia, formas recentes de biotecnologia vão mais longe, tendendo a tornar indiscernível as distinções clássicas entre crescimento natural e produção artificial. Ars sive natura, este poderia ser o novo slogan. Neste sentido, em oposição à bioética corrente que tenta compensar o monismo tecnológico através de um dualismo prático, discutiremos a idéia de que, quando age sobre o Outro (Fremdeneinwirkung), a biotecnologia nunca é puramente técnica, sendo (...) imediatamente prática, ética e política. Por outro lado, confrontada com novos desafios tecnológicos, a fenomenologia necessita assumir certas características de fenomenotecnologia; ações não são nunca meramente práticas. Uma tal combinação entre fenomenologia e fenomenotecnologia abre especiais perspectivas no que diz respeito ao trato da questão da vida humana. Primeiramente, descreveremos o eu corporal como gerador de sua própria história, na medida que evidencia graus de identidade e se constitui como altamente vulnerável. Em segundo lugar, distinguiremos entre a atitude técnica, restrita ao fato de que algo se modifica, e a atitude terapêutica, que se dirige a alguém que sofre: o paciente. A seguir, ultrapassaremos os limites do enquadramento clínico ao considerar novas conquistas no que diz respeito à produção da vida (por exemplo, clonagem e manipulação genética). Antes de simplesmente argumentar pró ou contra, temos de indagar o que significa produzir um eu vivo. Neste contexto, o tempo da poiesis será contrastado com o do pathos. Examinaremos o lugar desde o qual um ser vivo ou pessoal pode ser definido como alguém em si, e pretendemos tencionar simultaneamente o caráter paradoxal de atribuição de um eu ao Outro (Fremdezuschreibung), que assemelha-se ao paradoxo de ter a experiência do Outro como Outro (Fremderfahrung). Pois a pré-história e a pós-história de um alguém específico, incluindo nascimento e morte, é apenas acessível a nós em termos de substituição. Reduzidos a conjuntos de células, seres humanos seriam liberados de tudo isto. Restaria algo sobre o que falamos, mas de modo algum alguém falando a nós. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Biotecnologia. Terapia. Fenomenologia. Fenomenotecnologia. ABSTRACT Certainly, as long as human beings exist, life has never been exempt from technical manipulations. However, recent forms of biotechnology go further, tending to blur the classical distinction between natural growth and artificial production. Ars sive natura, that may be the new slogan. Now, in opposition to current bioethics which try to compensate the technological monism by means of a practical dualism, we will argue that by acting upon the Other (Fremdeinwirkung) biotechnology is never purely technical, it is immediately practical, ethical and political. On the other side, faced with new technological challenges, phenomenology needs certain features of phenomenotechnology; actions are never merely practical. Such an intertwining of phenomenology and phenomenotechnology opens up special perspectives in dealing with the issue of human life. Firstly, we will describe the bodily self as generating its own history, as showing grades of selfhood and as being highly vulnerable. Secondly, we will distinguish between the technological attitude, restricted on something to be changed, and the therapeutic attitude, addressed to somebody suffering, namely the patient. In the end, we cross the limits of the clinical frame by considering new attempts of life production (e.g. cloning and gene manipulation). Before simply arguing pro and con we have to ask what does it mean to produce a living self. In this context the time of poiesis will be contrasted with the time of pathos. We will examine the place from where a living or personal being may be defined as somebody in itself, and we will simultaneously stress the paradoxical character of ascribing the status of a self to the Other (Fremdzuschreibung), which resembles the paradox of experiencing the Other as an Other (Fremderfahrung). At last, the pre-history and the post-history of a oneself, including birth and death, is only accessible for us by means of substitution. Reduced to cell ensembles, human beings would get rid of all that. There would be left something we speak about, but by no means somebody speaking to us. KEY WORDS – Biotechnology. Therapy. Phenomenology. Phenomenotecnology. (shrink)

The topic of this contribution is the tension between the everyday dichotomy of nature and technology and the nanotechnological understanding of the world. It is essential to nanotechnology that nature and technology not be categorically opposed as the manmade and the non-manmade, but rather regarded as parts of a structurally identical whole. After the introduction, I will address three points: In a brief first section I will formulate a few questions and a thesis about the nanotechnological (...) developments that can be expected to come. In the main section I will assess four aspects of everyday understanding of nature and technology that are used to legitimate nanotechnology. Finally I will discuss whether an everyday understanding of nature can be conceived as a critical authority with respect to the nanotechnology program. (shrink)

This article examines the possibilities of constructing a discourse of the medial that involves no essential distinction between the spheres of the technical, the natural, and the human. Because th...

One of the legacies of modern philosophy is to have separated or bifurcated the human from nature. Marco Altamirano offers a critique of the modern concept of nature in order to chart a new trajectory for the philosophy of nature. -/- By examining the history of the concept of nature, Altamirano shows how a spatial and epistemological concept of nature emerged in Descartes, where a subject confronts an object in space and subsequently wonders about her (...) mode of access to that object. He then argues that a time-based concept of nature is necessary in order to reinstall the subject within its eventual ecology. Deploying conceptual resources from Bergson, Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault, and Leroi- Gourhan (among others), Altamirano shows how the concept of technology harbors an escape route from the spatial and epistemological picture of nature. Ultimately, this book draws the profile of a concept of nature based on time and technology that bypasses the nature-artifice distinction that has mired the philosophy of nature since modern philosophy. (shrink)

Die Kritische Theorie gilt als Theorie der Frankfurter Schule. So wie sie von Max Horkheimer in seinem klassischen Aufsatz über Kritische und traditionelle Theorie in den dreißiger Jahren ausgearbeitet wurde, ist sie allerdings eine kritische Theorie der Gesellschaft, nicht der Natur und der Technik. Der Grund dafür ist darin zu suchen, daß die Kritische Theorie gerade in Absetzung von der positivistisch verstandenen Naturwissenschaft konzipiert wurde und daß ferner die Entwicklung von Technik im Sinne der Produktivkräfte als eine unabhängige (...) Randbedingung der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung gesehen wurde. Eine Ausnahme innerhalb der Frankfurter Schule bildet Herbert Marcuse, der die Themen Naturbeherrschung und Technikentwicklung in seinen Arbeiten ausdrücklich behandelt. Der vorliegende Band versucht nun, Technik und Natur ausdrücklich in den Einzugsbereich der Kritischen Theorie zu bringen. Anlaß dazu sind die fortschreitende Technisierung der menschlichen Lebensverhältnisse, die Technisierung der Natur, die wir selbst sind, nämlich des Leibes, wie auch die Tatsache, daß die für uns relevante äußere Natur bereits weitgehend anthropogene Natur ist. Das verlangt nach einer kritischen Theorie der Technologieentwicklung, nach einer kritischen Behandlung der menschlichen Natur innerhalb der Gesellschaftstheorie, und schließlich nach einer Theorie der gesellschaftlichen Naturverhältnisse. Ansätze dazu werden aus dem Bereich der Sozialökologie, der feministischen Theorie des Körpers und der Theorie von Informatisierungsprozessen vorgeführt. Das Interesse dabei ist, diese Ansätze in die Tradition der älteren Kritischen Theorie einzubringen. Deshalb arbeiten mehrere Beiträge die Vorgeschichte der Behandlung der Themen Technik und Natur in der Kritischen Theorie auf. Aus dem Zentrum der Kritischen Theorie verbannt, finden sich ihre Spuren eher am Rande, nämlich im Zusammenhang der Ästhetik. Es gilt heute, was seiner Zeit unter den Stichworten Nicht-Identität oder Eingedenken der Natur im Subjekt nur angedeutet werden konnte, ins Zentrum theoretischer Bemühungen zu rücken. (shrink)

The distinction between nature and artifice has been definitive for Western conceptions of the role of humans within their natural environment. But the human must already be separated from nature in order to distinguish between nature and artifice. This separation, in turn, facilitates a classification of knowledge in general, typically cast in terms of a hierarchy of sciences that ascends from the natural sciences to the social (or human) sciences. However, this hierarchy considers nature as (...) a substantial foundation upon which artifice operates and to which it responds. Here I examine three inter-related concepts that, by focusing on events rather than substances, operate beyond the nature–artifice distinction and thereby resist the hierarchical classification of the sciences: Foucault’s concept of technology, the concept of milieu as it crosses over historically from physics to biology and anthropology, and Deleuze and Guattari’s reconfiguration of the concept of milieu in terms of their concept of machine. (shrink)

The separation of technological and economic science has maintained the illusion that knowledge itself, when applied to nature, can generate industrialization. The implicit equation “TECHNOLOGY=NATURE plus KNOWLEDGE” ignores the social component of (UNEQUALO EXCHANGE. A global, thermodynamic perspective reveals that world market prices are an intrinsic aspect of the reproduction of industrial technomass. Global exchange rates have to guarantee a net transfer of “exergy” (free energy) to industrial sectors, and industrial technology, as the art of managing (...) these thermodynamic profits, thus remains confined to a restricted social space. The accelerating destruction of the biosphere can only be checked by breaking the entropy-rewarding logic of general-purpose money. (shrink)

This essay presents an argument against human cloning. The thrust of the argument is that cloning is morally impermissible inasmuch as it violates thedignity of the clone who, as a person, is as yet an end in himself or herself. This violation of human dignity is made possible by a confusion between what Aristotledescribes as things that are “by nature” and things that are “by art.” By attempting to “make” a person, the technique of cloning superimposes the logic of (...) artupon the domain of natural reproduction. Corresponding to the efficient, formal, and final causes in art are three specific ways in which the dignity of the clone isviolated. Notably, however, these same three violations of human dignity occur in the attitudes and practices of parents in natural reproduction, indicating that theproblem of cloning is but a symptom of a more deep-seated malaise. (shrink)

This essay presents an argument against human cloning. The thrust of the argument is that cloning is morally impermissible inasmuch as it violates thedignity of the clone who, as a person, is as yet an end in himself or herself. This violation of human dignity is made possible by a confusion between what Aristotledescribes as things that are “by nature” and things that are “by art.” By attempting to “make” a person, the technique of cloning superimposes the logic of (...) artupon the domain of natural reproduction. Corresponding to the efficient, formal, and final causes in art are three specific ways in which the dignity of the clone isviolated. Notably, however, these same three violations of human dignity occur in the attitudes and practices of parents in natural reproduction, indicating that theproblem of cloning is but a symptom of a more deep-seated malaise. (shrink)

Hacking has maintained that in experiments phenomena are created, not discovered, and that scientific entities are tools for doing. These claims undermine the distinction between the natural and the artificial: phenomena and scientific entities become artifacts. Hacking's view raises the question whether the distinction between the natural and the artificial has to be given up. The paper argues 1) that phenomena are created, but in a sense that does not undermine the distinction between the natural and the (...) artificial, 2) that scientific entities are used as tools instead of being tools, and 3) that Hacking's view on experiments may be reconciled with the traditional view provided the concept of nature be reinterpreted. (shrink)

This article expands Patchen Markell’s seminal problematization of The Human Condition by examining the impact that the modern developments in science and technology had on Arendt’s signature categories. Whereas Markell is interested in the systematic “architecture” of the book, I attempt to historicize Arendt’s distinctions in light of the story she tells about science and technology. From the invention of the telescope to the splitting of the atom, technoscience has provoked shifts in the hierarchies within the vita activa; (...) spawned new varieties of “labor,” “work,” and “action”; and blurred the traditional boundaries between “nature” and the “human world.” These reconfigurations draw the contours of a new, “modern world” that is different from the world whose story and conceptual tradition Arendt set out to articulate. Largely as a result of the activities of science and technology, the experiences that informed the categories of the “Western tradition” correspond to a world that is no longer our own. (shrink)

Der Tagungsband beinhaltet fünfzehn Beiträge einer interdisziplinären Tagung des wissenschaftlichen, bildungsorientierten und gemeinnützigen Arbeitskreises philosophierender Ingenieure und Naturwissenschaftler (APHIN) e.V. Der Band umfasst Aufsätze aus dem Spannungsfeld von Philosophie, Ingenieur- und Naturwissenschaften und Aufsätze, die diesen Bereich transzendieren. Alle Beiträge spiegeln die Neugierde und Freude wider, über den eigenen fachlichen Tellerrand hinauszuschauen. Und sie zeigen, dass der Philosophie hierbei eine Schlüsselrolle zukommt. Das Selbstverständnis von APHIN – die Offenheit für die Fragen und Probleme der jeweils anderen – ist damit in (...) allen Beiträgen gegenwärtig. (shrink)

The treatment-enhancement distinction is often used to delineate acceptable and unacceptable medical interventions. It is likely that future assistive and augmenting technologies will also soon develop to a level that they might be considered to provide users, in particular those with disabilities, with abilities that go beyond natural human limits, and become in effect an enhancing technology. In this paper, we describe how this process might take place, and discuss the moral implications of such developments. We argue that (...) such developments are morally acceptable and indeed desirable. (shrink)

Certain restrictions on public funding for assisted reproductive technology (ART) are articulated and defended by recourse to a distinction between medical infertility and social infertility. We propose that underlying the prioritization of medical infertility is a vision of medicine whose proper role is to restore but not to improve upon nature. We go on to mark moral responses that speak of investments many continue to make in nature as properly an object of reverence and gratitude and (...) therein (sometimes) a source of moral guidance. We draw on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in arguing for the plausibility of an appeal to nature in opposition to the charge that it must contain a logical fallacy. We also invite consideration of the moral plausibility of some appeal to nature. Finally, we examine what follows in the case of ART. Should medicine respect as natural limits that should not be overcome: the need for a man and a woman in reproduction; menopause; and even declining fertility with age? We must first ask ourselves to what degree we should defer to nature in the conduct of medicine, at least in the particular if not the general case. This will involve also asking ourselves what we think is natural and in what instances and spirit might we defy nature. Divergent opinions and policies concerning who should receive ART treatment and public funding are more easily understood in view of the centrality, complexity and fundamental nature of these questions. (shrink)

One of the areas of study of tafsīr is the stories in the Qur’ān. In the stories of the Qur’ān, generally creation, man, the nature of man and different societies that lived in history are mentioned. Although the main theme in the stories is belief and disbelief, social structures and cultural features are explicitly and indirectly mentioned as well. But the mufassirs approached the stories mainly from the point of view of belief and disbelief. They did not declare an (...) opinion on cultural studies. Positive science applies the culture, science and technology that humanity has, only to the will and labour of man. However, when we look at the sacred texts, humanity has not only realized its development in the field of culture, science and technology, but also evolved by the presence of divine grace as well as the mind. In this evolution, the prophets were given a special task. This study covers the prophets and some inventions and professions attributed to them. The examination of the influence of divine grace and the Prophet’s fatānah (outstanding reasoning power) in the development of culture, science and technology is among the importance of the study. Because when scientific determinations are examined, it is seen that the first cultural events and civil developments occurred in the geography of the Prophets. Again, it can be seen that the explanation of culture and cultural developments with a positivist perspective and an empirical paradigm has some shortcomings. For this reason, the article aims to explain how cultural developments are formed based on sacred information data. In the study, the qualitative method was selected and the document examination technique was applied. Along with cultural activities, the prophets and their works were discussed; classical and modern tafsīr sources, as well as historical books, akhīlik (a guild system) works and futuwwatnāmas (rules and regulations of the guild) were addressed. Man was created by Almighty Allah with different and superior equipment than other beings. He has been taught all names. Names mean having the ability to recognize-classify-name the creature, to reason, to transform the nature and to transfer the culture. The meaning of the verse “he taught him all the names” is to teach the Prophet Adam the knowledge of things and the general knowledge of civilized life. The general knowledge was developed by people and various and different objects were produced; science and technique were constantly developed. Especially the prophets made a great contribution to these scientific and technological developments. Thus, the prophets guided people in the spiritual sphere such as faith, worship and morality, as well as in the scientific and material sphere. Throughout the history, the prophets have shed light on scientific developments directly or indirectly, showing the limits of the level of science that humanity can reach through their miracles. According to Islāmic Sciences, the process of domesticating seeds and taming animals began during the reign of the Prophet Adam. He produced dresses for himself and his wife. As a prophet, a religion and belief system was formed during his time. Along with Prophet Idrīs, more beautiful dresses began to be knitted and sewn, writing with pencil. In the era of Prophet Noah, besides agriculture, art was also developed; sculptures and ships were made. During Prophet Hoad period, there was progress in agriculture as well as urbanization activities, and villages and towns began to form. During the reign of Ṣāleḥ, cities were founded in a serious sense. For this reason, in Prophet Ṣāleḥ’s stories, emphasis is placed on the words dār and diyār, which means house or houses, and in particular the word medīna (city) is used. The inscription, which began to be mentioned with Prophet Idris in Islāmic Sciences, also began to be used in the Qur’ān along with Prophet Abraham/Ibrāhīm, and during the reign of Prophet Moses/Mūsā, it was referred to as the book. During the reign of Prophet Joseph, money was invented and the clock and calendar were used. Again, Islāmic sources also contain the information that Prophet Joseph/Yūsuf invented paper for the first time. During the period of Prophet Shu‘ayb, the knowledge of account, measurement and weighing were developed, and they began to be used extensively in trade. During the reign of Prophet David/Dāwūd, iron was very widely used, and Prophet David, made household items out of iron, as well as war tools and equipment. Prophet Solomon/Sulaymān, on the other hand, expanded the processing of iron further, making it widely in all areas of life. During the reign of Prophet Jesus/ʿĪsā and Luqmān, medicine also made progress; Prophet Jesus developed and treated methods of treatment for crippled patients. Along with Islām, this information has been included and developed in the most detailed way in the Qur’ān, the personality of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the Hadīth. (shrink)

The use of tools and artefacts is a distinctive and problematic phenomenon in the history of humanity, and as such it has been a topic of discussion since the beginning of Western culture, from the myths of the Ancient Greek through Humanism and Romanticism to Heidegger. Several questionable aspects have been brought to the fore: the relation between technology and arts, the effects of the use of technology both on the world and on the user and the (...) class='Hi'>nature of the trust that users place in technology . This last topic is the subject of this special issue, which has the twofold goal of fostering a cross-disciplinary debate and, in doing so, of overcoming, at least in part, the fragmentation of the literature on this topic.The problematic nature of trust in technology becomes evident with the dissemination of information and communication technologies and the subsequent information revolution, with which artefacts cease to be used mainly to perform physical and fatigui .. (shrink)

ABSTRACTCertain restrictions on public funding for assisted reproductive technology are articulated and defended by recourse to a distinction between medical infertility and social infertility. We propose that underlying the prioritization of medical infertility is a vision of medicine whose proper role is to restore but not to improve upon nature. We go on to mark moral responses that speak of investments many continue to make in nature as properly an object of reverence and gratitude and therein (...) a source of moral guidance. We draw on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in arguing for the plausibility of an appeal to nature in opposition to the charge that it must contain a logical fallacy. We also invite consideration of the moral plausibility of some appeal to nature. Finally, we examine what follows in the case of ART. Should medicine respect as natural limits that should not be overcome: the need for a man and a woman in reproduction; menopause; and even declining fertility with age? We must first ask ourselves to what degree we should defer to nature in the conduct of medicine, at least in the particular if not the general case. This will involve also asking ourselves what we think is natural and in what instances and spirit might we defy nature. Divergent opinions and policies concerning who should receive ART treatment and public funding are more easily understood in view of the centrality, complexity and fundamental nature of these questions. (shrink)

From the point of view of the history and philosophy of science, the relationship of Descartes' to Aristotle's concept of nature has not been grasped in an entirely satisfactory way. In this article, the two concepts will be subjected to a comparative analysis, beginning with the outstanding feature that both concepts of nature are characterized by a contradistinction to the non-natural: Aristotle separates nature and technology; Descartes opposes nature to thinking. My thesis is that these (...) meanings have found privileged application in specific contexts of experience: the field of application especially suitable for the Aristotelian concept is the experience of everyday life, while for the Cartesian concept it is subjective experience. Historically, the relationship between meaning and experience is of help in understanding the conditions in which the two concepts arose. The topical relevance of the concepts to modern society is a consequence of the continued existence of the favored contexts of experience. Roughly stated, we sometimes still perceive in an Aristotelian way and at other times think in a Cartesian way. (shrink)

In this paper it is highlighted and argued that Boscovich’s natural sciences theory is so deeply rooted in metaphysics and pervaded by it, we can maintain that it is a distinctive example of sharp-­witted, clever and far­-reaching metaphysical natural philosophy. Critically engaging with the unsubstantiated denial of metaphysics and several centuries long attempts to overcome it, I demonstrate that by metaphysical thinking Boscovich arrived at his unique notion of attractive­repulsive force and gained insight into the structure of things, by which (...) he anticipated, among other things, the theory of relativity and quantum physics. Although Boscovich greatly and successfully used quantitative methods while solving problems from geodesy, astronomy, optics, civil engineering statistics, hydraulic engineering and other fields – the most important parts of his natural sciences legacy, which made him transpose several centuries, are supported by geometric intuition and carried out mainly by qualitative methods, that is, metaphysical speculation. Also, I explain how for the creation and development of electromagnetism it was crucial to describe electromagnetic phenomena using Boscovich’s unique law of force and his theory of the structure of matter, what was explicitly stated by the ‘father of electromagnetism’ James Clerk Maxwell. Boscovich would have never reached these ideas by the exact scientific method, only by metaphysically founded and guided ‘proper thinking’. (shrink)

Distinctions between therapy and enhancement are difficult to draw with precision, especially in marginal cases. Nevertheless, most recent Christian discussions of enhancement technologies accept the general plausibility of distinctions drawn between therapeutic interventions and enhancement technologies by appealing to general understandings of nature and human nature as available benchmarks. On that basis, a range of religious assessments of enhancement technologies can be identified. Those judgments incorporate different interpretations of nature as a source of moral insight, different understandings (...) of human responsibility in light of God's purposes, and different assessments of the effects of sin and finitude on human freedom. (shrink)

Educational technology is controversial - some see it as essential to providing free global learning, others view it as a dangerous distraction that undermines good education. In both instances, most theories that have previously been applied to educational technology do not account for the distinctive nature and vast potential of technology. This book addresses this issue, exploring how education has been bound up with technology from the beginning, and recognising that educational aims have already been (...) shaped by technologies. Offering a 'dialogic' theory of educational technology, Rupert Wegerif and Louis Major respond to contemporary challenges to education within this book, including, but not limited to, climate change, misinformation on the internet and the impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Chapters introduce, discuss, and contextualise key theories and illustrate through case studies their uses within a diverse range of educational contexts, spanning from primary education to adult lifelong learning. Each chapter also concludes with a short summary, demonstrating how these theories translate to practical implications for design. A fascinating response to current developments in educational technology, this is a crucial read for all involved in creating, researching, or making decisions about the use of technologies within educational contexts. (shrink)

The distinction between sociology of science on the one hand and methodology and systematics on the other, is an established historical fact. Thus, even in modern methodologically orientated philosophy, epistemological analyses still tend to disregard the pragmatic contexts within which scientific knowledge is produced, processed and applied. This situation also reflects the well-known fact that philosophy of science has largely ignored the conceptual and methodological foundations of technology, that is, those disciplines directly and explicitly linked to the practical (...) implications and intended applications of scientific research. The following considerations suggest that the methodology of technology provides useful and generally applicable criteria of the evaluation and acceptance of the hypotheses and theories of empirical science. (shrink)

Auch unter den Bedingungen der Verwissenschaftlichung und Technisierung der Gesellschaft bleiben wesentliche Aspekte von Aristoteles' Naturbegriff kontextrelativ anwendbar: In lebensweltlicher Erfahrung finden Bestimmungen der (extensionalen) Entgegensetzung von Natur und Technik, in wissenschaftlicher Erfahrung unabhängig davon bestehende (intensionale) Natureigenschaften bevorzugte Anwendungen. Die Abgrenzung von Natur gegen Technik hat für kulturelle Orientierungen, öffentliche Diskurse und politische Handlungsentscheidungen, in denen die materiellen Folgen menschlicher Tätigkeiten thematisch sind, grundlegende Bedeutung. Für den Kontext der Wissenschaften dienen die disziplinenübergreifenden, an den Naturwissenschaften orientierten Selbstorganisationstheorien (...) als Beispiel der Anwendbarkeit. (shrink)

Science and technology are frequently confused. This essay points out thebases for this confusion and then focuses on a basic distinction, namely, that whereas science brings us information that we have little choice but to absorb and reflect upon, technology is something that humans elect to do and, hence, can also elect not to do. It is proposed that technological ethics are most cogently undertaken with scientific understanding as the linchpin and religious/artistic sensibilities as the muse.

Die Darstellung konzentriert sich auf den Naturbegriff in seinem Verhältnis zu Kultur, die folglich nur reduzierte Charakterisierung erfährt. Herausgearbeitet werden vor allem die Umfänge, Eigenschaften und Grenzen der auf Kultur bezogenen Naturbegriffe. Das Feld dieser Bedeutungen ist in einer Pluralität von sich teils überschneidenden, teils wechselseitig ergänzenden Naturbegriffen eingebettet. Weil erst vor diesem Hintergrund die Spezifität der Beziehung von Natur und Kultur sowie ihrer Natur - Kultur und ihr Anderes Bestimmungselemente deutlich wird, beginne ich mit einer Vorbemerkung zum Naturdiskurs (1). (...) Im Anschluss daran stelle ich fünf Varianten der Verhältnisbestimmung von Natur und Kultur vor. Bei den ersten beiden handelt es sich um die klassischen Entgegensetzungen von Natur zu Technik einerseits und zu Geschichte andererseits. Die Differenz von Natur und Technik geht auf Aristoteles zurück und hat sich bis heute vor allem Aktualität im lebensweltlichen Erfahrungsbereich bewahrt. (2). Den lebensweltlichen Nahbereich des direkt Wahrnehm- und Veränderbaren transzendiert die exemplarisch von Jean-Jacques Rousseau formulierte Gegenüberstellung von Natur und Geschichte. (3). Übergangsbereiche von Natur und Kultur sowie Bereiche, in denen sich zwischen beiden nicht mehr sinnvoll unterscheiden lässt, sind in den vergangenen zwei Jahrhunderten zunehmend zum Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Arbeit geworden. Die Vielfalt der gegenwärtigen Forschungen in diesem Zusammenhang gestattet keine einheitliche Bestimmung des Natur-Kultur-Verhältnisses. Es lassen sich jedoch gemeinsame Strukturen bevorzugter Thematisierungsrichtungen ausmachen. Dazu gehört das Festhalten an den beiden, nicht dualistisch aufgefassten Begriffen als Bezeichnung von Gegenstandskomponenten. Hieran anknüpfend schlage ich vor, die Begriffe als polare Extreme eines Feldes von Mischungszuständen zu verstehen (4). Abschließend folgen die zwei Varianten, in deren Konsequenz es liegt, die Legitimität jeweils eines der beiden Begriffe zu bestreiten: Die naturalistische und die kulturalistische Variante. Sie rekurrieren jeweils beide auf einen historischen Prozess und sind als theoretisches Programm formuliert (5 und 6). (shrink)

Emerging technologies can have profound conceptual implications. Their emergence frequently calls for the articulation of new concepts, or for modifications and novel applications of concepts that are already entrenched in communication and thought. In this paper, we introduce the notion of “conceptual appropriation” to capture the dynamics between concepts and emerging technologies. By conceptual appropriation, we mean the novel application of a value-laden concept to lay a contestable claim on an underdetermined phenomenon. We illustrate the dynamics of conceptual appropriation by (...) analyzing the concept NATURE and its uptake in three discourses of emerging technology: cellular agriculture, solar geo-engineering, and biomimicry. We argue that NATURE and its cognate NATURALNESS are strongly valanced concepts upon which different stakeholders lay a claim. In doing so, stakeholders advance distinct conceptions of nature, typically to suit their own interests. Our case-studies illustrate how in discourses on emerging technology, the application of value-concepts is entangled with ideological stakes and power dynamics. (shrink)

New technologies have the potential to severely “challenge” or “disrupt” not only our established social practices but our most fundamental concepts and distinctions like person versus object, nature versus artificial or being dead versus being alive. But does this disruption also change these concepts? Or does it merely change our operationalizations and applications of the same concepts? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on individual conceptual change, philosophers of socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) should think about conceptual (...) change as a change in a network of interrelated concepts. What really generates a potential social disruption are changes of inferential relations between concepts – whether or not this entails a change of the respective individual concepts. Philosophers of socially disruptive technologies are therefore in the privileged position of being able to avoid commitments regarding the individuation of individual concepts. -/- . (shrink)

Singer and Dawson point out that two arguments against abortion, that the embryo is entitled to protection because from fertilization it is (1) a human being or (2) a potential human being, are also used by opponents of embryo experimentation. They focus on the second argument, evaluating the notion of potentiality as it applies to gametes, to the unimplanted embryo, to the implanted developing embryo, and to the embryo created by in vitro fertilization (IVF). They argue that there is a (...) crucial distinction between natural reproduction, in which all that is needed for the embryo to have a prospect of reaching its potential is for those involved to refrain from stopping it, and IVF, in which the embryo cannot develop into a person without a deliberate human act. Reproductive techniques necessitate our rethinking of established views about potentiality, and how it should be applied to the embryo in a laboratory. (KIE abstract). (shrink)

Global environmental science, in its current configuration as predominantly interdisciplinary earth systems analysis, owes its existence to technological development in three respects. (1) Environmental impacts of globalization of corporate and military industrial development linked to widespread use of new technologies prompted investigation of ways to understand and anticipate the global nature of such impacts. (2) Extension of the reach of technology itself demands extension of attempts to anticipate and control the environment in which the technology is to (...) function. Thus as the reach becomes global, the environment in question is also global. (3) Such global studies cannot get far without the development of command, control and information technologies (computers, satellites, automated remote sensing devices) which are crucial for data gathering, storage, and analysis and for the simulation modeling, crucial to theory testing and prediction. This network of dependence on technological development gives the global environmental sciences a rather distinctive epistemological profile, one in which some distinctions that we had thought were clear, on the basis of models of classic laboratory sciences (such as those between experiment and deduction or representation and instrument), turn out to be far from clear. In consequence there needs to be a careful evaluation of the extent to which, or the ways in which, these sciences can provide bases for policy decisions. (shrink)

The constitutive role of technology in the constructive theory of science. Consequences for the philosophy of technology. Technology plays an important role in the constructivistic reconstructions of the natural sciences. However, there is no indepth view or thorough explication of the term "technology" and its connotations and relations in those exercises. Technology, there, is seen as a more or less evident part of the lifeworld's A priori of the natural sciences. This paper is dedicated to (...) the reconstruction of the function of technology in the argumentations chains and proto-theories which shall, in the constructivistic (methodical) theory of sciences, provide the methodical fundament of the sciences. In a second step, the aspects of technology are identified which are indispensable to fulfil the functions of technology in the argumentation chains mentioned above. Finally, these aspects are related to current debates in the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

Mit diesem Beitrag möchte ich der Frage nachgehen, ob die Gegenstände, Vorhaben oder Konzeptionen der Nanotechnologie geeignet sind, zu einer tiefgreifenden Veränderung bisher vorherrschender Natur-Technik-Verständnisse zu führen. Von besonderem Interesse sind dabei nichtwissenschaftliche Auffassungen, von denen ich exemplarisch die der Lebenswelt vorstellen werde. In ihrer aristotelischen Verfassung folgt sie einer kategorialen Entgegensetzung von Natur und Technik. Natur zeichnet sich demnach durch eine nicht auf Technik reduzierbare Selbstbewegung aus, Technik geht hingegen ganz im menschlichen Handeln auf (Abschnitt (...) 1). Das nanotechnologische Naturverständnis läuft dem lebensweltlichen Verständnis insofern zuwider, als es keine kategoriale Abgrenzung zur Technik kennt. Es lassen sich verschiedene Naturbegriffe der Nanotechnologie unterscheiden, von denen ich zwei Gruppen hervorhebe: die naturalistische und die der Natur-Technik-Differenz (Abschnitt 2). Letztere enthält wiederum zwei Bedeutungen. Zum einen meint Natur das gesetzmäßig Verfaßte. Als solches stellt sie eine unüberschreitbare Voraussetzung und Grenze des nanotechnologisch Machbaren dar. Eine steigende Relevanz der Nanotechnologie (wie der wissenschaftlichen Technik überhaupt) würde dieser Bedeutung zu größerer kultureller Tragweite gegenüber der lebensweltlichen Entgegensetzung verhelfen (Abschnitt 3). Zum anderen bezeichnet Technik in der Nanotechnologie aber, wie auch in der Lebenswelt, das vom Menschen Hergestellte (ohne jedoch von Natur kategorial getrennt zu sein). Wegen dieser Gemeinsamkeit trägt die Nanotechnologie trotz ihrer differenten Naturauffassung zur Stützung des lebensweltlichen Technikverständnisses bei. Sie vermag unter bestimmten Bedingungen mit ihren Methoden den der lebensweltlichen Wahrnehmung nicht zugänglichen künstlichen Ursprung von nanotechnologischen Gegenständen nachzuweisen. Wenn diese Identifikation prinzipiell ausgeschlossen ist, fallen die nanotechnologischen Gegenstände der Natur zu. Ansonsten bilden sie Hybride, in denen Natur und Technik mitunter in nicht mehr auftrennbarer Verschränkung vorliegen. Diese Untrennbarkeit ist nicht spezifisch für die Nanotechnologie und setzt der Identifikation nanotechnologischer Eingriffe keine neue Grenze (Abschnitt 4). Abschließend gehe ich auf den Einfluß der Nanotechnologie auf das lebensweltliche Naturverständnis ein, d. h. auf den erwartbaren Einfluß von nanotechnologischen Produkten und die Bedeutung der Grenzen der nanotechnologischen Unterscheidbarkeit von Natur und Technik in der Lebenswelt (Abschnitt 5). (shrink)

This book offers an interdisciplinary account of the role of science and technology in contemporary culture, culminating in a social-political and philosophical critique of transhumanism. Its central claim is that it is past time to restrain the runaway ambitions of technoscientific knowledge. The author probes the assumptions of leading transhumanist thinkers and reviews the arguments of prominent critics as he develops his own distinctive take on transhumanism. He frames these other discussions within a wider critique of the modern technoscientific (...) impulse, which is seen as the hidden driver of any number of the social pathologies. Crucially, he offers his own naturalistic account of an alternative path for human flourishing, and discusses how philosophy needs to change in order to better contribute to pressing societal questions and to be made relevant to public policy. The interdisciplinary orientation of Transhumanism and Nature makes it relevant to scholars and students across a wide range of disciplines, including social and political philosophy, philosophy of technology, science and technology studies, environmental studies, and public policy. it relevant to scholars and students across a wide range of disciplines, including social and political philosophy, philosophy of technology, science and technology studies, environmental studies, and public policy. (shrink)

Despite the many turns that philosophy of technology has undergone in recent decades, the question of the nature and limits of technological determinism (TD) has been neglected, because it was considered as solved and overcome, and therefore not worth further discussion. This paper once again raises the problem of TD, by trying to save the opposing, but complementary elements of truth of the two main forms of TD that I shall call “nomological” and “normative”: (a) technology is (...) all-pervasive and has an inexorable capacity for extending itself into every field of human life, and (b) we have a capacity to counteract and orient technology, at least in some measure. In order to reconcile these seemingly inconsistent claims, the key move for my argument is a brief analysis of the notion of scientific experiment from the perspective of the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. As a result, two senses of technology are distinguished, which I shall call respectively “reflective” and “methodological.” From the point of view of this distinction, the all-pervasiveness and inexorability of technology and the in principle irreducibility of human persons to technology—which nomological and normative TD assert dialectically one against the other—can be reconciled. Among other things, this requires the rejection (in one fundamental sense) of the widely held assumption, made both by nomological and normative TD, that technology is a cultural field whose contents can be neatly separated from the rest of human culture. This thesis should be replaced by the more qualified claim of the reflective unity and the methodological multiplicity of technology. (shrink)

Unlike basic sciences, scientific research in advanced technologies aims to explain, predict, and (mathematically) describe not phenomena in nature, but phenomena in technological artefacts, thereby producing knowledge that is utilized in technological design. This article first explains why the covering-law view of applying science is inadequate for characterizing this research practice. Instead, the covering-law approach and causal explanation are integrated in this practice. Ludwig Prandtl's approach to concrete fluid flows is used as an example of scientific research in the (...) engineering sciences. A methodology of distinguishing between regions in space and/or phases in time that show distinct physical behaviours is specific to this research practice. Accordingly, two types of models specific to the engineering sciences are introduced. The diagrammatic model represents the causal explanation of physical behaviour in distinct spatial regions or time phases; the nomo-mathematical model represents the phenomenon in terms of a set of mathematically formulated laws. (shrink)

Economists have long treated technological phenomena as events transpiring inside a black box and, on the whole, have adhered rather strictly to a self-imposed ordinance not to inquire too seriously into what transpires inside that box. The purpose of Professor Rosenberg's work is to break open and examine the contents of the black box. In so doing, a number of important economic problems be powerfully illuminated. The author clearly shows how specific features of individual technologies have shaped a number of (...) variables of great concern to economists: the rate of productivity improvement, the nature of learning processes underlying technological change itself, the speed of technology transfer, and the effectiveness of government policies that are intended to influence technologies in particular ways. The separate chapters of this book reflect a primary concern with some of the distinctive aspects of industrial technologies in the twentieth century, such as the increasing reliance upon science, but also the considerable subtlety and complexity of the dialectic between science and technology. Other concerns include the rapid growth in the development of costs associated with new technologies as well as the difficulty of predicting the eventual performance characteristics of newly emerging technologies. (shrink)