Socrates was not a moral philosopher. Instead he was a theorist who showed how human desire and human knowledge complement one another in the pursuit of human happiness. His theory allowed him to demonstrate that actions and objects have no value other than that which they derive from their employment by individuals who, inevitably, desire their own happiness and have the knowledge to use actions and objects as a means for its attainment. The result is a naturalised, practical, and demystified (...) account of good and bad, and right and wrong. Professor Reshotko presents a freshly envisioned Socratic theory residing at the intersection of the philosophy of mind and ethics. It makes an important contribution to the study of the Platonic dialogues and will also interest all scholars of ethics and moral psychology. (shrink)

At Tm. 47e, Timaeus steps back from his discussion of what came about through noûs and turns toward an account of what came about through anankê. Broadie, 2012, Nature and Divinity in Plato’s Timaeus, sketches out two routes for the interpretation of this ‘new beginning.’ The ‘metaphysical’ approach uses perceptibles qua imitations of intelligibles in order to glimpse the intelligibles (just as we look at our reflection in a mirror in order to view ourselves). The ‘cosmological’ reading assumes we use (...) the perceptible part of the cosmos in order to come to know the entire cosmos. Broadie openly favors the cosmological reading for understanding the Timeaus as a whole. However, she confines its utility to the Timaeus and does not recommend it for other dialogues. I use Broadie’s ‘cosmological reading’ to better understand what Plato distinguishes as anankê in his second beginning. This sets the stage for my argument that Broadie’s cosmological reading is a promising means for understanding the metaphysics and epistemology of the Forms. By making some comparisons to Sophist (251c–256a), I show that a refined understanding of anankê in the second beginning of the Timaeus clarifies what Plato thinks is involved in coming to know a Form. I argue that a close look at what was available to the Demiurge for cosmic creation by means of noûs yields three distinct ways in which his construction of the cosmos was limited by anankê. Clarifying these three ways in which anankê operates shows that the Demiurge’s manipulation of the foundational elements yields a perceptible world that brings out some potential relationships among Forms while suppressing others. In particular, the Demiurge’s geometricization of the elements leads him to make compromises concerning how Forms can combine in the Receptacle. These choices produce nomological relationships among the Forms with respect to where they can overlap in the Receptacle. This produces the law-like and reliable, but unnecessary, behavior of the perceptible world. I argue that our understanding of these limitations and their translation into where the Receptacle can partake in more than one Form simultaneously, figures importantly in the estimating the potential for human knowledge of the Forms. I question the use of ‘necessity’ as a translation for ‘anankê’ in the Timaeus. (shrink)

In consoling the lover of sights and sounds at Republic 475e4-479d5, Socrates describes a tripartite distinction among knowledge, doxa, and ignorance. Socrates claims that knowledge is ‘over’ what-is, doxa is over what is and is-not, and ignorance is over nothing at all. I argue that Plato shows that doxa and ignorance are also related to what-is. While knowledge, doxa, and ignorance interact with different first-degree objects, these three capacities have a common second-degree object: what-is. The fact that Socrates claims that (...) doxa is inferior to knowledge, and ignorance is inferior to doxa, shows that these three capacities have a shared aspiration that doxa and ignorance each fail to fulfill in their own way. Following Plato’s analogy to the senses at 477c1-d1, I use an analogy to the senses to demonstrate Plato’s understanding of the relationship between doxa and what is. (shrink)

I compare two theories of motivation: The Socratic Theory of Motivation and Fred Dretske's attempt to vindicate the use of desires in folk-psychological explanations. I find that, although Socrates ' theory is, at first glance, counterintuitive, while Dretske's provides persuasive analyses of beliefs and desires, there is a way of developing Dretske's theory which produces a theory that is parallel to the Socratic Theory of Motivation. In fact, if we substitute "all desire is for homeostasis" for the thesis that "all (...) desire is for the good" in the Socratic Theory of Motivation, we can actually reduce much of the Socratic Theory from psychology to physiology. I call this parallel theory the Socratized Dretskean Theory of Motivation. As a consequence, I find that many features of the Socratized Dretskean Theory of Motivation are actually more consistent with our common sense physiological views than are our everyday folk-psychological assumptions concerning beliefs and desires. I conclude that, if we are to vindicate folk psychology, we should take a Socratic stance concerning such psychological entities as beliefs, desires and knowledge. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Apeiron Jahrgang: 47 Heft: 2 Seiten: 266-292.

Many philosophers assert that psychological verbs generate opaque contexts and that the object of a psychological verb cannot be replaced with a co‐referring expression salva veritate as the objects of non‐psychological verbs can be. I argue that the logical and linguistic concerns which govern this assertion do not transfer to observational and experimental situations because the criteria that we use in order to verify that an observed subject has one hypothesized desire rather than another provide inconclusive evidence when we don't (...) allow for all regular substitutions in psychological contexts. This becomes more obvious when we contextualize intentional behavior within the appropriate framework by recognizing that, in order to make sense of any desire attribution, we must understand the subject experiencing the desire to be pursuing each desired situation as a means to a further overarching goal. I conclude that the object of desire should always be read de re. (shrink)

Shaw introduces an important and compelling line of argumentation concerning the relationship between pleasure and the good into the literature on Plato’s dialogues with ramifications beyond any commitment that Plato has Socrates make to hedonism at Protagoras 351b–357e. To appreciate Shaw’s argument, the term ‘hedonism’ must be understood to indicate that the good is identical to bodily pleasure—not to both sensate and modal pleasure understood as a dichotomy, and not to all pleasures of the soul and body understood as a (...) blended, commensurable, spectrum. Chapter 1 characterizes hedonism in a narrower way.. (shrink)