A generalized Veltman semantics developed by de Jongh is used to investigate correspondences between several extensions of intepretability logic . In this paper we present some new results on independences.

Interpretability logic is an extension of provability logic. Veltman models and generalized Veltman models are two semantics for interpretability logic. We consider a connection between Veltman semantics and generalized Veltman semantics. We prove that for a complete image-finite generalized Veltman modelW there is a Veltman model W ′ that is bisimular to W.

We obtain modal completeness of the interpretability logics IL $\!\!\textsf {P}_{\textsf {0}}$ and ILR w.r.t. generalised Veltman semantics. Our proofs are based on the notion of full labels [2]. We also give shorter proofs of completeness w.r.t. the generalised semantics for many classical interpretability logics. We obtain decidability and finite model property w.r.t. the generalised semantics for IL $\textsf {P}_{\textsf {0}}$ and ILR. Finally, we develop a construction that might be useful for proofs of completeness of extensions of ILW w.r.t. (...) the generalised semantics in the future, and demonstrate its usage with $\textbf {IL}\textsf {W}^\ast = \textbf {IL}\textsf {WM}_{\textsf {0}}$. (shrink)

The filtration method is often used to prove the finite model property of modal logics. We adapt this technique to the generalized Veltman semantics for interpretability logics. In order to preserve the defining properties of generalized Veltman models, we use bisimulations to define adequate filtrations. We give an alternative proof of the finite model property of interpretability logic with respect to Veltman models, and we prove the finite model property of the systems and with respect to generalized Veltman models.

Interpretability logic is a modal formalization of relative interpretability between first‐order arithmetical theories. Verbrugge semantics is a generalization of Veltman semantics, the basic semantics for interpretability logic. Bisimulation is the basic equivalence between models for modal logic. We study various notions of bisimulation between Verbrugge models and develop a new one, which we call w‐bisimulation. We show that the new notion, while keeping the basic property that bisimilarity implies modal equivalence, is weak enough to allow the converse to hold in (...) the finitary case. To do this, we develop and use an appropriate notion of bisimulation games between Verbrugge models. (shrink)

Cultural psychologists often describe the relationship between mind and culture as ‘dynamic.’ In light of this, we provide two desiderata that a theory about encultured minds ought to meet: the theory ought to reflect how cultural psychologists describe their own findings and it ought to be thoroughly naturalistic. We show that a realist theory of causal powers — which holds that powers are causally-efficacious and empirically-discoverable — fits the bill. After an introduction to the major concepts in cultural psychology and (...) describing causal power realism, we use a case study — the effects of pathogen prevalence on culture and cognition — to show the explanatory capacities of the powers framework. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on the propensity toward identifying natural kinds with successful scientific categories in contemporary discussions of natural kinds within the philosophy of science. Success in this case is understood as the fulfillment of epistemic interests or goals in a given field of scientific research. The prevailing view is that, in order to have a theory of natural kinds that successfully captures current scientific practice, the relevant epistemic interests are the current interests of scientists working in a (...) particular field. In contrast, we concur with the Franklin-Hall (2015) that a wider range of possible interests needs to be taken into account, in order to avoid making natural kinds too dependent on the current stage of research. But unlike Franklin-Hall who suggests looking for an intersection between the interests and goals of current epistemic agents and our neighboring epistemic agents (the categorical bottleneck view), we advocate the view that all these different interests and goals need to be taken into account, and thus our view takes into account a much wider range of categories. (shrink)

No começo havia Saussure, mais ou menos daí parte nossa história. Para serpreciso, ela começa muito antes – talvez tenha de fato “desde sempre” começado –, maspedimos licença para tomar como nosso ponto de partida provisório essa dóxa de algummodo duvidosa de nossos tempos.O giro saussuriano tem, obviamente, muito a ver com a voz. Se tomarmos, comseriedade, a natureza negativa do signo linguístico, seu valor puramente diferencial eopositivo, então a voz – como o terreno supostamente natural da fala, sua substânciaaparentemente (...) positiva, seu firme substrato – deve ser colocada em questão. A voz deveser descartada com cuidado como fonte de uma blindagem imaginária que tem, até estemomento, impedido a linguística de descobrir as determinações estruturais quepossibilitam a espinhosa transubstanciação da voz em signo linguístico. A voz é oobstáculo do qual teríamos de nos livrar a fim de dar início a uma nova ciência dalinguagem. (shrink)

We conducted an on-line survey to investigate the professor’s idea of “morality” and then to compare their moral thinking at the abstract level with their moral thinking in the real life situations by sampling 257 professors from the University of Novi Sad. We constructed questionnaire based on related theoretical ethical concepts. Our results show (after we performed exploratory factor analysis) that the professor’s idea of “morality” consists of the three moral thinking patterns which are simultaneously activated during the process of (...) their abstract moral thinking. We have identified these patterns in the following manner: deontological, formal and subjective pattern. In addition, our results show that of the three, the subjective pattern is more activated than the other two during their process of the moral thinking at the abstract level. We also discovered that there is a statistically significant difference between professor’s moral thinking patterns activation level at the abstract level and their moral thinking patterns activation level in the real life situation. (shrink)

InHow the West Came to Rule, Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu offer an alternative to both Political Marxism and world-systems analysis by going beyond the nation-state as the unit of analysis in the former and the marginalisation of articulation and combination between modes of production in the latter. Their account also gives more room to non-European actors neglected in other interpretations of the rise of the West. However, I argue that their argument is much closer toWSAand that their critique of (...) Wallerstein regarding Eurocentrism, the origins of capitalism and the role of wage labour in the capitalist world-system is problematic. Furthermore, Anievas and Nişancıoğlu do not offer a sufficiently rigorous definition of combination, leading to an overextension of the concept. (shrink)

This paper investigates, from a philosophical perspective, whether high functioning autists are legally responsible for the crimes they may commit. We do this from the perspective of the Croatian legal system. According to Croatian Criminal Law, but also criminal laws adopted in many other countries, the legal responsibility of the person is undermined due to insanity when two conditions are satisfied. The first may be called the incapacity requirement. It states that a person, when committing the crime, suffers cognitive or (...) volitional incapacities or limited capacities that are relevant for exculpation. The second, we may call the mental disorder requirement, which states that these exculpatory incapacities are due to the presence of a mental disorder. In this paper we focus on the incapacity requirement. The review of the studies on executive functions deficits associated with high-functioning autism suggests that many autists should not be held categorically responsible for the crimes they may commit. Nonetheless, we argue that these impairments in executive functions generally do not provide an unqualified excuse. (shrink)

The paper takes as the starting point a dense and notorious quote by Lacan where he takes up in a single gesture three concepts of ancient philosophy, tyche, clinamen and den. The contention is that all three aim at the status of the object, although by different means and in different philosophical contexts, and the paper tries to spell out some crucial points concerning each. Tyche, usually translated as chance and put into an opposition with automaton, requires a reading of (...) some passages of Aristotle’s Physics where Lacan took it from, and an account of the problem of repetition in psychoanalysis. Clinamen, the swerve, stemming from Epicure and Lucretius, requires a condensed reading of the tradition which took it up, from Cicero to Hegel, Marx, Deleuze and Badiou, pinpointing the dilemmas and contradictions of this tradition. Den, stemming from Democritus who coined this neologism, brings up an entity which is neither being nor nothing, neither one nor zero nor multiple. It is perhaps the best evocation, at the dawn of philosophy, of what Lacan would call object a, and it allows to sidestep the difficulties and the pitfalls presented by the other two notions. The paper tries to pin down the minimal requirement for the Lacanian theory with the irreducible and incommensurable (non)relation of ‘minus one’ and den. (shrink)

Understanding the difference between conscious and unconscious states is important for making sense of human cognition. Consider: your perception of these words is currently conscious while the feeling of the floor beneath your left foot presumably is not. But what does the difference between these states consist in? Contemporary philosophers disagree about how to answer this kind of question. Extrinsic theorists claim states are conscious because of how they are related to other states, entities, or processes. Intrinsic theorists deny this (...) by claiming that consciousness is internal to states. As it stands, debates about consciousness are thus stuck at an impasse.^ So I approach things differently. In this dissertation, I argue there is a way to overcome the gridlock that plagues contemporary debates about consciousness, and to accommodate the considerations that motivate both intrinsic and extrinsic theorists. The way forward lies in developing a robust account of causal powers. Causal powers, on my view, correspond to dispositions things have. For example, salt’s disposition to dissolve in water corresponds to a power salt has: its solubility. Causal powers, moreover, can help us account for how things behave, for how and why things interact with each other in the ways they do. For example, we can account for salt’s dissolving in water by studying when and why salt manifests its power of solubility. ^ And we can also account for our conscious experiences in reference to causal powers. Indeed, I argue that just as salt manifests one of its powers when it dissolves in water, so too humans manifest one of their powers when they have conscious experiences—our conscious experiences can be understood in reference to the causal powers we have, and in reference to how and why we manifest these powers. Just as importantly, if we use causal powers as a basis for a theory of consciousness, we can overcome the current opposition between extrinsic and intrinsic theories, and in doing so, open up avenues for theorizing about consciousness anew. (shrink)

Some psychologists and philosophers have argued that neuroscience is importantly relevant to our moral responsibility practices, especially to our practices of praise and blame. For consider: on an unprecedented scale, contemporary neuroscience presents us with a mechanistic account of human action. Furthermore, in uential studies – most notoriously, Libet et al. (1983) – seem to show that the brain decides to do things (so to speak) before we consciously make a decision. In light of these ndings, then – or so (...) some have argued – we ought to revise our practices of praise and blame. In the current paper, I argue that this conclusion is unwarranted. The reason is that the argument for it depends on controversial non-empirical premises, premises we need not accept. I suggest, however, that neuroscience does bear on our moral responsibility practices in one important, if less revisionary, way. In particular, neuroscience o ers a new kind of evidence for determining when agents should be held exempt from our normal moral responsibility practices. (shrink)

The paper investigates the possibilities and problems of the media political theory. The new media paradigm is defined by the Network as a distributive diagram and a digital sign as the flexible sign. Nevertheless, the design of the technology is a subject of public dispute. For that reason the paper proposes a cultural and material analysis that would discard technological determinism and domesticating metaphors in order to describe the material ground for digital network society. The paper derives Deleuze/Guattari’s machinic “productivity” (...) as a basic modus for the political actions of network subjects accustomed to lifestream. (shrink)

Patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) fall into a different diagnostic category than patients in the more familiar vegetative states (VS). Not only are MCS patients conscious in some sense, they have a higher chance for recovery than VS patients. Because of these differences, we ostensibly have reason to provide MCS patients with care that goes beyond what we provide to patients with some VS patients. But how to justify this differential treatment? I argue we can’t justify it solely (...) by looking to MCS patients’ actual levels of consciousness. We must look also to the ways in which these patients are potentially conscious. Specifically, I argue that certain sensible and well-regarded policy recommendations cannot be justified by looking solely to patients’ actual levels of consciousness, but that they can be justified by looking to patients’ potential for consciousness. Insofar then as we have prima facie reason to follow the recommendations, we also have prima facie reason to view the potential for consciousness as morally salient. If that is true, however, several important implications follow: first, if the potential for consciousness is morally salient, this translates into actual and pressing obligations to patients with disorders of consciousness generally. Second, if the potential for consciousness is morally salient, this has implications that go beyond our obligations to patients with disorders of consciousness. Indeed, if the potential for consciousness is morally salient, this adds an important layer of complexity to the normative landscape, a layer we may not have sufficiently noticed before. (shrink)

Unified quantum logic based on unified operations of implication is formulated as an axiomatic calculus. Soundness and completeness are demonstrated using standard algebraic techniques. An embedding of quantum logic into a new modal system is carried out and discussed.

Although a large body of research exists concerning connections between personality traits and blood types, no studies can be found within the literature on the links between morality and one’s blood type. We have conducted research examining whether blood type has any impact on the degree to which moral foundations, according to Haidt, are observable in an individual. Our study focused on 240 adult male and female subjects, with an average age of 43.47 years; each group was based on the (...) ABO blood type system and consisted of 60 subjects in total. Based on the data obtained, we can conclude that there is a connection between the Harm and Purity moral foundations and blood group. (shrink)

The very influential theoretical concepts proposed by Rudolf Otto in his 1917 classic The Idea of the Holy are often seen as examples of properly religious content that cannot be approached by any other means except religious. This conclusion is challenged by closer readings of Otto’s writings on naturalism and religion where he, despite of being at times critical of some versions of naturalism, expresses his thorough commitment to naturalist ic explanations. Otto’s views are presented as compatible with recent cognitive-scientific (...) theories of religion and as a constructive contribution to the scientific study of religion. Otto’s theological position, because it is based on his naturalism, is a possible methodological framework for further studies in religion and science in general and cognitive science of religion in particular. (shrink)

At the beginning of the ’30s—the period of lively debates on the relation between language and society—one of the main issues in linguistics was language heterogeneity. On the example of the texts by Boris Larin, Georgij Danilov and Lev Jakubinskij we shall compare two attitudes about unity and division of a language. If the studies by Larin and Danilov in various ways establish divisions in society and language at the end of the ’20s, in the ’30s there is a marked (...) tendency to recognize language unity and the cohesiveness of the proletarian society, as seen in socio-linguistic analyses by Jakubinskij. The conclusion, suggested at the end of this exposition, claims that the idea of one national language grows in importance in the discourse of the Soviet linguistics at the beginning of 1930s. Disappearance of the contemporary language heterogeneity in the discourse of Soviet linguists of the period corroborates how linguistics adapts to the political conceptions of society. (shrink)

The supporters of the neurodiversity movement contend that autism is not a mental disorder, but rather a natural human variation. In a recent paper Jerome Wakefi eld, David Wasserman and Jordan Conrad (2020) argued against this view relying on Wakefi eld’s harmful dysfunction theory of mental disorder (the HD theory). Although I argue that the HD theory is problematic, I contend that arguments offered by Wakefi eld et al. (2020) against those of the neurodiversity movement are plausible, except in one (...) respect: their claim that high functioning autism in general is not a disorder is not well supported. I argue instead that the disorder status of high-functioning autistic persons should be judged on a case-by-case basis, depending on the harmfulness of the condition. In this regard, I maintain that the list of basic psychological capacities provided by George Graham (2010) provides an adequate conceptualization of harm. Moreover, I show how this framework may offer an appropriate tool for a case-by-case assessment of harm associated with high-functioning autism. (shrink)

The underlying thesis of this book is that "the undiscovered Dewey" is ascertained only by understanding the significance of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution for Dewey's philosophy and for his concept of inquiry. Rogers argues that we must realize the importance of Dewey's Darwinian commitments in order to understand how for Dewey there is a fundamental uncertainty and openness that characterizes the growth of "our natural and social horizons" (11). Routinely, Rogers argues, scholars tend to misunderstand or underestimate Darwin's importance (...) for Dewey's notion of inquiry. According to Rogers, Dewey was a champion of what is known as the Darwinian Enlightenment rather than the Newtonian Enlightenment. Those .. (shrink)

Lockean accounts of personhood propose that an individual is a person just in case that individual is characterized by some advanced cognitive capacity. On these accounts, human beings with severe cognitive impairment are not persons. Some accept this result—I do not. In this paper, I therefore advance and defend an account of personhood that secures personhood for human beings who are cognitively impaired. On the account for which I argue, an individual is a person just in case that individual belongs (...) to a natural kind that is normally characterized by advanced cognitive capacities. Since “human being” is just such a natural kind, individual human beings can be persons even when they do not themselves have advanced cognitive capacities. I argue, furthermore, that we have good reason to accept this account of personhood over rival accounts since it is uniquely able to accommodate the intuitive concept of an impaired person. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Discussion of the ethics of memory modification technologies has often focused on questions about the limits of their permissibility. In the current paper, I focus primarily on a different issue: when is it rational to prefer MMTs to alternative interventions? My conclusion is that these conditions are rare. The reason stems from considerations of autonomy. When compared with other interventions, MMTs do a particularly poor job at promoting the autonomy of their users. If this conclusion is true, moreover, it provides (...) a fresh perspective on debates about the permissibility of MMTs. On the one hand, for those who would limit the use of MMTs to a narrow range of circumstances, the conclusion that MMTs are rarely preferable gives them further reason to eye MMTs with suspicion. On the other hand, for those who view MMTs as permissible in a wide range of circumstances, the conclusion may deflate their endorsement. (shrink)

Memory blunting is a pharmacological intervention that decreases the emotional salience of memories. The technique promises a brighter future for those suffering from memory-related disorders such as PTSD, but it also raises normative questions about the limits of its permissibility. So far, neuroethicists have staked out two primary camps in response to these questions. In this paper, I argue both are problematic. I then argue for an alternative approach to memory blunting, one that can accommodate the considerations that motivate rival (...) approaches even while avoiding the problems these rivals face. In addition to arguing for this primary thesis, the paper also aims to suggest something about neuroethics generally: despite what some neuroethicists claim, new discoveries in neuroscience may not typically upend traditional views of morality. Rather, discoveries in neuroscience often provide us with new occasions to reflect on enduring questions about what it means to be human. (shrink)

Dans les années 1760, l'atelier du baron d'Holbach est, avec Ferney au temps de Voltaire, le principal lieu de diffusion des idées hétérodoxes qui permettent la radicalisation des Lumières en France. L'activité de traduction d'Holbach, plus importante en quantité que son activité d'auteur, est étudiée ici pour la première fois de manière systématique. En comparant les ouvrages clandestins traduits et publiés par Holbach avec leurs vrais ou prétendus originaux (majoritairement anglais), Mladen Kozul analyse les manipulations énonciatives, thématiques et éditoriales (...) qu'Holbach opère dans les textes anglais pour en légitimer le discours et les transformer en livres clandestins français. Il montre qu'Holbach, fidèle aux procédés d'une culture rhétorique qui brasse et recycle textes et discours, s'appuie sur les stratégies des encyclopédistes qu'il perfectionne en employant les méthodes de la librairie clandestine. Les textes traduits par Holbach orientent d'une manière décisive la perception qu'a le public des correspondances entre les idées des Lumières en France et celles provenant d'autres cultures de l'Europe occidentale, et notamment d'Angleterre. Les figures d'auteurs anglais qui se dégagent du livre clandestin apparaissent comme des constructions qui installent, aux yeux du lecteur français, le mirage d'un front philosophique transculturel radical, uni et solidaire. Les pratiques du baron nous permettent ainsi d'interroger le rapport complexe du public cultivé des Lumières à l'altérité culturelle. En repensant les notions de traduction et d'auteur, Mladen Kozul invite à voir en Holbach l'inventeur d'une des premières manipulations médiatiques d'envergure en Occident. (shrink)

Plutarch tells the story of a man who plucked a nightingale and finding but little to eat exclaimed: "You are just a voice and nothing more." Plucking the feathers of meaning that cover the voice, dismantling the body from which the voice seems to emanate, resisting the Sirens' song of fascination with the voice, concentrating on "the voice and nothing more": this is the difficult task that philosopher Mladen Dolar relentlessly pursues in this seminal work.The voice did not figure (...) as a major philosophical topic until the 1960s, when Derrida and Lacan separately proposed it as a central theoretical concern. In A Voice and Nothing More Dolar goes beyond Derrida's idea of "phonocentrism" and revives and develops Lacan's claim that the voice is one of the paramount embodiments of the psychoanalytic object. Dolar proposes that, apart from the two commonly understood uses of the voice as a vehicle of meaning and as a source of aesthetic admiration, there is a third level of understanding: the voice as an object that can be seen as the lever of thought. He investigates the object voice on a number of different levels--the linguistics of the voice, the metaphysics of the voice, the ethics of the voice, the paradoxical relation between the voice and the body, the politics of the voice--and he scrutinizes the uses of the voice in Freud and Kafka. With this foundational work, Dolar gives us a philosophically grounded theory of the voice as a Lacanian object-cause. (shrink)

Goering and colleagues (2017) acknowledge closed-loop neural devices have the potential to undermine agency. Indeed, the authors observe that “the agent using the device may . . . sometimes doubt whether she is the author of her action, given that the device may operate in ways that are not transparent to her” (65). Still, the authors ultimately argue that closed-loop neural devices may be construed as supporting agency, especially when we view agency from a relational perspective. The reason? We often (...) manifest our agency in relation with others. For example, family and close friends sometimes step in to support us in setting and achieving our aims. In a similar way, then, the authors argue that “we can imagine [a closed-loop] device stepping in to support the user in achieving her aim” (67). Closed-loop neural devices, in other words, can be construed as supporting one’s agency in much the same way as other people can be seen as supporting one’s agency. The authors thus conclude that when we view agents from a relational perspective, closed-loop neural devices may be viewed as supporting rather than undermining agency. I largely agree with the authors’ conclusion. I also believe, however, that their discussion can be clarified by distinguishing three kinds of agency and viewing closed-loop neural devices from the perspective of each. By thinking carefully about agency, we can see more clearly the ways in which it is undermined by closed-loop neural devices, as well as the way in which these devices may support agency. (shrink)

When is it rational to undergo cognitive enhancement? In the case of what I’ll call massive cognitive enhancement, my answer is never. The reason is that one must base one’s decision to undergo massive cognitive enhancement on what I’ll call either phenomenal or non-phenomenal outcomes. If the former, the choice is not rational because massive cognitive enhancements are transformative and, I’ll argue with Paul (2015), transformative experiences cannot be chosen rationally. If the latter, the choice is not rational because it (...) ought to be based at least partly on phenomenal outcomes. This argument, however, leaves open the idea that it may nonetheless be rational to choose massive cognitive enhancement for others—for example, one’s children. The article explores this possibility, arguing that choosing enhancement for others can be rational or moral, but not both. (shrink)