This major study of Kant provides a detailed examination of the development and function of the doctrine of transcendental illusion in his theoretical philosophy. The author shows that a theory of 'illusion' plays a central role in Kant's arguments about metaphysical speculation and scientific theory. Indeed, she argues that we cannot understand Kant unless we take seriously his claim that the mind inevitably acts in accordance with ideas and principles that are 'illusory'. Taking this claim seriously, we can make much (...) better sense of Kant's arguments and reach a deeper understanding of the role he allots human reason in science. (shrink)

This is the first full-length biography in more than fifty years of Immanuel Kant, one of the giants amongst the pantheon of Western philosophers as well as the one with the most powerful and broad influence on contemporary philosophy. It is well known that Kant spent his entire life in an isolated part of Prussia living the life of a typical university professor. This has given rise to the view that Kant was a pure thinker with no life of his (...) own, or at least none worth considering seriously. In this biography, Manfred Kuehn debunks that myth once and for all. Taking account of the most recent scholarship Professor Kuehn allows the reader to follow the same journey that Kant himself took in emerging as a central figure in modern philosophy. (shrink)

The title of this book is somewhat misleading. It is not a straightforward text on Kant’s methodology. Rather, the author uses Kant’s methods of analysis and synthesis as a backdrop in order to “complete the task where Kant left off”. The “task” is varyingly described by the author as that of leading us back to the “engendering archê” or the “originary”. This journey back to the originary will presumably allow us to explain the “world’s worlding”. The book draws on a (...) broadly phenomenological interpretation of Kant and thus emphasizes, a la Heidegger, the role of the imagination in Kant’s philosophy. Indeed, according to the author, Kant’s first Critique heralds the deep and profound notion that the “way to truth” is through the imagination. Again echoing Heidegger, the author takes it to be an unfortunate fact that Kant “shrunk back from this abyss”. Despite Kant’s timidity, however, the Critique is nevertheless said to provide us with the resources for a robust phenomenology. (shrink)

A long time ago, I procured a little book edited by Soren Kierkegaard entitled The Sickness Unto Death (1849). What is more, I read it. (I must confess to having been first attracted to it solely by its title). For and as a tribute to Alastair Hannay I was inspired to set down in print this brief (altogether too brief, philosophically speaking) and unsystematic reflection. What struck me most palpably was the suggestion that, although our worldly endeavors and thus our (...) publications are, so to speak, temporally limited, our despair is not. I write on the obligations and privileges of that mood. (shrink)

(1998). Transcendental illusion and transcendental realism in Kant's second antinomy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 47-70.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Critique of Ontology and Transcendental Realism Transcendental Illusion Transcendental Illusion and Transcendental Realism in the Antinomy of Pure Reason The Antinomial Conflicts The Regulative Use of Reason.

The central thesis of this book is clear. According to Collins, Kant is not an idealist of any sort. Kant is not an idealist, on Collins’s view, because he neither denies the existence of a non-mental reality nor claims that we cannot be sure that there is any non-mental reality. Because Kant explicitly criticizes both dogmatic and problematic forms of idealism, Collins concludes that the appellation “idealist” is altogether improperly ascribed to Kant. One might ask straightaway whether there might not (...) be another form of idealism that might properly be ascribed to Kant, for example, “transcendental idealism.” Alas, according to Collins, Kant’s own tendency to refer to his philosophy as “transcendental idealism” is quite unfortunate and quite misleading. It is misleading because “it suggests that Kant claims that the domain of objects is just a domain of ideas, that is, of mental representations”. Really? (shrink)