We provide the first demonstration of an artificial neural network encoding the perceptual templates that form an important component of the high level strategic understanding developed by experts. Experts have a highly refined sense of knowing where to look, what information is important and what information to ignore. The conclusions these experts reach are of a higher quality and typically made in a shorter amount of time than those of non-experts. Understanding the manifestation of such abilities in terms of both (...) the psychology of expert performance and the underlying neural mechanisms constitutes one of the most challenging problems in the cognitive sciences. Using perceptual templates we show how the amount of contextual information can change significantly even within a given task, the relationship between local and non-local contexts and finally why there is very little correlation between measures of intelligence and level of expertise in many of the most complex tasks performed by humans. (shrink)

In 1991, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center implemented a policy that permitted the recovery of organs from cadavers pronounced dead using standardized cardiac criteria. This policy allowed families that had made a decision to forgo life sustaining treatment to then request organ donation. This entailed taking the patient to the operating room, discontinuing therapy, and after the patient is pronounced dead, procuring organs.

In the mid 1980s it was apparent that the need for organ donors exceeded those willing to donate. Some University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) physicians initiated discussion of possible new organ donor categories including individuals pronounced dead by traditional cardiac criteria. However, they reached no conclusion and dropped the discussion. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, four cases arose in which dying patients or their families requested organ donation following the elective removal of mechanical ventilation. Controversy surrounding (...) these cases precipitated open discussion of the use of organ donors pronounced dead on the basis of cardiac criteria. Prolonged deliberations by many committees in the absence of precedent ultimately resulted in what is, to our knowledge, the country's first policy for organ donation following elective removal of life support. The policy is intricate and conservative. Care was taken to include as many interested parties as possible in an effort to achieve representative and broad based support. This paper describes the development of the UPMC policy on non-heart-beating organ donation. (shrink)

We introduce an innovative technique that quantifies human expertise development in such a way that humans and artificial systems can be directly compared. Using this technique we are able to highlight certain fundamental difficulties associated with the learning of a complex task that humans are still exceptionally better at than their computer counterparts. We demonstrate that expertise goes through significant developmental transitions that have previously been predicted but never explicated. The first signals the onset of a steady increase in global (...) awareness that begins surprisingly late in expertise acquisition. The second transition, reached by only a very few experts in the world, shows a major reorganisation of global contextual knowledge resulting in a relatively minor gain in skill. We are able to show that these empirical findings have consequences for our understanding of the way in which expertise acquisition may be modelled by learning in artificial intelligence systems. This point is emphasised with a novel theoretical result showing explicitly how our findings imply a non-trivial hurdle for learning for suitably complex tasks. (shrink)

When successful solid organ transplantation was initiated almost 40 years ago, its current success rate was not anticipated. But continuous efforts were undertaken to overcome the two major obstacles to success: injury caused by interrupting nutrient supply to the organ and rejection of the implanted organ by normal host defense mechanisms. Solutions have resulted from technologic medical advances, but also from using organs from different sources. Each potential solution has raised ethical concerns and has variably resulted in societal acclaim, censure, (...) and apathy. Transplant surgery is now well accepted, and the list of transplant candidates has grown far quicker than the availability of organs. More than 30,000 patients were awaiting organs for transplantation at the end of March 1993. While most organs came from donors declared dead by brain criteria, the increasing shortage of donated organs has prompted a reexamination of prior restrictions of donor groups. Recently, organ procurement from donors with cardiac death has been reintroduced in the United States. This practice had been mostly abandoned by the U.S. and some, though not all, other countries. Transplantation has been more successful using organs procured from heart-beating, "brain dead" cadavers than organs from non-heart-beating cadavers. However, recent advances have led to success rates with organs from non-heart-beating donors that may portend large increases in organ donation and procurement from this source. (shrink)

Organ transplantation is an accepted therapy for major organ failure, but it depends on the availability of viable organs. Most organs transplanted in the U.S. come from either "brain-dead" or living related donors. Recently organ procurement from patients pronounced dead using cardiopulmonary criteria, so-called "non-heart-beating cadaver donors" (NHBCDs), has been reconsidered. In May 1992, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) enacted a new, complicated policy for procuring organs from NHBCDs after the elective removal of life support. Seventeen months later (...) only one patient has become a NHBCD. This article describes her case and the results of interviews with the health care team and the patient's family. The case and interviews are discussed in relation to several of the ethical concerns previously raised about the policy, including potential conflicts of interest, the definition of cardiopulmonary death, and a possible net decrease in organ donation. The conclusion is reached that organ procurement from non-heart-beating cadavers is feasible and may be desirable both for the patient's family and the health care providers. (shrink)

In the preceding commentary, Campbell and Weber raise two valid and important issues concerning non-heart-beating organ donation (NHBOD). First, because the procedure links withdrawal of life support and the potential for subsequent organ donation, the desire for organs may create a situation in which care of the dying individual has relatively less importance and the dying may receive suboptimal care. Second, even if concerns about care of the dying were dealt with adequately, there will not be enough non-heart-beating donors to (...) significantly decrease the organ shortage that exists, making the procedure not worth the risk. We agree that attention to the important details of caring for the dying are, and must be, the primary concern of all health care workers caring for those individuals. Ensuring the patients' comfort, dignity, and autonomy, and providing for family and social support are the mainstays of this care. All policies for NHBOD should clearly support and mandate these concepts. Regarding the second concern, we agree that NHBOD is currently rare; however, evidence is increasing that this type of donation has great potential. Continued growth of the practice in this country will depend largely on public acceptance, which we believe will be directly influenced by whether the public perceives that care of the dying is not compromised by this procedure. (shrink)

Preprinted in God and the Problem of Evil (Blackwell 2001), ed. William Rowe. In this article, we reply to Bill Rowe's "Evil is Evidence Against Theistic Belief" in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell 2003).

Preprinted in God and the Problem of Evil(Blackwell 2001), ed. William Rowe. Many people deny that evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. After all, they say, the grounds for belief in God are much better than the evidence for atheism, including the evidence provided by evil. We will not join their ranks on this occasion. Rather, we wish to consider the proposition that, setting aside grounds for belief in God and relying only on (...) the background knowledge shared in common by nontheists and theists, evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. Our aim is to argue against this proposition. We recognize that in doing so, we face a formidable challenge. It’s one thing to say that evil presents a reason for atheism that is, ultimately, overridden by arguments for theism. It’s another to say that it doesn’t so much as provide us with a reason for atheism in the first place. In order to make this latter claim seem initially more plausible, consider the apparent design of the mammalian eye or the apparent fine-tuning of the universe to support life. These are often proposed as reasons to believe in theism. Critics commonly argue not merely that these supposed reasons for theism are overridden by arguments for atheism but rather that they aren’t good reasons for theism in the first place. Our parallel proposal with respect to evil and atheism is, initially at least, no less plausible than this proposal with respect to apparent design and theism. (shrink)

Stable heavy isotopes co‐exist with their lighter counterparts in all elements commonly found in biology. These heavy isotopes represent a low natural abundance in isotopic composition but impose great retardation effects in chemical reactions because of kinetic isotopic effects (KIEs). Previous isotope analyses have recorded pervasive enrichment or depletion of heavy isotopes in various organisms, strongly supporting the capability of biological systems to distinguish different isotopes. This capability has recently been found to lead to general decline of heavy isotopes in (...) metabolites during yeast aging. Conversely, supplementing heavy isotopes in growth medium promotes longevity. Whether this observation prevails in other organisms is not known, but it potentially bears promise in promoting human longevity. (shrink)

An evaluation of a health condition-specific hope scale adapted from the more general dispositional Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1991) is provided. Participants (N = 202) with a rare, debilitating, and potentially stigmatising health condition were recruited from readers of the Anal Fissure Self Help Page. Data were gathered anonymously using an online survey linked to the website. Consistent with hope theory, this new measure yielded a pathways factor (perceived capacity to find ways to achieve desired goals) and an (...) agency factor (perceived motivation to pursue goals energetically). Respondents with stronger pathways thoughts reported greater benefits from website information for understanding and generating strategies for managing anal fissures. Stronger agency beliefs were related to more frequent website visits, more rereading of first-hand patient accounts, and shorter duration of fissure symptoms. Results offer preliminary support for validity of this scale and for using web-based methodologies to study conditions, such as anal fissure. (shrink)

An evaluation of a health condition-specific hope scale adapted from the more general dispositional Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1991) is provided. Participants (N = 202) with a rare, debilitating, and potentially stigmatising health condition were recruited from readers of the Anal Fissure Self Help Page. Data were gathered anonymously using an online survey linked to the website. Consistent with hope theory, this new measure yielded a pathways factor (perceived capacity to find ways to achieve desired goals) and an (...) agency factor (perceived motivation to pursue goals energetically). Respondents with stronger pathways thoughts reported greater benefits from website information for understanding and generating strategies for managing anal fissures. Stronger agency beliefs were related to more frequent website visits, more rereading of first-hand patient accounts, and shorter duration of fissure symptoms. Results offer preliminary support for validity of this scale and for using web-based methodologies to study conditions, such as anal fissure. (shrink)

Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Wadsworth 2015, 6th edition, eds Michael Rea and Louis Pojman. What is propositional faith? At a first approximation, we might answer that it is the psychological attitude picked out by standard uses of the English locution “S has faith that p,” where p takes declarative sentences as instances, as in “He has faith that they’ll win”. Although correct, this answer is not nearly as informative as we might like. Many people say that (...) there is a more informative answer. They say that, at the very least, propositional faith requires propositional belief. More precisely, they say that faith that p requires belief that p or that it must be partly constituted by belief that p. This view is common enough; call it the Common View. I have two main aims in this paper: (i) to exhibit the falsity of the Common View and the paucity of reasons for it, and (ii) to sketch a more accurate and comprehensive account of what propositional faith is. (shrink)

Reprinted in Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity, Oxford, 2009, eds Michael Rea and Thomas McCall. In this essay, I assess a certain version of ’social Trinitarianism’ put forward by J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, ’trinity monotheism’. I first show how their response to a familiar anti-Trinitarian argument arguably implies polytheism. I then show how they invoke three tenets central to their trinity monotheism in order to avoid that implication. After displaying these tenets more fully, I (...) argue that Trinitarians would do well to hold Moreland’s and Craig’s trinity monotheism at arms length. (shrink)

Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Wadsworth, 2013, 6th edition, eds. Michael Rea and Louis Pojman. In this essay, I argue that the moral skepticism objection to what is badly named "skeptical theism" fails.

Reprinted in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, Volume 1: Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, Oxford 2009, ed. Michael Rea. A popular argument for the divinity of Jesus goes like this. Jesus claimed to be divine, but if his claim was false, then either he was insane (mad) or lying (bad), both of which are very unlikely; so, he was divine. I present two objections to this argument. The first, the dwindling probabilities objection, contends that even if we make generous probability (...) assignments to the relevant pieces of evidence for Jesus’ divinity, the probability calculus tell us to suspend judgement on the matter. The second, and more telling objection in my opinion, the merely mistaken objection, contends that it is no less plausible to suppose that Jesus was neither mad nor bad but merely mistaken than that he was divine. (shrink)

This 9,000+ word entry briefly assesses five models of the Trinity, those espoused by (i) Richard Swinburne, (ii) William Lane Craig, (iii) Brian Leftow, (iv) Jeff Brower and Michael Rea, and (v) Peter van Inwagen.

We argue that Michael Peterson's and William Hasker's attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible constitute miserable failures. We then sketch Peter van Inwagen's attempt to do the same and conclude that, to date, no one has shown his attempt a failure.

Michael J. Murray defends the traditional doctrine of hell by arguing directly against its chief competitor, universalism. Universalism, says Murray, comes in “naïve” and “sophisticated” forms. Murray poses two arguments against naïve universalism before focusing on sophisticated universalism, which is his real target. He proceeds in this fashion because he thinks that his arguments against sophisticated universalism are more easily motivated against naïve universalism, and once their force is clearly seen in the naïve case they will be more clearly (...) seen in the sophisticated. In this essay, I argue that Murray’s arguments against naïve universalism have no force whatsoever. (shrink)

This is a Polish translation of "Was Jesus Mad, Bad, or God?...Or Merely Mistaken?," Faith and Philosophy 21, 2004: 456-479, reprinted in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, Volume 1: Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement (Oxford 2009), ed. Michael Rea.

This is a review of Michael Peterson's The Problem of Evil.

This is a review of Michael Kelly's _Iconoclasm in Aesthetics_.

While there has been considerable interest in the nature of faith and trust in recent philosophical literature, relatively little has been said about what it is for faith or trust to be psychologically stronger or weaker. Drawing on recent accounts of propositional faith by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Lara Buchak, I argue that the strength of one’s faith can vary in two distinct dimensions. The first primarily involves the extent to which one’s confidence motivates one to take risks. The second (...) involves the resilience of the first dimension of strength to possible counterevidence. (shrink)

The Victorian period in Britain was an “age of reform.” It is therefore not surprising that two of the era’s most eminent intellects described themselves as reformers. Both William Whewell and John Stuart Mill believed that by reforming philosophy—including the philosophy of science—they could effect social and political change. But their divergent visions of this societal transformation led to a sustained and spirited controversy that covered morality, politics, science, and economics. Situating their debate within the larger context of Victorian society (...) and its concerns, _Reforming Philosophy_ shows how two very different men captured the intellectual spirit of the day and engaged the attention of other scientists and philosophers, including the young Charles Darwin. Mill—philosopher, political economist, and Parliamentarian—remains a canonical author of Anglo-American philosophy, while Whewell—Anglican cleric, scientist, and educator—is now often overlooked, though in his day he was renowned as an authority on science. Placing their teachings in their proper intellectual, cultural, and argumentative spheres, Laura Snyder revises the standard views of these two important Victorian figures, showing that both men’s concerns remain relevant today. A philosophically and historically sensitive account of the engagement of the major protagonists of Victorian British philosophy, _Reforming Philosophy_ is the first book-length examination of the dispute between Mill and Whewell in its entirety. A rich and nuanced understanding of the intellectual spirit of Victorian Britain, it will be welcomed by philosophers and historians of science, scholars of Victorian studies, and students of the history of philosophy and political economy. (shrink)

According to the received account of guilt in the philosophical literature, one cannot feel guilt unless one takes oneself to have done something morally wrong. But ordinary people feel guilt in many cases in which they do not take themselves to have done anything morally wrong. In this paper, I focus on one kind of guilt without perceived wrongdoing, guilt about being merely causally responsible for a bad state-of-affairs. I go on to present a novel account of guilt that explains (...) guilt about mere causal responsibility, according to which guilt represents part of the self as bound up with what is bad. (shrink)

The concept of minimal risk has been used to regulate and limit participation by adolescents in clinical trials. It can be understood as setting an absolute standard of what risks are considered minimal or it can be interpreted as relative to the actual risks faced by members of the host community for the trial. While commentators have almost universally opposed a relative interpretation of the environmental risks faced by potential adolescent trial participants, we argue that the ethical concerns against the (...) relative standard may not be as convincing as these commentators believe. Our aim is to present the case for a relative standard of environmental risk in order to open a debate on this subject. We conclude by discussing how a relative standard of environmental risk could be defended in the specific case of an HIV vaccine trial among adolescents in South Africa. (shrink)

In a penetrating analysis of student unrest, the Dean for Institute Relations at M.I.T (and former chief of the psychiatric services both there and at Wellesley College) isolates a major cause of campus conflict: the overwhelming, nonproductive mass of unstated academic and social norms that divert the student from creative intellectual effort and from the attempt to define and reach his goals as independently as he is able.

This Element, written for researchers and students in philosophy and the behavioral sciences, reviews and critically assesses extant work on number concepts in developmental psychology and cognitive science. It has four main aims. First, it characterizes the core commitments of mainstream number cognition research, including the commitment to representationalism, the hypothesis that there exist certain number-specific cognitive systems, and the key milestones in the development of number cognition. Second, it provides a taxonomy of influential views within mainstream number cognition research, (...) along with the central challenges these views face. Third, it identifies and critically assesses a series of core philosophical assumptions often adopted by number cognition researchers. Finally, the Element articulates and defends a novel version of pluralism about number concepts. (shrink)

What is the relation between small-scale collaborative plans and the execution of those plans within interactive contexts? I argue here that joint attention has a key role in explaining how shared plans and shared intentions are executed in interactive contexts. Within singular action, attention plays the functional role of enabling intentional action to be guided by a prior intention. Within interactive joint action, it is joint attention, I argue, that plays a similar functional role of enabling the agents to act (...) in a collaborative way such that their actions are rationally guided by a prior shared intention. This understanding of joint attention – as having a key functional role of enabling the rational guidance of joint intentional action by a prior shared intention – allows for an alternative understanding of the kind of minimal cooperation that infants can engage in. On this understanding, infants’ capacity to engage in joint actions is already an incipient capacity to engage in rational and intentional joint actions, albeit a capacity that is necessarily scaffolded by an adult rational co-partner. (shrink)

This a clear and concise introduction to Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard.ichael Watts uses Kierkegaard's own writings to introduce his theoriesbout living a truthfu; and spiritual life, while explaining the enormousnfluence of the philosopher's personal life on his work and beliefs. As theounder of 20th century existentialism, and the first philosopher to definehe idea of angst, Kierkegaard's profound influence on modern life is clearlyefined in accessible terms in this guide for students and general readers.

Common knowledge is ubiquitous in our lives and yet there remains considerable uncertainty about how to model or understand it. Standard analyses of common knowledge end up being challenged by either regress or circularity which then give rise to well-known paradoxes of practical reasoning, such as the Two Generals’ Paradox. This paper argues that the nature and utility of common knowledge can be illuminated by appeal to Wittgenstein’s Hinge Epistemology. It is argued that those things that we standardly think of (...) as being common knowledge in our lives are the same as those that Wittgenstein identified as hinge certainties. This identification of common knowledge with hinge certainties allows us to resolve the regress problem for common knowledge and explain how the Two Generals’ Paradox arises. (shrink)

It is a commonplace in economics that we should disregard sunk costs. The sunk cost effect might be widespread, goes the conventional wisdom, but we would be better off if we could rid ourselves of it. In this paper, I argue against the orthodoxy by showing that the sunk cost effect is often beneficial. Drawing on discussions of related topics in dynamic choice theory, I show that, in a range of cases, being disposed to honor sunk costs allows an agent (...) to mimic a resolute chooser, someone who adopts the best plan at the outset of a decision problem and sticks with it, even when resoluteness is unfeasible. I discuss several kinds of cases in which honoring sunk costs coincides with resolute choice. (shrink)

On doxastic theories of propositional faith,necessarily,S has faith that p only if S believes that p. On nondoxastic theories of propositional faith, it’s false that,necessarily,S has faith that p only if S believes that p. In this article, I defend three arguments for nondoxastic theories of faith and I respond to published criticisms of them.