he following is an essay by Emmanuel Levinas, newly translated by Mendel Kranz, concerning Jewish culture and education, Hebrew studies, and Zionism. The essay was first published in 1954 in the United States by The Alliance Review, a small journal affiliated with the Alliance israélite universelle, and has since been almost entirely forgotten. In 2011–2012, it was republished in French by Denis Poizat based on the original draft found in the Alliance archives. Preceding Levinas’s essay is a preface (...) by Kranz that situates it at the intersection of Levinas’s postwar project for Judaism, his relation to Zionism, and the colonial backdrop of the ENIO—three issues that are rarely considered together in Levinas scholarship. Poizat also provides some commentary on the question of education and the similarities between this and other essays by Levinas. (shrink)

In order to explore the nature and possible reality of consciousness, a universe was created in the laboratory according to Procedure 347:B of the Unified Universe Creation Manual. This universe was allowed to evolve without further intervention through the stage in which biological-type life formed, and additionally beyond that point to life forms of complexity such that consciousness was deemed a possibility by the researchers. The behaviour of these possibly conscious beings was noted, both externally and internally. Before the universe (...) was sacrificed, a random sample of the beings was removed and autopsied according to Provision 472-B of the Consciousness Inspection Handbook, version 5472. Both the behavioural and physical data are consistent with the existence of a primitive form of consciousness. (shrink)

Following the practice of human beings everywhere historians distinguish the real or most significant cause of an occurrence or state of affairs from ‘less important considerations’, ‘precipitating circumstances’, or ‘mere conditions’. I shall term claims that some phenomenon is most basically to be attributed to some one of the factors causally necessary for its occurrence attributive causal explanations or causal attributions and discuss here the extent to which moral convictions are constitutive of them.

The author argues, Contra hume, That "the motives of human action are not related to the action in the way in which the causes of the sort of physical behaviour to which hume refers are related to that behaviour." the author contends this because he is opposed to the consequence of hume's theory that "moral appraisal presupposes 'necessity' or determinism." he concludes that we do have to explain morality in terms of human motives, But that a different sort of causality (...) is involved here than in the physical world. (staff). (shrink)

It is commonly held that moral judgements are implicitly general — or universalizable — in that if anyone is morally obligated to perform or refrain from some action, everyone in relevantly similar circumstances is similarly obligated. I undertake here to show that David Hume fully subscribed to this thesis and that because of the way it is related to his conceptions of obligation and what he terms the practicality of morals he is pushed to insist that the moral sentiments of (...) human beings across space and time are much more uniform than he knew them to be. My discussion places Hume in the historical context of the controversy about 'the general foundation of morals' referred to near the beginning of the second Enquiry, and it is part of my thesis that Hume's moral philosophy can be understood only in terms of arguments and counter-arguments developed by other contributors to the controversy. (shrink)

It is shown that Einstein abandoned his earlier view that there are material consequences, such as asymmetric aging, implied by the space-time transformations of transformations of relativity theory.

The topic of instrumentalism has engaged many scholars of contemporary educational thought. One can distinguish the positions of anti-instrumentalism from those that stress noninstrumental values of education, both conceived in the context of neoliberal/neoconservative and consumption-driven reality. In this text, Maria Mendel enters into this engagement from the perspective of the current political consumption of memory. While taking up the problem of the role public pedagogy plays in contemporary nation-states — especially in the current turn toward the past — (...) Mendel focuses on both educational and sociopolitical issues in the context of what she calls “retroactive instrumentalism.” When return to the past is the “principle of the contemporary,” she argues, instrumentalism does not necessarily result from intentional planning ex ante. If education is broadly understood as a practice of public space formation, it may be composed of experiences that do not have to be “traditionally” purposeful and oriented toward the future. They may gain their instrumental character ex post. To illustrate this possibility, Mendel analyzes snippets of Polish reality concerning the construction of “the good nation.” Many of the elements of public pedagogy in this case contain unifications that pertain directly to the instrumental character of the learning experiences employed by a society as it transforms into a nation. The instrumentalism of those elements is discovered post factum. In its ontological dimension, then, education may gain or solidify its instrumental character ex post. Based on the analysis proposed in this text, one could say that when instrumentality is retroactive, it becomes displaced intentionality — that is, it provides an instrumental story that disguises the intentions of the one writing the narrative. Mendel concludes by using the Aristotelian notion of phantasia, which regards “being without a matter,” to encourage productive thought about how to create public narratives that are free of instrumentalism. This grounds a version of public pedagogy that is oriented toward the animation of people's active imagining and thus becoming public. By epistemologically shifting learning into a public space, such public pedagogy serves to recultivate society and humanity as plurality, diversity, and coproduction of the public. (shrink)

In his Metrica, Hero provides four procedures for finding the area of a circular segment (with b the base of the segment and h its height): an Ancient method for when the segment is smaller than a semicircle, $$(b + h)/2 \, \cdot \, h$$ ( b + h ) / 2 · h ; a Revision, $$(b + h)/2 \, \cdot \, h + (b/2)^{2} /14$$ ( b + h ) / 2 · h + ( b / 2 (...) ) 2 / 14 ; a quasi-Archimedean method (said to be inspired by the quadrature of the parabola) for cases where b is more than triple h, $${\raise0.5ex\hbox{$\scriptstyle 4$} \kern-0.1em/\kern-0.15em \lower0.25ex\hbox{$\scriptstyle 3$}}(h \, \cdot \, b/2)$$ 4 / 3 ( h · b / 2 ) ; and a method of Subtraction using the Revised method, for when it is larger than a semicircle. He gives superficial arguments that the Ancient method presumes $$\pi = 3$$ π = 3 and the Revision, $$\pi = {\raise0.5ex\hbox{$\scriptstyle {22}$} \kern-0.1em/\kern-0.15em \lower0.25ex\hbox{$\scriptstyle 7$}}$$ π = 22 / 7. We are left with many questions. How ancient is the Ancient? Why did anyone think it worked? Why would anyone revise it in just this way? In addition, why did Hero think the Revised method did not work when $$b > 3\;h$$ b > 3 h? I show that a fifth century BCE Uruk tablet employs the Ancient method, but possibly with very strange consequences, and that a Ptolemaic Egyptian papyrus that checks this method by comparing the area of a circle calculated from the sum of a regular inscribed polygon and the areas of the segments on its sides as determined by the Ancient method with the area of the circle as calculated from its diameter correctly sees that the calculations do not quite gel in the case of a triangle but do in the case of a square. Both traditions probably could also calculate the area of a segment on an inscribed regular polygon by subtracting the area of the polygon from the area of the circle and dividing by the number of sides of the polygon. I then derive two theorems about pairs of segments, that the reviser of the Ancient method should have known, that explain each method, why they work when they do and do not when they do not, and which lead to a curious generalization of the Revised method. Hero’s comment is right, but not for the reasons he gives. I conclude with an exploration of Hero’s restrictions of the Revised method and Hero’s two alternative methods. (shrink)

This paper presents an attempt to describe parents’ activities, in which context it is puzzling that – on the basis of a negative assessment of the current reality (current crises, including the privatization of what is public) – parents seem to be searching intensively for new solutions that would make better not only the school but also the world it is a part of. Their focus, in this, is on the local dimension of activities that refer to sustainability and emphasize (...) place. In this approach, place is a field of confrontation and constant becoming. Parental activities in one sustainable community school in Chicago is the point of departure to introduce a pedagogy of the vital place that pays specific attention to how the heritage of these places makes them (partially) resistant to capitalist capture, and somewhat ready to take on the challenges of the crisis in which we live on the planet today. The reflection presented in this article is guided by the assumption that, in these times, when the survival of humankind is at stake, we desperately need a more-than-human format of world. (shrink)