In this paper, we discuss the problem of the relationship between legal concepts and legal norms. We argue that one of the widespread theories of legal concepts, which we call ‘the embedding theory’, is false. The theory is based on the assumption that legal norms are central for any legal system and that each legal norm establishes an inferential link between a certain class of facts and a certain class of legal consequences. Alf Ross’s embedding theory was presented in his (...) famous paper “Tu–Tu”. According to Ross, the sole function of legal concepts is to simplify normative information. Hence, the use of legal concepts may be a matter of convenience, rather than necessity. We criticize this approach mainly by pointing to the existence of so-called second order substantive concepts, which are not reducible to any determined set of conditional sentences (inferential links). In short, second order substantive concepts play the role of general standards, and general standards are used to provide flexibility for a particular legal system. In addition, general standards are ‘value loaded’, since they serve as a frame of reference for judges applying law to particular cases. To understand such general standards as a predefined set of conditionals means to overlook their ‘open’ content, and thus their function. In our opinion, the acceptance of the embedding theory means to misinterpret the function of general standards. We also argue that Giovani Sartor’s idea of defective legal concepts doesn’t help to clarify or defend the embedding theory. (shrink)

This article concerns the conflict between copyright and museums’ digitisation and online sharing of collections. This issue has recently become particularly important in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. The authors outline the concept of a virtual museum and present the most important copyright provisions in EU law that may create obstacles for cultural institutions in realising virtual counterparts. To perceive copyright as the main obstacle in the process of digitisation and online sharing of collections is not unusual. Hence, the article (...) briefly presents legal framework of the European copyright applicable to such situations. The authors argue that although copyright offers a range of possibilities for museums interested in digitising their collections, at the same time it is responsible for a _chilling effect_, resulting in fear of potential infringement and liability. The authors conclude that the EU’s development of new legislation, coinciding with the need for digitisation and online sharing of cultural heritage caused by the pandemic, has favoured public interest at the expense of creators’ rights, but still lacks satisfactory legal tools for effectively allowing cultural institutions to digitise and share their collections. (shrink)

Branching is a set-theoretical model of reality that is in accord with contemporary physics. This structure is also a model for some logical calculi. However, if the formal language defined on the basis of branching is to correspond to our ways of speaking about possible events, a number of issues must be clarified. All of them are connected with the notion of possibility that is employed in this language. Yet the apparent need to supplement this language with an additional notion (...) of possibility means that branching ceases to be attractive as a candidate for a model of physical reality, as it contains considerably more elements than we would like to see in reality. Thus, the connection between this logical tool and ontology becomes questionable. (shrink)