Reimagining “humanity” is a powerful aim of the educational philosophy of Zak Stein. A relative new-comer to the field of Education and philosophy, Stein has in the last decade or so shown himself to be a potent “developmentalist,” and visionary of a “metamodern metaphysics” for reconfiguring how societies understand learning, new forms of education, and most interestingly he situates his work within a metaphysics of Love. Stein poignantly calls for a “return” to important past wisdom in transforming learning but he (...) does so from a critical integral perspective in ways that are unique in educational writing today. The author appreciates and demonstrates Stein’s awareness of the meta-context of the Anthropocene and “crises” as a critical basis for any design of future education. He particularly focuses this introductory technical paper on Stein’s views on fear and its essential core role in shaping human evolution and thus our ways of learning and designing curriculum. The author adds a brief critique of how Stein’s work could be improved in terms of a holistic-integral fear management/education in this discussion of a new metaphysics of love for education in general. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates the central role of the Socratic elenchus in the Sophist. In the first part, I defend the position that the Stranger describes the Socratic elenchus in the sixth division of the Sophist. In the second part, I show that the Socratic elenchus is actually used when the Stranger scrutinizes the accounts of being put forward by his predecessors. In the final part, I explain the function of the Socratic elenchus in the argument of the dialogue. By contrast (...) with standard scholarly interpretations, this way of reading the text provides all the puzzles about being (241c4–251a4) with a definite function in the dialogue. It also reveals that Plato’s methodology includes a plurality of method and is more continuous than what is often believed. (shrink)

This article delves into Captain Samuel Alfred Warner’s dogged campaign to sell two inventions – his submersible mine and “long range” missile – to the British government in the 1840s and 1850s. Departing from a historiography that dismisses Warner as a fraudster, it clarifies how he managed to generate widespread interest in his weapons technologies for nearly twenty years. I therefore analyze three key elements of his self-promotion: his personal branding, his pitch, and his simultaneous embrace and rejection of publicity. (...) Neither elite nor highly educated, Warner ran up against a culture of “polite science” that distinguished disinterested practitioners from profit-minded schemers. To establish his credentials, he emphasized his practical maritime experience and represented himself as a martyr willing to bear the scorn of a disbelieving establishment. In pitching his devices, Warner capitalized on alarmism over border security and the integrity of the empire; he declared that they could hobble France’s modernizing navy and quickly end colonial conflicts. When skeptics began to fret over the proliferation of his destructive weapons, Warner flipped the script and lauded the threat of mutual annihilation as a deterrent to needless warfare. The issue of publicity, however, would ultimately be Warner’s professional undoing. Despite successful demonstrations, his clashes with official investigators and his refusal to disclose his chemical secrets led critics to dispute the originality of his discoveries. An examination of Warner’s self-promotional strategies, his fraught interactions with the British state, and the ambivalent public reaction to his contraptions provides insight into how scientific authority was acquired and lost in this period. (shrink)

This collection addresses a post-WWII shift in the hierarchy of scientific explanations, where the highest goal moves from reductionism towards some ...

I argue that, although Aristotle himself does not say it in so many words, the Phaedrus has a deep influence on the three books of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. I also show that this influence is not only negative, as some scholars believe, but that Aristotle draws and expands on some of the results and propositions of the Phaedrus. After demonstrating how influential the Phaedrus is for the Rhetoric, I return in my conclusion to the difference between the two works.

Let equation image be the semigroup of all mappings on the natural numbers equation image, and let U and V be subsets of equation image. We write U≼V if there exists a countable subset C of equation image such that U is contained in the subsemigroup generated by V and C. We give several results about the structure of the preorder ≼. In particular, we show that a certain statement about this preorder is equivalent to the Continuum Hypothesis.The preorder ≼ (...) is analogous to one introduced by Bergman and Shelah on subgroups of the symmetric group on equation image. The results in this paper suggest that the preorder on subsemigroups of equation image is much more complicated than that on subgroups of the symmetric group. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Hill [AJP, 2018] argues that Rachels’s famous bare-difference argument for the moral irrelevance between killing and letting die fails. In this paper, I argue that certain features in Hill’s cases might lead our intuitions astray. I propose new cases and suggest that they support the conclusion that, in itself, intentional killing is morally equivalent to intentional letting-die.

ABSTRACT Hill [AJP, 2018] argues that Rachels’s famous bare-difference argument for the moral irrelevance between killing and letting die fails. In this paper, I argue that certain features in Hill’s cases might lead our intuitions astray. I propose new cases and suggest that they support the conclusion that, in itself, intentional killing is morally equivalent to intentional letting-die.

The Limits of Cognition and the Shape of Being Based on the Thought of Karl Jaspers The article points out the elements of Karl Jaspers’ epistemological conception that cross out the possibility of a comprehensive account of being. The key issue here is the limits of cognition, which take the form of object cognition. The theme of limits points to the inadequacies of human thinking in the context of quantifiable and absolutist representations of reality. The impossibility of adequately grasping the (...) totality of reality will be illustrated here by means of the criticism Jaspers levelled at absolutising metaphysics. In connection with the description of the structure of cognition proposed by Jaspers, the article points out the conceptual proximity of the issue of worldview and metaphysics in the light of the thought of the cited author. (shrink)

Self-compassion is considered to be a healthy and adaptive attitude towards oneself, occurring both as a feature, as well as a state. Self-compassionate attitude towards oneself is composed of: a) kindness and understanding given to oneself b) mindfulness of one’s own experiences and c) a sense of community of experiences with humanity. Compassion towards oneself is structurally and functionally distinct from the self-commiseration and self-pity that lead to worse adaptation. Research shows that self-compassion is associated with better regulation of negative (...) emotions. Neff in her theoretical assumption states that due to more effective emotion regulation, people with a higher level of selfcompassion can generally cope better with reality. Therefore a question arises as to what the relationship is between a compassionate attitude towards oneself and social functioning of people. This article is a review of research that has been conducted so far regarding relations between self-compassion and the various dimensions of social functioning. (shrink)

Neuroeconomics has the potential to fundamentally change the way economics is done. This article identifies the ways in which this will occur, pitfalls of this approach, and areas where progress has already been made. The value of neuroeconomics studies for social policy lies in the quality, replicability, and relevance of the research produced. While most economists will not contribute to the neuroeconomics literature, we contend that most economists should be reading these studies.

The aim of this paper is to clarify the use of contrast cases—which are pairs of cases in which the feature under examination is varied and all else is held fixed—in ethical methodology. In another paper, I argue that we must reject a separability principle which is thought to allow one to use contrast cases to infer truths about intrinsic value. Here I offer a different criticism that has a positive upshot about what we are licensed to infer from contrast (...) cases. This provides clarification about the epistemic use of contrast cases in value theory and insight into what we can glean from contrast cases. (shrink)

For the theorists of crisis, the revolutionary state comes into existence through violence, and due to its inability to provide an authoritative katechon (restrainer) against internal and external violence, it perpetuates violence until it self-destructs. Writing during extreme economic depression and growing social and political violence, the crisis theorists––Joseph de Maistre, Juan Donoso Cortés, and Carl Schmitt––each sought to blame the chaos of their time upon the Janus-faced postrevolutionary ideals of liberalism and socialism by urging a return to pre-revolutionary moral (...) and religious values. They are united by three counterrevolutionary principles, all of which are purported to remedy revolutionary violence: traditional constitutional fidelity, the philosophy of the decision, and opposition to bourgeois liberalism. This essay is followed by the first complete English translation and publication of Donoso’s letter of October 24, 1851, which contains Donoso’s only reference to the “discussing class,” a political entity later popularized by Schmitt in his 1922 work Political Theology. (shrink)

Peterson et al. (2023) write that there’s “a rich philosophical debate on the nature of authenticity in dementia” involving the relationship of identity and autonomy. I explore this with Jaworska’s...

Following Moore, value invariabilists deny that the intrinsic value of something can be affected by features extrinsic to it. The primary focuses of this paper are (i) to examine the invariabilistic thesis and expand upon how we ought to understand it, in light of contemporary axiological distinctions, and (ii) to argue that distinguishing between different kinds of invariabilism provides resources to undermine a prominent argument against variabilism. First, I use two contemporary axiological distinctions to clarify what kind of value the (...) invariabilism debate concerns (final value). Then I show how the distinction between personal value and value simpliciter reveals different variabilistic theses, depending on what type of final value one thinks may be affected by extrinsic features. Using this insight, I challenge an argument for final value simpliciter invariabilism. Variabilists offer the example of the vicious being pleased as a counterexample to the claim that pleasure’s final value is invariant to contextual changes. The argument that I examine purports to show that this case actually supports invariabilism about pleasure’s final value simpliciter, because the best explanation for why the vicious being pleased is a fitting object of indignation is that the vicious person’s pleasure is finally valuable simpliciter. I argue that this argument fails because the vicious person’s pleasure being finally personally good for them better explains why an attitude of indignation is fitting. I address two objections and conclude with remarks about how my results might inform future research on value invariabilism. (shrink)

The bare‐difference methodology is considered to be a powerful tool in ethical reasoning. The underlying idea is that we can identify the intrinsic evaluative significance of some feature by constructing contrast cases or bare‐difference cases, i.e., two cases that hold everything constant but for the feature of interest. While this popular methodology has been challenged by prominent philosophers such as Kagan, Thomson, and Kamm, it is intuitively appealing because, as Perrett identifies, the methodology appears to share the same logical structure (...) as a fruitful scientific procedure. In this paper, I argue that examining this ‘scientific analogy’ is crucial to understanding both the limitations and the prospects for ethical bare‐difference reasoning. I expand upon Perrett's discussion of the scientific analogy and examine another relevant similarity. I then highlight two relevant dissimilarities between ethical bare‐difference reasoning and its scientific analogue. Though these differences threaten to undermine the analogy, I show how the analogy might be mended to better bring the ethical methodology in line with its scientific counterpart and avoid challenges to ethical bare‐difference methodology raised by philosophers in the literature. (shrink)

Like nature itself, modern economic life is driven by relentless competition and unbridled selfishness. Or is it? Drawing on converging evidence from neuroscience, social science, biology, law, and philosophy, Moral Markets makes the case that modern market exchange works only because most people, most of the time, act virtuously. Competition and greed are certainly part of economics, but Moral Markets shows how the rules of market exchange have evolved to promote moral behavior and how exchange itself may make us more (...) virtuous. Examining the biological basis of economic morality, tracing the connections between morality and markets, and exploring the profound implications of both, Moral Markets provides a surprising and fundamentally new view of economics--one that also reconnects the field to Adam Smith's position that morality has a biological basis. Moral Markets, the result of an extensive collaboration between leading social and natural scientists, includes contributions by neuroeconomist Paul Zak; economists Robert H. Frank, Herbert Gintis, Vernon Smith, and Bart Wilson; law professors Oliver Goodenough, Erin O'Hara, and Lynn Stout; philosophers William Casebeer and Robert Solomon; primatologists Sarah Brosnan and Frans de Waal; biologists Carl Bergstrom, Ben Kerr, and Peter Richerson; anthropologists Robert Boyd and Michael Lachmann; political scientists Elinor Ostrom and David Schwab; management professor Rakesh Khurana; computational science and informatics doctoral candidate Erik Kimbrough; and business writer Charles Handy. (shrink)

Some theories of goodness are descriptively rich: they have much to say about what makes things good. Neo-Aristotelian accounts, for instance, detail the various features that make a human being, a dog, a bee good relative to facts about those forms of life. Famously, such theories of relative goodness tend to be comparatively poor: they have little or nothing to say about what makes one kind of being better than another kind. Other theories of goodness—those that take there to be (...) absolute goodness—are comparatively rich: they offer grounds for judging some types of things better than others because they have more absolute goodness. Moorean accounts, for example, can tell us that humans and human experiences are superior to bees and blades of grass. But such theories tend to be descriptively poor: they struggle to tell us in virtue of what this is so. In this essay we motivate and flesh out a view that splits the difference between accounts of goodness as relative and accounts of goodness as absolute. Such a view holds promise only if the mechanics of this kind of metaphysics of goodness can be worked out. Here we present a view on which the paradigm for absolute goodness is God and the paradigm for each kind of relative goodness is a divine idea. (shrink)

Since 1900, debates about the justification of punishment have also been debates about the cause of crime. In the early twentieth century, the rehabilitative ideal of punishment viewed mental illness and dysfunction in individuals as the cause of crime. Starting in the 1970s, retributivism identified the immorality of human agents as the source of crime, which dovetailed well with the “tough-on-crime” political milieu of the 1980s and 1990s that produced mass incarceration. After surveying these historical trends, Wirts argues for a (...) social critical view that crime is best understood as a product of an unjust society, not faulty human beings. This view should take the lessons learned by the critiques of rehabilitation, however, and resist the tendency to reduce human beings to recipients of social services. (shrink)

Despite intensive exegetical work, Plato’s description of dialectic in the Sophist still raises many questions. Through a close reading of this passage that contextualizes it in the general organisation of the Sophist, this paper provides answers to these questions. After presenting the difficult text, I contend that the “vowel-kinds” are necessary conditions for the blending of kinds. Then, I interpret the “cause of divisions” mentioned by the Stranger as the kinds responsible of the dichotomous division in the first half of (...) the dialogue. In the next part, I show that 235d5-e2 does not describe a procedure of “meta-divison” as some commentators have it, but that it describes the method of division itself. Finally, I connect the difficulty and the obscurity of the passage to the fact that dialectic is the supreme science and I explain why dialectic is the science of free men. (shrink)

Donald Davidson has made enormous contributions to the philosophy of action, epistemology, semantics and philosophy of mind and today is recognized as one of the most important analytical philosophers of the late twentieth century. _Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge_ addresses * Davidson's writings on epistemology and theory of language with their implications of ontology and philosophy of mind * the central issue of whether truth is the ultimate goal of enquiry, challenged by contributions from Richard Rorty and Paul Horwich (...) * Davidson's approach to semantics and applied linguistics as addressed by Kirk Ludwig, Gabriel Segal, Peter Pagin, Stephen Neale, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore and Reinaldo Elugardo * Davidson's advances in the philosophy of mind in relation to the views of Williard V. Quine, John McDowell and Peter F. Strawson, in essays by Roger Gibson and Anita Avramides. (shrink)

The complexity of the self-strengthening relationship between debts, money and manipulation is discussed. This ‘Trinity‘ has a significant impact on dehumanization of contemporary society. The ‘Trinity‘ also contributes to formation of dependency of individuals and groups to their creditors and to emergence of postmodern slavery.

The topic of professionalism has dominated the content of major academic medicine publications during the past decade and continues to do so. The message of this current wave of professionalism is that medical educators need to be more attentive to the moral sensibilities of trainees, to their interpersonal and affective dimensions, and to their social conscience, all to the end of skilled, humanistic physicians. Urgent calls to address professionalism from such groups as the Association of American Medical Colleges, the American (...) Board of Internal Medicine, and the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, among others. In fact, at the 2004 annual meeting of the AAMC six separate presentations addressed professionalism with such titles as "Evaluating Humanism and Professionalism," Professionalism: Expectation, Education, Evaluation," or "Toward Assessing Professional Behaviors of Medical Students through Peer Observations". Professionalism, then, has become part of the current academic medicine parlance, used by administrators, clinical faculty, residency programs, and professional organizations with an expectation of shared meanings and goals. All of these stakeholders focus on what has become a consistent list of attributes deemed to be the essence of professionalism, which usually include variations on altruism, duty, excellence, honor and integrity, accountability, and respect. In fact, most of the scholarly work to date has been listing, describing, decrying, and measuring/evaluating it. In this collection of essays, we don’t argue with these attributes. Instead, we ask questions of the discourse from which they arise, how the specialized language of academic medicine disciplines has defined, organized, contained, and made seemingly immutable a group of attitudes, values, and behaviors subsumed under the label "professional" or "professionalism." This collection aims to be a critical text, one that questions the profession’s beliefs about the nature of its work and how such beliefs are enacted in medical education, particularly as they fuel the professionalism discourse. In addition, we will scrutinize how the discourse is enacted in both the formal and hidden curriculum, and in the larger medical environment. (shrink)