Insight has been investigated under the assumption that participants solve insight problems with insight processes and/or experiences. A recent trend has involved presenting participants with the solution and analysing the resultant experience as if insight has taken place. We examined self-reports of the aha experience, a defining aspect of insight, before and after feedback, along with additional affective components of insight (e.g., pleasure, surprise, impasse). Classic insight problems, compound remote associates, and non-insight problems were randomly interleaved and presented to participants. (...) Solution feedback increased ratings of aha experience in both insight and non-insight problems, with this result being driven by responses to solutions that were initially incorrectly generated. Ratings of aha for correctly generated solutions decreased after the correct solution was presented. These findings have implications for insight research paradigms as well as informing teaching methods. (shrink)

The ability to generate diverse ideas is valuable in solving creative problems ; yet, however advantageous, this ability is insufficient to solve the problem alone and requires the ability to logically deduce an assessment of correctness of each solution. Positive schizotypy may help isolate the aspects of divergent thinking prevalent in insight problem solving. Participants were presented with a measure of schizotypy, divergent and convergent thinking tasks, insight problems, and non-insight problems. We found no evidence for a relationship between schizotypy (...) and insight problem solving. Relationships between divergent thinking and insight problem solving were also surprisingly weak; however, measures of convergent thinking had a stronger relationship with problem solving. These results suggest that convergent thinking is more important than divergent thinking in problem solving. (shrink)

Many feminist epistemologists have been inclined to embrace socialized epistemology. There are, however, many different theses that go by that name. Sandra Harding, Lynn Hankinson Nelson, and Elizabeth Potter hold various of these theses, but their reasons for holding those theses, while they do support less ambitious theses, do not support the theses they are offered to support.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Argument ofthe Natural History Mark Webb In the NaturalHistoryofReligion Hume claims there are two principal questions concerning religion: one "concerning its foundation in reason," and the other "concerning its origin in human nature." He forthrightly states that his concern here is to determine "[w]hat those principles are, which give rise to the original belief, and what those accidents and causes are, which direct its operation."1 That is to (...) say, his express intentis, via an empirically based study, to determine and elucidate the causal or natural origin of religion—its beliefs and practices. These are among his first remarks. Consider now his very last remarks: The whole is a riddle, an aenigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspence of judgment appear the only result ofour most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species ofsuperstition to another, set them a quarrelling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape, into the calm, though obscure, regions ofphilosophy. (NHR 4:363) These last remarks should strike one as enigmatic: for, given that his purported aim is to offer a naturalistic account ofwhy humans hold religious beliefs, it is strange that he should be content to end in mystery—particularly sosince theworkitselfonersaplausible account ofsuch origins. Still, even ifHume should have felt the project to have failed, what does that have to do with "suspense of judgment," "quarrelling superstitions," and especially his "happy escape"? But of course he is up to much more in the Natural History than he lets on. Indeed,he offersnotonly acausal accountofreligiousbeliefbutamoral critique ofitas well. Why shouldhe doboth in the same work? I suggest that the causal account and the moral critique are intimately connected; and that the work is first and foremost a moral critique intended to sever allegiance to "traditional religion"—traditional theism in general, and Christianityin particular. One aim ofthis paper Volume XVII Number 2 141 MARKWEBB is to offer a unified reading of the Natural History, while the other is to assess the cogency ofHume's project on this reading. To this end we should first situate the Natural History among Hume's other works. It follows the firstEnquiry which addresses inter alia the credibility of "revealed" religion (particularly section 10, "Of Miracles"), and the second Enquiry which advances a naturalistically based morality. It was completed about the time he began the Dialogues, the main contention ofwhich is that natural theology offers minimal if any support for most traditional religious claims. In the Natural History, then, it is reasonable to suppose he is assuming the cogency of his claims against revealed religion, the viability of a naturalistically based morality, and the utter inability of natural theology to ground either traditional religious tenets or morality. The Dialogues in particular illuminate Hume's thought: after concluding that a posteriori arguments offer absolutely no grounds for ascribing the traditional moral attributes to the Deity, Philo goes on to counter Cleanthes' claim—that "[r]eligion, however corrupted, is still better than noreligion atall"2—bycontendingthattraditional religion simply is unessential andeven harmful to the needs ofsociety. Hume advances his causal account because he believes both that traditional religion lacks any basis in reason, and that recourse to a supernatural origin is untenable. And it will become evident in the course of this paper that the Natural History is most accurately understood against the backdrop of his moral theory as expounded in the second Enquiry—indeed the former is an exercise in applied ethics. The Strategy ofthe Natural History The sceptical tone ofmany ofits passages should strike one as out of place. For the scepticism is directed not towards providing a causal account of the origin ofreligious beliefs and practices (the purported aim), but rather towards their plausibility. Yet one might well expect such passages if Hume is assuming that religion has no tenable basis in reason nor for its revelational claims, and that he intends the work to be more than merely a natural history—as indeed he does. Speaking of polytheism and the... (shrink)

This study modelled associations between gender, ruminative cognitive style, alcohol use, and the time course of negative affect over the course of 43,111 random assessments in the natural environment. Participants completed 49 days of experience sampling over 1.3 years. The data indicated that rumination at baseline was positively associated with alcohol dependence symptoms at baseline as well as higher negative affect over the course of the study. Consistent with negative reinforcement models, drinking served to decrease the persistence of negative affect (...) from moment to moment. However, this ameliorative effect of drinking was evident only among women, suggesting an increased risk for negative reinforcement driven drinking behaviour. In addition, rumination appeared to counteract the desired effects of alcohol on mood among women. This suggests that women who ruminate more may be motivated to consume larger amounts of alcohol to achieve the desired effects. Overall, the results indicate that ruminative cognitive style and the persistence of negative affect from moment to moment may reflect an individual vulnerability for the development of alcohol use disorder especially among women. (shrink)

This paper explores the question of whether there can be a right to secede from a liberal state by examining the concept of a liberal state and the different forms of liberalism that may be appealed to in order to justify secession. It argues that where the foundations of the state’s legitimacy are conceived in terms of a non-derivative right to self-determination, then secession from a liberal state may be a justified form of action for different types of groups including (...) ‘illiberal’ ones. If, however, a broader definition of political legitimacy is adopted – one that is predicated upon the liberal notions of individual moral autonomy and equality – then the right to independent statehood will generally not include a right to secede from a state that already upholds these principles. Consequently, liberal theorists of secession are forced to choose between particularizing a right of independent statehood to groups trapped in illiberal states, or acknowledging that the right to secede includes a right to establish an ‘illiberal’ state that bestows upon its citizens unequal rights and entitlements other than a right of exit. (shrink)

This book takes a theoretical enterprise in Christian philosophy of religion and applies it to Buddhism, thus defending Buddhism and presenting it favorably in comparison. Chapters explore how the claims of both Christianity and Theravada Buddhism rest on people's experiences, so the question as to which claimants to religious knowledge are right rests on the evidential value of those experiences. The book examines mysticism and ways to understand what goes on in religious experiences, helping us to understand whether it is (...) good grounds for religious belief. The author argues that religious language in both Christian and Buddhist traditions is intelligible as factual discourse, and so reports of mystical experience are true or false. The book contends that those experiences can be fruitfully thought of as perceptual in kind and that they are therefore good prima facie grounds for religious belief, in the absence of defeating conditions. The work goes on to explore Christian and Buddhist testimony and how the likelihood of self-deception, self-delusion, imaginative elaboration and the like constitutes a defeating condition. It is shown that this defeater has less scope for operation in the Buddhist case than in the Christian case, and therefore Theravada Buddhism is better grounded. This work will appeal to students and scholars of philosophy and philosophy of religion, and those interested in the study of religious experience. (shrink)

In recent years an uneasy peace has descended in U.S. academe between those who feel research universities have done too little to advance the representation of minority groups and women and those who feel that the administrative policies developed to improve representation can and sometimes do come into conflict with core intellectual commitments of universities. Using quantitative and qualitative evidence from interviews with 47 natural sciences, engineering, and mathematics faculty members at a U.S. research university, the paper examines the background (...) characteristics of three sets of protagonists - academic progressives, academic traditionalists, and those whose views bridge the divide - and the way respondents discussed and justified their viewpoints. The paper draws on the theory of strategic action fields to illuminate the structure and dynamics of the conflict and suggests modifications to the theory that would improve its explanatory power for this case. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: History Contemporary Problems Conclusion Works cited.

Contrary to the popular belief that feminism has gained a foothold in the many disciplines of the academy, the essays collected in Theorizing Backlash argue that feminism is still actively resisted in mainstream academia. Contributors to this volume consider the professional, philosophical, and personal backlashes against feminist thought, and reflect upon their ramifications. The conclusion is that the disdain and irrational resentment of feminism, even in higher education, amounts to a backlash against progress.

Essays and photographs describe the course of the Truckee River and the people who depend on the river's water.

This paper addresses the notorious logic and semantic difficulties encountered by Lévinas in articulating his ethics of alterity. Tracing the philosophical genesis of this question in Descartes and Heidegger, it recognises Lévinas's claim that there can be no ontological foundation for ethics because ontology would reduce ethics to a form of mathematical ratio. Lévinas is unwilling to deny his phenomenological experience of a desire for goodness and unable to deny his despair at his ontological alienation from the good and so (...) he is driven to seek an irrational link between the human being and a metaphysical ‘good beyond being’. Retrieving an ancient gnostic neo-Platonist working of the same problem from the work of Hans Jonas, the paper reconsiders Lévinas's reading of Plato, specifically his understanding of Socrates’ exposition of erosin the Phaedo, in order to illustrate how his ethics of alterity may allow the human being to refer irrationally to the good beyond being. (shrink)

Some philosophers of religion claim that one reason God permits suffering is to make people dissatisfied with their lives so they will turn to him. That theodicy is inadequate because 1) that strategy of behavior modification constitutes punishment (in the psychologists’ sense), and 2) punishment is not the most effective strategy of behavior modification. Since God can be expected to use the most effective strategy available to him, such a theodicy is inadequate.

A philosophical theory of religion ought to meet four criteria: it should be extensionally accurate, neutral, phenomenological, and non-circular. I argue that none of the popular theories of religion meet all these criteria, and that, in particular, the extensional accuracy criterion and the non-circularity criterion can’t be met without sacrificing extensional accuracy. I conclude that, therefore, religions do not form a kind, and so, there is no such thing as religion.

In what has become known as the ‘Science Wars,’ two sides have emerged. Some philosophers of science have claimed that, because science is a social practice, it is hopelessly infected with political bias. Others have claimed that science is a special kind of practice, structurally immune to bias. They are both right, because they are referring to different things when they use the word ‘science.’ The second group is referring the method of theory selection, as practiced by scientists in the (...) laboratory, while the first group is referring to the ongoing social practice of science, of which theory choice is a part. The scientific method of theory choice, when practiced correctly, is resistant to bias, while the socially embedded practice is particularly sensitive to political forces, and so is subject to bias. (shrink)

In her article, "Is Depression Sin? A Philosophical Examination of Christian Voluntarism," Anastasia Phillippa Scrutton has offered a thoughtful contribution to the philosophical literature regarding depression and freedom of the will. Her analysis provides a careful and well-organized review of the position, prevalent in some Christian literature, that depression is within the individual's control and is thus a sin. She describes various components of this view, which she labels Christian voluntarism, and distinguishes it from more moderate versions of free will, (...) in its assumptions that nearly all persons in all situations possess total freedom, and thus the inherent ability to prevent or to overcome depression.... (shrink)

The author discusses the physical, social and psychological dimensions of personhood as they are affected by disfigurement. She draws on two case studies to discuss varying reactions to disfigurement and explores ways the physician can respond to requests for surgical correction of deformity.

David Truncellito provides an analysis of Anselm’s ontological argument according to which Anselm’s use of the term “God” equivocates between purported reference to a being and reference to the idea of that being. I argue that this interpretation does not capture Anselm’s intent, and offer another analysis of the argument that charges Anselm with a different equivocation.

David Truncellito provides an analysis of Anselm’s ontological argument according to which Anselm’s use of the term “God” equivocates between purported reference to a being and reference to the idea of that being. I argue that this interpretation does not capture Anselm’s intent, and offer another analysis of the argument that charges Anselm with a different equivocation.

A separatist conflict has been ongoing in India-administered Kashmir since 1989. Focusing on this region, this book critiques the existing normative theories of secession, and offers a comprehensive examination of the right of sub-groups to secede. The book looks at the different accounts of the moral right to secede, and assesses both the theories themselves as well as the claims of those who want to separate Kashmir from India. Included within this analysis are the three main types of normative theory (...) that ground the right of groups to secede in principles of national self: determination, consensual governance and rectificatory justice. Previous studies have discussed the causes behind the uprising in Kashmir against Indian authority and examined some of the legal and geo-political implications of the conflict for India and the wider region. This book provides a new way of looking at the Kashmir dispute, by asking what these theories tell us about Kashmir, and in turn what the example of Kashmir allows us to learn about these theories. It is of interest to students and scholars of South Asian Politics and International Relations. (shrink)

Certainty has proved to be a troublesome epistemological concept, which motivates many philosophers to be fallibilists. But fallibilism proves troublesome, too, as it is hard to state in a way that does not either imply skepticism, or deny that there are necessary truths. The Sellarsian idea of a space of reasons in which there are normative proprieties attached to epistemic positions allows for an understanding of fallibilism which allows that there is knowledge, there are necessary truths, and yet we can (...) be wrong about anything. This result is accomplished by taking the fallibilist claim as a normative recommendation, not a descriptive thesis. (shrink)

Even if an argument from religious experience can show that the subjects of religious experience are in contact with something which can justifiedly be named 'God', this does not settle the matter because, 'God' has a use other than its use as a proper name, in which use the term had descriptive content. To be of interest to Natural Theology, the argument from religious experience must show that the object of religious experience has the properties associated with the term 'God' (...) in this descriptive sense. In particular, it must show that the object of religious experience is omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly loving, and the creator of the physical universe. ;I consider five ways of making that further argument: a descriptivist theory of names, whereby the name has as its content the predicates in the description; an account of religious experience whereby the subject perceives that God has those properties named in the description; an argument from the testimony of God concerning his own properties; an argument from the effects of religious experience on its subjects to the effect that since it makes them better, the experiences must be at least of a benevolent being; and an argument that Christian practice is a well-founded doxastic practice, and so beliefs formed in this practice are prima facie justified, including the belief that the object of religious experience is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly loving. I find all these arguments inadequate to make the case. (shrink)

A random sample of 146 fortune 500 firms were surveyed in 1996 to determine whether firm size and industry type affect employers' level of involvement and support of ethical and environmental policies and practices. The study found relationships between firm size and ethical and environmental policies and practices. While the majority of firms (90.3%), regardless of size, have a formal written code of ethics, large firms are more likely to employ an ombudsperson to handle ethical concerns and to have a (...) network confidentiality policy. Although most firms (83.5%) have a formal written environmental policy, large firms are more inclined to invest in new ways to reduce the production of various types of waste. Another interesting twist to the study has to do with the relationships found between industry type and ethical and environmental policies and practices. Industries, such as the computers and electronics and scientific and photographics sectors, that are involved with high precision products and industries, such as mining, crude oil, and petroleum refining, that utilize natural resources are more inclined to have a formal written code of ethics and social responsibility. In addition, industries that utilize natural resources are more likely than other industries to have formal written environmental policies and practices. (shrink)

Preview: /Review: Michael Webb, The Whole at Once: A Conversation on Meaning, 244 pages./ This is a book about a phenomenological challenge: to reach the depths of meaning. It relies principally on becoming aware of the self and of the core essence of wholes, be they collections of objects or sentences or ideas. But meaning is the end point constituting, according to the author, a drive more powerful even than the will to live. It lies beyond any given perspective. The (...) work is presented as a dialogue between student and master; its 244 pages actually make for a quick and relatively easy read, not burdening the reader with jargon. It intends to be a popular presentation but without skimping on issues of relevance to philosophy. (shrink)