This paper argues that the exclusion problem for mental causation can be solved by a variant of non-reductive physicalism that takes the mental not merely to supervene on, but to be grounded in, the physical. A grounding relation between events can be used to establish a principle that links the causal relations of grounded events to those of grounding events. Given this principle, mental events and their physical grounds either do not count as overdetermining physical effects, or they do so (...) in a way that is not objectionable. (shrink)

A knowledge-based decision theory faces what has been called the prodigality problem : given that many propositions are assigned probability 1, agents will be inclined to risk everything when betting on propositions which are known. In order to undo probability 1 assignments in high risk situations, the paper develops a theory which systematically connects higher level goods with higher-order knowledge.

Moritz Schulz explores counterfactual thought and language: what would have happened if things had gone a different way. Counterfactual questions may concern large scale derivations or small scale evaluations of minor derivations. A common impression, which receives a thorough defence in the book, is that oftentimes we find it impossible to know what would have happened. However, this does not mean that we are completely at a loss: we are typically capable of evaluating counterfactual questions probabilistically: we can say what (...) would have been likely or unlikely to happen. Schulz describes these probabilistic ways of evaluating counterfactual questions and turns the data into a novel account of the workings of counterfactual thought. (shrink)

According to a suggestion by Williamson, outright belief comes in degrees: one has a high/low degree of belief iff one is willing to rely on the content of one’s belief in high/low-stakes practical reasoning. This paper develops an epistemic norm for degrees of outright belief so construed. Starting from the assumption that outright belief aims at knowledge, it is argued that degrees of belief aim at various levels of strong knowledge, that is, knowledge which satisfies particularly high epistemic standards. This (...) account is contrasted with and shown to be superior to an alternative proposal according to which higher degrees of outright belief aim at higher-order knowledge. In an “Appendix”, it is indicated that the logic of degrees of outright belief is closely linked to ranking theory. (shrink)

The pattern of credences we are inclined to assign to counterfactuals challenges standard accounts of counterfactuals. In response to this problem, the paper develops a semantics of counterfactuals in terms of the epsilon-operator. The proposed semantics stays close to the standard account: the epsilon-operator substitutes the universal quantifier present in standard semantics by arbitrarily binding the open world-variable. Various applications of the suggested semantics are explored including, in particular, an explanation of how the puzzling credences in counterfactuals come about.

According to the knowledge norm of belief, one should believe p only if one knows p. However, it can easily seem that the ordinary notion of belief is much weaker than the knowledge norm would have it. It is possible to rationally believe things one knows to be unknown The aim of belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013). One response to this observation is to develop a technical notion of ‘outright’ belief. A challenge for this line of response is to (...) find a way of getting a grip on the targeted notion of belief. In order to meet this challenge, I characterize ‘outright’ belief in this paper as the strongest belief state implied by knowledge. I show that outright belief so construed allows this notion to play important theoretical roles in connection with knowledge, assertion and action. (shrink)

Recently, Yalcin (Epistemic modals. Mind, 116 , 983–1026, 2007) put forward a novel account of epistemic modals. It is based on the observation that sentences of the form ‘ & Might ’ do not embed under ‘suppose’ and ‘if’. Yalcin concludes that such sentences must be contradictory and develops a notion of informational consequence which validates this idea. I will show that informational consequence is inadequate as an account of the logic of epistemic modals: it cannot deal with reasoning from (...) uncertain premises. Finally, I offer an alternative way of explaining the relevant linguistic data. (shrink)

This paper studies degrees of doxastic justification. Dependency relations among different beliefs are represented in terms of causal models. Doxastic justification, on this picture, is taken to run causally downstream along appropriate causal chains. A theory is offered which accounts for the strength of a derivative belief in terms of (i) the strength of the beliefs on which it is based, and (ii) the epistemic quality of the belief-forming mechanisms involved. It is shown that the structure of degrees of justification (...) converges to ranking theory under ideal conditions. (shrink)

There is a renewed debate about modus ponens. Strikingly, the recent counterexamples in Cantwell, Dreier and MacFarlane and Kolodny are generated by restricted readings of the ‘if’-clause. Moreover, it can be argued on general grounds that the restrictor view of conditionals developed in Kratzer and Lewis leads to counterexamples to modus ponens. This paper provides a careful analysis of modus ponens within the framework of the restrictor view. Despite appearances to the contrary, there is a robust sense in which modus (...) ponens is valid, owing to the fact that conditionals do not only allow for restricted readings but have bare interpretations, too. (shrink)

This Special Issue of Journal of Critical Realism (JCR) is dedicated to the 2022 International Association for Critical Realism (IACR) Conference, which was hosted by the International Institute of...

The current debate about peer disagreement has so far mainly focused on the question of whether peer disagreements provide genuine counterevidence to which we should respond by revising our credences. By contrast, comparatively little attention has been devoted to the question by which process, if any, such revision should be brought about. The standard assumption is that we update our credences by conditionalizing on the evidence that peer disagreements provide. In this paper, we argue that non-dogmatist views have good reasons (...) to reject conditionalization. Instead, peer disagreements should be understood to call for a revision of our prior conditional probabilities: rather than merely adding to our original evidence, they pose a challenge to the thought that we have properly assessed the probative force of our original evidence. (shrink)

Indexical beliefs pose a special problem for standard theories of Bayesian updating. Sometimes we are uncertain about our location in time and space. How are we to update our beliefs in situations like these? In a stepwise fashion, I develop a constraint on the dynamics of indexical belief. As an application, the suggested constraint is brought to bear on the Sleeping Beauty problem.

Quine challenged traditional views of the a priori by appealing to two key premises: that any statement may be held true “come what may” and that no statement is immune to revision in light of new experience. Chalmers has recently developed a seemingly compelling response to each of these claims. The critique is particularly threatening because it seems to rest on the Bayesian premise that upon acquiring evidence E, a rational agent will update her credence in any statement S to (...) equal her prior conditional credence in S given E. We argue that Chalmers’s criticisms misfire. When properly understood, Quine’s two theses are largely consistent with Bayesianism. (shrink)

As the ubiquity of technology-mediated communication grows, so does the number of questions about the costs and benefits of replacing in-person interactions with technology-mediated ones. In the present study, we used a daily diary design to examine how people’s emotional experiences vary across in-person, video-, phone-, and text-mediated interactions in day-to-day life. We hypothesised that individuals would report less positive affect and more negative affect after less life-like interactions (where in-person is defined as the most life-like and text-mediated as the (...) least life-like). In line with this hypothesis, the analysis of 527 unique interactions reported by 102 individuals (mean age = 19.3; 85.6% female) over the course of 7 days reveals that people feel lonelier, sadder, less affectionate, less supported, and less happy following less life-like interactions. Additional analyses show that the links between life-like communication and momentary experiences are independent of properties of individual interactions such as interaction length and participants’ overall evaluations of interaction quality. These findings provide initial evidence that there may be inherent properties of common technology-mediated communication tools that may lead to momentary changes in affective experiences and make social connection more challenging. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Is uncertainty about preferences rationally possible? And if so, does it matter for rational decision? It is argued that uncertainty about preferences is possible and should play the same role in rational decision-making as uncertainty about worldly facts. The paper develops this hypothesis and defends it against various objections.

Problems in normative ethics paradigmatically concern what it is obligatory or permissible for an individual to do. Yet sometimes, each of us ought to do something individually in virtue of what we ought to do together. Unfortunately, traversing these two different levels at which a moral obligation can arise – individual and collective – is fraught with difficulties that easily lure us into conclusions muddying our understanding of collective obligations. This paper seeks to clearly lay out a systematic problem central (...) to the relation between collective and individual duties in view of alleviating some such confusion and facilitating more concerted attempts at resolving it: Collective duties require individuals to act in order for the collective duty to be fulfilled. Yet typically, a collective duty does not entail any one set of individual duties that would prescribe such contributory actions: The work we need to do in order to fulfil a duty can be allocated differently to the individuals collectively bearing it. Much like in matters of distributive justice, then, deriving individual duties from a collective one requires us to employ a distributive scheme, which raises separate normative concerns that have rarely taken centre stage in the debate so far. (shrink)

A possible event always seems to be more probable than an impossible event. Although this constraint, usually alluded to as regularity , is prima facie very attractive, it cannot hold for standard probabilities. Moreover, in a recent paper Timothy Williamson has challenged even the idea that regularity can be integrated into a comparative conception of probability by showing that the standard comparative axioms conflict with certain cases if regularity is assumed. In this note, we suggest that there is a natural (...) weakening of the standard comparative axioms. It is shown that these axioms are consistent both with the regularity condition and with the essential feature of Williamson’s example. (shrink)

According to a prominent thought, in one’s practical reasoning one should rely only on what one knows. Yet for many choices, the relevant information is uncertain. This has led Schiffer to the following objection: oftentimes, we are fully rational in reasoning from uncertain premises which we do not know. For example, we may decide to take an umbrella based on a 0.4 credence that it will rain. There are various ways proponents of a knowledge norm for practical reasoning can respond. (...) One option is to say that the right way of dealing with uncertain information requires knowledge of probabilities. Another option is to say that credences can be knowledge because they really are beliefs with an unusual kind of content that consists of a set of probability spaces. Mixed accounts are possible as well. On neither of the accounts in the literature, however, can reasoning from uncertain premises be taken as reasoning based on a graded attitude, a credence, toward an ordinary proposition. To make room for this possibility, I argue that reliance comes in degrees. The knowledge norm is only plausible when taken to be concerned with full reliance.Partial reliance, on the other hand, goes hand in hand with credence. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility of supplementing the suppositional view of indicative conditionals with a corresponding view of epistemic modals. The most striking feature of the suppositional view consists in its claim that indicative conditionals are to be evaluated by conditional probabilities. On the basis of a natural link between indicative conditionals and epistemic modals, a corresponding thesis about the probabilities of statements governed by epistemic modals can be derived. The paper proceeds by deriving further consequences of this thesis, in (...) particular, the logic of epistemic modals and their logical interaction with indicative conditionals are studied. (shrink)

Analyses of so-called ‘post-truth’ discourse in populist politics have so far largely focussed on sorting it into cases of lying, bullshitting, bubble-like epistemic constraints, or alternative epistemic norms flouting objective truth. We review these proposals and point out problems with each. Some scholars, however, have recently drawn attention to how apparent assertions of facts in these contexts seem to be functionally entangled with expressing or affirming social identities. To get a clearer picture of what such an explanation might amount to, (...) we differentiate four different ways in which social identities might be connected to apparently assertive discourse: signalling, expressive affirmation, dissonance reduction, and identity grounding. Distinguishing and deciding among these will matter not only for providing an accurate analysis of post-truth discourse, but also for determining the exact grounds on which it merits criticism and for what might be done about it. (shrink)

Three-valued accounts of conditionals frequently promise (a) to conform to the probabilistic view that conditionals are evaluated by conditional probabilities, and (b) to yield a plausible account of compounds of conditionals. However, McGee (1981) shows that probabilistic validity, the conception of validity most naturally associated with the probabilistic view, cannot be characterized by a finite matrix. Adams (1995) indicates a further generalization of this result. Nevertheless, Adams (1986) provides a description of probabilistic validity in three-valued terms by going beyond the (...) standard framework. Yet the language Adams considers is severely restricted: it does not contain compounds of conditionals. Thus, a natural question arises: Is there a plausible three-valued account of compounds of conditionals which agrees with probabilistic validity on the restricted language? In this note, I develop a general framework in which to address this question. The answer will be negative. (shrink)

The relation between chance and actuality gives rise to a puzzle. On the one hand, it may be a chancy matter what will actually happen. On the other hand, the standard semantics for ‘actually’ implies that sentences beginning with ‘actually’ are never contingent. To elucidate the puzzle, I defend a kind of objective semantic indeterminacy: in a chancy world, it may be a chancy matter which proposition is expressed by sentences containing ‘actually’. I bring this thesis to bear on certain (...) counter-examples, proposed by Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio, to Lewis' ‘principal principle’. (shrink)

Fassio and Gao (2021) object to a knowledge-based decision theory on the ground that it cannot deal with unsuccessful inquiry. One way for inquiry to fail is not to know what one should know. If one’s inquiry fails in this way, is a subsequent choice in any way wrong when based on one’s limited actual knowledge? This paper discusses two strategies for dealing with this problem. On a first strategy, there is nothing wrong with such a choice (but something went (...) wrong prior to one’s choice). On a second strategy, there is something wrong with one’s choice and a knowledge-based decision theory should require that one’s decisions be based on the knowledge one should have, not merely on the knowledge one actually has. (shrink)

Why are hard decisions hard? According to the incomparabilists, hard choices are hard because the options cannot be compared. Proponents of parity hold that hard choices are hard because the options can be compared but only in terms of a fourth value relation—parity—in addition to the three standard relations: better, worse, and equally good. Others claim that hard choices are hard because it is vague (or indeterminate) how the options relate in terms of the three standard relations. Lastly, there is (...) the epistemicist. For the epistemicist, hard choices are hard because one is irresolvably ignorant about how the options compare. In the debate about hard choices, epistemicism is often mentioned but rarely defended. The present paper is a contribution to closing this gap. (shrink)

The article is an extended comment on Strawson’s neglected paper ‘Maybes and Might Have Beens’, in which he suggests that both statements about what may be the case and statements about what might have been the case can be understood epistemically. We argue that Strawson is right about the first sort of statements but wrong about the second. Finally, we discuss some of Strawson’s claims which are related to positions of Origin Essentialism.

Der interdisziplinär angelegte Band hat zum Ziel, das Thema der Mystik aus literatur-wissenschaftlicher, philosophisch-interkultureller und theologisch-interreligiöser Perspektive zu beleuchten. Dabei geht es insbesondere um eine epochenübergreifende Auseinandersetzung mit der Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Mystik und Literatur vom Mittelalter bis in die Gegenwart. Innerhalb dieses weitgespannten Bogens soll der systematische Perspektiven eröffnenden Begegnung zwischen Literaturwissenschaft, Theologie und Philosophie besonderes Gewicht zukommen.

Partindo do pluralismo religioso como um fato europeu, no diálogo inter-religioso encontra-se uma chance para uma espécie de acordo entre diferentes culturas. No presente texto, após intensos debates sobre diferentes correntes religiosas e filosóficas do decorrer da história, o professor Dr. Michael Schulz utiliza especialmente da abordagem dos pensadores Stephan Grätzel e Armin Kreiner para explicar o que significa uma filosofia da religião inter-religiosa e intercultural.

In order to protect the indigenous population of the Americas from slavery and war, Bartolomé de Las Casas carries out a cultural turn in the understanding of what is considered “natural”. The idea that there are slaves by nature was explained in the colonial period by recourse to Aristotle and in view of the inhabitants of the West Indies. A warlike subjugation of disobedient and rebellious slaves was therefore a “natural” affair - like the entire European expansion. Drawing on Aristotle’s (...) understanding of ethos and Aquinas’ considerations of human beings’ natural knowledge of God, Las Casas initiates a culturalist interpretation of human nature. In this way, the indicators that are supposed to qualify the Indians as homunculi and slaves by nature are re-qualified as indicators of authentic humanity. The article reconstructs Las Casas’ innovative cultural argumentation. (shrink)

A partir de las reflexiones del filósofo peruano Fidel Tubino sobre una hermenéutica diatópica, este artículo aborda el problema intercultural de los derechos humanos; se deben desarrollar estos derechos conjuntamente en un diálogo intercultural; no pueden ser implantados en otras culturas a partir de la cultura occidental. La hermenéutica diatópica evita tanto el relativismo cultural como el imperialismo cultural; está al servicio de la reconciliación de las culturas.

In this paper, I argue that established responses to the demandingness objection fail to acknowledge an alternative explanation of the intuitive pull of this objection for a significant subset of norms being subject to it. This is the class of imperfect collective duties, which give rise to conceptually distinct objections from fairness that nonetheless permeate many clear examples of intuitively problematic moral demands. Such duties obtain where it is morally required to attain a certain outcome O, yet obtaining O does (...) not require each moral agent to do as much as they individually can but instead requires a finite amount of effort that can be variously allocated to different agents – think of classic collective action problems such as protesting against an unjust policy, lobbying a government, donating to disaster relief, or hosting refugees. -/- In such cases, our collective ability to attain O grounds a collective duty C to attain O, but this collective duty can be translated into various schemes of individual duties P to contribute towards O. Accordingly, this decomposition of C raises a problem of distributive justice. In fact, many intuitive objections to unfair distributions in such cases can be readily accounted for with the conceptual apparatus of prominent theories of distributive justice, but not by standard theories of interpersonal morality. For instance, the moral relevance of the fact that performing a composite duty P is more burdensome for agent A than for agent B can readily be explained in luck-egalitarian terms. Yet both utilitarians and contractualists could not account for this fact independently of an appeal to the demandingness objection, provided that the moral importance of the outcome attainable through P still trumps reasons against it that are due to the burden borne by the agent. -/- Put briefly, then, we need to clearly distinguish objections that morality demands _too much_ of me from objections that morality demands too much _of me_. Doing so is likely to make accepting the demandingness of morality properly construed more intuitively plausible, perhaps as mitigated by certain existing responses. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Aufsatz geht von der neophänomenologisch inspirierten These aus, dass uns das Coronavirus aus einem existenzvergessenen Relativismus gerissen hat. Im Angesicht einer Bedrohung für Leib und Leben brach sich im Frühjahr 2020 schnell die kollektive Einsicht von systemrelevanten Berufsgruppen und Versorgungsinfrastrukturen Bahn. Die drohende Ansteckung mit SARS-CoV-2 ließ die allermeisten Menschen erkennen, dass es offenkundig spezifische Güter und Dienstleistungen gibt, die auf eigenartig seinsverstetigende Weise einen Wert in sich tragen. Diese plötzliche Einsicht in die existenzielle Eigenlogik gesellschaftlicher Daseinsvorsorge kollidiert (...) jedoch grundlegend mit einem werttheoretischen Relativismus, wie er von den vorherrschenden Denkrichtungen der Wirtschaftswissenschaft vertreten wird. Ebenjene Diskrepanz nimmt der vorliegende Aufsatz in den Blick und entwickelt ein neophänomenologisches Verständnis für diese eigenartige Abteilung der Produktwelt, eine Abteilung, für welche das Beatmungsgerät gewissermaßen zum Symbol geworden ist und die ich mit dem Terminus der ‚existenziellen Güter‘ auf den Begriff bringen möchte. Zu diesem Zweck wird gezeigt, dass die seit dem Frühjahr 2020 entstandene Situation vor dem Hintergrund eines entfremdeten menschlichen Selbstverständnisses verstanden werden kann. Letzteres besteht in einer Art existenzvergessenem Relativismus, welcher anhand der Studien von Hermann Schmitz bis in die Bewusstseinsphilosophie um 1800 zurückverfolgt werden kann. Mit Hilfe seines begrifflichen Instrumentariums der Neuen Phänomenologie diagnostiziert Schmitz in der Frühromantik des deutschen Idealismus ein entfremdetes Verständnis von Subjektivität, welches eine enorme, bis heute anhaltende Wirkmächtigkeit entfaltet hat. Diesem Gedanken folgend wird der Einfluss rekonstruiert, den dieses menschliche Selbstverständnis auf die wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Theoriebildung genommen hat. Es setzte sich, so meine Kernthese, in der Subjektkonzeption der neoklassischen Grenznutzentheorie um 1870 fort, wirkte von dort bis in die zeitgenössische Gesundheitsökonomik und widerfährt uns schließlich in Gestalt einer drohenden Versorgungskrise im Gesundheitswesen. Das durch das Coronavirus ausgelöste Krisenszenario der vergangenen Monate gleicht aus dieser Perspektive dem Erwachen aus einem relativistischen Traum abstrakter Nutzenmaximierung und Effizienzsteigerung. Das abschließend entwickelte Verständnis existenzieller Güter soll dazu beitragen, den darin manifest gewordenen Entfremdungsprozess zu überwinden. (shrink)

The present paper addresses the question of whether outsiders in science can be rational. This question is addressed on three levels: the level of beliefs of outsiders, the level of decisions of out-siders, and the level of assertions of outsiders. It is argued that outsiders can indeed be rational but only within tightly constrained limits.

A paper by Schulz (Philos Stud 149:367–386, 2010) describes how the suppositional view of indicative conditionals can be supplemented with a derived view of epistemic modals. In a recent criticism of this paper, Willer (Philos Stud 153:365–375, 2011) argues that the resulting account of conditionals and epistemic modals cannot do justice to the validity of certain inference patterns involving modalised conditionals. In the present response, I analyse Willer’s argument, identify an implicit presupposition which can plausibly be denied and show that (...) accepting it would blur the difference between plain assumptions and their epistemic necessitations. (shrink)

The former president of the German Constitutional Court, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, coined the formulation, "The liberal, secularised state is nourished by presuppositions that it cannot itself guarantee."1 In the first part of this article I would like to discuss the deliberations of one who is considered the chief philosopher of the Federal Republic of Germany, Jürgen Habermas, in particular his thinking regarding the epistemological and existential status and role of religion in a modern democracy. I investigate Habermas's concept of philosophy with (...) the intention of exploring the possibility and range of a philosophy of religion allowed for in his approach. This is why the reactions to Habermas's discourse on... (shrink)

This volume contains fifteen essays in honour of Wolfgang Künne. The essays deal with issues from the philosophy of language and logic, broadly conceived. They cover topics ranging from truth, reference, and the ontology of abstract objects, to action, intentionality, and speech acts. By taking into account the works of early analytic philosophers—including Bolzano, Frege, Peirce, Husserl, and Wittgenstein—they foster our understanding of the history of the ideas discussed, while at the same time contributing to the systematic debate. The collection (...) also includes an up-to-date bibliography of Künne’s published work. (shrink)

This book addresses a seemingly marginal and as yet sparsely discussed policy problem that turns out to open a window into longstanding debates at the very heart of normative ethics, metaethics, and practical rationality more broadly: Should we contact the last uncontacted peoples? Over the course of this book, I will explore grounds for three responses to this question: yes, no, and rejecting the question. First, I aim to show that even though the case of uncontacted people stirs up some (...) hard problems for theories of justice and well-being, they still warrant a presumption in favour of intervention: It seems that we would have similar duties towards uncontacted people as we are regularly taken to have towards contacted people similarly placed – if being contacted would be good for them. And it looks as though it would be, based on considerations of welfare more broadly and reasons of autonomy in particular. Still, intuitively there seems to be a strong presumption against intervention – or so widely accepted policies of non-intervention would suggest. I go on to explore two options for why intervention may be wrong overall: It may turn out to be harmful or impermissibly risky upon closer inspection of contingent circumstances; or it may be that extinguishing uncontacted cultures is bad independently of the interests of those living in them. Two further options challenge the viability of the question: I consider whether the case of uncontacted peoples undermines the very bases of our moral judgments, perhaps instantiating what Bernard Williams sought to capture with the idea of a relativism of distance. Lastly, I address whether the question of one’s self-interest in this matter challenges practical rationality more fundamentally by being a transformative choice or one between incomparable options. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the methodical status of phenomenological reduction in Heidegger's early Freiburg lectures (1919-1923). Starting from the assumption that the traditional interpretation of reduction focused mainly on Heidegger’s interpretation of its ontological possibility (by explaining reduction from the phenomenon of anxiety), we propose a reading conducted from a methodical perspective. First, we follow the Heideggerian appropriation of reduction as the epoché of the objectivations of life and determine its “phenomenological residue” as essentially evental and (...) “noematic”. Then, by broadening the meaning of reduction understood now as reconduction to the origin, we highlight its essentially interpretative, performative and rearticulatory character. As the “hermeneutical reduction” is accomplished as a critical destruction, the phenomenological seeing is essentially mediated in an interpretative and historical way. (shrink)

The pattern of ups and downs in a sequence with varying pitch can be heard as a melodic contour. Contrary to single pitch, the neural representation of melodic contour information in the auditory cortex is rarely investigated, and it is not clear whether the processing entails a hemispheric asymmetry. The present magnetoencephalography study assessed the neuromagnetic responses of N = 18 normal-hearing adults to four-note sequences with fixed vs. varying pitch that were presented either monaurally or diotically; data were analyzed (...) using minimum-norm reconstructions. The first note of the sequences elicited prominent transient activity in posterior auditory regions (Planum temporale), especially contralateral to the ear of entry. In contrast, the response to the subsequent notes originated from more anterior areas (Planum polare) and was larger for melodic contours than for fixed pitch sequences, independent from the ear of entry and without hemispheric asymmetry. Together, the results point to a gradient in the early cortical processing of melodic contours, both in spatial and functional terms, where posterior auditory activity reflects the onset of a pitch sequence and anterior activity reflects its subsequent notes, including the difference between sequences with fixed pitch and melodic contours. (shrink)