Une réduction herméneutique? L'épochè et le « résidu phénoménologique » chez le premier Heidegger (1919-1923)

Heidegger Studies 38 (1):23-45 (2022)
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine the methodical status of phenomenological reduction in Heidegger's early Freiburg lectures (1919-1923). Starting from the assumption that the traditional interpretation of reduction focused mainly on Heidegger’s interpretation of its ontological possibility (by explaining reduction from the phenomenon of anxiety), we propose a reading conducted from a methodical perspective. First, we follow the Heideggerian appropriation of reduction as the epoché of the objectivations of life and determine its “phenomenological residue” as essentially evental and “noematic”. Then, by broadening the meaning of reduction understood now as reconduction to the origin, we highlight its essentially interpretative, performative and rearticulatory character. As the “hermeneutical reduction” is accomplished as a critical destruction, the phenomenological seeing is essentially mediated in an interpretative and historical way.

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