This is a translation of the second chapter of F.W.J. Schelling's Abhandlungen zur Erlaüterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre. It is preceded by a brief introduction in which I situate the chapter within Schelling's oeuvre and suggest that it is not only an early articulation of Schellingian Naturphilosophie, but also prescient, anticipating Schelling's later positive philosophy.

This essay argues for the applicability and importance of the notion of the unconscious in Fichte’s Jena period, with a focus on the,second’ Wissenschaftslehre. The essay begins by arguing for the existence of a fundamental tension in Fichte’s philosophy: namely, between a,transcendence’ principle – that the conditions for consciousness cannot themselves be present within experience, since they ground that experience – and an,immanence’ principle that there is no genuine reality outside of consciousness. It is shown that this tension is (...) particularly evident if one observes some of the conflicting ways in which Fichte employs the notions of,intellektuelle Anschauung’ and,unmittelbares Bewusstsein.’ Fichte seems to violate the immanence principle especially insofar as he characterizes the conditions of the possibility of consciousness as a series of,actions,’ which, qua actions, must be,real’ in some sense: insofar as they are both real and not present to consciousness, it is argued, they must be unconscious. Although Fichte does not wholly embrace the notion of unconscious mental activity due to his adherence to the immanence principle, his conception of the,two series’ of the Wissenschaftslehre as well as some of his uses of the notion of,unmittelbares Bewusstsein’ in particular allow the recognition that Fichte has a rich but inchoate conception of the unconscious. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I defend an interpretation of the methodological development of transcendental philosophy from Kant's first Critique to Fichte's later Jena-period Wissenschaftslehre. Both Kant and Fichte claim that experience is founded upon certain a priori subjective structures and capacities. However, I argue that the methodology of Kant's first Critique includes a number of assumptions and explicit doctrines that limit his ability to explain experience. The chief problem of Kant's theory of method is, I claim, his distinction between (...) the methods of philosophy and mathematics, whereby the method of construction is limited to mathematics. I argue that Fichte attempts to solve Kant's problem by expanding the method of construction to philosophy itself. As a method, construction has two aspects. First, the task of the philosopher is to reconstruct discursively the spontaneous process whereby subjectivity is self-constructing. By "self-construction," I refer to a functional structure wherein subjectivity is the achievement of a range of proto-conscious, primitive mental activities. Second, the method of the philosopher is similar to the method of geometric construction, viz., the postulation of a task to be completed regarding which one---beginning from putatively self-evident resources---creatively and imaginatively seeks out a solution. Fichte turns to construction since there is no algorithm for philosophical reflection and he revises Kant's important doctrines regarding intellectual intuition and the productive imagination. However, though Fichte's solution to Kant's problem is promising, the notion of construction itself generates a number of problems. (shrink)

How surprising is the insight, that being equals I in the 15th lecture of the Doctrine of Science 1804/II? It might have been indeed an unexpected turn for his contemporaries in Berlin listening to Fichte for the first time, but should it be surprising for us, having at least since 2012 (the year the last volume of [Gesamtausgabe] appeared) access to all his published and unpublished works? I want to propose a way of reading Fichte, which bypasses two popular and (...) contradictory interpretations of his philosophy in the post-Jena period: (a) the Absolute is the new first principle (hence the I is just a shadow of the much higher being) and (b) his system basically remains unchanged (hence the being is nothing more than the I). At first, I analyze the functions of later Fichte’s improved version of the Kantian and Reinholdian abstract subject-object-symbolism and assign specific content to it. This will shed light on the structure and the first principle of the Doctrine of Science 1804/II. In the second section I give reasons why Fichte calls both God and I “absolute” and “pure being” and explain their relation to each other referring to a thought experiment sometimes used by Kant—an analogy between the divine and human (pure) reason. The analogical thinking of this kind remains within the borders of transcendental philosophy as long as it is used only for certain didactic purposes. (shrink)

The philosophical thought of J. G. Fichte, particularly his later work, is at the very center of the paradigm shift under way in the field of German idealism. Crucial to this reassessment is Fichte's _Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo_ of 1796 to 1799, the manuscript at the heart of this essay colleciton and an articulation of the philosopher's _Wissenschaftslehre,_ or overall system of philosophy, which he discussed in lectures at the University of Jena. Coherent, comprehensive, and edited by two of the (...) foremost Fichte scholars in the world, the essays provide a much needed introduction to the major themes of the most important period of Fichte's philosophical thought--and thus to German idealism itself--and make a persuasive case for the originality and continuing significance of the later Jena _Wissenschaftslehre._. (shrink)

Why has Fichte been reading Wissenschaftslehre for his whole life? Depending on how one counts, Fichte has presented close to 20 versions of his philosophical main project, the doctrine of science. This paper gives the outline of an answer to this often raised question, focusing on the last six courses between 1807 and 1814. Three characteristics of the later body of Fichte’s theoretical philosophy are brought to attention: First, its seriality, second, its actual oral mediality, and last but (...) not least the fact that the later doctrine of science transgresses its own territory to appeal to the students to eventually become the creative prototype of transcendental philosophy themselves. These three topics constitute what here is called the meta-methodological disposition of Fichte’s later Wissenschaftslehre. To rule out a shortened understanding of meta-methodology as a matter of mere propaedeutics, the paper connects the methodological theorems of the doctrine of science to the more contentual level of theoretical deductions. In this regard the paper exposes Fichte’s trans-conceptual concept of ›life‹, which is probably more properly expressed as ›living‹ as Fichte intends this concept to self-referentially unify meta-methodological configurations with his later transcendental epistemology: philosophy should never reach final completement and thus come to a halt, but rather live on philosophically resp. think the living.Warum las Fichte zeit seines Lebens Wissenschaftslehre? Je nach Zahlung hat Fichte gut 20 Versionen seines gleichnamigen philosophischen Hauptprojektes vorgelegt. In diesem Beitrag wird eine Antwort zu dieser oft gestellten Frage anskizziert, wobei der Fokus auf den letzten sechs Parcours zwischen 1807 und 1814 liegt. Drei Charakteristika der spaten Gestalt von Fichtes theoretischer Philosophie werden herausgearbeitet: Erstens, ihre Serialitat, zweitens, ihre Medialitat der aktualen Mundlichkeit, drittens der Umstand, dass die spate Wissenschaftslehre ihr eigenes Gebiet ubersteigt, um an ihre Horer appellieren zu konnen, schlieslich selbst zum schopferischen Urbild der Transzendentalphilosophie zu werden. Diese drei Kontexte konstituieren die hier so bezeichnete meta-methodologische Einstellung von Fichtes spater Wissenschaftslehre. Um auszuschliesen, dass diese Meta-Methodologie verkurzt als eine Frage bloser Propadeutik verstanden wird, werden die methodologischen Theoreme der Wissenschaftslehre mit der im eigentlichen Sinne inhaltlichen Ebene ihrer theoretischen Deduktionen verbunden. Dazu wird Fichtes uberbegriffliches Konzept von ›Leben‹ exponiert, das die selbstreferentielle Einheit von meta-methodologischer Konfiguration und spater transzendentaler Epistemologie herstellt: Philosophie soll nicht formal vollendet und damit angehalten werden, sondern vielmehr philosophisch leben beziehungsweise ›Leben‹ denken. (shrink)

This paper provides a synthesis and translation of Le strutture speculative della dottrina della scienza; Il pensiero di J.G. Fichte negli anni 1801–1807 (Genova: Pantograf, 1995) by Gaetano Rametta. The 1807 Wissenschaftslehre offers important insight into Fichte’s mittlere Phase (1801–1807). Fichte’s text and Rametta’s work on it remain untranslated into English; this translation, the notes to which offer a running commentary and defi nitions of key terms, intends to make the former known through the latter. Rametta focuses on Fichte’s (...) analysis of vision, and the vision of vision. In his middle-period and later work, Fichte developed this theme far past the early Jena-period doctrine thereof, as treated by Dieter Henrich. Within this thematic context, Rametta also discusses the proof-structure of the 1807 WL, the distinction between Wahrheitslehre and Phänomenologie, and the concept of Weisheit or “wisdom.” The article concludes with a treatment of the significance of Fichte’s later philosophy for the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This article aims at a new interpretation of paragraph §1 of Fichte’s main work of 1794/95, the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. This well-known text of the early Jena period explicitly introduces a number of thought motifs that will prove to be valuable for the later versions of the Wissenschaftslehre – including the second version of 1804 – and these motifs will furthermore illuminate the significance of the first principle for Fichte’s entire Wissenschaftslehre.

A translation of the main text for only published version J. G. Fichte's later WL. (Hitzig: Berlin 1810). It excludes Fichte's Preface.

In his booklet "Contributions to a better founded presentation of mathematics" of 1810 Bernard Bolzano made his first serious attempt to explain the notion of a rigorous proof. Although the system of logic he employed at that stage is in various respects far below the level of the achievements in his later Wissenschaftslehre, there is a striking continuity between his earlier and later work as regards the methodological constraints on rigorous proofs. This paper tries to give a (...) perspicuous and critical account of the fragmentary logic of Beyträge, and it shows that there is a tension between that logic and Bolzano's methodological ban on ?kind crossing? (shrink)

In his booklet ‘Contributions to a better founded presentation of mathematics’ of 1810 Bernard Bolzano made his first serious attempt to explain the notion of a rigorous proof. Although the system of logic he employed at that stage is in various respects far below the level of the achievements in his later Wissenschaftslehre, there is a striking continuity between his earlier and later work as regards the methodological constraints on rigorous proofs. This paper tries to give a (...) perspicuous and critical account of the fragmentary logic of Beyträge, and it shows that there is a tension between that logic and Bolzano's methodological ban on ‘kind crossing’. (shrink)

In the later Fichte the reflection splits the world into a fivefoldness of its possible view. To get through all the a priori arranged levels from sensuality to the Doctrine of Science means to use up all the possibilities of the views of the world. I will examine whether Fichte can offer us a direct proof of completeness of the standpoints or at least show indirectly that there must be exactly five of them. Which answer would he give us (...) if we argued that history, skepticism and nonentity could complement the array? -/- Keywords Fivefoldness-worldviews-completeness-proof-history-skepticism -/- Die Reflexion spaltet nach Fichte die Welt in eine Fünffachheit ihrer möglichen Ansicht. Das Durchlaufen der a priori geordneten Stufen von der Sinnlichkeit bis zur Wissenschaftslehre stellt zugleich ein Ausschöpfen der Möglichkeiten dar, sich zur Welt zu verhalten. Ich werde prüfen, ob Fichte uns einen direkten Beweis der Vollständigkeit der Standpunkte geben oder zumindest indirekt dafür argumentieren kann, dass es genau fünf sein müssen. Was würde er uns antworten, wenn wir behaupteten, die Geschichte, der Skeptizismus und die Nullität könnten die Reihe ergänzen? -/- Schlüsselbegriffe Fünffachheit-Weltansichten-Vollständigkeit-Beweis-Geschichte-Skeptizismus. (shrink)

On 6 January 1795, the twenty-year-old Schelling—still a student at the Tübinger Stift—wrote to his friend and former roommate, Hegel: “Now I am working on an Ethics à la Spinoza. It is designed to establish the highest principles of all philosophy, in which theoretical and practical reason are united”. A month later, he announced in another letter to Hegel: “I have become a Spinozist! Don’t be astonished. You will soon hear how”. At this period in his philosophical development, Schelling (...) had been deeply under the spell of Fichte’s new philosophy and the Wissenschaftslehre. The text Schelling was writing at the time was the early Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie, though his characterization of this text would much better fit the somewhat later work which is the focus of the current paper: Schelling’s 1801 Darstellung meines System der Philosophie (hereafter: Presentation). The Presentation is a text written more geometrico, following the style of Spinoza’s Ethics. While Spinoza’s influence and inspiration is stated explicitly and unmistakably in Schelling’s preface, the content of this composition might seem quite foreign to Spinoza’s philosophy, so much so, in fact, that Michael Vater—the astute translator and editor of the recent English translation of the text—has contended that “despite the formal similarities between Spinoza’s geometrical method and Schelling’s numbered mathematical-geometrical constructions, Schelling’s direct debts to Spinoza are few”. The Presentation is an extremely dense and difficult text, and while I agree that at first glance Schelling’s engagement with the concept of reason (Vernunft) and the identity formula ‘A=A’ seems to have little if anything to do with Spinoza (especially since Spinoza’s key terminology of ‘God’, ‘causa sui’, ‘substance’, ‘attribute’, and ‘mode’ is barely mentioned in the Presentation), I suspect that at a deeper level Schelling is attempting to transform Spinoza’s system by replacing God, Spinoza’s ultimate reality, with reason. Though this might at first seem bizarre, I believe it can be profitably motivated and explained upon further reflection. It is this transformation of Spinoza’s God into (the early) Schelling’s reason that is the primary subject of this study. I develop this paper in the following order. In the first part I provide a very brief overview of Schelling’s lifelong engagement with Spinoza’s philosophy, which will prepare us for my study of the 1801 Presentation. In the second part, I consider the formal structure and rhetoric of the Presentation against the background of Spinoza’s Ethics, and show how Schelling regularly imitates Spinoza’s tiniest rhetorical gestures. In the third and final part I turn to the opening of the Presentation, and argue that Schelling attempts there to distance himself from Fichte by developing a conception of reason as the absolute, or the identity of the subject and object, just as the thinking substance and the extended substance are identified in Spinoza’s God. (shrink)

Fichte-Studien, volume 49 (Leiden: Brill/Rodopi Publishers, 8 April 2021), edited by David W. Wood, 471pp. -/- Presenting new critical perspectives on J.G. Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, this volume of articles in English by an international group of scholars addresses the topic of first principles in Fichte’s writings. Especially discussed are the central text of his Jena period, the 1794/95 Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, as well as later versions like the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo (1796-99) and the presentations of 1804 (...) and 1805. Also included are new studies on the first principles of the particular sub-disciplines of Fichte’s system, such as the doctrines of aesthetics, nature, right, ethics, and history. The volume also contains a number of miscellaneous essays on Fichte research, as well as several book reviews. (shrink)

Arthur Schopenhauer (born 1788 in Danzig, died 1860 in Frankfurt am Main), was the son of Heinrich Floris Schopenhauer, a wealthy merchant, and Johanna Trosiener, who was later to become a well‐known member of Goethe's circle in Weimar and, subsequently, a popular novelist whose collected works, published in 1831, filled twenty‐four volumes. The death of his father (a probable suicide) in 1805 led to the future philosopher's ultimate abandonment of the plan that he should enter business. After further study, (...) he attended the University of Göttingen in 1809 where he studied with G. E. Schulze, whose Aenisidisumus (1796), with its critique of Kant's conception of the thing‐in‐itself, had played a crucial role in the early development of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. It was through Schulze that he became acquainted, not only with Kant, but with Plato and Schelling (see Hübscher 1989, pp. 159ff). The connection between Plato and Kant, a crucial thesis of his philosophy as a whole, is the subject of some of his earliest and most penetrating notebook entries (Schopenhauer 1988, vol. I, nos 17, 228, 442). Schopenhauer left Göttingen for Berlin to attend Fichte's lectures. Despite apparently serious attempts, testified by his voluminous notebooks (preserved in Schopenhauer 1988, vol. II), Schopenhauer found himself deeply out of sympathy with the Fichtean philosophy of reflection, and his distaste for German idealism, which only increased with the years, dates from this encounter. On the heels of Napoleon's invasion of Berlin, Schopenhauer retired to a small town outside of Weimar, where (June‐November 1813) he wrote his dissertation On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, whose simplification and transformation of the Kantian doctrine of the concepts of the understanding into a third “form of intuition” next to space and time forms the basis of his distinctive epistemology and its difference from Kant's. (This difference is most clearly expressed in §21; see also the “Critique of Kantian Philosophy”, the Appendix to The World as Will and Representation, vol. I, pp. 437–451). The “ideality of sensation” is the theme of On Vision and Colors, written in 1815 under the influence of his encounter with Goethe's Farbenlehre (a sympathy not reciprocated by Goethe for the younger man's contribution). At this time, Schopenhauer moved to Dresden, where for four years he worked out The World as Will and Representation in intellectual isolation. In addition to the dual influence of Plato and Kant, Schopenhauer had also been introduced to doctrines of Eastern religion by F. Meyer in Weimar (1813), and is often said to be the first Western philosopher seriously to incorporate Eastern thought into his system (see Schopenhauer 1988, vol. I, no. 564). The “work” is announced in a note that is even earlier, from 1813, which begins. (shrink)

Dans les « Prolégomènes à la logique pure » de ses Recherches logiques , Husserl rend hommage aux deux premiers volumes de la Wissenschaftslehre de 1837 de Bernard Bolzano comme un « ouvrage qui […] surpasse de loin tout ce que la littérature mondiale a à offrir en termes de contributions systématiques à la logique ». Cet article porte sur le jeune Husserl comme lecteur du chef-d’oeuvre de Bolzano, visant ainsi à contribuer à une compréhension adéquate de certains aspects (...) des théories de Bolzano et de Husserl et de ce sur quoi portent ces théories. Je me concentrerai sur la question de savoir comment Bolzano en 1837 et Husserl autour de 1900 ont conçu les contenus des actes et états mentaux.Dans les sections 1 et 2, je fais état de la redécouverte de la WL de Bolzano au sein de l’École de Brentano, et en ce qui concerne le problème des représentations sans objets, j’endosse la défense de Bolzano par Husserl contre Twardowski. Dans les sections 3 et 4, je présente un aperçu de la théorie des propositions et des notions , et montre comment Husserl assimile le cadre conceptuel bolzanien dans ses RL. Tandis que Bolzano considère les propositions et les notions comme étant des objets abstraits sui generis, le jeune Husserl développe une conception des notions et des propositions en termes d’espèces. J’explique cette conception dans la section 5 et je la défends contre le dernier Husserl. La discussion la plus extensive et la plus détaillée d’une seule et unique thèse de la philosophie de la logique de Bolzano qu’on puisse trouver dans les livres et les articles publiés par Husserl de son vivant se trouve dans le dernier chapitre de ses RL. Le sujet de discussion, et la dernière section de cet article, est une affirmation courageuse, pour ne pas dire outrageuse de Bolzano qui, du moins pris au pied de la lettre, contredit tout simplement ce que la plupart des philosophes ont tenu pour acquis depuis Aristote. Les questions, soutient Bolzano, sont une espèce particulière de propositions, et donc leur vérité est susceptible d’être évaluée.In the “Prolegomena to Pure Logic” of his Logical Investigations Husserl praised the first two volumes of Bernard Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre of 1837 as “a work which … far surpasses everything that world-literature has to offer in the way of systematic contributions to logic”. This paper is about the early Husserl as a reader of Bolzano’s masterpiece, hoping thereby to contribute to a proper understanding of certain aspects of Bolzano’s and Husserl’s theories and of what those theories are about. I shall concentrate on the question how Bolzano in 1837 and Husserl around 1900 conceive of the contents of mental acts and states.In sections 1-2 I report on the rediscovery of Bolzano’s WL in the school of Brentano, and as regards the issue of objectless presentations, I endorse Husserl’s defence of Bolzano against Twardowski. In sections 3-4 I present an outline of Bolzano’s theory of propositions and notions and go on to show how Husserl assimilates the Bolzanian framework in his LI. While Bolzano takes propositions and notions to be sui generis abstract objects, the early Husserl develops a species conception of notions and proposition. I explain this view in section 5 and defend it against Husserl’s later self. The most extensive and most thorough discussion of a single contention in Bolzano’s philosophy of logic that can be found in any of Husserl’s books and articles published during his lifetime is contained in the last chapter of his LI. The topic of this discussion, and of the final section of this paper, is a courageous if not outrageous Bolzanian contention : questions, he claims, are a special kind of propositions and hence truth-evaluable. (shrink)

Why Fichte? I wondered, when the six-day Fichte Tagung was announced for Zwettl, Austria. Hegel and Kant and Hume had had their festivals. I expected that. But in spite of some party spirit for Fichte there is hardly a competitive passion on the part of Fichte people against Kant and Hegel and Hume people that would prompt a world congress. There is no International Society for the study of Fichte. There is indeed intense interest in his work, witnessed in the (...) new and carefully edited collection of his works, which is still in progress, the numerous, excellent and recently published studies, and the number of excellent Fichte articles appearing in leading journals. There is particular and growing interest in his revisions of his Wissenschaftslehre, in which his notion of intuition develops remarkably. His fully developed position does indeed offer a subtle and profound option to Hegel’s interpretation of consciousness. His influence on nineteenth century figures in literature as well as in philosophy is striking and important. But that has been so for a century and a half, and the same can be said of Schelling’s later work and influence, which is much less studied. (shrink)

Dans l’essai Objets intentionnels de 1894, Husserl développe en réaction à Twardowski une théorie originale de l’assomption comme solution au problème des représentations sans objet. Après avoir examiné le détail de cette théorie et en avoir soulevé les difficultés, je montre dans cet article que la solution proposée par cette théorie doit être abordée de manière indépendante de celle qui sera développée plus tard dans les Recherches logiques et j’expose dans quelle mesure elle est ancrée dans la psychologie descriptive brentanienne (...) tout en mettant à profit certains outils de la logique de Bolzano. Enfin, j’indique que Husserl continuera à développer cette théorie après les Recherches logiques, confirmant ainsi qu’elle occupe une place de choix dans la théorie phénoménologique du jugement.In his essay Intentional Objects of 1894, Husserl develops in response to Twardowski an original theory of assumptions as a solution to the problem of objectless presentations. First, I analyze in this paper the main points of his theory and point out some of the difficulties it raises. I then suggest that the solution presented in this theory must be addressed independently of the one developed by Husserl later in the Logical Investigations and try to show in which extent his theory of assumptions is rooted in the brentanian descriptive psychology, although it makes good use of some logical tools from Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre. Since Husserl continues to work on this theory even after the Logical Investigations, it confirms the important place one should give to the theory of assumptions it the phenomenological theory of judgment. (shrink)

Rather than adopting a view of Fichte as a “proto-existentialist,” as some scholars have suggested, I instead aim to develop an account which articulates a fundamental existential structure which helps to elucidate and situate later notions of existential subjectivity by accounting for its condition of possibility. In this vein, existentialism not only articulates a certain kind of being in the world but a logical condition of the structure of subjectivity itself. I call this structuring condition existential logic, and locate (...) it in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. I develop the term existential logic instead of merely attributing to Fichte the term existential-ism or existentialist, insofar as I aim to locate an operative structure within the being who then becomes an existential subject for whom existential engagement is only then possible. The term existential logic suggests that the striving of the self both with and against the world—as existential phenomenology would have it—is a structure inherent within Fichte's logical deduction and formulation of the Absolute I. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2001) 304-305 [Access article in PDF] Wildfeuer, Armin G. Praktische Vernunft und System. Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur ursprünglichen Kant-Rezeption Johann Gottlieb Fichtes. Stuttgart-Bad/Cannstatt : Frommann-Holzboog, 1999. Pp. 596. Cloth, DM 168. The subtitle of this book, a slightly revised dissertation from the University of Bonn (1994), reads: "Investigations into the developmental history of Johann Gottlieb Fichte's original reception of Kant." The work comes (...) to almost 600 pages. The main text is heavily overlaid with detailed footnotes, extensive quotations and supplementary material in smaller print and narrow line spacing. To the reader who is patient enough to face this scholastic mode of presentation, there emerges behind it a valuable contribution to our overall understanding of Fichte's philosophical work in general and its core discipline, the Wissenschaftslehre or first, transcendental philosophy, in particular.In the grand narrative about the development of German idealism Fichte is placed between Kant and Schelling. More precisely, he is typically portrayed as continuing but also revising Kant's work under the double influence of the leading early post-Kantian, Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758-1823), and the skeptical anti-Kantian and anti-Reinholdian, Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761-1833), called "Aenesidemus" after the title of his anonymous main work.Wildfeuer's investigations supplement this picture with a detailed consideration of what could be called "Fichte before Fichte": the early development of Fichte's thought, prior to his encounter with Reinhold and prior even to his encounter with Kant (1790). To be sure, Wildfeuer also deals with Fichte's continued philosophical development up through 1794, and he has many interesting things to say about the lasting presence of Fichte's earliest concerns in his more mature work. But the chief merit of the book is the sustained attention it pays to the very beginnings of Fichte's thought.Much of the prehistory of Fichtean philosophy has to be conjectured, given the scarcity of documents about Fichte's years of study (1780-84) and of his work as itinerant tutor (1785-1793). From Fichte's own testimony in his correspondence it is clear that prior to encountering Kant's three Critiques he held a determinist position regarding nature as well as human conduct. Based on some indications in Fichte's later works, Wildfeuer identifies as the chief source of Fichte's determinism the work of Karl Ferdinand Hommel (1722-1781), a professor of law at Leipzig, whom Fichte could have heard as a student and whose pseudonymous treatise Alexander von Joch... On Reward and Punishment According to Turkish Laws (1770) Fichte cites. Hommel (alias von Joch) maintains a deterministic view of human action, while justifying the social practice of punishment and reward. In particular, he maintains the dependence of the will on the intellect and of the latter on sensations or sensory impressions. Wildfeuer refers to this position, as it was temporarily adopted by Fichte, as that of the primacy of the understanding over the will.But Wildfeuer also shows that from early on Fichte's determinist leanings in speculation were counterbalanced by the conviction that feeling, especially feeling in religious matters, is an equally valid source of truth. For Wildfeuer, this early duality of speculation and feeling is the lasting basis of Fichte's life-long concern with reconciling the competing demands of head and heart. In particular this pre-Kantian key concern [End Page 304] in Fichte informs the latter's central systematic occupation with the unity of the mind amidst its differentiation into faculties or kinds of mental activity.Further texts which Wildfeuer examines in pursuit of the pre-Kantian Fichte are his Latin Valedictory Address, given upon graduating from one of Germany's finest secondary schools at the time, the Princely College of Pforta (1780), and the "Aphorisms on Religion and Deism" (1790).On the basis of this material Wildfeuer goes on to reconstruct the distinct reception that each of Kant's three Critiques received by Fichte. According to Wildfeuer, the Critique of Pure Reason originally was read by... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Das Begreifen des Unbegreiflichen, Philosophie, und Religion bei Johann Gottlieb Fichte 1800-1806Dorothea WildenburgChristoph Asmuth. Das Begreifen des Unbegreiflichen, Philosophie, und Religion bei Johann Gottlieb Fichte 1800-1806. Stuttgart/Bad Cannstadt: frommann-holzboog, 1999. Pp. 411. DM 118.00."God is neither One nor Many... all these predicates are suited only to finite natures, not for the Incomprehensible... Yet if we attribute even one of them to Him, it is all the same no (...) matter which; the error is always the same, that one wants to comprehend the Incomprehensible." These remarks of the Verantwortungsschrift gegen die Anklage des Atheismus (1799) indicate a main concern of Fichte's later philosophy. This is the problematical relation between the "Absolute" or "God" as origin and principle of all knowing on the one hand, and the possibility of comprehending the Absolute on the other. The Absolute, as knowing, is always finite and differentiated within itself. Asmuth's purpose is to clarify this relation in Fichte.The chief emphasis of this book lies on the presentation and interpretation of two later writings, Die Anweisung zum seeligen Leben (1806) and the Wissenschaftslehre 18042, the second of three series of lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre held in Berlin. Another important [End Page 288] topic is the relationship between strictly philosophical and popular writings, because the Anweisung belongs to Fichte's popular texts, while the Wissenschaftslehre 18042 is a scholarly or scientific one. Asmuth shows that the methodological difference between the popular and the scientific approach is based on the structure of the Wissenschaftslehre, which for Fichte is always situated between realism and idealism: "The popular is the real form of lecturing; the scholarly, the ideal form" (18).The work thus covers a whole thematic complex, which the author presents in its multiple entanglements: He discusses the topic of Comprehending the Incomprehensible, asking whether and how the unity of the Absolute and the differences of knowing are compatible, and how this topic is connected with the relation between popular philosophy and Wissenschaftslehre. He links this question in turn to the methodological standpoint in the Wissenschaftslehre, thus its realism and idealism.In the first three of seven chapters the work turns to religion, thus toward the "real" side of knowing, to popular philosophy. At first Asmuth deals with this subject historically, presenting Fichte's assessment of popular lecturing and showing that it was for Fichte realistic and corresponding to "ordinary knowing" (47). After representing Fichte's position within its historical context, he provides a detailed analysis of the Anweisung, emphasizing its rational character and rejecting any mystical interpretation, such as he finds in Edith Düsing's recent publications, for example (68). The task of religion is not, Asmuth points out, to clarify the relation between concept and what is incomprehensible, but rather merely to state this relation factually: "Religion conceives the relation of finite and absolute... in its That" (112). Fichte does not separate religion from Wissenschaftslehre. They are both complementary accesses to the Absolute, but not of equal value: "Thinking in its constitutive function remains predominant." (121)After the representation of Fichte's view of Christianity, we find (chapters IV-VI) the discussion of the Wissenschaftslehre, the "ideal" side of knowing. The discussion starts with the problem of appropriate terminology. Taking Fichte's difficult language as the occasion to ask whether it is possible in principle to seek through language the "pre-linguistic An sich of what has been thought (des Gedachten)" (164), he tries to make clear how the problem of language can be used to explain Fichte. Yet it remains unclear whether language as such can be used to explain the fact that Fichte's texts themselves are partly "cryptic." The fact that the Absolute cannot be attained through language does not itself provide a sufficient reason for incomprehensible writing.The fifth and sixth chapter contain a philosophical-historical analysis of the Wissenschaftslehre 18042. Asmuth argues against Wolfgang Janke and Michael Brüggen that the Wissenschaftslehre proper does not start before lecture 15. The preceding lectures, which Asmuth considers as Propraedeutics, serve only as preparation for the Doctrine of Truth, which is finally followed by the Phenomenology. The Propraedeutics... (shrink)

Bernard Bolzano presents in his work Wissenschaftslehre a definition of derivability among sentences. Tarski publishes his well-known definition of logical consequence almost one hundred years later. This article intends to prove that the Bolzano´s definition is fully satisfactory compared to the Tarski´s one, even though no attention was drawn to Bolzano´s definition at that time.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte was the founding figure of the philosophical movement known as German idealism, a branch of thought which grew out of Kant's critical philosophy. Fichte's work formed the crucial link between eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought and philosophical, as well as literary, Romanticism. Some of his ideas also foreshadow later nineteenth- and twentieth-century developments in philosophy and in political thought, including existentialism, nationalism and socialism. This volume offers essays on all the major aspects of Fichte's philosophy, ranging from the (...) successive versions of his foundational philosophical science or Wissenschaftslehre, through his ethical and political thought, to his philosophies of history and religion. All the main stages of Fichte's philosophical career and development are charted, and his ideas are placed in their historical and intellectual context. New readers will find this the most convenient and accessible guide to Fichte currently available. Advanced students and specialists will find a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Fichte. (shrink)

Why Fichte? I wondered, when the six-day Fichte Tagung was announced for Zwettl, Austria. Hegel and Kant and Hume had had their festivals. I expected that. But in spite of some party spirit for Fichte there is hardly a competitive passion on the part of Fichte people against Kant and Hegel and Hume people that would prompt a world congress. There is no International Society for the study of Fichte. There is indeed intense interest in his work, witnessed in the (...) new and carefully edited collection of his works, which is still in progress, the numerous, excellent and recently published studies, and the number of excellent Fichte articles appearing in leading journals. There is particular and growing interest in his revisions of his Wissenschaftslehre, in which his notion of intuition develops remarkably. His fully developed position does indeed offer a subtle and profound option to Hegel’s interpretation of consciousness. His influence on nineteenth century figures in literature as well as in philosophy is striking and important. But that has been so for a century and a half, and the same can be said of Schelling’s later work and influence, which is much less studied. (shrink)

A surprising explosion of interest in J. G. Fichte's system of transcendental philosophy--the so-called Wissenschaftslehre or "Theory of Scientific Knowledge"--has occurred in recent decades. Whereas previous interest in Fichte centered primarily upon the early works which he published while in Jena and was concerned to establish his position on the mythical stairway stretching from the Critique of Pure Reason to the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, the most interesting recent work focuses upon his later, often unpublished, writings and (...) makes large claims concerning the originality and contemporary relevance of the WL. Despite a blizzard of new monographs and essays, a general overview of Fichte's entire work from the perspective of current research has been lacking. This lack is now remedied with the publication of this new Introduction to Fichte's thought by a noted exponent of the prevailing "Munich school" of Fichte interpreters, Joachim Widmann, who is best known for his highly original and rigorously formal study of Fichte's spring 1804 lectures on the WL. (shrink)

The paper points out the reasons for the substitution of the concept of reason’s striving for the concept of will in J.G. Fichte’s later writings, and particularly in his lectures on the Facts of Consciousness of 1813. In this way, it is possible to rethink R. Lauth’s interpretation, according to which Fichtian philosophizing would reconsider the primacy attributed by modernity to theoretical knowledge and would succeed in constructing a “nova method” philosophy, but would fail to overcome a ‘horizontal’ conception (...) of reason with a view to the formation of a “prima methodo” philosophy. The latter would start, not from the striving-affection correlation, but from the self-clarification of reason according to the task it sets for itself. After an overview of the doctrine of striving in the context of a philosophical exposition nova methodo, (§2) we define how Fichte rethinks it in terms of a will capable of coherently ordering constellations of events and how such ordering underlies an understanding of the world as the horizon of coherent human action (§3). (shrink)

Frederick Neuhouser has attempted the impossible - a book about “the early Fichte” without mentioning, or engaging with, the third principle of the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794-95. Neuhouser offers no satisfactory explanation of this surprising omission - the third principle is by far the most important structural moment of “the early Fichte.” Neuhouser hints that he is not prepared to discuss the absolute positing of quantifiability, and the systematic implications thereof, because “there is some doubt about the (...) extent of Fichte’s commitment to this project in the later versions of the Wissenschaftslehre,” and, the aims of such systematic derivation “are almost certainly incapable of being carried out”. These reasons are quite baffling even within the parameters Neuhouser sets for his book. Yes, there is doubt whether Fichte remained committed to the type of systematic deduction elucidated in the Wissenschaftslehre after 1800. However, Neuhouser’s book is about the Fichte of 1790-99, and if he regards the system of 1797-99 as a further development of the systematic structuration of the Wissenschaftslehre, then evidence should have been supplied vis-à-vis a proper outline of the system of the Wissenschaftslehre. It must also be said that if one regards the Fichtean project of deducing the principles of theoretical reason from one principle as not worthy of serious comment then the motivation for writing a book on the early Fichte is not readily apparent. (shrink)

After the monumental works of Xavier Leon and Martial Guéroult, the French have again produced a significant piece of Fichte-interpretation. The author advances two radically new theses: Fichte's philosophy is above all centered around the deduction of the other, and even objectivity as such is based upon inter-subjectivity. The Doctrine of Science, instead of being the foundation of an absolute idealism, teaches that the only knowledge which can be had is empirical knowledge, and all logic is rooted in time. Philonenko (...) claims that Fichte's aim was to uphold the adequacy and essential correctness of common everyday knowledge over against the pretensions of metaphysical speculation. This is a magnificent book: the product of a truly amazing scholarship in the history of philosophy, full of ingenious and highly imaginative rapprochements and insights. It is also another welcome manifestation of that recent continental trend in the interpretation of German idealism which realizes that Fichte and Schelling do not simply fill the gap between Kant and Hegel, but are great philosophers in their own right. If any objection can be made at all against the work, it would be the limitation of its argument to the first period of Fichte's creativity. The author's avowed aim is to confine himself to the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, and, as a matter of fact, we rarely find a quote later than 1798. Indeed, Fichte always claimed that no qualitative change took place in his thought. However, his exposition of it steadily altered, and in view of this, perhaps it is not entirely unjustified to regret that the Wissenschaftslehre of 1804 and the Answeisung zum seligen Leben are not taken into account in interpreting the early Fichte.—M. J. V. (shrink)

This handsome volume contains Fichte’s preparatory, supplementary, and popular writings about the first version of the Wissenschaftslehre, together with a very judicious selection from his philosophical correspondence in the decade 1790-99. Anyone who puts it on the shelf beside the Heath-Lachs translation of the 1794 lecture script and the two 1797 “Introductions” can now be confident of possessing in excellent and accurate English all of Fichte’s theoretical discussions of the philosophical view that made him both famous and immensely influential (...) in the development of German idealism. His later thought remains still the private preserve of a few German-reading specialists; and we need good modern translations of his practical philosophy: Foundation of Natural Right and System of Ethical Theory. But his Theory of Scientific Knowledge we do now have. (shrink)

This is another contribution from one of the most impressive series of recent German scholarship on German Idealism. In this volume Fichte scholars add a definitive edition of incidental papers from a transitional period in Fichte's later career. This period was complicated by the progress of the Napoleonic wars, and the need for Fichte to relocate temporarily in Königsberg. Among the longer pieces in the volume one finds: "Bericht über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre und die bisherigen Schicksale derselben" (...) ; "Wissenschaftslehre Königsberg" ; "Nebenbemerkungen zu 1" ; "Realbemerkungen bei Machiavelli" ; "Die Republik der Deutschen" ; and "Bei Lektüre von Pestalozzis Buch, 'Wie Getrud ihre Kinder lehrt'". In addition to extensive notes and helpful introductory remarks, the volume contains a detailed index. (shrink)

InhaltVorwortSiglenverzeichnisJürgen STOLZENBERG: Fichtes Deduktionen des Ich 1804 und 1794Ulrich SCHLÖSSER: Worum geht es in der späteren Wissenschaftslehre und inwiefern unterscheiden sich die verschiedenen Darstellungen von ihr dem Ansatz nach?Enrico GIORGIO: Der Begriff »absolutes Wissen« in der WL-1801/02 aus der Perspektive der SpätlehreFaustino FABBIANELLI: Ist die späte Wissenschaftslehre ein »Aktualer Idealismus«? Ein spekulativer Vergleich zwischen Fichtes und Gentiles DenkenVadim V. MURSKIY: Fichtes Spätwerk in Bezug auf das Problem der Einheit und der Veränderung seiner LehreJohannes BRACHTENDORF: Substanz, Subjekt, Sein – (...) die Spinoza-Rezeption der frühen und der späten WissenschaftslehreBirgit SANDKAULEN: Spinoza zur Einführung. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1812Ewa NOWAK-JUCHACZ: Philosophie als vox pacis. J. G. Fichtes Pragmatik als Gegenstück des regulativen Friedensideals I. KantsVladimir ALEKSEEVIC ABASCHNIK: Die ersten Fichteaner über die Schwierigkeiten des Verständnisses der WissenschaftslehreMarina PUSCHKAREWA: Fichte und Schelling. Das Problem des »Trägers des Wissens«Robert MARSZAŁEK: Fichtes Religionstheorie im Licht der Schellingschen Gedanken zur MythologieSalvatore PATRIARCA: Gesetz und Selbstbestimmung des Absoluten. Ein Vergleich zwischen der späten Philosophie Fichtes und der mittleren Philosophie SchellingsPaul ZICHE: Systemgrundriß und blitzartige Einsichten. Zum Verhältnis von Propädeutik und systematischer Philosophie bei Fichte und SchellingGiacomo RINALDI: Method and Speculation in Fichte’s Later PhilosophyAngelica NUZZO: Fichte’s 1812 Transcendental Logic – Between Kant and HegelDiogo FERRER: Hegels Fichte-Kritik und die späte WissenschaftslehreRolf AHLERS: Der späte Fichte und Hegel über das Absolute und SystematizitätMatteo Vincenzo D’ALFONSO: Schopenhauer als Schüler FichtesXabier Insausti UGARRIZA: José Manzanas Rezeption des späten FichteIbon Uribarri ZENEKORTA: Manzana zwischen Kant und Fichte. Das Absolute als entscheidende FrageHiroshi KIMURA: Fichte und Tekirei Edo – Bild und Feld. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Das Begreifen des Unbegreiflichen, Philosophie, und Religion bei Johann Gottlieb Fichte 1800-1806Dorothea WildenburgChristoph Asmuth. Das Begreifen des Unbegreiflichen, Philosophie, und Religion bei Johann Gottlieb Fichte 1800-1806. Stuttgart/Bad Cannstadt: frommann-holzboog, 1999. Pp. 411. DM 118.00."God is neither One nor Many... all these predicates are suited only to finite natures, not for the Incomprehensible... Yet if we attribute even one of them to Him, it is all the same no (...) matter which; the error is always the same, that one wants to comprehend the Incomprehensible." These remarks of the Verantwortungsschrift gegen die Anklage des Atheismus (1799) indicate a main concern of Fichte's later philosophy. This is the problematical relation between the "Absolute" or "God" as origin and principle of all knowing on the one hand, and the possibility of comprehending the Absolute on the other. The Absolute, as knowing, is always finite and differentiated within itself. Asmuth's purpose is to clarify this relation in Fichte.The chief emphasis of this book lies on the presentation and interpretation of two later writings, Die Anweisung zum seeligen Leben (1806) and the Wissenschaftslehre 18042, the second of three series of lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre held in Berlin. Another important [End Page 288] topic is the relationship between strictly philosophical and popular writings, because the Anweisung belongs to Fichte's popular texts, while the Wissenschaftslehre 18042 is a scholarly or scientific one. Asmuth shows that the methodological difference between the popular and the scientific approach is based on the structure of the Wissenschaftslehre, which for Fichte is always situated between realism and idealism: "The popular is the real form of lecturing; the scholarly, the ideal form" (18).The work thus covers a whole thematic complex, which the author presents in its multiple entanglements: He discusses the topic of Comprehending the Incomprehensible, asking whether and how the unity of the Absolute and the differences of knowing are compatible, and how this topic is connected with the relation between popular philosophy and Wissenschaftslehre. He links this question in turn to the methodological standpoint in the Wissenschaftslehre, thus its realism and idealism.In the first three of seven chapters the work turns to religion, thus toward the "real" side of knowing, to popular philosophy. At first Asmuth deals with this subject historically, presenting Fichte's assessment of popular lecturing and showing that it was for Fichte realistic and corresponding to "ordinary knowing" (47). After representing Fichte's position within its historical context, he provides a detailed analysis of the Anweisung, emphasizing its rational character and rejecting any mystical interpretation, such as he finds in Edith Düsing's recent publications, for example (68). The task of religion is not, Asmuth points out, to clarify the relation between concept and what is incomprehensible, but rather merely to state this relation factually: "Religion conceives the relation of finite and absolute... in its That" (112). Fichte does not separate religion from Wissenschaftslehre. They are both complementary accesses to the Absolute, but not of equal value: "Thinking in its constitutive function remains predominant." (121)After the representation of Fichte's view of Christianity, we find (chapters IV-VI) the discussion of the Wissenschaftslehre, the "ideal" side of knowing. The discussion starts with the problem of appropriate terminology. Taking Fichte's difficult language as the occasion to ask whether it is possible in principle to seek through language the "pre-linguistic An sich of what has been thought (des Gedachten)" (164), he tries to make clear how the problem of language can be used to explain Fichte. Yet it remains unclear whether language as such can be used to explain the fact that Fichte's texts themselves are partly "cryptic." The fact that the Absolute cannot be attained through language does not itself provide a sufficient reason for incomprehensible writing.The fifth and sixth chapter contain a philosophical-historical analysis of the Wissenschaftslehre 18042. Asmuth argues against Wolfgang Janke and Michael Brüggen that the Wissenschaftslehre proper does not start before lecture 15. The preceding lectures, which Asmuth considers as Propraedeutics, serve only as preparation for the Doctrine of Truth, which is finally followed by the Phenomenology. The Propraedeutics... (shrink)

A surprising explosion of interest in J. G. Fichte's system of transcendental philosophy--the so-called Wissenschaftslehre or "Theory of Scientific Knowledge"--has occurred in recent decades. Whereas previous interest in Fichte centered primarily upon the early works which he published while in Jena and was concerned to establish his position on the mythical stairway stretching from the Critique of Pure Reason to the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, the most interesting recent work focuses upon his later, often unpublished, writings and (...) makes large claims concerning the originality and contemporary relevance of the WL. Despite a blizzard of new monographs and essays, a general overview of Fichte's entire work from the perspective of current research has been lacking. This lack is now remedied with the publication of this new Introduction to Fichte's thought by a noted exponent of the prevailing "Munich school" of Fichte interpreters, Joachim Widmann, who is best known for his highly original and rigorously formal study of Fichte's spring 1804 lectures on the WL. (shrink)

This a general account of the school of Mo-tzu, its social basis as a movement of craftsmen, its isolated place in the Chinese tradition, and the nature of its later contributions to logic, ethics, and science. It assesses the relation of Mohist thinking to the structure of the Chinese language, and grapples with the textual dynamics of later Mohist writings, particularly in regard to grammar and style, technical terminology, the use and significance of stock examples, and overall organization. (...) Includes edited and annotated Chinese text with an English translation and commentary, a glossary, and a photographic reproduction of the unemended text from the Taoist Patrology. (shrink)

Schleiermachers Wissenschaftslehre wird in dieser Untersuchung als eine universale Prinzipienlehre und formale Strukturtheorie rekonstruiert. Es werden mit einem interdisziplinären Ansatz im Anschluß an und in Weiterführung von Überlegungen Schleiermachers zur Struktur von Wirklichkeit und zu ihrer Erkenntnis grundlegende Fragen der Bildung und Konzeptualisierung von Wissenschaften im allgemeinen und von Theologie im besonderen behandelt. Über seine Platoninterpretation, die Rolle der Naturphilosophie, und eine Analyse zentraler Texte Schleiermachers wird erkennbar, daß sich hinter der dyadisch bestimmten Semantik de facto eine triadische Elementarstruktur (...) verbirgt, die über das Operieren mit Dualen zu generieren versucht wird und von der her allererst seine Theorieanlage und Systementscheidungen plausibel werden. Diss. theol. Heidelberg 2000, ausgezeichnet mit dem Ruprecht-Karls-Preis 2000. (shrink)