Comrade Huang Yüeh-mien's article, "A Discussion of the Aesthetics of the Wealthy" [Lun shih-li che ti mei-hsüeh], which criticized my point of view in aesthetics, was published later than my self-criticism. Before he published it, he had presented it at a discussion meeting at Peking Teachers College. He let me read it only after he had submitted it to Literature [Wen-i pao] for publication. I wrote to the editor of Literature, Comrade K'ang Cho, saying that basically I accepted his (...) criticisms but that I wished to raise a number of points. I pointed out that the author's method of dealing with the problems of "empathy emotion," "forgetting self," and "inspiration" was not very different from the method that I had used before. I pointed out that "association of ideas" occupied an important position in his aesthetics — he seems to substitute "association of ideas of form" for "intuition of form." Furthermore, I stated that I did not think he had answered clearly the questions of whether "beauty exists in the mind or in the thing," of the relationship between beauty and sense of beauty, and of the difference between formal thought and abstract thought; and I said that I hoped he would give me more assistance with these questions. However, Comrade Huang Yüeh-mien for the most part ignored the points that I had raised and the questions to which I had sought answers, and he published in Literature the paper that he had presented at Peking Teachers College almost unaltered. Consequently, the questions that I raised concerning Comrade Huang Yüeh-mien's point of view in aesthetics remain unanswered. At that time I still felt that his point of view in aesthetics basically was materialistic, although there were some tendencies in it that raised doubts in my mind. This explains the fact that my judgments on idealist aesthetics remain to be improved. (shrink)

Because the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge is a method of thinking, Ch'eng Tzu dealt with it first. In Erh Ch'eng i-shu [Legacy of the Two Ch'engs], section 25, it is said: "The Ta hsueh [Great Learning] states: A thing has its essentials and nonessentials, an affair has a beginning and an end. Knowledge of what is primary and what is secondary approximates the truth." Ch'eng Tzu maintained that the most important thing in study is to know (...) what is essential and what is nonessential - the beginning and the end. The extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things; it is essential and constitutes the beginning. Governing the world and the state is nonessential and constitutes the end. Chu Tzu [Chu Hsi] said: "Ch'eng Tzu discussed the theory of the investigation of things in detail." But what is the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things? Chu Tzu maintained that "to investigate" [ko] means "to study thoroughly" [ch'iung]; the term "thing" [wu] means "principle" [li]. To investigate the thing is to study its principle thoroughly. A thorough study of principle leads to an extension of knowledge; without a thorough study there can be no extension. Consequently, he thought that the investigation of things is the beginning of truth and that the student who undertakes the investigation of things is already near the truth. Why? Because the student who undertakes the investigation of things can control his mind completely. Although the key to governing the state and pacifying the world lies in the person — as in the saying "governing the world and the state must begin with the person" — one who would govern the state and pacify the world must first cultivate himself. Cultivating the self is the key to governing the state and pacifying the world, and the means of cultivating the self are the investigation of things, the extension of knowledge, sincere thought, and a correct mind. Perhaps the reader will ask, what the relationship is between cultivating the self, on the one hand, and the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge, on the other hand? Cultivating the self belongs to the realm of ethics; investigating things and the extension of knowledge belong to the realm of knowledge. Given the fact that the cultivation of the self belongs to the realm of ethics and the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge belong to the realm of knowledge, how can an intrinsic relationship between these two dissimilar realms develop? We know that Ch'eng Tzu emphasized two kinds of knowledge, moral knowledge and empirical knowledge. He maintained that if there were only empirical knowledge, there would be only the physical person dependent upon external things without knowing truth. Moral knowledge is true knowledge; therefore, it is necessary to transform empirical knowledge into moral knowledge. Only when external, empirical knowledge and internal, moral knowledge are combined is there true knowledge. But how are empirical knowledge and moral knowledge combined? Chu Tzu elaborated on this point. In the collected writings of Chu Tzu there is an explanation of the couplet "Heaven gave birth to the people/There are things and there are laws" from the Shihching [Book of Poetry]: "Ta ya cheng min." Chu Tzu maintained that in the line "There are things and there are laws" from the Shih-ching, the word "thing" [wu] means "form" [hsing] and the word "laws" [tse] means principle [li]. "Form" is a metaphysical concept, and "law" is what is called metaphysics. Man certainly cannot be without this thing, but unless we understand the "principle" of this "thing," we have no way of knowing whether it conforms to the correct form of life or of deciding the appropriateness of the thing. We must, therefore, seek the principle of this thing. But even if we know the thing and seek its principle, we still have not reached "the limits of the thing"; "the principle of the thing" has not been thoroughly studied and our knowledge of it is not complete. Consequently, we must strive "to reach its limits." This is the meaning of the statement:Only by investigating the thing and arriving at the thing itself can the principle of the thing be known completely. When the principle of the thing is known completely, our knowledge of it is extended and focused. Without obscuration, weaknesses and insurmountable barriers, the intention cannot but be sincere and the mind cannot but be up-right. (shrink)

Riben Jiuzhou da xue tu shu guan cang you gu xie Huizhou ben "Zhuzi yu lei" yi bai si shi juan. Huizhou ben shang cheng "Chi lu", xia qi li bian, zai yu lu dao yu lei de xing cheng guo cheng zhong chu yu guan jian de di wei, dui xue jie yan jiu zhu xi si xiang de xing cheng guo cheng, Zhu Xi men ren de qing kuang, jin ben "Zhuzi yu lei" de xing cheng guo (...) cheng yi ji zhong gu shi qi gu Han yu bai hua, ti gong le xin de cai liao he xin de shi ye. (shrink)

本书力图站在思想和历史的高度,以评传的手法,真实、准确、形象地速写黄宗羲的生平、思想、学术。.

This study attempts to reconstruct Nietzsche’s reading of Aristotle in the 1860s and 1870s—the years before he left his career as a philologist. Against the popular view that Nietzsche read only one book by Aristotle, namely the Rhetoric, the present study hopes to show that he had direct knowledge of several of Aristotle’s main works, while much of his interest in Aristotle centred on the latter’s account of art. The particular aim of this study is to explore how Nietzsche’s reading (...) of Aristotle contributed to the formation of The Birth of Tragedy. It will show that, although Nietzsche mentions Aristotle in his first book only en passant, his theory of tragedy should be understood against the background of Aristotelian poetics, especially as interpreted by such contemporaries as Jacob Bernays, Joseph Hubert Reinkens, and Gustav Teichmüller. (shrink)

Much has been written about Kemp Smith’s (1941) famous problem regarding the tension between Hume’s naturalism and his scepticism. However, most commentators have focused their attention on the Treatise; those who address Enquiry often take it to express essentially the same message as the Treatise. When Hume’s scepticism in the Enquiry has been investigated in its own right, commentators have tended to focus on Hume’s inductive scepticism in Sections 4 and 5. All in all, it seems that Section 12 has (...) been unduly neglected. This paper seeks to address Kemp Smith’s problem from the standpoint of Hume’s treatment of scepticism in EHU 12, and finds an interesting internalist account that makes sense both of Hume’s discussion in EHU 12 and his aims in the Enquiry as a whole, as well as one that is of philosophical interest, having intriguing parallels to contemporary epistemological accounts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Found in Translation: “New People” in Twentieth-Century Chinese Science Fiction by Jing JiangYingying HuangJing Jiang. Found in Translation: “New People” in Twentieth-Century Chinese Science Fiction. New York: Columbia University Press, 2021. 144 pp. Paperback, ISBN 9780924304941.One of the Association of Asian Studies’ Asia Shorts series, Jing Jiang’s monograph is a delightful 130-page read including notes and a bibliography. It contributes new and cross-cultural perspectives to the Chinese SF (...) scholarship that has recently been invigorated by a plethora of translations into English, animated discussions at conference panels and themed lectures, and book-length studies such as Nathaniel Isaacson’s Celestial Empire: The Emergence of Chinese Science Fiction (2017), which focuses on China’s early twentieth century, and Hua Li’s Chinese Science Fiction during the Post-Mao Cultural Thaw (2021), which deals with works published between 1978 and 1981, to name just a couple. Jiang’s book covers both periods and the time in between with a purpose to investigate “how Chinese science fiction participates and intervenes in Chinese conceptualizations of the modern at critical junctures over the last century” (1), which Jiang achieves through comparative readings of texts brought into dialogue via translation. A shared theme of the texts studied is, as the book title suggests, the creation of a “new people,” either through edification or high-tech means such as bioengineering. Therefore, the interventions by science fiction that this study is concerned with are chiefly in debates about modern citizenry, subjectivity, and humanity in China’s twentieth century, when science fiction enjoyed its first two “booms.”This book has an introduction, four chapters, and an epilogue. The introduction offers a brief history of Chinese science fiction and announces the author’s intention to “situate Chinese science fiction within a dynamic model of world literature” (2). Jiang makes two crucial points: first, Chinese science fiction is a product of translation and transculturation, which [End Page 591] requires an intertextual and comparative study; second, contrary to its designation as a popular genre in the West, science fiction in China has been a form of elite literature and even a part of statist thinking. While this introduction may seem a bit long for a short book with “conciseness” as one of its marketing guidelines—the account of Lu Xun’s early life and turn to literature, for example, may be a little too elaborate for its purpose (10–12)—it lays a solid foundation for discussions about science fiction’s translingual dimensions and role in China’s nation-building discourse to develop through the chapters.The expansive first chapter, “Medicine for the Mind, Panacea for the Nation: How Did the Stories of Science and Fiction Become One?” is yet another historical survey, occasionally repeating points from the introduction, but this time of the background, genesis, and early growth of science fiction in China from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century (i.e., the late Qing dynasty [1644–1911] and early Republican era [1912–49]). Jiang gives a detailed account of occurrences deemed important to the rise and confluence of fiction and science within China’s nation-building discourse, including literati intellectuals’ promotion of “new fiction” and the dissemination of scientific knowledge, highlighting the roles played by central figures like Liang Qichao, Lu Xun, and John Fryer. Jiang makes the illuminating observation that Fryer’s stipulation of a “new novel” for a fiction contest he organized in Shanghai in 1895 foreshadowed China’s literary realism and the vernacular movement (30), and her remarks about translation, Chinese science fiction’s inherent hybridity, and its mission to cure the nation well echo the book’s central argument about the genre’s interventions.A shorter chapter follows, entitled “Scientifically Formed or Reformed: Bioengineering and Other Fantasies about a New Species of National Subjects,” which examines early science fiction stories about manufacturing humanity and argues that these texts “gave rise to a literary vision that believed literally in the malleability or programmability of the soul” (39). During the first boom of Chinese science fiction in the 1900s, translations of and sequels to Western stories showcase the debate about science’s power of shaping the soul... (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the epistemological positions of Philo and Cleanthes in the Dialogues. I find that Philo's attitude towards skepticism mirrors that of the first Enquiry, most notably in its endorsement of mitigated skepticism, and its treatment of religious reasoning as distinctly discontinuous with science and philosophy. Meanwhile, Cleanthes's epistemological framework corresponds to that of the Treatise, most notably in its adoption of something like the Title Principle, and its treatment of some forms of religious reasoning as broadly (...) continuous with science and philosophy. It is not merely that the epistemological systems of the Treatise and Enquiry are echoed in Cleanthes's and Philo's positions respectively; these frameworks seem to clarify, provide a substantive basis for, and render more complete their somewhat piecemeal statements on this topic in the Dialogues. Thus, Philo's and Cleanthes's dispute is not limited to the theological, but extends to the epistemological. -/- . (shrink)

国家“十五”规划重点图书北京市“十五”规划重点图书北京市哲学社会科学“九五”规划重点项目北京市社会科学理论著作出版基金重点资助项目.

本书着重就严复的学术思想、政治主张及其社会影响展开研讨,全国各地专家学者从不同角度、不同层面深入探讨了严复思想,内容广泛,分析深刻。.

国家重点学科“985第1期”建设项目 “211工程第2期”项目广东省2004哲学社会科学规划项目中山大学马克思主义哲学与中国现代化研究所主持研究.

After reading the essays of Mr. Ts'ai and Mr. Chu, I have a few immature opinions. Generally speaking, I feel that in dealing with the errors of their opponents, both Ts'ai I in his criticism of Huang Yüeh-mien and Chu Kuang-ch'ien in his criticism of Ts'ai I are quite accurate and convincing. However, in presenting their own arguments of what is right, both of them are on shaky ground and in error. That is because in one way or (...) another, consciously or unconsciously, they either deny the objective aspect of the existence of beauty or deny the social aspect of the existence of beauty . All of them consider the objective and the social aspects of beauty as being either this or that, as mutually exclusive and irreconcilable opposites. They think that if we acknowledge the social aspect of beauty, we then have to deny the objective aspect, the fact that the existence of beauty does not depend on the subjective conditions of a person ; or if we acknowledge the objective aspect, we have to deny the social aspect, the fact that the existence of beauty depends on the social life of human beings. But in fact it is not like that. On the one hand, beauty cannot be separated from human society; on the other hand, it can have an objective existence which is independent of man's subjective consciousness. It is this question that I shall discuss. (shrink)

本书共分三部分, 内容包括东亚公共哲学的开展, 东亚思想传统中的公与私, 西方政治思想中的公与私.

本书作者将儒家伦理和当代英美道德哲学相结合,论证了儒家传统中有着与德性伦理概念相关联的特征,阐明儒家文本的意义。.

本书分为魏晋玄学与文学的自觉、魏晋玄学与《文心雕龙》、魏晋玄学与六朝乐论、画论三篇,作者在书中讨论了魏晋玄学影响六朝文论的基本可能性等问题。.

本书选择并论述的美育范畴,较全面的反映了美育现代性。包括现代美育、审美个性、时间与空间、功利超越与文化超越等内容。.

The philosophy of language in the Gongsun Longzi 公孫龍子 has been a hot topic since the 20th century, but there is still controversy about what point Gongsun Long 公孫龍 is making. This article reviews representative studies of the philosophy of language in the Gongsun Longzi in Sinophone academia since 2000. Some studies (especially in journal articles) conceive that one or two of the discourses are on the philosophy of language, while the other discourses concern ontology, epistemology, semiotics, or logic. In (...) contrast, certain scholars read the whole book as being about the philosophy of language. The divergence lies in whether the common thread is linguistic meaning or concept, and whether Gongsun Long’s doctrine is unveiled by one or several theories. These differences lead to a wide variation in their interpretation of the key terms and claims in the Gongsun Longzi. It is found that there is no theoretical framework that can perfectly interpret the book without incurring any criticism, and more efforts are needed to elucidate the philosophy of language in the Gongsun Longzi. (shrink)

Explores the resources for contemporary ethics found in the work of the Cheng brothers, canonical neo-Confucian philosophers. Yong Huang presents a new way of doing comparative philosophy as he demonstrates the resources for contemporary ethics offered by the Cheng brothers, Cheng Hao (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi (1033–1107), canonical neo-Confucian philosophers. Huang departs from the standard method of Chinese/Western comparison, which tends to interest those already interested in Chinese philosophy. While Western-oriented scholars may be excited to learn about Chinese (...) philosophers who have said things similar to what they or their favored philosophers have to say, they hardly find anything philosophically new from such comparative work. Instead of comparing and contrasting philosophers, each chapter of this book discusses a significant topic in Western moral philosophy, examines the representative views on this topic in the Western tradition, identifies their respective difficulties, and discusses how the Cheng brothers have better things to say on the subject. Topics discussed include why one should be moral, how weakness of will is not possible, whether virtue ethics is self-centered, in what sense the political is also personal, how a moral theory can be of an antitheoretical nature, and whether moral metaphysics is still possible in this postmodern and postmetaphysical age. “This book presents the philosophical ideas of the Cheng brothers intelligently, convincingly, and powerfully. It is among the best books ever written on the Cheng brothers, including works in the Chinese language.” — Kam-por Yu, coeditor of Taking Confucian Ethics Seriously: Contemporary Theories and Applications. (shrink)

The past 60 years have seen the rediscovery of the immense cultural depth of Confucian humanist thought and its power to shape the way human beings are understood in East Asia. In this volume, renowned Confucian scholar Chun-chieh Huang analyzes various East Asian contexts to identify the central pillars of the Confucian humanist spirit: a continuum between mind and body, harmony between oneself and others, the unity of heaven and humanity, and a profound historical consciousness. Scholars of religion, history, (...) philosophy and Asian studies will find this volume an indispensable guide to the rich tradition of East Asian Confucian humanism. (shrink)

本书分“历史篇”和“理论篇”两部分共6章。内容包括:马克思主义产生以前的文化观、马克思主义创始人的文化理念与文化研究方法等。.

Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume’s claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this (...) tension by appealing to Hume’s treatment of the ‘distinctions of reason’, as explained by Garrett (1997). (shrink)

An accurate personality model is crucial to many research fields. Most personality models have been constructed using linear factor analysis. In this paper, we investigate if an effective deep learning tool for factor extraction, the Variational Autoencoder, can be applied to explore the factor structure of a set of personality variables. To compare VAE with LFA, we applied VAE to an International Personality Item Pool Big 5 dataset and an IPIP HEXACO dataset. We found that LFA tends to break factors (...) into ever smaller, yet still significant fractions, when the number of assumed latent factors increases, leading to the need to organize personality variables at the factor level and then the facet level. On the other hand, the factor structure returned by VAE is very stable and VAE only adds noise-like factors after significant factors are found as the number of assumed latent factors increases. VAE reported more stable factors by elevating some facets in the HEXACO scale to the factor level. Since this is a data-driven process that exhausts all stable and significant factors that can be found, it is not necessary to further conduct facet level analysis and it is anticipated that VAE will have broad applications in exploratory factor analysis in personality research. (shrink)

A major figure in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, Ernest Sosa is a pioneer of contemporary virtue epistemology. Engaging with his important work for the first time, a team of renowned scholars of Chinese philosophy bring Western analytic epistemology into dialogue with themes and issues in the history of the Chinese tradition in order to reveal multiple points of connection. Drawing on thinkers and texts from Confucianism, Daoism and Chinese Buddhism, chapters explore issues central to virtue epistemology, such as the reliabilist (...) and responsibilist divide, the distinction between virtues constitutive of knowledge and virtues auxiliary to knowledge, epistemic competence and the role of testimony. Including Sosa's constructive and systematic responses to each scholar's interpretation of his work, this volume demonstrates the value of cross-cultural dialogue, advancing the field of virtue epistemology and paving the way for further engagement between philosophical traditions. (shrink)

Hume's Epistemological Evolution argues that Hume's Enquiry represents a significant departure from the Treatise in respect of its epistemological framework. The Treatise's treatment of skepticism is an unsatisfactory one, as Hume seems to realize, and he therefore forms a new epistemological framework in the Enquiry. Qu's central argument is that Hume's epistemology evolves between these two works.

The inoffensive title of Section 1.4.7 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, ‘Conclusion of this Book’, belies the convoluted treatment of scepticism contained within. It is notoriously difficult to decipher Hume’s considered response to scepticism in this section, or whether he even has one. In recent years, however, one line of interpretation has gained popularity in the literature. The ‘usefulness and agreeableness reading’ (henceforth U&A) interprets Hume as arguing in THN 1.4.7 that our beliefs and/or epistemic policies are justified via (...) their usefulness and agreeableness to the self and others; proponents include Ardal (in Livingston & King (eds.) Hume: a re-evaluation, 1976), Kail (in: Frasca-Spada & Kail (eds.) Impressions of Hume, 2005), McCormick (Hume Stud 31:1, 2005), Owen (Hume’s reason, 1999), and Ridge (Hume Stud 29:2, 2003), while Schafer (Philosophers, forthcoming) also defends an interpretation along these lines. In this paper, I will argue that although U&A has textual merit, it struggles to maintain a substantive distinction between epistemic and moral justification—a distinction that Hume insists on. I then attempt to carve out the logical space for there being a distinctly epistemic notion of justification founded on usefulness and agreeableness. However, I find that such an account is problematic for two reasons: first, it cannot take advantage of the textual support for U&A; secondly, it is incompatible with other features of the text. (shrink)

In the field of psychology, filial piety is usually defined in terms of traditional Chinese culture-specific family traditions. The problem with this approach is that it tends to emphasize identification of behavioral rules or norms, which limits its potential for application in other cultural contexts. Due to the global trend of population aging, governments are searching for solutions to the accompanying financial burden so greater attention is being focused on the issue of elder care and its relevance to filial practices. (...) We contend that the psychological investigation of filial piety in Chinese societies has progressed to the point that it can now provide a solid structure for research targeting intergenerational relations in other cultures. We describe an indigenous psychology approach that integrated Chinese historical, philosophical, and social trends to construct a model of filial piety in terms of the dual reciprocal and authoritarian filial aspects underlying parent-child relations: the dual filial piety model (DFPM). We use this model to re-conceptualize filial piety from its usual definition as a set of Chinese culture-specific norms to a contextualized personality construct represented by a pair of culturally-sensitive psychological schemas of parent-child interaction. We then describe how the DFPM can provide a framework for research on filial relations on individual, structural, societal, and cross-cultural levels. We conclude with a discussion of how the model may be able to integrate and extend Western research on intergenerational relations and contribute to the issue of elder care beyond Chinese societies. (shrink)

Controversies surrounding social media platforms have provided opportunities for institutional reflexivity amongst users and regulators on how to understand and govern platforms. Amidst contestation, platform companies have continued to enact projects that draw upon existing modes of privatized governance. We investigate how social media companies have attempted to achieve closure by continuing to set the terms around platform governance. We investigate two projects implemented by Facebook (Meta)—authenticity regulation and privacy controls—in response to the Russian Interference and Cambridge Analytica controversies surrounding (...) the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Drawing on Goffman’s metaphor of stage management, we analyze the techniques deployed by Facebook to reinforce a division between what is visible and invisible to the user experience. These platform governance projects propose to act upon _front-stage data relations:_ information that users can see from other users—whether that is content that users can see from “bad actors”, or information that other users can see about oneself. At the same time, these projects relegate _back-stage data relations_—information flows between users constituted by recommendation and targeted advertising systems—to invisibility and inaction. As such, Facebook renders the user experience actionable for governance, while foreclosing governance of back-stage data relations central to the economic value of the platform. As social media companies continue to perform platform governance projects following controversies, our paper invites reflection on the politics of these projects. By destabilizing the boundaries drawn by platform companies, we open space for continuous reflexivity on how platforms should be understood and governed. (shrink)

Disputants in the debate regarding whether Hume's argument on induction is descriptive or normative have by and large ignored Hume’s positive argument (that custom is what determines inferences to the unobserved), largely confining themselves to intricate debates within the negative argument (that inferences to the unobserved are not founded on reason). I believe that this is a mistake, for I think Hume’s positive argument to have significant implications for the interpretation of his negative argument. In this paper, I will argue (...) that Hume’s positive and negative arguments should be read as addressing the same issues, whether normative or causal. I will then focus on the Enquiry version of Hume’s positive argument, arguing that it carries a significant normative conclusion: there, Hume argues that custom plays a normative role in justifying our inductive inferences. Given that Hume’s positive argument should be read as addressing the same issues as his negative argument, we should correspondingly read Hume’s negative argument in the Enquiry as having a normative conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine three mutually inconsistent claims that are commonly attributed to Hume: all beliefs are involuntary; some beliefs are subject to normative appraisal; and that ‘Ought implies Can’. I examine the textual support for such ascription, and the options for dealing with the puzzle posed by their inconsistency. In what follows I will put forward some evidence that Hume maintains each of the three positions outlined above. I then examine what I call the ‘prior voluntary action’ solution. (...) I argue that this position in any form fails to account for synchronic rationality. I then raise more specific objections depending on how we disambiguate the position, which can be read as either granting beliefs derivative voluntariness, or as denying their normative significance; the former version is inconsistent with Hume’s treatment of natural abilities, while the latter falls to a regress given Hume’s thesis regarding the inability of actions and passions to be subject to epistemic normativity. I then propose to reject instead for two reasons: first, the weakness of textual support for such an ascription; secondly, Hume’s explicit recognition of the irrelevance of involuntariness to normative evaluation in the moral case. (shrink)

本书从方法论高度, 取系统论, 控制论, 信息论的基本思想的某些层次, 以观察审观现象. 书末还另有几篇与美学有直接或间接关系的论文.