Hume: Philosophy of Religion

One of the standard objections against the impossibility of infinite regress is associated with David Hume and Paul Edwards, but originates with William Ockham. They claim that in an infinite regress every member of the series is explained, and nothing is unexplained. Every member is explained by the one before it, and the series as a whole is nothing over and above its members, and so needs no cause of its own. Utilizing the well-known Thomistic distinction between essentially ordered and (...) accidentally ordered causal series, I show that the Hume-Edwards-Ockham objection fails to touch Aquinas’s argument against the impossibility of infinite regress in an essentially ordered series. However, Aquinas also argues that accidentally ordered causal series can only regress infinitely if supported by an everlasting essential cause. The Hume-Edwards-Ockham objection does raise a question about this thesis, but I show how St. Thomas can reply to it convincingly. (shrink)

Wśród prekursorów nowoczesnej nauki o religii David Hume zajmuje szczególne miejsce. Znany jest bowiem nie tylko jako dociekliwy badacz racjonalności religii, należącej do kluczowych problemów filozofii religii, ale także badacz naturalnych podstaw religii, zaprezentowanych zwłaszcza w „Naturalnej historii religii”. Jednym z najważniejszych dokonań Hume’a jest wyraźne oddzielenie, a zarazem komplementarność, dwóch sposobów badania religii, z których jeden koncentruje się na racjach wierzeń religijnych, zaś drugi na przyczynach występowania określonych wierzeń i praktyk. W wystąpieniu swoim argumentuję, że Hume’owski sposób myślenia o (...) religii nie tylko stanowił ważny etap na drodze do nowoczesnej nauki o religii, ale również wykazuję, że ta ostatnia w znacznym stopniu inspirowała się i nadal inspiruje Hume’owską krytyką religii. (shrink)

Hume appears to have sometimes taken religion to be founded on reason, at other times to have taken it to be founded on faith, and at yet other times to be based on authority. All of these views can be found in the different pieces collected together in the second volume of his Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. By means of an analysis of what Hume meant by "genuine religion," "true religion," and "rational religion," I uncover a consistent, sincere (...) view that Hume sustained throughout his published works. This view is atheistic. (shrink)

There are good reasons to think that at least a part of Hume's project in the ‘The natural history of religion’ was to buttress a philosophical critique of the reasonableness of religious belief undertaken in other works, and to attack a fundamentalist account of the history of religion and the foundations of morality. But there are also problems with supposing that Hume intended to achieve either of these goals. I argue that two problems in particular – accounting for Hume's neglect (...) of revelation, and accounting for his remarks on the ‘invincibility’ of the reasons for ‘genuine theism’ – can only be resolved by recognizing that Hume's purposes in ‘The natural history’ were not fundamentally critical. If I am right, Hume's purpose was mainly to explain why ‘false’ or ‘adulterate’ forms of religious belief are so widespread and so influential. (shrink)

Contrary to what has been stated in most accounts that Hume intends to make arguments against the existence of God, he aims to attack the claim that religious propositions can be argued; not completely reject these propositions. He considers these propositions epistemologically outside of human knowledge but ontologically accepts the existence of God. With such a view, we can dismiss atheistic-agnostic interpretations and relate him to a kind of mysticism. The key to deciding whether or not Hume is a mystic (...) is to determine what criteria we have to consider someone a mystic. Two very influential components here are (1)the belief in the existence of God; (2) the belief that the existence of God is far from our usual reasoning (antirational or irrational).And the second component is enough to call someone like Wittgenstein a fideist. We claim that there is clear evidence of these components in Hume’s works; therefore, what reason do we have to remove Hume from the circle of fideism and mysticism? In this study, after an introduction to the concept and types of fideism, we show that Hume, based on his works, surpasses skepticism and manifests a special kind of fideism.While there is an emphasis on the mystery of the proposition that God exists, he combines Christian faith, in aform that is inseparable from illogical and mysterious propositions such as the incarnation of God. Thus, Hume can be called a Christian mystic. (shrink)

Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy is a collection of essays that are all concerned with major figures and topics in the early modern philosophy. Most of the essays are concerned, more specifically, with the philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776). The sixteen essays included in this collection are divided into five parts. These parts are arranged under the headings of: (1) Metaphysics and Epistemology; (2) Free Will and Moral Luck; (3) Ethics, Virtue and Optimism; (4) Skepticism, Religion and Atheism; and (...) (5) Irreligion and the Unity of Hume’s Thought. A particularly important theme running through many of these essays is the subject of Hume’s irreligious aims and intentions. The fifth and final part of the collection is devoted to an articulation and defence of this specific understanding of Hume’s philosophical thought. (shrink)

A miracle is defined as a violation of or intercession in the laws of nature. Some recent reports of UFO phenomena are such that UFOs may satisfy that definition. In this paper, we ask how Hume’s famous argument in “Of Miracles” relates to UFOs. We argue that his critique fails and that some well corroborated UFO reports are such that they justify a belief in miracles (qua violations of laws of nature).

This chapter contains section titled: Hume, Cicero, and the Skeptical Tradition Hume and the French The Deists and Butler Conclusion References Further Reading.

This chapter contains section titled: Natural Religion in EHU The Critique of the Design Argument in DNR The Problem of Evil Part 12 and the Interpretation of DNR Conclusion References Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Miracle on Definition Street What the Bible Says Now Testify Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About the Gospels But Were Afraid to Ask Oh Come On, All Ye Faithful One More Kink for the Christmas Miracle Countin' on a Miracle (Objection) to Come Through Hume, Joyful and Triumphant.

This chapter contains sections titled: Pre‐Kantian Philosophical Theology Post‐Kantian Reconstructions of the Deist Project Hume and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion Works cited.

Was David Hume an atheist? This chapter argues that the answer to this question is less interesting and less important than the answer to a related question: What, according to Hume, does a theist believe? The chapter argues that Hume distinguishes a variety of different forms of theism, ranging from vulgar superstition to refined theism, and that he is much more firmly opposed to theism in its popular and vulgar forms.

Authoritative and comprehensive interpretation of the Scottish philosopher's writings on religion.

Abstractabstract:This article examines Kant's response to the criticisms of natural theology that Hume articulates in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Though Kant was in agreement with the Dialogues' rejection of dogmatic theism, he equally viewed many of its arguments as a threat to his aim of constructing a critical theology. Kant is often taken to have successfully diffused this skeptical threat on the basis of a symbolic anthropomorphism articulated in the Prolegomena. However, I argue that the Prolegomena account remains susceptible (...) to Hume's criticisms, and that it was only several years later in the third Critique that Kant was able to show how the Dialogues' skeptical conclusions can be circumvented. In this manner, I aim to show that Hume's challenge is more significant, and Kant's response more complex, than has previously been acknowledged. (shrink)

This paper provides epistemological support for one of Hume’s numerous critiques of the teleological arguments for God’s existence. Hume explores the following question: can we explain the observed harmony of the universe without appealing to the work of an intelligent creator? The answer, presented through the character of Philo, appears to be positive. I will try to defend this position. Following Hume’s theory of space, and exploring the relation between ideas of the whole and relation, I will show the universe (...) can be seen as finite space with definite numbers of parts which are spatially and causally interconnected. Because all changes occur on the basis of Hume’s principle of causation, we can say the harmony of the universe is established and maintained precisely because of the changes happening on the basis of causation. If this is the case, the role of the intelligent creator appears to be redundant. (shrink)

In the field of philosophy of religion, the issue of the existence of world after death and the doctrine of rewards and punishments in the hereafter is one of the important and confusing issues as persuades theologians and philosophers of religion to present various and contradictory views about it. Meanwhile, despite David Hume's considerable reputation as one of the most important philosophical critics of religion, the secular irreligious significance of this philosopher's views, especially on the issue of induction and probable (...) reasoning, has not attracted the attention and energy of Hume's researchers in recent decades. The main objectives of this paper, on the basis of methodical research, are to identify the relevance of induction and probable reasoning to the problem of belief in a future state and to the doctrine of rewards and punishments of human acts in philosophy of religion, and to show that the goal of Hume's critical analysis of the credibility and practical significance of religious inductive arguments, by providing an account of the foundation of probable reasoning, is to reject the principal aims of defenders of Christian orthodoxy. It was orthodoxy defender’s aim to show, on the basis of our experience of this world, that there is a future state of rewards and punishments, and that prudence requires that we guide our conduct in this life with a view to our expectations of happiness or misery in the next. We will show that Hume provides a naturalistic account of the psychological mechanisms for the foundations of probable reasoning that generate our beliefs concerning the future, and this account serves to explain why religious arguments concerning the doctrine of a future state inevitably fail to persuade us or influence our conduct, so the doctrine of state of rewards and punishments is of little or no practical consequence for human. (shrink)

Článek má za cíl ukázat podobnosti mezi Humovou a Madisonovou politickou filozofií v oblasti politiky náboženské tolerance. Humův kritický postoj k církvím a k náboženství je dnes v interpretační literatuře velmi známý. Často se však zapomíná na důsledky, které z tohoto postoje plynou pro jeho politickou filozofii. Hume se totiž na mnoha místech svého rozsáhlého filozofického díla (kam je třeba řadit i jeho Dějiny Anglie a mnohé eseje) zamýšlel nad otázkou, jak řídit stát nábožensky roztříštěný do církví a sekt. Podobně (...) se i jeden z nejvýznamnějších otců zakladatelů, James Madison, obával názorově roztříštěné společnosti; přičemž co do důvodů i řešení tohoto problému je patrná podobnost mezi jeho a Humovými myšlenkami. Hume i Madison shodně považovali za zdroj lidské tendence ke stranictví lidskou přirozenost a řešení této stranickosti spatřovali jednak v ustavení státu na co nejširším území, a jednak v co největší míře tolerance rozličných názorů i v náboženských otázkách. Oba argumentovali tím, že se v dějinách prakticky ukázalo jako nejúčinnější právě zavedení co nejširší náboženské tolerance. Kromě toho Madison používá stejné metafory a výrazy ve stejném kontextu jako Hume. Humův vliv na Madisona v otázce náboženské tolerance tak nelze při interpretaci intelektuálních zdrojů Jamese Madisona dále přehlížet. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: ch. 1 The Cry of Rachel -- Maritain's 1942 Marquette Aquinas Lecture -- Maritain's The Person and the Common Good -- Camus's The Plague -- ch. 2 Joy -- Being as the Good and the Eruption of Willing -- Being and Philosophical Psychology -- An Ordinary Knowledge of God and Metaphysics -- Metaphysics as Implicit Knowledge -- Being and the Intellectual Emotions -- ch. 3 Quandoque Evils -- Aquinas's Rationale for the Corruptible Order -- The Corruptible (...) Order and Quandoque Evils -- Bracketing Quandoque Evils between Goods -- A Caveat in Understanding the Subject of the Consequent Good -- The Effect of Human Providence upon the Frequency of Quandoque Evils -- ch. 4 Natural Corruptions -- Death as a Natural Corruption -- Natural Corruption as Nondefinitive -- Ambiguity of "Praeter Intentionem" and "Per Accidens" -- God and the Evil of Punishment (Poena) -- Other Interpretations -- Abraham and Isaac -- Conclusion -- ch. 5 Preliminaries to Aquinas and the Contemporary Discussion -- C.G. III, 71: "If Evil Exists, God Exists" -- William Rowe on Cosmological Reasoning -- De Ver. X, 12, ad 10m: "If not God from Justice, then God from Some Other Effect" -- Summary of Aquinas on the Existence of Evil -- A Strategy -- ch. 6 The Thomist and the Contemporary Discussion: Personalist Theodicies -- Marilyn McCord Adams and "Horrendous Evils" -- William Hasker: Personal Satisfaction and World Approval -- John Hick: Creation as a Gymnasium for the Development of Our Virtues -- David Ray Griffin and the Denial of Genuine Evils -- The Brothers Karamazov -- Thomistic "Natural Desires" of the Human Person -- ch. 7 The Thomist and the Contemporary Discussion: Cosmological Theodicies -- Diogenes Allen and Suffering as an Experience of God -- David Hume and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, X and XI -- William Rowe and "Pointless Evils" -- J. L. Mackie and Further Objections to a Cosmological Theodicy -- Mackie's Fourth Criticism and Aquinas on the Causality of Human Choices -- Aquinas and Plantinga -- The Avoidance of Determinism -- The Avoidance of Divine Culpability -- A Thomistic Free Will Defense? -- Richard Swinburne: Nature as a Necessary Display Case for Our Knowledge of Good and Evil -- Bruce Reichenbach: Developing Plantinga and Swinburne -- ch. 8 Conclusion and Comparison to Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump -- Brian Davies's Apophatic Treatment of the Evil Problem -- Eleonore Stump and the Love of God -- The Consolation of Rachel. (shrink)

In this volume, authors Alan Bailey and Dan O'Brien examine the full import of David Hume's arguments and the context of the society in which his work came to fruition. They analyze the nuanced nature of Hume's philosophical discourse and provide an informed look into his position on the possible content and rational justification of religious belief. The authors first detail the pressures and forms of repression that confronted any 18th century thinker wishing to challenge publicly the truth of Christian (...) theism. From there, they offer an overview of Hume's writings on religion, paying particular attention to the inter-relationships between the various works. They show that Hume's writings on religion are best seen as an artfully constructed web of irreligious argument that seeks to push forward a radical outlook, one that only emerges when the attention shifts from the individual sections of the web to its overall structure and context. Even though there is no explicit denial in any of Hume's published writings or private correspondence of the existence of God, the implications of his arguments often seem to point strongly towards atheism. David Hume was one of the leading British critics of Christianity and all forms of religion at a time when public utterances or published writings denying the truth of Christianity were liable to legal prosecution. His philosophical and historical writings offer a sustained and remarkably open critique of religion that is unmatched by any previous author writing in English. Yet, despite Hume's widespread reputation amongst his contemporaries for extreme irreligion, the subtle and measured manner in which he presents his position means that it remains far from clear how radical his views actually were. (shrink)

An examination of David Hume's philosophy of religion that situates his conception "true religion" within the context of his overall science of human nature, his rejection of popular religion, and his Ciceronian influence"--Provided by publisher.

Axios's Essence of... Series takes the greatest works of practical philosophy and pares them down to their essence. Selected passages flow together to create a seamless work that will capture your interest from page one. This newest volume in the series is dedicated to David Hume who is ranked as one of the greatest Western philosophers and economists. You will find three main sections on Hume (Religion, Morals, and Economics) as well as a section on his life.

Diálogos sobre a religião natural -- Cartas selecionadas.

Hume contrasts two different ways in which we might speak about the attributes of the first cause of all: first, in an attempt to describe the actual nature of this ultimate being or principle; or second, in ascribing attributes to it as so many honorifics, with no intention to describe but merely to express our own reverence. I survey Hume’s skeptical critique of the former, descriptive kind of talk, and also examine his purposes in considering and, through his character Philo, (...) apparently valorizing the latter, reverence-expressing kind of religious speech. (shrink)

David Hume's writings on history, politics and philosophy have shaped thought to this day. His bold scepticism ranged from common notions of the 'self' to criticism of standard theistic proofs. He insisted on grounding understandings of popular religious beliefs in human psychology rather than divine revelation, and he aimed to disentangle philosophy from religion in order to allow the former to pursue its own ends. In this book, Professors David W Purdie and Peter S Fosl decipher some of Hume's most (...) challenging texts for the modern reader, while preserving the sharp intellect and undaunted nerve for which Hume is famous. Hume's spirit is brought alive for contemporary times and his writing is made accessible for its intended audience: the general public."-- Back cover. (shrink)

Christian apologists argue that the testimony of the miracles of Jesus provide evidence for Christianity. Hume tries to undermine this argument by pointing out that miracles are said to occur in other religious traditions and so miracles do not give us reason to believe in Christianity over the alternatives. Thus, competing miracles act as an undercutting defeater for the argument from miracles for Christianity. Yet, before Hume, Locke responds to this kind of objection, and in this paper I explain and (...) defend his response. In short, Locke argues that God will ensure that there is more evidence for Christianity (if true) and this greater evidence is an undercutting defeater for Hume’s competing miracles defeater (i.e., it is a defeater-defeater). If so, then, as Locke argues, competing miracles do not weaken the evidence from miracles for Christianity. (shrink)

In the “Contrary Miracles Argument,” Hume argues that the occurrence of miracle stories in rival religions should undermine our belief in the trustworthiness of these reports. In order for this argument to have any merit, it has to be understood in its historical, religious context. Miracle stories are used in support of religions, and it's part of religion as we find it to reject miracle stories from rival traditions. A defender of miracle stories could avoid the argument by breaking the (...) connection between miracles and religious doctrine, but then miracles won't justify revealed religion. (shrink)