Our concern in this paper lies with a common argument from racial discrimination to realism about races: some people are discriminated against for being members of a particular race (i.e., racial discrimination exists), so some people must be members of that race (i.e., races exist). Error theorists have long responded that we can explain racial discrimination in terms of racial attitudes alone, so we need not explain it in terms of race itself. But to date there has been little detailed (...) discussion of whether it is better to explain racial discrimination in terms of race or in terms of racial attitudes alone. Our goal is to offer a novel and detailed argument in defense of explaining racial discrimination in terms of racial attitudes alone, by attending to the neglected phenomenon of misperception discrimination, which involves differential treatment due to misperceived race. We argue that the discriminatory action in misperception cases must be explained in the same way as cases where (according to the realist) the victim’s race is accurately perceived. Thus, the victim’s actual race cannot provide the best explanation. The main upshot of our argument is that explanatory arguments from racial discrimination to realism about race fail. (shrink)

Verse work on quintessence of Dvaita Vedanta and philosophy of Vishnu faith.

In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons. I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons (psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism) all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and demonstrating how each view (...) fails to satisfy at least one of these constraints. I then propose and defend my own account of motivating reasons, which I call the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. On the account I defend, motivating reasons are propositions. A proposition is the reason for which someone Ф‐s when (a) she represents that proposition as a normative reason to Ф, and (b) her representation explains, in the right way, her Ф‐ing. As I argue, the Guise of Normative Reasons Account satisfies all three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and weathers several objections that might be leveled against propositionalist views. (shrink)

In this essay, I develop an account of belief as commitment to the truth of a proposition. On my account, to believe p is to represent p as true by way of committing to the truth of p. To commit to the truth of p, in the sense I am interested in, is to exercise the normative power to subject one’s representation of p as true to the normative standard of truth. As I argue, my account of belief as commitment (...) of the truth explains a variety of features of belief that separate it from attitudes like acceptance, supposition, and imagination. Most importantly, it explains the distinctive connection between belief and evidence. Moreover, my account helps solve three further puzzles about belief, regarding doxastic voluntarism, the aim of belief, and Moore’s paradox. (shrink)

Susanna Rinard has recently offered a new argument for pragmatism and against evidentialism. According to Rinard, evidentialists must hold that the rationality of belief is determined in a way that is different from how the rationality of other states is determined. She argues that we should instead endorse a view she calls Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of all states is determined in the same way. In this paper, I show that Rinard’s claims are mistaken, and that evidentialism (...) is more theoretically virtuous than its opponents sometimes give it credit for. Not only does evidentialism not make an exception for belief, but it fits naturally into a unified, explanatorily powerful account of the rationality of intentional mental states. According to such an account, the rationality of all intentional mental states, including belief, is determined by the right kind of reasons for those states. Since the right kind of reasons for belief just are evidential considerations, this unified account entails evidentialism. I conclude, contra Rinard, that evidentialism can be situated within a general account of rationality that is at least as theoretically virtuous as pragmatism, if not more so. (shrink)

This paper defends an account of moral worth. Moral worth is a status that some, but not all, morally right actions have. Unlike with merely right actions, when an agent performs a morally worthy action, she is necessarily creditworthy for doing the right thing. First, I argue that two dominant views of moral worth have been unable to fully capture this necessary connection. On one view, an action is morally worthy if and only if its agent is motivated by the (...) features of the action that make it right. On the other, an action is morally worthy if and only if its agent is motivated by the action’s rightness itself. Neither of these views captures the connection between moral worth and creditworthiness, because each view leaves room for cases of accidentally doing the right thing. Next, I develop a new account, which I call the Guise of Moral Reasons Account. On my account, morally worthy actions are right actions that are motivated by moral reasons as such. This account rules out cases of accidentally doing the right thing, thus capturing the necessary connection between moral worth and creditworthiness for doing the right thing. (shrink)

This chapter discusses some of Anscombe’s contributions to the philosophy of practical reason. It focuses particularly on Anscombe’s view of what it is to act for reasons. I begin by discussing the relationship between acting intentionally and acting for reasons in Anscombe's theory of action. I then further explicate her view by discussing her rejection of two related views about acting for reasons: causalism (the view that reasons are a kind of cause of actions) and psychologism (the view that reasons (...) are mental states like desires and beliefs). In the process, I try to show that Anscombe’s rejection of these theses does not leave us with mystery, but rather sheds light on an interesting and serious heterodox view of acting for reasons. I conclude by suggesting that though Anscombe's views have been taken sufficiently seriously by philosophers of action, they should be taken more seriously by philosophers of practical reason. (shrink)

Metaethical constitutivists seek to ground normativity in facts about what is constitutive of agency. One strand of constitutivism locates the foundations of normativity in constitutive aims, which are standardly conceived of in teleological terms. I present three challenges that show that the teleological conception of constitutive aims is inadequate for the constitutivist project. I then sketch an alternative conception of constitutive aims in the form of a commitment-based conception. On the commitment-based conception, actions and attitudes constitutively represent their objects as (...) having certain properties, and their constitutive aims are fixed by the accuracy-conditions of these representations. Because such representations constitutively involve a commitment on the part of the agent to the object’s having the relevant property, they generate authoritative norms for the agent. I conclude that, unlike the teleological conception, the commitment-based conception promises to yield a unified constitutivism that delivers authoritative normative standards for both actions and attitudes. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in analytic philosophy that engages with non-Western philosophical traditions, including South Asian religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. However, thus far, there has been no engagement with Sikhism, despite its status as a major world religion with a rich philosophical tradition. This paper is an attempt to get a start at analytic philosophical engagement with Sikh philosophy. My focus is on Sikh ethics, and in particular on the theory of vice and (...) virtue that can be gleaned from Sikh scripture. According to this theory, the five major vices have a unified source in the vice of haumai. Haumai is a kind of false conception of oneself as singularly important, and correspondingly, a false conception of the world as revolving around oneself, as a world of objects there for one’s use. Vice, then, comes down to the failure to recognize the importance of others. The corresponding picture of virtue is that virtue consists in a recognition of the importance of others, through the recognition of an ultimate reality on which all are One. After reconstructing the Sikh theory of vice and virtue, I conclude with some comparative remarks on Sikh and Western ethics. (shrink)

All activities which are taking place in the Cosmos also exist in a human body in subtle micro-scale. Plexuses centers in a human body are the most mysterious kinds of energies. The six-center plexus system is the path of the Kundalini shakti, the primordial cosmic energy of a person. Each plexus has its own propensities (vibrating words/dimensions/vritti) and an acoustic root. These plexuses control some cluster of words of sounds and corresponding physical organs in human body. The 50 main propensities (...) of the human’s unit mind are expressed through the vibration-expression of these plexuses. These vibrations cause hormones to secrete from the corresponding glands of the human’s body. These plexuses can play very important roles in curing the diseases. According to the Theory of Nikola Tesla’s 369, there are all together 1 to 9 digital root numbers exist. All other higher or lower numbers are the combination of those digital root numbers. This statement seems quite true when we compare it with Theory of Absolutivity. If 3, 6, 9 numbers are arranged together it makes a letter Ohm (AUM) which represents actually a Sagun Bramh/Nikola Tesla’s 369 triangle which is a part of NirgunBramh having higher dimensions. Number zero is the NirgunBramh (having all the qualities but in dormant form) which does not possess any quality in action. Number 3, 6, 9 forming as an equilateral triangle of static, mutative and sentient forces representing the Black-hole which is a part of Sagun Bramh projecting Himself as a Visible World through Big-bang along with forming five basic elements such as Ethereal, Areal, Fire, Liquid and Solid. According to the biological science, life emerged in this planet from matter about four billion years ago in the form of DNA that carried the software for the development of billion of species on the way to its final destination in humans. These facts also fully support the above hypothesis of universe formations. (shrink)

The Cosmos we live in consists of Invisible Prakriti and Visible World. In Visible World, we do live. All the galaxies, Milky Ways, nebulas and planets, stars, and physical bodies belong to this world are governed by the physical and mathematical laws of nature. Prakriti which is invisible spiritually governed and wave-formed existed even before the Big-Bang. Purush holds the Visible World and Prakriti around makes entire Cosmos in existence. Purush which is an absolutely positively charged and quality less with (...) no traces of negative portions always existed, neither being created nor destroyed. A fraction of a Purush known as Omega Point appears into the portion of Prakriti due to some causal effect for further expansion of the Visible World. Purush is situated in the middle of the cylindrical universe surrounded by the Prakriti and Visible World. Theories proposed by different scientists and philosophers to verify the Purush seem to be incomplete trial and error of the zigzag puzzle show. Today, our scientists, cosmologists, and mathematicians are trying to explain the function of the universe through only four physical dimensions of science, which seems to be incomplete without explaining the transcendental factors while dealing with the living bodies. (shrink)

A development project introduces various changes into a community. Some of these changes are positive while others are negative or warrant better planning. Evaluation reports designed strictly for quantitative, targetoriented physical and fiscal achievements often overlook many of these changes. Our personal field observations and experiences with an agricultural development project showed us several examples of impacts brought about in the local farming system in some hill districts of Nepal. These impacts cannot be neglected and project evaluation and progress reports (...) should accommodate such changes. (shrink)

Background The allocation of scarce deceased donor kidneys is a complex process. Transplant providers are increasingly relying on constructs such as frailty and cognitive function to guide kidney transplant (KT) candidate selection. Patient views of the ethical issues surrounding the use of such constructs are unclear. We sought to assess KT candidates’ attitudes and beliefs about the use of frailty and cognitive function to guide waitlist selection.Methods KT candidates were randomly recruited from an ongoing single-center cohort study of frailty and (...) cognitive function. Semi-structured interviews were conducted, and thematic analysis was performed. Inductively derived themes were mapped onto bioethics principles.Results Twenty interviews were conducted (65% contact rate, 100% participation rate) (60% male; 70% White). With respect to the use of frailty and cognitive function in waitlisting decisions, four themes emerged in which participants: (1) valued maximizing a scarce resource (utility); (2) prioritized equal access to all patients (equity); (3) appreciated a proportional approach to the use of equity and utility (precautionary utility); and (4) sought to weigh utility- and equity-based concerns regarding social support. While some participants believed frailty and cognitive function were useful constructs to maximize utility, others believed their use would jeopardize equity. Patients were uncomfortable with using single factors such as frailty or cognitive impairment to deny someone access to transplantation; participants instead encouraged using the constructs to identify opportunities for intervention to improve frailty and cognitive function prior to KT.Conclusions KT candidates’ values mirrored the current allocation strategy, seeking to balance equity and utility in a just manner, albeit with conflicting viewpoints on the appropriate use of frailty and cognitive impairment in waitlisting decisions. (shrink)

In this commentary, I raise a few questions about Schmidt’s argument against (R-E): whether facts about incoherence are directly reasons for suspension on particular propositions, as opposed to reasons against sets of attitudes; whether (R-E) should really be formulated in terms of a broad category of “doxastic attitudes” that includes transitional attitudes like suspension; and whether incoherence-based reasons really must fit into the category of “epistemic reasons,” as opposed to be a more general category of right-kind reasons. Though my questions (...) reflect some skepticism about the specifics of Schmidt’s argument, I conclude that it succeeds in what I take to be its broader aim. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In his ‘Rationality versus Normativity’, John Broome argues against the view that rationality is reducible to normativity. Broome’s argument rests on the claim that while rationality supervenes on the mind, normativity does not. In this commentary, I argue that Broome's arguments succeed only against views on which reasons and normativity are univocal. Once we admit of multiple kinds of normative reasons, some fact-given and others non-factive, a version of the reasons-responsiveness view emerges that is untouched by Broome's arguments. On (...) such a view, rationality supervenes on non-factive reasons, not on fact-given ones, so rationality supervenes on a kind of normativity that supervenes on the mind. This shows that Broome has not refuted reasons-responsiveness views wholesale. Moreover, because Broome’s arguments do refute univocal versions of reasons-responsiveness views, they provide a justification for preferring non-univocal versions of reasons-responsiveness views to univocal ones. (shrink)

A cohesive power of a structure is an effective analog of the classical ultrapower of a structure. We start with a computable structure, and consider its effective power over a cohesive set of natural numbers. A cohesive set is an infinite set of natural numbers that is indecomposable with respect to computably enumerable sets. It plays the role of an ultrafilter, and the elements of a cohesive power are the equivalence classes of certain partial computable functions determined by the cohesive (...) set. Thus, unlike many classical ultrapowers, a cohesive power is a countable structure. In this paper we focus on cohesive powers of graphs, equivalence structures, and computable structures with a single unary function satisfying various properties, which can also be viewed as directed graphs. For these computable structures, we investigate the isomorphism types of their cohesive powers, as well as the properties of cohesive powers when they are not isomorphic to the original structure. (shrink)

Computability theory is the mathematical theory of algorithms, which explores the power and limitations of computation. Classical computability theory formalized the intuitive notion of an algorithm and provided a theoretical basis for digital computers. It also demonstrated the limitations of algorithms and showed that most sets of natural numbers and the problems they encode are not decidable (Turing computable). Important results of modern computability theory include the classification of the computational difficulty of sets and problems. Arithmetical and hyperarithmetical hierarchies and (...) the Turing degrees provide important measures of the level of such difficulty. There are uncountably many Turing degrees and they are partially ordered. These classifications are used in contemporary research to investigate the complexity of problems in modern computable mathematics, for example, regarding structures and their properties. (shrink)

Verbal autopsy presents the opportunity to understand the disease burden in many low-income countries where vital registration systems are underdeveloped and most deaths occur in the community. Advances in technology have led to the development of software that can provide probable cause of death information in real time, and research considering the ethical implications of these advances is necessary to inform policy. Our research explores these ethical issues in rural Nepal using a public health ethics framework. We considered the burdens (...) and benefits of VA and giving cause of death information to families of the deceased through qualitative research with VA interviewers, community members, national policy stakeholders and international academics. Burdens can be experienced differently, and it is important to balance the emotional burden of VA with utilization of the data to inform planning and increased access to health services. The training, support and supervision of VA interviewers should be prioritized if VA is taken to scale. Initial and ongoing community engagement is recommended in addition to engaging ethical, legal, health and policy personnel in developing protocols and systems. Integrating rigorous research while cautiously moving forward is recommended to ensure systems and responses to concerns are relevant to contexts. (shrink)

BackgroundImportance of awareness of medical ethics and its integration into medical curriculum has been frequently highlighted. Study 1 aimed to assess the knowledge, attitude, and reported practices of medical ethics among clinicians at Patan Academy of Health Sciences, a tertiary care teaching hospital in Nepal. Study 2 was conducted to assess whether there was a difference in knowledge, attitude, and reported practices of medical ethics among doctors who received formal medical ethics education during undergraduate studies and those who did not.MethodsTwo (...) cross-sectional surveys using self-administered questionnaires were conducted. Study 1 included 72 participants; interns, medical officers, and consultants working at Patan Academy of Health Sciences. Study 2 was a comparative study conducted among 54 medical officers who had received formal medical ethics education (Group 1) and 60 medical officers who did not (Group 2).ResultsParticipants who had completed post-graduate education had higher knowledge (p = 0.050), practice (p < 0.001), and overall combined scores (p = 0.011). Participants with ethics education had higher knowledge (p < 0.001), attitude (p = 0.001), practice (p < 0.001), and overall score (p < 0.001). Most participants preferred consulting colleagues if an ethical dilemma arose. Fewer participants had heard of the Declaration of Helsinki. Most participants thought doctors to be most capable of judging what is best for the patient (Study 1: 70.42%, Study 2 Group 1: 42.59%, Group 2: 80%). Case scenarios in which participants demonstrated poor practice were ethical issues concerning truth-telling, end-of-life decisions, treating HIV/aids patients, treating a minor, and reporting colleague’s errors.ConclusionsThis study found that participants who have received medical ethics education have higher knowledge, attitude, and practice scores. The results further justify the need for medical ethics education to be a part of the core medical curriculum. A blame-free environment where seniors can be approached for advice should be created. Research ethics should also be given attention. During medical ethics training, ethical issues where doctors perform poorly should be given more priority and should be discussed in a country-specific context. (shrink)

Recently, there has been an increased interest in developing statistical methodologies for analyzing single case experimental design data to supplement visual analysis. Some of these are simulation-driven such as Bayesian methods because Bayesian methods can compensate for small sample sizes, which is a main challenge of SCEDs. Two simulation-driven approaches: Bayesian unknown change-point model and simulation modeling analysis were compared in the present study for three real datasets that exhibit “clear” immediacy, “unclear” immediacy, and delayed effects. Although SMA estimates can (...) be used to answer some aspects of functional relationship between the independent and the outcome variables, they cannot address immediacy or provide an effect size estimate that considers autocorrelation as required by the What Works Clearinghouse Standards. BUCP overcomes these drawbacks of SMA. In final analysis, it is recommended that both visual and statistical analyses be conducted for a thorough analysis of SCEDs. (shrink)

Domestic violence is one of the most common forms of violence against women. Domestic violence during pregnancy is associated with adverse perinatal and maternal outcomes. We aimed to assess whether domestic violence was associated with mode of delivery, low birthweight and preterm birth in two sites in Nepal. In this prospective cohort study we consecutively recruited 2004 pregnant women during antenatal care at two hospitals between June 2015 and September 2016. The Abuse Assessment Screen was used to assess fear and (...) violence. Having ever experienced either fear or violence was defined as any domestic violence. Obstetric outcomes were obtained from hospital records for 1381 women, selecting singleton pregnancies only. Mode of delivery was assessed as birth by cesarean section or not. A birthweight of less than 2500 g was defined as low birthweight and preterm birth as birth before completion of 37 weeks gestation. Descriptive and multiple logistic regression analyses were performed to assess associations. Twenty percent of the women reported any domestic violence. Among all 1381 women, 37.6% gave birth by cesarean section. Of those women who delivered by cesarean section, 84.7% had an emergency cesarean section. Less than 10% of the babies were born prematurely and 13.5% were born with low birthweight. We found no significant association between exposure to any domestic violence during pregnancy and risk of a low birthweight baby or birth by cesarean section. However, having experienced both violence and fear was significantly associated with giving birth to a preterm infant [aOR 2.33 ]. Domestic violence is common in Nepal. This is a potential risk factor for severe morbidity and mortality in newborns. We found that the risk of having a preterm baby was higher for pregnant women who experienced both fear and violence. This should be recognized by the health sector. In this study, no significant differences were found in the rate of cesarean section nor low birthweight for women who had experienced any domestic violence compared to those who did not. (shrink)

The death of Bal Keshav Thackeray, in November 2012, has led several Indian journalists and intellectuals to think over the legacy of the supreme leader of the Shiv Sena to the Indian society. The present article means to identify the reasons which have let the Indian journalists describe the bequest of Thackeray to the Indian society in terms of a legacy of fear. The article deals with Thackeray's use of fear as a tool to arise consent around his social, (...) cultural and political thinking first and, secondly, to legitimize and justify the existence and the modus operandi of the Shiv Sena. The author dwells on the way Thackeray has been able to arise and feed social and cultural fear in order to give a meaning and a sense to his political enterprise. The article argues that the most scaring aspect of Thackeray's political discourse doesn't lie in the aims pursued and in the ways they have been pursued but in the idea of social and cultural identity it is based on. (shrink)

In these replies, I react to comments on my paper “Facts about Incoherence as Non-Evidential Epistemic Reasons”, provided by Aleks Knoks, Sebastian Schmidt, Keshav Singh, and Conor McHugh. I discuss potential counterexamples to my claim that the fact that the subject’s doxastic attitudes are incoherent is an epistemic reason for her to suspend; whether such incoherence-based reasons bear on individual attitudes or only on combinations of attitudes; the prospects of restricting evidentialism about epistemic reasons to reasons to believe; whether (...) incoherence-based reasons are truly epistemic; the alleged normative and motivational expendability of incoherence-based reasons; the possibility of incoherence-based reasons to suspend without actual belief in the incoherent propositions; the relationship between suspension, inquiry, and incoherence; and the nature of suspension of judgment. (shrink)