Auch unter den Bedingungen der Verwissenschaftlichung und Technisierung der Gesellschaft bleiben wesentliche Aspekte von Aristoteles' Naturbegriff kontextrelativ anwendbar: In lebensweltlicher Erfahrung finden Bestimmungen der (extensionalen) Entgegensetzung von Natur und Technik, in wissenschaftlicher Erfahrung unabhängig davon bestehende (intensionale) Natureigenschaften bevorzugte Anwendungen. Die Abgrenzung von Natur gegen Technik hat für kulturelle Orientierungen, öffentliche Diskurse und politische Handlungsentscheidungen, in denen die materiellen Folgen menschlicher Tätigkeiten thematisch sind, grundlegende Bedeutung. Für den Kontext der Wissenschaften dienen die disziplinenübergreifenden, an den Naturwissenschaften orientierten Selbstorganisationstheorien als Beispiel (...) der Anwendbarkeit. (shrink)

This article brings together two sets of data that are rarely discussed in concert; namely, disagreement and testimony data. I will argue that relativism yields a much more elegant account of these data than its major rival, contextualism. The basic idea will be that contextualists can account for disagreement data only by adopting principles that preclude a simple account of testimony data. I will conclude that, other things being equal, we should prefer relativism to contextualism. In making this comparative (...) point, I will also defend self-standing relativist accounts of disagreement and testimony data. (shrink)

Von den zahllosen Vorstellungen, die heute dem öffentlichen Reden über Natur zugrundeliegen, gehört die aristotelische Naturbegrifflichkeit zweifellos immer noch zu den einflußreichsten. Während in der Tradition des aristotelischen Denkens Natur und Technik zwei verschiedene Seinsweisen bezeichnen, verwerfen die Naturwissenschaften jede substantielle Unterscheidung zwischen den beiden Sphären. Die zunehmende Technisierung der Welt macht zudem einen Begriff problematisch, der im wesentlichen das von humanen Eingriffen Ungestörte subsumiert. Kann das öffentliche Verständnis, soweit es aristotelisch geprägt ist, die Tendenz zur Veränderung und Ersetzung von (...) Natur durch Technik überhaupt noch angemessen erfassen? Dieser Frage möchte ich auf zwei Ebenen nachgehen. Zum einen setze ich die aristotelische Unterscheidung von Natur und Technik weitestgehend als Dichotomie voraus, sehe von ihren lebensweltlichen Bezügen ab und konfrontiere sie exemplarisch mit einigen, teils schon vollzogenen, teils zu erwartenden Verschiebungen im Verhältnis dieser beiden Sphären. Insofern die Binnenperspektive der Individuen außer Betracht bleibt und es sich vornehmlich um Prozesse handelt, die die Grundlagen der materiellen Lebensverhältnisse betreffen, könnte man von der „gesellschaftlichen Ebene“ sprechen. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich ein spezieller, zunehmend verengter Kontext, in dem die Entgegensetzung noch sinnvoll Anwendung findet(I). Zum anderen rekonstruiere ich die aristotelische Begrifflichkeit im Horizont eines lebensweltlichen Verständnisses. Hierbei werde ich weniger von einer wechselseitigen Ausschließung der beiden Sphären ausgehen als von der Annahme, daß Natur und Technik die gegenüberliegenden Ränder eines Übergangsfeldes von Zuständen bezeichnen, in denen beide gleichsam gemischt enthalten sind. Die begrifflichen Hilfsmittel für diese Vermittlung finden sich bei Aristoteles selbst. Es handelt sich um die Individuationsprinzipien Stoff und Form, die in ihrer Anwendung auf die Definition von Natur eine differenziertere Wahrnehmung des Technischen gestattet. (shrink)

Assertions have a curious relationship to certainty. On the one hand, it seems clear that we can assert many everyday propositions while not being absolutely certain about them. On the other hand, it seems odd to say things like ‘p, but I am not absolutely certain that p’. In this paper, I aim to solve this conundrum. I suggest a pretense theory of assertion, according to which assertions of p are proposals to act as if the conversational participants were (...) absolutely certain of p. I suggest that this explains why absolute certainty is not required to make assertions, while it is still problematic to voice your uncertainties once you have made an assertion. By voicing your uncertainties, you thwart your very own proposal to act as if everybody was absolutely certain. (shrink)

With the advent of the era of artificial intelligence, deep reinforcement learning has achieved unprecedented success in high-dimensional and large-scale artificial intelligence tasks. However, the insecurity and instability of the DRL algorithm have an important impact on its performance. The Soft Actor-Critic algorithm uses advanced functions to update the policy and value network to alleviate some of these problems. However, SAC still has some problems. In order to reduce the error caused by the overestimation of SAC, we propose (...) a new SAC algorithm called Averaged-SAC. By averaging the previously learned action-state estimates, it reduces the overestimation problem of soft Q-learning, thereby contributing to a more stable training process and improving performance. We evaluate the performance of Averaged-SAC through some games in the MuJoCo environment. The experimental results show that the Averaged-SAC algorithm effectively improves the performance of the SAC algorithm and the stability of the training process. (shrink)

The student management work model in colleges and universities is an effective plan for college student management, but the traditional college student management work is not very good in terms of student psychology, resulting in negative attitudes such as low learning desire, low learning efficiency, and inactive learning. In recent years, with the development of artificial intelligence technologies such as sentiment analysis and incentive theory, emotional management and incentive theory have been applied to the management of college students. The (...) emotional management and incentive model is a way to help college students get rid of psychological obstacles and guide students to establish positive and correct values by predict and analyze the psychological state of college students through language emotion recognition and BP neural network. This paper compares the college student management work model based on emotional management and incentives with the traditional college management work mode through experiments. The results show that the students’ learning enthusiasm is better than the traditional college student management work mode based on emotional management and incentives. The student management work model in colleges and universities is 15.8% better, and the students’ grades have improved by 12.5%; the college student management work model based on emotional management and incentives also has a positive role in helping students’ mental health. The way of emotional management and motivation can make better use of college students’ psychology to effectively manage students and guide students to develop in a good direction. (shrink)

The use of e-commerce has exploded due to the impact of COVID-19. People with no experience in e-commerce prior to the COVID-19 pandemic began online shopping for their safety following the pandemic outbreak. As such, these newly joined customers have played a vital role in the rapid development of e-commerce. Maintaining these customers and increasing their repurchase intention is a core issue for e-commerce platform companies. Thus, using new e-commerce users as the participants, this study investigated the structural relationship between (...) brand experience, brand emotional factors, brand loyalty, and repurchase intention with brand love as the mediator. Research on the multidimensional brand experience from Chinese customers’ perspective is still lacking, and our study attempts to fill this gap. A structured questionnaire and hypotheses were designed based on studies and survey of 310 respondents from China in this study. The study results show that, first, the four dimensions of brand experience have a significant positive correlation with brand emotion, with brand cognitive experience having the greatest impact on consumer brand emotion. Second, the influence of brand emotion on brand loyalty is positive and significant, and brand attachment has a stronger influence than brand love on brand loyalty. In addition, brand loyalty has a positive effect on repurchase intention. Finally, brand love plays a mediating role on the relationship between brand attachment and brand loyalty. To enhance customers’ brand attachment and love for e-commerce platforms, companies must enhance customers’ interest and curiosity in their products. And companies will improve their services to customers by introducing artificial intelligence algorithms to increase customers’ repurchase intention, which will ultimately increasing their profitability. This study contributes to the development of e-commerce platform companies. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine the link between English foreign language teacher’s professional identity and employee success via mediating role of critical thinking. Further, we examined the moderating role of leader motivational language between employee professional identity and critical thing and also indirect effect on employee success via critical thinking. We collected data from Chinese MNC’s school by using time lagged study design. We used hierarchical linear regression for direct hypotheses and Hayes PROCESS model’s for mediation, moderation, (...) and mediation moderation analysis. The results show that there is positive relation between employee’s professional identity and teacher’s success. Further, critical thinking mediates the link between professional identity and employee success. The results of the moderated mediation analysis show that critical thinking mediated the interaction of employee’s professional identity and leader’s motivational language on teacher’s success. (shrink)

Robot is definitely playing important role in human society. Low contact on machine standards is mostly on industrial robot while close contacts are in increasing demand in service robot, etc. The development of robotics with advanced hardware and artificial intelligence (AI) provide the possibility with human beings while close contacts raise many new issues on ethics and risks. For interaction, the related technique of perception, cognition and interaction are briefly introduced. For ethics, rules should be given for the robot (...) designers to include ethics for certain application while risks should be evaluated during the experiment test. To make efficient decision, safety design with AI technology should be put on agenda for roboticists. Except from the risks, ethics raise many challenges while most of them can be solved by developing technologies while some of the problems exist in human’s society which also raise the questions for the human beings. More broader vision should be taken from different social departments together to avoid the possible embarrassed issues. It’s time to welcome the world of robotics and related techniques will make life more efficient while human-robot coexistence society will come one day and law should be imposed on both. (shrink)

Motivation crucially influences the willingness to play online games. Game motivation can affect players’ flow experience and player’s companionship with their game roles or avatars. However, the relationship among game motivation, flow experience, and companionship is unclear; therefore, designing online games that improving the playing experience is difficult. This study chose online pet games as study samples, and this study used a game motivation scale, flow experience scale, and the Companionship Scale of Artificial Pets to identify the relationship among (...) game motivation, flow experience, and companionship. According to 216 valid questionnaire responses, this study demonstrated that game motivation for online pet game players was primarily immersion and achievement, compared with achievement motivation, immersion motivation had a greater influence on flow experience and the development of player companionship with online pets, and players with immersion and achievement motivation had a substantially enhanced flow experience and companionship with their online pets. (shrink)

Both jianxing 践形 (taking on proper appearance) and jianxing 践行 (putting into practice) were concepts coined by Confucians before the Qin Dynasty. They largely referred to similar things. But because the Daxue 大学 ( Great Learning ) was listed as one of the Sishu 四书 (The Four Books) during the Song Dynasty, different explanations and trends in terms of the Great Learning resulted in taking on proper appearance and putting into practice becoming two different systems of efforts. The former (...) formed a vertical kind of representation and a complete system of practice by developing the sincerity of intentions inside and taking on proper appearance and looks outside in shendu æ Žç‹¬ (self-discipline when alone) and chengyi 诚意 (developing the sincerity of intentions), and the latter developed into a horizontal system of practice through the interdependency of zhi 知 (knowing or knowledge) and xing 行 (doing or practice). The interdependence between knowledge and practice promoted by the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi represented the vertical practice of moral understanding, while the integration of knowing and doing advocated by Wang Yangming represented using the way in developing the sincerity of intentions to adjust and transform the representation of the relationship between knowledge and practice. The ideas that were frequently stressed, such as the same effort and naturally being so, were all from developing the sincerity of intentions and taking on proper appearance, and they were all the representation of really making intentions sincere. In fact, the confusion over the integration of knowing and doing reflected the tension between two different systems and inconsistency in their thoughts. (shrink)

Facial expression recognition plays a significant part in artificial intelligence and computer vision. However, most of facial expression recognition methods have not obtained satisfactory results based on low-level features. The existed methods used in facial expression recognition encountered the major issues of linear inseparability, large computational burden, and data redundancy. To obtain satisfactory results, we propose an innovative deep learning model using the kernel entropy component analysis network and directed acyclic graph support vector machine. We use the KECANet in (...) the feature extraction stage. In the stage of output, binary hashing and blockwise histograms are adopted. We sent the final output features to the DAGSVM classifier for expression recognition. We test the performance of our proposed method on three databases of CK+, JAFFE, and CMU Multi-PIE. According to the experiment results, the proposed method can learn high-level features and provide more recognition information in the stage of training, obtaining a higher recognition rate. (shrink)

A fundamental question in reading research concerns whether attention is allocated strictly serially, supporting lexical processing of one word at a time, or in parallel, supporting concurrent lexical processing of two or more words (Reichle, Liversedge, Pollatsek, & Rayner, 2009). The origins of this debate are reviewed. We then report three simulations to address this question using artificial reading agents (Liu & Reichle, 2010; Reichle & Laurent, 2006) that learn to dynamically allocate attention to 1–4 words to “read” as (...) efficiently as possible. These simulation results indicate that the agents strongly preferred serial word processing, although they occasionally attended to more than one word concurrently. The reason for this preference is discussed, along with implications for the debate about how humans allocate attention during reading. (shrink)

ʻDurch Dein Wort ward jegliches Ding!ʼ / ʻThrough Thy Word All Things Were Made!ʼ: 2. Mandäistische und samaritanistische Tagung. Edited by Rainer Voigt. Mandäistische Forschungen, vol. 4. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2013. Pp. x + 393, illus. €98.

This paper explores and ultimately affirms the surprising claim that artificial intelligence (AI) can become part of the person, in a robust sense, and examines three ethical and legal implications. The argument is based on a rich, legally inspired conception of persons as free and independent rightholders and objects of heightened protection, but it is construed so broadly that it should also apply to mainstream philosophical conceptions of personhood. The claim is exemplified by a specific technology, devices that connect (...) human brains with computers and operate by AI-algorithms. Under philosophically reasonable and empirically realistic conditions, these devices and the AI running them become parts of the person, in the same way as arms, hearts, or mental capacities are. This transformation shall be called empersonification. It has normative and especially legal consequences because people have broader and stronger duties regarding other persons (and parts of them) than regarding things. Three consequences with practical implications are: (i) AI-devices cease to exist as independent legal entities and come to enjoy the special legal protection of persons; (ii) therefore, third parties such as manufacturers or authors of software lose (intellectual) property rights in device and software; (iii) persons become responsible for the outputs of the empersonified AI-devices to the same degree that they are for desires or intentions arising from the depths of their unconscious. More generally, empersonification marks a new step in the long history of human–machine interaction that deserves critical ethical reflection and calls for a stronger value-aligned development of these technologies. (shrink)

Husserl's analysis of perception and Heidegger's theory of time are both fixated on the objectivity of objects - or the objectrelation of experience and its essential constitution. This reflects - and in the case of Heidegger quite explicitly - Kantian heritage. This phenomenological, transcendental relevance of the object essentially refers to intentionality - and thus an object-related figure of self-transcending subjectivity. Quite differently, Latour determines the status of things in the collective, ascribing to them an agency that brackets the (...) traditional opposition between acting subjects and passive objects. The contribution encircles precisely that critical point which leads to the separation of phenomenological and ANTistical approaches. While phenomenology grounds itself by reconstructing the experience of objects, ANT focuses on the description of the structures of action, which are composed of actants of all kinds. Finally, the question arises whether Latour's collectivist sociology can learn from phenomenology's methodological solipsism that there is a constructive dimension and plenitude of power in the work of description that is not just left to actors in general, but above all to the analyst herself? German Husserls Analyse der Wahrnehmung und Heideggers Zeittheorie sind beide in ihrem Theorieaufbau auf die Gegenständlichkeit der Gegenstände - oder auf den Gegenstandsbezug der Erfahrung und seine wesensmäßige Konstitution - fixiert. Hierin spiegelt sich, bei Heidegger explizit, Kantisches Erbe. Diese phänomenologische, transzendentalphilosophische Relevanz des Gegenstands verweist im Kern auf Intentionalität - und damit auf eine objektbezogene Selbstüberschreitungsfigur der Subjektivität. Ganz anders bestimmt Latour den Stellenwert der Dinge im Kollektiv, wenn er ihnen eine Handlungsmacht zuschreibt, die den traditionellen Gegensatz zwischen Handlungssubjekten und Objektbehandlung einklammert. Der folgende Beitrag kreist den kritischen Punkt ein, der in der Theoriebildung zur Verzweigung phänomenologischer und ANTistischer Ansätze führt. Während sich die Phänomenologie im Zuge einer begrifflichen Rekonstruktion der Erfahrung von Gegenständen konsolidiert, ist die ANT auf die Beschreibung von Handlungsstrukturen ausgerichtet, die sich aus Aktanten aller Art zusammensetzen. Abschließend stellt sich die Frage, ob nicht die kollektivistische Soziologie Latours von dem methodischen Solipsismus der Phänomenologie lernen kann, dass es eine konstruktive Dimension und Machtfülle der deskriptiven Arbeit gibt, die nicht einfach den Akteuren überhaupt, sondern vor allem der Analytikerin überlassen ist? (shrink)

This paper explores and ultimately affirms the surprising claim that artificial intelligence (AI) can become part of the person, in a robust sense, and examines three ethical and legal implications. The argument is based on a rich, legally inspired conception of persons as free and independent rightholders and objects of heightened protection, but it is construed so broadly that it should also apply to mainstream philosophical conceptions of personhood. The claim is exemplified by a specific technology, devices that connect (...) human brains with computers and operate by AI-algorithms. Under philosophically reasonable and empirically realistic conditions, these devices and the AI running them become parts of the person, in the same way as arms, hearts, or mental capacities are. This transformation shall be called empersonification. It has normative and especially legal consequences because people have broader and stronger duties regarding other persons (and parts of them) than regarding things. Three consequences with practical implications are: (i) AI-devices cease to exist as independent legal entities and come to enjoy the special legal protection of persons; (ii) therefore, third parties such as manufacturers or authors of software lose (intellectual) property rights in device and software; (iii) persons become responsible for the outputs of the empersonified AI-devices to the same degree that they are for desires or intentions arising from the depths of their unconscious. More generally, empersonification marks a new step in the long history of human–machine interaction that deserves critical ethical reflection and calls for a stronger value-aligned development of these technologies. (shrink)

Alois Riehl was one of the few Kantian-inspired philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who argued for a realist approach to Kant’s original doctrine. He therefore rejected prevailing idealist reconstructions and attempted to establish a view of Kant as an important forerunner of what he programmatically called ‘critical realism.’ In the present paper it will be shown what this exactly meant for the interpretation of Kant’s and especially Riehl’s own critique of idealism as a systematic position. In (...) particular, it is stated that anti-idealism in Riehlian terms amounts to a ‘realistic rehabilitation’ of Kantian things-in-themselves. Furthermore, some connections are drawn to early-twentieth century American realism. (shrink)

Artificial Neural Networks have reached “grandmaster” and even “super-human” performance across a variety of games, from those involving perfect information, such as Go, to those involving imperfect information, such as “Starcraft”. Such technological developments from artificial intelligence (AI) labs have ushered concomitant applications across the world of business, where an “AI” brand-tag is quickly becoming ubiquitous. A corollary of such widespread commercial deployment is that when AI gets things wrong—an autonomous vehicle crashes, a chatbot exhibits “racist” behavior, (...) automated credit-scoring processes “discriminate” on gender, etc.—there are often significant financial, legal, and brand consequences, and the incident becomes major news. As Judea Pearl sees it, the underlying reason for such mistakes is that “... all the impressive achievements of deep learning amount to just curve fitting.” The key, as Pearl suggests, is to replace “reasoning by association” with “causal reasoning” —the ability to infer causes from observed phenomena. It is a point that was echoed by Gary Marcus and Ernest Davis in a recent piece for theNew York Times: “we need to stop building computer systems that merely get better and better at detecting statistical patterns in data sets—often using an approach known as ‘Deep Learning’—and start building computer systems that from the moment of their assembly innately grasp three basic concepts: time, space, and causality.” In this paper, foregrounding what in 1949 Gilbert Ryle termed “a category mistake”, I will offer an alternative explanation for AI errors; it is not so much that AI machinery cannot “grasp” causality, but that AI machinery (qua computation) cannot understand anything at all. (shrink)

Die Dinge als Dinge sind in den letzten Jahrzehnten immer mehr ins Zentrum des Forschungsinteresses gerückt. In diesem Buch geht es darum, ob es so etwas wie eine Rhetorik der Dinge gibt, ob man eine Theorie des Stilllebens zu den Dingen im Bild formulieren kann und was all das zusammen mit der Frage nach dem Ding-Design mit Rhetorik zu tun hat.

Aus dem Motiv eines »Aufstandes der Dinge« leitet sich im linken russischen Konstruktivismus der Imperativ einer Befreiung der Dinge her, der sich von ihrer Repräsentation abkehrt und ein Bilderverbot verhängt, um neue Dinge für 〉neue Menschen〈 zu erschaffen. Diese Dinge – Universalkleidungsstücke und mobile Gebrauchsgegenstände – überspringen den Gegensatz zwischen Objekt und Dinglichkeit. Wie die zeitgenössische russische Phänomenologie (Gustav Špet, Nikolaj Žinkin) feststellt, macht kein 〉idealer Gegenstand〈 ihr Wesen aus, sondern der soziale Gebrauch, der es in (...) einen unabschließbaren Veränderungsprozess involviert. Russian constructivism's motif of an »insurgence of things« leads to the imperative of a liberation of things, which turns away from their representation and declares a Bilderverbot (prohibition of representation) in order to create new things for »new men.« These things – for example, clothing and articles of daily use – overleap the opposition between object and thingness. Their essence, as contemporary Russian phenomenology (Gustav Špet, Nikolaj Žinkin) affirms, is not constituted by any »ideal object«, but by social usage, which involves it in an interminable metamorphosis. (shrink)

Husserls Analyse der Wahrnehmung und Heideggers Zeittheorie sind beide in ihrem Theorieaufbau auf die Gegenständlichkeit der Gegenstände – oder auf den Gegenstandsbezug der Erfahrung und seine wesensmäßige Konstitution – fixiert. Hierin spiegelt sich, bei Heidegger explizit, Kantisches Erbe. Diese phänomenologische, transzendentalphilosophische Relevanz des Gegenstands verweist im Kern auf Intentionalität – und damit auf eine objektbezogene Selbstüberschreitungsfigur der Subjektivität. Ganz anders bestimmt Latour den Stellenwert der Dinge im Kollektiv, wenn er ihnen eine Handlungsmacht zuschreibt, die den traditionellen Gegensatz zwischen Handlungssubjekten (...) und Objektbehandlung einklammert. Der folgende Beitrag kreist den kritischen Punkt ein, der in der Theoriebildung zur Verzweigung phänomenologischer und ANTistischer Ansätze führt. Während sich die Phänomenologie im Zuge einer begrifflichen Rekonstruktion der Erfahrung von Gegenständen konsolidiert, ist die ANT auf die Beschreibung von Handlungsstrukturen ausgerichtet, die sich aus Aktanten aller Art zusammensetzen. Abschließend stellt sich die Frage, ob nicht die kollektivistische Soziologie Latours von dem methodischen Solipsismus der Phänomenologie lernen kann, dass es eine konstruktive Dimension und Machtfülle der deskriptiven Arbeit gibt, die nicht einfach den Akteuren überhaupt, sondern vor allem der Analytikerin überlassen ist? Husserl's analysis of perception and Heidegger's theory of time are both fixated on the objectivity of objects - or the objectrelation of experience and its essential constitution. This reflects - and in the case of Heidegger quite explicitly - Kantian heritage. This phenomenological, transcendental relevance of the object essentially refers to intentionality - and thus an object-related figure of self-transcending subjectivity. Quite differently, Latour determines the status of things in the collective, ascribing to them an agency that brackets the traditional opposition between acting subjects and passive objects. The contribution encircles precisely that critical point which leads to the separation of phenomenological and ANTistical approaches. While phenomenology grounds itself by reconstructing the experience of objects, ANT focuses on the description of the structures of action, which are composed of actants of all kinds. Finally, the question arises whether Latour's collectivist sociology can learn from phenomenology's methodological solipsism that there is a constructive dimension and plenitude of power in the work of description that is not just left to actors in general, but above all to the analyst herself? (shrink)

This paper critically assesses the possibility of moral enhancement with ambient intelligence technologies and artificial intelligence presented in Savulescu and Maslen (2015). The main problem with their proposal is that it is not robust enough to play a normative role in users’ behavior. A more promising approach, and the one presented in the paper, relies on an artifi-cial moral reasoning engine, which is designed to present its users with moral arguments grounded in first-order normative theories, such as Kantianism or (...) utilitarianism, that reason-responsive people can be persuaded by. This proposal can play a normative role and it is also a more promising avenue towards moral enhancement. It is more promising because such a system can be designed to take advantage of the sometimes undue trust that people put in automated technologies. We could therefore expect a well-designed moral reasoner system to be able to persuade people that may not be persuaded by similar arguments from other people. So, all things considered, there is hope in artificial intelli-gence for moral enhancement, but not in artificial intelligence that relies solely on ambient intelligence technologies. (shrink)

This paper discusses the problem of responsibility attribution raised by the use of artificial intelligence technologies. It is assumed that only humans can be responsible agents; yet this alone already raises many issues, which are discussed starting from two Aristotelian conditions for responsibility. Next to the well-known problem of many hands, the issue of “many things” is identified and the temporal dimension is emphasized when it comes to the control condition. Special attention is given to the epistemic condition, (...) which draws attention to the issues of transparency and explainability. In contrast to standard discussions, however, it is then argued that this knowledge problem regarding agents of responsibility is linked to the other side of the responsibility relation: the addressees or “patients” of responsibility, who may demand reasons for actions and decisions made by using AI. Inspired by a relational approach, responsibility as answerability thus offers an important additional, if not primary, justification for explainability based, not on agency, but on patiency. (shrink)

These phenomenological studies on the philosophy of the image review contemporary image theory while defending the fundamental insight that images alone make the artificial presence of things possible.

In 2017, a Philadelphia research team revealed the closest thing to an artificial womb the world had ever seen. The ‘biobag’, if as successful as early animal testing suggests, will change the face of neonatal intensive care. At present, premature neonates born earlier than 22 weeks have no hope of survival. For some time, there have been no significant improvements in mortality rates or incidences of long-term complications for preterms at the viability threshold. Artificial womb technology, that might (...) change these odds, is eagerly anticipated for clinical application. We need to understand whether AWT is an extension of current intensive care or something entirely new. This question is central to determining when and how the biobag should be used on human subjects. This paper examines the science behind AWT and advances two principal claims. First, AWT is conceptually different from conventional intensive care. Identifying why AWT should be understood as distinct demonstrates how it raises different ethico-legal questions. Second, these questions should be formulated without the ‘human being growing in the AW’ being described with inherently value laden terminology. The ‘human being in an AW’ is neither a fetus nor a baby, and the ethical tethers associated with these terms could perpetuate misunderstanding and confusion. Thus, the term ‘gestateling’ should be adopted to refer to this new product of human reproduction: a developing human being gestating ex utero. While this paper does not attempt to solve all the ethical problems associated with AWT, it makes important clarifications that will enable better formulation of relevant ethical questions for future exploration. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Japanese Things and Words:An Answer to Heidegger's QuestionMichael F. MarraIt has been over thirty years since my high school teacher of philosophy, Professor Dino Dezzani, recommended a book from which to begin my study of philosophy: Martin Heidegger's (1889-1976) Unterwegs zur Sprache (On the way to language [1959]). Evidently he was aware of my interest in literature and thought that Heidegger's discussion of words, things, and (...) poetic language would give some sort of direction to my naïve and youthful questions of what literature is about and what I should hope to find in it.The impact that Heidegger's book had on this young student was much greater than my professor could ever have imagined. I would hardly have committed myself to the study of Japan were it not for my reading of "A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer," which appears in On the Way to Language. The dialogue is a fictional reconstruction of an actual meeting that Heidegger had with Tezuka Tomio (1903-1983), a Japanese scholar of German literature who visited the German philosopher in Freiburg at the end of March 1954.1 In the dialogue the Inquirer (Heidegger) formulates a central question that, in my opinion, should be of fundamental interest to anyone seriously concerned with the study of Japan. The question is deceptively simple, at least compared with the difficulty of coming up with the answer-an answer that, as a matter of fact, the reader will not find fully formulated in the dialogue. The question is: "What is the Japanese word for 'language' "? The Japanese visitor (Tezuka in Heidegger's recollection) appears to have been caught off guard, as we can see from Heidegger's parenthetical remark: "after further hesitation." Had Heidegger posed the same question to a Frenchman or an Italian, the answer would have been immediate: "langue" or "lingua." The challenge for Tezuka was definitely higher since he had a variety of words from which to choose. He could have used, for example, the expression gengo, a combination of two Chinese characters indicating "the speech of words." Instead, he used an ancient Japanese word derived from the native Yamato vocabulary: kotoba, which literally means "the foliage of speech."2There should be little doubt that Tezuka's choice was prompted by his desire to please Heidegger by playing the philosopher's own game-something that Tezuka totally succeeded in doing, as Heidegger's dialogue attests. Tezuka introduced a term that lent itself to etymological play-an enterprise very close to the heart of Heidegger, and one that was also very popular among Japanese thinkers.3 In fact, the expression kotoba incorporates the word koto, which means both "thing" and [End Page 555] "word" and which is found in the basic concepts of Japanese ontology: Mikoto (God, or "the honorable thing"), makoto (truth, or "the true word"), kotodama (soul, or "the spirit of words"), and kotowari(reason, or "the splitting of things"). The association of "words" and "things" in the Japanese word for "language" must have been of particular interest to Heidegger, who, four years before his meeting with Tezuka, had written "Das Ding" (The thing), a major lecture on the notion of things interpreted in light of the fourfold earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. In the dialogue Heidegger refers to this essay, in which "things" are presented in their objectified presence-the disparaged things that modernity and technology have dispossessed of their Being (Sein). Heidegger points out that never has the distance between things and Sein been as great as in modernity, when all distances in space and time have shrunk.4 Given the unflattering position that Heidegger had taken on the notion of "things," Tezuka was forced to come to the rescue of the Japanese word kotoba by endowing koto with the meaning of two Heideggerian keywords: "event" (kotogara) and "affair" (Sache). The thingly component of kotoba was not simply an objectifiable presence that can be counted, analyzed, and disposed of, but rather a poietic "act" that has the power to create a reality by transforming the named thing (koto) into a real thing (koto).In "A Dialogue... (shrink)

In the fourth Immanuel Kant Lecture, Quine summons the specter of Kant’s Ding an sich, the thing in itself. Clearly antithetical to his naturalism, Quine quickly dismisses it as having feet of clay. Despite this short shrift, it is worth examining what he did say about the Ding an sich—in the Kant Lectures, in “Things and Their Place in Theories”, and in “Structure and Nature”. I offer a critical reading of these passages in the context of Quine’s proxy functions, (...) ontological relativity, and structure. I argue that Quine uses the Ding an sich as a foil for his anti-metaphysical, deflationary structuralism—a view that grounds objectivity in true statements, without any transcendental notion of objects, without the Ding an sich. (shrink)

This article juxtaposes two of the most influential thinkers of the previous century, Georges Bataille and Martin Heidegger: my overarching claim will be that a contrastive approach allows a better understanding of two central dynamics within their work. First, I show that both were deeply troubled by a certain methodological anxiety; namely, that the practice of writing might distort and deform their insights. By employing a comparative strategy, I suggest that we can gain a better understanding of the very specific (...) form this fear takes in them: in each case, it is articulated and justified in terms of the ‘chose’ or ‘Ding’ (‘thing’) or the ‘objet’ or ‘Objekt’ (‘object’). Second, I argue that close textual comparison allows us to identify an important, new dimension in their reactions to this shared anxiety: the thing or object which was originally the site of the anxiety gradually becomes, through series of ontological and textual shifts, the solution to it. I track this transformation across a range of case studies including Heidegger’s later work on the term ‘Ding’ and Bataille’s treatment of prostitution. I close by indicating how these results might create avenues for further research. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with the anthropology of the Sophists.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a high-profile subject these days. In its brief history it has undergone several highs and lows and suffered from significant degrees of hype as well as antagonism and fear. One thing is clear: we are no closer to the goal of producing a truly sentient being than when it started. Nonetheless, the tools developed by AI researchers are here to stay and as with all technological advances it has its good and bad aspects. In this (...) article I will present a brief overview of the field of AI looking at what it is, how it developed, what are its specialism as well as some of its well-publicised successes, and failures, as well as pointing out some key Christian participants in the story. (shrink)

The question about the thing is one of the main topics in the work of Vilém Flusser. It seeks to reconsider not only the phenomenology of the things and the problem between the natural and the cultural objects but, importantly, a focus on the “thing” forefronts his theory about human evolution from the manipulation of things towards the digitization of the so called non-things. The connection between Eudoro de Sousa and Vilém Flusser, both friends of the Brazilian (...) Philosopher Vicente Ferreira da Silva in the 1950s in São Paulo, goes also back to the History of the Devil, in which Flusser reinterpreted the Devil as a) the lord of the things and b) the time and the seven sins as the inner mechanism of western civilization. In the 1980s, Eudoro de Sousa, wrote his Mythology, in which he also considers the diabolic force of instrumental reason and the necessity of recovering the symbolic possibility and the reintegration of all things in some kind of final harmony. Both philosophers where influenced by the work of Martin Heidegger, and the present essay tries to show their adaptation of Heidegger’s thinking as well as the parallels between Eudoro de Sousa’s and Vilém Flusser’s vision of overcoming the “diabolic” crisis of Western industrialized civilization. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the development of an artificial womb is already well on its way. By putting together pieces of information arising from new scientific advances in different areas, (neo-natal care, gynecology, embryology, the human genome project and computer science), I delineate a distinctive picture, which clearly suggests that the artificial womb may become a reality sooner than we may think. Currently, there is a huge gap between the first stages of gestation (using in vitro (...) fertilization) and the 22nd week (inside the womb). At the present time this gap seems an insurmountable barrier for fully developing a fetus outside a natural womb – a notion better known as ectogenesis. The history of science however, suggests that impenetrable barriers are such only temporarily. It is just a matter of time (and due research) until someone – intentionally or by chance – accesses the right answer and finds a way to overcome existing obstacles. Despite misgivings that the case of the artificial womb presents too many barriers, it would be naïve to suppose things would happen any differently. I observe in this paper, that it is time to acknowledge the consequences of new developments in different areas of scientific research which are leading to the advent of an artificial womb; and I modestly suggest that we might initiate a discussion on this topic now, while we have still enough time to decide what we may want and why. (shrink)

This chapter examines the possibility of using AI technologies to improve human moral reasoning and decision-making, especially in the context of purchasing and consumer decisions. We characterize such AI technologies as artificial ethics assistants (AEAs). We focus on just one part of the AI-aided moral improvement question: the case of the individual who wants to improve their morality, where what constitutes an improvement is evaluated by the individual’s own values. We distinguish three broad areas in which an individual might (...) think their own moral reasoning and decision-making could be improved: one’s actions, character, or other evaluable attributes fall short of one’s values and moral beliefs; one sometimes misjudges or is uncertain about what the right thing to do is in particular situations, given one’s values; one is uncertain about some fundamental moral questions or recognizes a possibility that some of one’s core moral beliefs and values are mistaken. We sketch why one might think that AI tools could be used to support moral improvement in those areas, and describe two types of assistance: preparatory assistance, including advice and training supplied in advance of moral deliberation; and on-the-spot assistance, including on-the-spot advice and facilitation of moral functioning over the course of moral deliberation. Then, we turn to some of the ethical issues that AEAs might raise, looking in particular at three under-appreciated problems posed by the use of AI for moral self-improvement: namely, reliance on sensitive moral data; the inescapability of outside influences on AEAs; and AEA usage prompting the user to adopt beliefs and make decisions without adequate reasons. (shrink)

Russian constructivism's motif of an »insurgence of things« leads to the imperative of a liberation of things, which turns away from their representation and declares a Bilderverbot (prohibition of representation) in order to create new things for »new men.« These things – for example, clothing and articles of daily use – overleap the opposition between object and thingness. Their essence, as contemporary Russian phenomenology (Gustav Špet, Nikolaj Žinkin) affirms, is not constituted by any »ideal object«, but (...) by social usage, which involves it in an interminable metamorphosis. (shrink)

This paper discusses the notion of a thing in Heidegger. Its aim is to explain the systematic place of that notion in Heidegger’s thought in relation to his ontological discourse: as what is explained through different understandings of being, things allow for a simultaneous differentiation and discussion of the different epochs in the so-called history of being. Thus a henomenology of things and thingness serves as frame of reference for all explications of ‘what there is.’ If Heidegger is (...) a realist, it is not because he attributes reality to all that is, but rather because all explanations of being refer back to how things are discovered as meaningful. (shrink)

Ethics of Artificial Intelligence This article provides a comprehensive overview of the main ethical issues related to the impact of Artificial Intelligence on human society. AI is the use of machines to do things that would normally require human intelligence. In many areas of human life, AI has rapidly and significantly affected human society … Continue reading Ethics of Artificial Intelligence →.

The Meaning of Things explores the meanings of household possessions for three generation families in the Chicago area, and the place of materialism in American culture. Now regarded as a keystone in material culture studies, Halton's first book is based on his dissertation and coauthored with Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. First published by Cambridge University Press in 1981, it has been translated into German, Italian, Japanese, and Hungarian. The Meaning of Things is a study of the significance of material possessions (...) in contemporary urban life, and of the ways people carve meaning out of their domestic environment. Drawing on a survey of eighty families in Chicago who were interviewed on the subject of their feelings about common household objects, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Eugene Rochberg-Halton provide a unique perspective on materialism, American culture, and the self. They begin by reviewing what social scientists and philosophers have said about the transactions between people and things. In the model of 'personhood' that the authors develop, goal-directed action and the cultivation of meaning through signs assume central importance. They then relate theoretical issues to the results of their survey. An important finding is the distinction between objects valued for action and those valued for contemplation. The authors compare families who have warm emotional attachments to their homes with those in which a common set of positive meanings is lacking, and interpret the different patterns of involvement. They then trace the cultivation of meaning in case studies of four families. Finally, the authors address what they describe as the current crisis of environmental and material exploitation, and suggest that human capacities for the creation and redirection of meaning offer the only hope for survival. A wide range of scholars - urban and family sociologists, clinical, developmental and environmental psychologists, cultural anthropologists and philosophers, and many general readers - will find this book stimulating and compelling. Translations: Il significato degli oggetti. Italian translation. Rome: Edizione Kappa, 1986. Der Sinn der Dinge. German translation. Munich: Psychologie Verlags Union, 1989. Japanese translation 2007. Targyaink tukreben. Hungarian translation, 2011. (shrink)

Artificial neural networks and supervised learning have become an essential part of science. Beyond using them for accurate input-output mapping, there is growing attention to a new feature-oriented approach. Under the assumption that networks optimised for a task may have learned to represent and utilise important features of the target system for that task, scientists examine how those networks manipulate inputs and employ the features networks capture for scientific discovery. We analyse this approach, show its hidden caveats, and suggest (...) its legitimate use. We distinguish three things that scientists call a ‘feature’: parametric, diagnostic, and real-world features. The feature-oriented approach aims for real-world features by interpreting the former two, which also partially rely on the network. We argue that this approach faces a problem of non-uniqueness: there are numerous discordant parametric and diagnostic features and ways to interpret them. When the approach aims at novel discovery, scientists often need to choose between those options, but they lack the background knowledge to justify their choices. Consequentially, features thus identified are not promised to be real. We argue that they should not be used as evidence but only used instrumentally. We also suggest transparency in feature selection and the plurality of choices. (shrink)

In the research field of machine ethics, we commonly categorize artificial moral agents into four types, with the most advanced referred to as a full ethical agent, or sometimes a full-blown Artificial Moral Agent (AMA). This type has three main characteristics: autonomy, moral understanding and a certain level of consciousness, including intentional mental states, moral emotions such as compassion, the ability to praise and condemn, and a conscience. This paper aims to discuss various aspects of full-blown AMAs and (...) presents the following argument: the creation of full-blown artificial moral agents, endowed with intentional mental states and moral emotions, and trained to align with human values, does not, by itself, guarantee that these systems will have _human_ morality. Therefore, it is questionable whether they will be inclined to honor and follow what they perceive as incorrect moral values. we do not intend to claim that there is such a thing as a universally shared human morality, only that as there are different human communities holding different sets of moral values, the moral systems or values of the discussed artificial agents would be different from those held by human communities, for reasons we discuss in the paper. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 8.1 (2001) 33-37 [Access article in PDF] "Impossible Things before Breakfast":A Commentary on Burman and Richmond Gwen Adshead "Why sometimes, I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast." --Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking GlassBoth Burman and Richmond discuss how a feminist critique or take on a body of theory helps to illuminate or confuse further theoretical development. Burman applies such a (...) critique to False Memory Syndrome (FMS); Richmond to psychoanalytic accounts of eating disorders. In this commentary, I want to discuss the application of a feminist critique to two vital concepts for psychiatry: the recording and measurement of data, and truthful accounts of experience. These concepts are of course related, and I want to explore their connections, not only with each other, but with specific areas of mental health practice, namely, mental health research, psychodynamic psychotherapy, and expert psychiatric testimony. The Recording Angel: Subjectivity and Objectivity, Measurement and Truth Most feminist critiques of measurement begin with an attack on the traditional theoretical distinction between objective and subjective worlds (for example, Fox Keller 1985). Classical accounts of Western scientific practice have assumed that it is possible to divide external physical experience in this way, and this assumption generates two further beliefs: first, that it is possible for an observer to, as it were, stand apart or outside the events observed, and second, that objective accounts of events are somehow real-er or true-er than subjective accounts. This account contains some very old ideas about natural experience: first, that a fixed reality exists that is external to those who have experienced an event, and second, that this reality is observable by others, that is, there is a space between the observer and the observed. This notion of objectivity has been thought to be crucial to valid measurement.In contrast, a feminist critique counterargues that every observer is influenced and influences what he is studying; that he is himself "positioned" in the subject of his interest, in Rom Harré's term. Further, feminist theory argues that because the objective-subjective split is artificial, subjective accounts of experience may be just as "true" as objective accounts. Overarching is the notion that all social behavior is socially constructed and affected by social context, including "science" in all its forms.Such doubts about the exact nature of science have been fueled by two sets of theory within [End Page 33] "science"--the claims of quantum theory in the 1920s and Thomas Kuhn's account of shifting scientific paradigms in the 1960s--and both of these theories have been important for feminism and feminist critique of scientific practice. Despite many odd features, quantum theory has produced research with considerable explanatory power (Hawking 1988, Barrow 1991, Smollin 1997), and some of its claims provide indirect support for the feminist position described above. For example, one claim of quantum theory is that, at the micro-level of events, what is being observed is influenced by the position of the observer. If true, then the notion of an easy divide between internal and external space, in which observer and observed are separately located, is undermined; rather, every position taken by the observer influences the observed in a dynamic relationship. There is no objectivity but rather a developing matrix of positions that are not externally fixed, but changing and uncertain. Similarly, in relation to social construction of theory, Kuhn's description of the changing nature of scientific paradigms also emphasizes the importance of social and community influences on scientific theories and how "true" accounts of events can change. Internal and External Worlds: Implications for Mental Health Research and Psychotherapy Practice Arguably, feminist claims about the social positioning of science are now unremarkable; no one involved in research (especially mental health research) could dispute that what is studied, what is funded, and what is published is hugely influenced by many social and political processes. Even if only to a limited extent, quantum theory and Kuhn do support the doubt thrown on classic notions of objectivity by feminist theory; if only by suggesting that reality... (shrink)

A revised version of my dissertation will soon appear (in German) under the title "Der Streit um das Ding an sich: Systematische Analysen zur Rezeption des kantischen Idealismus 1781–1794" (de Gruyter, vol. 150 “Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie” series). -/- My dissertation is focused on Kant’s transcendental idealism and the early, pre-Fichtean criticism thereof. It takes up the problem of the thing in itself in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and analyzes the most influential criticisms by Kant’s very first readers (...) (J. G. Feder, C. Garve, F. H. Jacobi, H. A. Pistorius, J. A. Eberhard, G. E. Schulze, and S. Maimon), who challenged the coherence and plausibility of Kant’s overall idealist conception. In reconstructing and discussing these early reactions to Kant’s idealism, I analyze and assess their criticism against the background of new scholarship on transcendental idealism, pursuing two central goals: (i) I defend Kant’s idealism –– and in particular, the status of the Kantian thing in itself –– against these early critics; (ii) nonetheless, I argue that by engaging with their texts, there are valuable lessons to be learnt which can and should inform our contemporary understanding of Kant. Consequently, the claims and arguments of this thesis have implications for both contemporary Kant scholarship, as well as research on the reception of Kant and/or the origins of German Idealism. With respect to Kant scholarship, I do not regard the endorsement of one-world readings of Kant’s idealism as an indispensable move for a defense of Kant against his early critics; the interpretive and argumentative strategies I develop are mostly neutral with respect to the debate between one- and two-world readings. From the perspective of research on the reception of Kant and/or the origins of German Idealism, my dissertation goes against a widespread tendency within the historiography of German philosophy: the tendency to distinguish between “conservative”, “backward-looking” early critics of Kant on the one hand, and more “progressive”, “forward-looking” ones –– who pave the way for German Idealism –– on the other hand. I argue instead that Kant’s pre-Fichtean readers form a far more homogeneous group than is often thought: rather than considering their arguments in isolation, where they can easily be overlooked philosophically, placing them in context with one another helps us better appreciate the interesting philosophical points they contain. -/- . (shrink)

These collected studies on the philosophy of the image offer the fundamental insight that images alone make the artificial presence of things possible. Images present things as exclusively visible, released from the laws of physics. Taking this idea as his point of departure, Wiesing provides an overview of the fundamental positions in contemporary image studies. He describes the use of images as signs from a phenomenological perspective, reconstructs Plato's concept of mimesis by way of the canon of (...) images it presupposes, and demonstrates the special relevance of extreme types of images— virtual reality, desktop windows, or abstract photography—for the philosophical labor of the concept of the image. (shrink)

To become more broadly applicable, positions on AI ethics require perspectives from non-Western regions and cultures such as China and Japan. In this paper, we propose that the addition of the concept of harmony to the discussion on ethical AI would be highly beneficial due to its centrality in East Asian cultures and its applicability to the challenge of designing AI for social good. We first present a synopsis of different definitions of harmony in multiple contexts, such as music and (...) society, which reveals that the concept is, at its core, about well-balanced relationships and appropriate actions which give rise to order, balance, and aesthetically pleasing phenomena. The mediator for these well-balanced relationships isTaktwhich is an ability to act thoughtfully and sensibly according to the specific situation and to put things into proportion and order. We propose that the central challenge of building harmonizing AI is to make intelligent systems tactful and also to design and use them tactfully. For an AI system to become tactful, it needs to be able to have an advanced sensitivity to the specific contexts which it is in and their social and ethical implications and have the capability of approximately inferring the emotional and cognitive states of people with whom it is interacting. (shrink)

India has produced several drafts of data policies. In this work, they are referred to [1] JBNSCR 2018, [2] DPDPR 2018, [3] NSAI 2018, [4] RAITF 2018, [5] PDPB 2019, [6] PRAI 2021, [7] JPCR 2021, [8] IDAUP 2022, [9] IDABNUP 2022. All of them consider Artificial Intelligence (AI) a social problem solver at the societal level, let alone an incentive for economic growth. However, these policy drafts warn of the social disruptions caused by algorithms and encourage the careful (...) use of computational technologies in various social contexts. Hence, the emerging data society and its implications in India's social contexts demand immense social science attention, which needs to be improved in the policy drafts, primarily because they are creations of industry stakeholders, technocrats, bureaucrats, and experts from tech schools. In the larger social milieu of digital infrastructure emerging, the fundamental question is whether India's national philosophy envisioned in the Indian constitution is reflected in the policy papers. The paper enquires whether the national data policy upholds the core values dispersed through the philosophy of the Indian constitution, which, among other things, is not confined only to inclusion, diversity, rights, liberty, justice and equality. By focusing on constitutional values, the paper seeks to offer a broader and more critical understanding of India's approach to AI policy by bringing together analyses of a wide array of policy documents available in the public realm. (shrink)

As artificial intelligence systems are becoming increasingly autonomous and will soon be able to make decisions on their own about what to do, AI researchers have started to talk about the need to align AI with human values. The AI ‘value alignment problem’ faces two kinds of challenges—a technical and a normative one—which are interrelated. The technical challenge deals with the question of how to encode human values in artificial intelligence. The normative challenge is associated with two questions: (...) “Which values or whose values should artificial intelligence align with?” My concern is that AI developers underestimate the difficulty of answering the normative question. They hope that we can easily identify the purposes we really desire and that they can focus on the design of those objectives. But how are we to decide which objectives or values to induce in AI, given that there is a plurality of values and moral principles and that our everyday life is full of moral disagreements? In my paper I will show that although it is not realistic to reach an agreement on what we, humans, really want as people value different things and seek different ends, it may be possible to agree on what we do not want to happen, considering the possibility that intelligence, equal to our own, or even exceeding it, can be created. I will argue for pluralism which is compatible with objectivism. In spite of the fact that there is no uniquely best solution to every moral problem, it is still possible to identify which answers are wrong. And this is where we should begin the value alignment of AI. (shrink)

Periodically in science there arrive on the scene what appear to be dramatically new theoretical frameworks (what the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn has called paradigm shifts). Characteristic of such changes in perspective is the recasting of old problems in new terms. By altering the conceptual vocabulary we use to think about problems, we may discover solutions which were obscured by prior ways of thinking about things. Connectionism, artificial life, and dynamical systems are all approaches to cognition which (...) are relatively new and have been claimed to represent such paradigm shifts. Just how deep the shifts are remains an open question, but each of these approaches certainly seems to offer novel ways of dealing with basic questions in cognitive science. (shrink)

For the philosopher, the most critical and fundamental question in the project of Artificial Intelligence is the question of intelligence or cognition in general. From the beginning of the research in “thinking Machining”, or Artificial Intelligence as it later became known, the key question is: What makes a thing intelligent or what constitutes intelligence? Since, intelligence, is a fundamental activity of the mind, the question, has been: Whether the mind is a computer or is the computer a mind? (...) Many philosophers who have and are engaging and interrogating these problematics, do it from the perspective of modern and contemporary philosophy of mind, consciousness and language. The objective of this work is to interrogate the question of “intelligence” in Artificial Intelligence from the perspective of the Scholastics’ notion of Intellectus. (shrink)