In her work, Doris Bischof-Köhler describes how empathically motivated prosocial behavior emerges during the second year of life. From a cross-cultural perspective we argue that this developmental pathway is prototypical for autonomy-oriented sociocultural contexts. Bischof-Köhler’s theory should be complemented by a theory of situational helping behavior based on shared intentional relations to provide an alternative developmental pathway for understanding toddlers’ prosocial behavior. Because this developmental pathway does not presuppose an understanding of self and others as autonomous intentional agents, it may (...) be more typical for relatedness-oriented sociocultural contexts. (shrink)

Erstmals werden in einem deutschsprachigen Werk zentrale Theorien sowie theoretische Konzepte der Internationalen Politischen Ökonomie vorgestellt. Der Band gibt einen fundierten Überblick über verschiedene theoretische Perspektiven mit ihren jeweiligen Stärken und Schwächen und verortet diese in der internationalen Diskussion. Der Band ermöglicht es, sich in die Vielfalt der verschiedenen Theorien einzuarbeiten – von Rational Choice, Keynesianismus und Institutionalismus über feministische Theorie, Regulations- und Weltsystemtheorie bis hin zu konstruktivistischen und poststrukturalistischen Theorien. Weiterhin werden wichtige Konzepte wie Laissez-Faire-Liberalismus, Finanzialisierung, Macht und die (...) Veränderung von Staatlichkeit diskutiert. ​. (shrink)

Influenced by the Wittgensteinian slogan “Don’t look for the meaning, look for the use,” ordinary language philosophers aimed to defuse various philosophical problems by analyzing key words in terms of what they are used to do or the conditions for appropriately using them. Although Moore, Grice and Searle exposed this error – mixing pragmatics with semantics – it still gets committed, now to a different end. Nowadays the aim is to reckon with the fact that the meanings of a great (...) many sentences underdetermine what we would normally mean in using them – even if the sentence is free of indexicality, ambiguity, and vagueness. This can be so because the sentence expresses a “minimal” proposition or even because it doesn’t fully express any proposition. Many theorists are led to defend “truth-conditional pragmatics” (or linguistic “contextualism”), to find a hidden indexical in every syntactic nook or semantic cranny, or otherwise to pay undue respect to seemingly semantic intuitions and intentions. This paper identifies various such moves and explains what’s regressive about them. (shrink)

There is a simple view of motivation on which desires are like pain-killers; they come in different strengths, and their strength determines their efficacy. That is, the stronger a desire the greater its motivational force and, when two desires conflict, the stronger one “wins out” over the weaker. This view makes it puzzling how anyone could ever exhibit “strength of will” and act on the weaker desire, even when it is a desire for something more highly valued than what is (...) more strongly desired. When the will, as the agent of reason, enters the fray, an explanation of what a person is motivated enough to do must reckon not only with competing desires and their motivational forces, but also with the will’s capacity to be affected by different ones in ways not proportional to their force. However, this complication sheds little light, for if the will must bestow its stamp of approval on a desire before the desire leads to action, then, it would seem, motivational force should be measured by strength of effect on the will. And if that’s the way to measure motivational force, then, since by that measure one always acts on the desire that affects one’s will most, there is no problem of strength of will after all. But the problem seems real, however inapt the label. (shrink)

Many physicists regard the flow of time as an illusion. There is an upper level flow of time, the phenomenon of past/present/future; and there is a lower level flow of time which is really a flow of events. Perceptual completion accounts for the lower level flow of time in a few ways: apparent movement; amodal completion; and dynamic change as exemplified by a newly described modal completion that we called happening. It acts like an illusory percept connecting discrete stimuli in (...) all sensory modalities. The past/present/future distinction cannot exist unless an object is perceived to be the same now as it is then. This cognition requires object persistence. Experiments with object persistence suggest the circumstances when that, too, is an illusory percept. The illusory percepts of object persistence and perceptual completion can account for the entire flow of time. Our findings and conclusions are congruent with a few time theories and cosmologies that suggest that the flow of time is an illusion. (shrink)

Das 17. Jahrhundert ist beherrscht von der Maschine. Sie dominiert als technische Konstruktion die Theorien und Praxen der wissenschaftlichen Revolution und bedingt entscheidend den Aufstieg der empirischen Wissenschaften. Als Metapher hat sie Erklärungskraft für barocke Modelle von Welt und Mensch, von Körper und Geist; bildlich repräsentiert sie kulturelle und natürliche, weltliche und religiöse Prozesse. Auch Literatur und Theater sind nicht ohne Maschinen zu denken. Darum geht es in diesem Buch: um die polyfunktionale Figur der Maschine in Bezug auf theater- und (...) literaturästhetische Diskurse und Performanzen. Denn Maschinen haben im rationalistisch-mechanistischen Barockzeitalter nicht nur philosophischen Erklärungswert - sie besitzen zugleich Generierungspotenzial: das Potenzial, Neues und Anderes, Mögliches und Unmögliches zu generieren. Die Poiesis der Maschine in der barocken Theater- und Literaturästhetik steht zur Diskussion. Vorgestellt werden zwei zentrale poietische Prozesse: Die Maschine generiert literarisch-theatrale Möglichkeitsräume auf der Bühne und im Buch. Zum einen setzt die Theatermaschine die barocke Ästhetik des Spektakulären um, gesteigert in der maschinellen Theatralisierung der Welt im Rahmen des barocken Festes. Zum anderen inszeniert die Maschinenliteratur Technikutopien auf der Schnittstelle zwischen Wirklichkeit und utopisch-visionärer Möglichkeit – und steht damit für das noch nicht diversifizierte literarische System der Frühen Neuzeit ein. Den Hauptteil des Buchs bildet ein Repertorium, welches die Werkgruppe der "Theatra Machinarum" erstmals systematisch erfasst: gedruckte, ein- oder mehrbändige Technikschaubücher vom 16. bis 18. Jahrhundert, die reale und imaginierte Maschinen in Bild und Text präsentieren und sich, häufig durch einen theatermetaphorischen Titel, als Inszenierungen von Wissen auf einer Bühne ausstellen. (shrink)

a comprehensive, somewhat Gricean theory of speech acts, including an account of communicative intentions and inferences, a taxonomy of speech acts, and coverage of many topics in pragmatics -/- .

Presenting a novel account of singular thought, a systematic application of recent work in the theory of speech acts, and a partial revival of Russell's analysis of singular terms, this book takes an original approach to the perennial problems of reference and singular terms by separating the underlying issues into different levels of analysis.

Confusion in terms inspires confusion in concepts. When a relevant distinction is not clearly marked or not marked at all, it is apt to be blurred or even missed altogether in our thinking. This is true in any area of inquiry, pragmatics in particular. No one disputes that there are various ways in which what is communicated in an utterance can go beyond sentence meaning. The problem is to catalog the ways. It is generally recognized that linguistic meaning underdetermines speaker (...) meaning because of the need for disambiguation and reference assignment and because people can speak figuratively or indirectly. But philosophers and linguists are coming to recognize that these are not the only ways. The situation may be described in Gricean terms: the distinction between what is said and what is implicated is not exhaustive. Charting the middle ground between the two will require attending to specific examples, noting their distinctive features, and articulating the relevant concepts. That is what I aim to do here. The basic idea will be to distinguish not only the implied from the explicit but the implicit from the implied. (shrink)

For the most part, the papers collected in this volume stern from presentations given at a conference held in Tucson over the weekend of May 31 through June 2, 1985. We wish to record our gratitude to the participants in that conference, as well as to the National Science Foundation and the University of Arizona SBS Research Institute for their financial support. The advice we received from Susan Steele on organizational matters proved invaluable and had many felicitous consequences for the (...) success of the con­ ference. We also would like to thank the staff of the Departments of Linguistics of the University of Arizona and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst for their help, as weIl as a number of individuals, including Lin Hall, Kathy Todd, and Jiazhen Hu, Sandra Fulmer, Maria Sandoval, Natsuko Tsujimura, Stuart Davis, Mark Lewis, Robin Schafer, Shi Zhang, Olivia Oehrle-Steele, and Paul Saka. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to Martin Scrivener, our editor, for his patience and his encouragement. Vll INTRODUCTION The term 'categorial grammar' was introduced by Bar-Rillel as a handy way of grouping together some of his own earlier work and the work of the Polish logicians and philosophers Lesniewski and Ajdukiewicz, in contrast to approaches to linguistic analysis based on phrase structure grammars. (shrink)

Grice’s distinction between what is said and what is implicated has greatly clarified our understanding of the boundary between semantics and pragmatics. Although border disputes still arise and there are certain difficulties with the distinction itself (see the end of §1), it is generally understood that what is said falls on the semantic side and what is implicated on the pragmatic side. But this applies only to what is..

Traditional debate on the metaphysics of gender has been a contrast of essentialist and social-constructionist positions. The standard reaction to this opposition is that neither position alone has the theoretical resources required to satisfy an equitable politics. This has caused a number of theorists to suggest ways in which gender is unified on the basis of social rather than biological characteristics but is “real” or “objective” nonetheless – a position I term social objectivism. This essay begins by making explicit the (...) motivations for, and central assumptions of, social objectivism. I then propose that gender is better understood as a real kind with a historical essence, analogous to the biologist’s claim that species are historical entities. I argue that this proposal achieves a better solution to the problems that motivate social objectivism. Moreover, the account is consistent with a post-positivist understanding of the classificatory practices employed within the natural and social sciences. (shrink)

This paper offers a smattering of applications of pragmatics to epistemology. In most cases they concern recent epistemological claims that depend for their plausibility on mistaking something pragmatic for something semantic. After giving my formulation of the semantic/pragmatic distinction and explaining how seemingly semantic intuitions can be responsive to pragmatic factors, I take up the following topics: 1. Classic Examples of Confusing Meaning and Use 2. Pragmatic Implications of Hedging or Intensifying an Assertion 3. Belief Attributions 4. Knowledge-wh 5. The (...) Knowledge Rule on Assertion 6. Testimony 7. Asserting and Thinking of Possibilities 8. Concessive Knowledge Attributions 9. “Pragmatic Encroachment” 10. Epistemic Contextualism.. (shrink)

The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that 'that'-clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this "Specification Assumption", that for a belief report of the form 'A believes that p' to be true,' the proposition that p must be among the things A believes. I use Kripke's Paderewski case to call the Specification Assumption into question. Giving up that assumption offers prospects for an intuitively more plausible approach (...) to the semantics of belief reports. But this approach must confront a puzzle of its own: it turns out that every case is a Paderewski case, at least potentially. (shrink)