Background:The management of challenging behaviours in inpatient with intellectual disability and/or autism spectrum disorders can lead to an escalation of control measures. In these complex situations where patients have an intellectual disability/autism spectrum disorder accompanied by a psychiatric comorbidity, the experiences of caregivers related to the crisis management have rarely been studied.Purpose:This study examined the moral experiences of caregivers related to challenging behaviours’ management and alternatives to control measures.Research design:Using Charles Taylor’s hermeneutic framework, a 2-month focused ethnography with a participatory (...) approach was used.Participants and research context:Sixteen caregivers were interviewed in a Canadian mental health setting for adults with intellectual disability/autism spectrum disorder and psychiatric comorbidity.Ethical considerations:The research was conducted in compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki and local Research Ethics Board approval. Written informed consent was collected systematically from participants.Findings:By accounting for caregivers’ moral experiences, this study sheds light on a neglected dimension of the care relationship: the vulnerability of the caregiver. We highlight the main barriers and facilitators to alternatives to control measures. First, a caregiver’s vulnerability was characterised by the overall impact of challenging behaviours and the moral distress associated with the use of control measures and exclusion mechanisms of intellectual disability/autism spectrum disorder patients. Second, a strong ambiguity between care and control measures and a lack of inclusive approaches were identified as the two main barriers to challenging behaviour management. Third, the involvement, both professional and personal, of caregivers was deemed necessary to implement alternatives to control measures.Discussion:A conflict of values opposes two conceptions of autonomy: a rational autonomy, which is counterproductive to the reduction of control measures, versus a relational autonomy based on shared vulnerability.Conclusion:The recognition of caregiver’s vulnerability is a benchmark to create alternative approaches, which defuse the logic of control and promote an ethics of care within which caregivers’ self-concern can be understood as fostering mutual respect. (shrink)

IntroductionWe aimed to study post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms in breast cancer patients during the coronavirus disease pandemic.Materials and methodsWe included BC patients receiving medical treatment during the first COVID-19 lockdown in France. PTSD symptoms were evaluated using the Impact of Event Scale-Revised questionnaire. Quality of life [Functional Assessment of Cancer Therapy-General ], cognitive complaints [Functional Assessment of Cancer Therapy–Cognitive Function ], insomnia [Insomnia Severity Index ], and psychosocial experiences during lockdown were also evaluated. Multivariable logistic regression was used to identify (...) clinical factors and psychosocial factors associated with PTSD symptoms.ResultsAmong the 253 included BC patients, 46% had metastatic cancer and 52% were treated by chemotherapy alone. COVID-19-induced adjustments in medical oncology practices were experienced by 27% of patients. No case of COVID-19 was reported; 23% of BC patients had PTSD symptoms. Compared to other patients, patients with PTSD symptoms had more fears relative to COVID-19 infection, had more feeling of isolation, and had more prescription or increased use of psychotropic drugs. In the multivariable model adjusted for clinical factors, fears relative to COVID-19 and increased use of psychotropic drugs were independently associated with PTSD symptoms. Besides, patients with PTSD symptoms had poor quality of life, and more cognitive complaints and insomnia.ConclusionPost-traumatic stress disorder symptoms were observed in 23% of BC patients during the first COVID-19 lockdown in France. Psychological supports are needed for patients treated during the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

The present note first discusses the concept of s-convex pain functions in decision theory. Then, the economic behavior of an agent with such a pain function is represented through the comparison of some recursive lotteries.

It is widely held that under ordinal utility, utility differences are ill-defined. Allegedly, for these to be well-defined (without turning to choice under risk or the like), one should adopt as a new kind of primitive quaternary relations, instead of the traditional binary relations underlying ordinal utility functions. Correlatively, it is also widely held that the key structural properties of quaternary relations are entirely arbitrary from an ordinal point of view. These properties would be, in a nutshell, the hallmark of (...) cardinal utility. While much is obviously true in these two tenets, this note explains why, as stated, they should be abandoned. Any ordinal utility function induces a rich quaternary relation. There is such a thing as ordinal utility differences. Furthermore, this induced quaternary relation respects, apart from completeness, the most standard structural properties of quaternary relations. These properties are, from an ordinal point of view, anything but arbitrary; from a quaternary perspective only completeness should be considered the hallmark—if any—of cardinal utility. These facts are explained to be especially relevant to the critical appreciation of the ordinalist methodology. (shrink)

We reexamine some of the classic problems connected with the use of cardinal utility functions in decision theory, and discuss Patrick Suppes's contributions to this field in light of a reinterpretation we propose for these problems. We analytically decompose the doctrine of ordinalism, which only accepts ordinal utility functions, and distinguish between several doctrines of cardinalism, depending on what components of ordinalism they specifically reject. We identify Suppes's doctrine with the major deviation from ordinalism that conceives of utility functions as (...) representing preference differences, while being non- etheless empirically related to choices. We highlight the originality, promises and limits of this choice-based cardinalism. (shrink)

State-dependent utility is a problem for the behavioural branch of decision theory under uncertainty. It questions the very possibility that beliefs be revealed by choice data. According to the current literature, all models of beliefs are equally exposed to the problem. Moreover, the problem is solvable only when the decision-maker can influence the resolution of uncertainty. This article gives grounds to reject these two views. The various models of beliefs can be shown to be unequally exposed to the problem of (...) state-dependent utility. The problem can be argued to be solved even when the decision-maker has no influence over the resolution of uncertainty. The implications of such reappraisal for a philosophical appreciation of the revealed preference methodology are discussed. (shrink)

Expected-utility theory has been a popular and influential theory in philosophy, law, and the social sciences. While its original developers, von Neumann and Morgenstern, presented it as a purely predictive theory useful to the practitioners of economic science, many subsequent theorists, particularly those outside of economics, have come to endorse EU theory as providing us with a representation of reason. But precisely in what sense does EU theory portray reason? And does it do so successfully? There are two strikingly different (...) answers to these questions in the literature. On the one hand, there is the view of people such as David Gauthier that EU theory is an implementation of the idea that reason's only role is instrumental. On the other hand, there is the view suggested by Leonard Savage that the theory is a “formal” and noninstrumental characterization of our reasoning process. (shrink)

This challenging and provocative book argues against much contemporary orthodoxy in philosophy and the social sciences by showing why objectivity in the domain of ethics is really no different from the objectivity of scientific knowledge. Many philosophers and social scientists have challenged the idea that we act for objectively authoritative reasons. Jean Hampton takes up the challenge by undermining two central assumptions of this contemporary orthodoxy: that one can understand instrumental reasons without appeal to objective authority, and that the (...) adoption of the scientific world view requires no such appeal. In the course of the book Jean Hampton examines moral realism, the general nature of reason and norms, internalism and externalism, instrumental reasoning, and the expected utility model of practical reasoning. The book is sure to prove to be a seminal work in the theory of rationality that will be read by a broad swathe of philosophers and social scientists. (shrink)

The Sure-Thing Principle famously appears in Savage’s axiomatization of Subjective Expected Utility. Yet Savage introduces it only as an informal, overarching dominance condition motivating his separability postulate P2 and his state-independence postulate P3. Once these axioms are introduced, by and large, he does not discuss the principle any more. In this note, we pick up the analysis of the Sure-Thing Principle where Savage left it. In particular, we show that each of P2 and P3 is equivalent to a dominance condition; (...) that they strengthen in different directions a common, basic dominance axiom; and that they can be explicitly combined in a unified dominance condition that is a candidate formal statement for the Sure-Thing Principle. Based on elementary proofs, our results shed light on some of the most fundamental properties of rational choice under uncertainty. In particular they imply, as corollaries, potential simplifications for Savage’s and the Anscombe- Aumann axiomatizations of Subjective Expected Utility. Most surprisingly perhaps, they reveal that in Savage’s axiomatization, P3 can be weakened to a natural strengthening of so-called Obvious Dominance. (shrink)

Research on reasoning about consequential arguments has been an active but piecemeal enterprise. Previous research considered in depth some subclasses ofconsequential arguments, but further understanding of consequential arguments requires that we address their greater variety, avoiding the risk of over-generalisation from specific examples. Ideally we ought to be able to systematically generate the set of consequential arguments, and then engage in random sampling of stimuli within that set. The current article aims at making steps in that direction, using the theory (...) of utility conditionals as a way to generate a large set of consequential arguments, and offering one study illustrating how the theory can be used for the random sampling of stimuli. Itis expected that further use of this method will bring more diversity to experimental research on consequential arguments, and more robustness to models of argumentation from consequences. (shrink)

Consider a subjective expected utility preference relation. It is usually held that the representations which this relation admits differ only in one respect, namely, the possible scales for the measurement of utility. In this paper, I discuss the fact that there are, metaphorically speaking, two additional dimensions along which infinitely many more admissible representations can be found. The first additional dimension is that of state-dependence. The second—and, in this context, much lesser-known—additional dimension is that of act-dependence. The simplest implication of (...) their usually neglected existence is that the standard axiomatizations of subjective expected utility fail to provide the measurement of subjective probability with satisfactory behavioral foundations. (shrink)

The psychology of reasoning is increasingly considering agents' values and preferences, achieving greater integration with judgment and decision making, social cognition, and moral reasoning. Some of this research investigates utility conditionals, ‘‘if p then q’’ statements where the realization of p or q or both is valued by some agents. Various approaches to utility conditionals share the assumption that reasoners make inferences from utility conditionals based on the comparison between the utility of p and the expected utility of q. This (...) article introduces a new parameter in this analysis, the underlying causal structure of the conditional. Four experiments showed that causal structure moderated utility-informed conditional reasoning. These inferences were strongly invited when the underlying structure of the conditional was causal, and significantly less so when the underlying structure of the conditional was diagnostic. This asymmetry was only observed for conditionals in which the utility of q was clear, and disappeared when the utility of q was unclear. Thus, an adequate account of utility-informed inferences conditional reasoning requires three components: utility, probability, and causal structure. (shrink)

This paper examines the preference-based approach to the identification of beliefs. It focuses on the main problem to which this approach is exposed, namely that of state-dependent utility. First, the problem is illustrated in full detail. Four types of state-dependent utility issues are distinguished. Second, a comprehensive strategy for identifying beliefs under state-dependent utility is presented and discussed. For the problem to be solved following this strategy, however, preferences need to extend beyond choices. We claim that this a necessary feature (...) of any complete solution to the problem of state-dependent utility. We also argue that this is the main conceptual lesson to draw from it. We show that this lesson is of interest to both economists and philosophers. (shrink)

There is one Karl Marx, and a multitude of Marxisms. This concise, introductory book by internationally renowned scholar Jean Anyon centers on the ideas of Marx that have been used in education studies as a guide to theory, analysis, research, and practice. Marx and Education begins with a brief overview of basic Marxist ideas and terms and then traces some of the main points scholars in education have been articulating since the late 1970s. Following this trajectory, Anyon details how (...) social class analysis has developed in research and theory, how understanding the roles of education in society is influenced by a Marxian lens, how the failures of urban school reform can be understood through the lens of political economy, and how cultural analysis has laid the foundation for critical pedagogy in US classrooms. She assesses ways neo-Marxist thought can contribute to our understanding of issues that have arisen more recently and how a Marxist analysis can be important to an adequate understanding and transformation of the future of education and the economy. By exemplifying what is relevant in Marx, and replacing that which has been outdone by historical events, Marx and Education aims to restore the utility of Marxism as a theoretical and practical tool for educators. (shrink)

The basic axioms or formal conditions of decision theory, especially the ordering condition put on preferences and the axioms underlying the expected utility formula, are subject to a number of counter-examples, some of which can be endowed with normative value and thus fall within the ambit of a philosophical reflection on practical rationality. Against such counter-examples, a defensive strategy has been developed which consists in redescribing the outcomes of the available options in such a way that the threatened axioms or (...) conditions continue to hold. We examine how this strategy performs in three major cases: Sen's counterexamples to the binariness property of preferences, the Allais paradox of EU theory under risk, and the Ellsberg paradox of EU theory under uncertainty. We find that the strategy typically proves to be lacking in several major respects, suffering from logical triviality, incompleteness, and theoretical insularity. To give the strategy more structure, philosophers have developed “principles of individuation”; but we observe that these do not address the aforementioned defects. Instead, we propose the method of checking whether the strategy can overcome its typical defects once it is given a proper theoretical expansion. We find that the strategy passes the test imperfectly in Sen's case and not at all in Allais's. In Ellsberg's case, however, it comes close to meeting our requirement. But even the analysis of this more promising application suggests that the strategy ought to address the decision problem as a whole, rather than just the outcomes, and that it should extend its revision process to the very statements it is meant to protect. Thus, by and large, the same cautionary tale against redescription practices runs through the analysis of all three cases. A more general lesson, simply put, is that there is no easy way out from the paradoxes of decision theory. (shrink)

Nous avons fait nos premiers pas, lu nos premiers livres, écrit nos premiers mots; de la même manière, nous lisons nos premiers mots philosophiques et nous les prononçons. Il en est de la philosophie comme de toute discipline intellectuelle : elle a son langage, ses mots propres, ses tournures un peu spécifiques qui peuvent, par leurs définitions, introduire aux problèmes philosophiques les plus importants. Il peut être utile d'essayer d'entrer dans la définition des termes philosophiques les plus usuels afin (...) de comprendre les questions philosophiques véhiculées par eux. Les mots étant les signes de ce que connaît l'intelligence de la réalité, ils contiennent déjà en eux toute une conception philosophique qui présente à l'esprit les divers degrés du réel. Dans le nouveau programme de Terminale du 27 mai 2003, il est demandé aux professeurs, sous la rubrique " repères ", d'initier les élèves aux questions philosophiques en proposant la signification des termes philosophiques les plus habituels, comme absolu/relatif, accidentel/ essentiel, en acte/en puissance, etc. Ce petit livre, Les premiers mots philosophiques, reprend l'ensemble des termes proposés dans ces " repères ", montrant comment, à partir des significations les plus simples" de ces termes philosophiques, l'intelligence peut s'ouvrir à la connaissance philosophique du réel, dans toute sa diversité et sa complexité. D'une certaine manière, il peut représenter comme une introduction à la philosophie, clarifiant les différents sens des mots philosophiques pour permettre, par eux, une première connaissance du réel. L'auteur, par son expérience pédagogique de trente années d'enseignement en classe Terminale, donne ainsi un " outil " pédagogique qui pourra être utile aux élèves comme aux professeurs, ainsi qu'à tous ceux qui désirent s'initier à la philosophie. L'auteur, Jean-Baptiste Echivard, est professeur de philosophie à l'Externat Sainte Marie de Lyon et à l'IPC - Facultés libres de philosophie et de psychologie. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the betting behavior of a decision-maker who can influence the likelihood of the events upon which she is betting. In decision theory, this is best known as a situation of moral hazard. Focusing on a particularly simple case, I sketch the first systematic analysis of moral hazard in the canonical Savage framework. From the results of this analysis, I draw two philosophical conclusions. First, from an observational and a descriptive point of view, there need to (...) be no incompatibility between moral hazard and the Savage framework. This qualifies the incompatibility view, that is ubiquitous in decision theory. Second, in general, moral hazard is not sufficient to overcome the challenges posed by state-dependent utility to the behavioral identification of beliefs. This qualifies the sufficiency view, that is influential in decision theory. These two philosophical conclusions are the main contributions of my paper. (shrink)

We consider a situation where an individual is facing an uncertain situation, but may costly alter his knowledge of the uncertainties. We study in this context how risk aversion may modify the individual search behavior. We consider a one-armed bandit problem (where one arm is safe and the other is risky) and study how the agent risk aversion can change the sequence of arms selected. The main result is that when the utility function is more concave, the agent has more (...) chances to select the safe arm. We also discuss how search is affected by risk aversion. (shrink)

We consider a situation where an individual is facing an uncertain situation, but may costly alter his knowledge of the uncertainties. We study in this context how risk aversion may modify the individual search behavior. We consider a one-armed bandit problem (where one arm is safe and the other is risky) and study how the agent risk aversion can change the sequence of arms selected. The main result is that when the utility function is more concave, the agent has more (...) chances to select the safe arm. We also discuss how search is affected by risk aversion. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Potochnik (Biol Philos 24(2):183–197, 2009) analyses some uses of optimality modelling in light of the anti-adaptationism criticism. She distinguishes two broad classes of such uses (weak and strong) on the basis of assumptions held by biologists about the role and the importance of natural selection. This is an interesting proposal that could help in the epistemological characterisation of some biological practices. However, Potochnik’s distinction also rests on the assumption that all optimality modelling represent the selection dynamic (...) involved in the system of phenomena being considered. Since this assumption does not hold for models belonging to optimal foraging theory (OFT)—one of behavioural ecology’s important modelling traditions—Potochnik’s proposal has to be critically reappraised. In this paper, we briefly discuss what is optimality modelling and what it means for a model to represent a dynamic of selection or of evolution. Then, we demonstrate that OFT modelling is unable to represent either past or contemporary selection dynamics. In order to make this point, we carefully delineate the theory’s rationale. This allows us to identify and analyse the assumptions on which the theory is built, and to circumscribe precisely the role that natural selection plays in it. Next, we show that the distinction of weak and strong uses of optimality modelling is seriously weakened when OFT modelling is taken into account. More precisely, the distinction is either irrelevant (if the assumption that selection dynamics are represented in all optimality modelling is held) or of a modest utility (if the assumption is dropped). However, we suggest that Potochnik’s original proposal could be saved, and that it even constitutes a tool to appraise the marks left in the literature by the evolution of optimality modelling practices in the last four decades, provided that it is made into a tripartite distinction. (shrink)

The paper extends a result in Dutta and Ray's (1989) theory of constrained egalitarianism initiated by relying on the concept of proportionate rather than absolute equality. We apply this framework to redistributive systems in which what the individuals get depends on what they receive or pay qua members of generally overlapping groups. We solve the constrained equalization problem for this class of models. The paper ends up comparing our solution with the alternative solution based on the Shapley value, which has (...) been recommended in some distributive applications. (shrink)

In some situations, a decision is best represented by an incompletely analyzed act: conditionally on a given event A, the consequences of the decision on sub-events are perfectly known and uncertainty becomes probabilizable, whereas the plausibility of this event itself remains vague and the decision outcome on the complementary event ${\bar{A}}$ is imprecisely known. In this framework, we study an axiomatic decision model and prove a representation theorem. Resulting decision criteria aggregate partial evaluations consisting of (i) the conditional expected utility (...) associated with the analyzed part of the decision, and (ii) the best and worst consequences of its non-analyzed part. The representation theorem is consistent with a wide variety of decision criteria, which allows for expressing various degrees of knowledge on ( ${A, \bar{A}}$ ) and various types of attitude toward ambiguity and uncertainty. This diversity is taken into account by specific models already existing in the literature. We exploit this fact and propose some particular forms of our model incorporating these models as sub-models and moreover expressing various types of beliefs concerning the relative plausibility of the analyzed and the non-analyzed events ranging from probabilities to complete ignorance that include capacities. (shrink)

Tel un dieu parmi les hommes... Ainsi Epicure decrit-il le bienheureux etat qu'il promet a Menecee, son disciple. Et qu'il promet aussi a tous ceux qui auront pris le soin de s'adonner, en temps utile, a l'etude de la vraie doctrine. Car la vie, d'ordinaire, perit par le delai, et chacun de nous meurt affaire. Selon le sage du Jardin, seules des certitudes irrecusables, touchant a la constitution physique du tout, peuvent nous delivrer de la crainte du sujet de (...) la mort et des dieux. Seule la science du mouvement eternel des atomes errant dans le vide infini peut annihiler la douleur de l'ame et laisser advenir en nous la souveraine felicite, la joie de vivre dont temoignent les enfants et les betes, le divin plaisir qui constitue la trame de notre etre. (shrink)

We investigate risk attitudes when the underlying domain of payoffs is finite and the payoffs are, in general, not numerical. In such cases, the traditional notions of absolute risk attitudes, that are designed for convex domains of numerical payoffs, are not applicable. We introduce comparative notions of weak and strong risk attitudes that remain applicable. We examine how they are characterized within the rank-dependent utility model, thus including expected utility as a special case. In particular, we characterize strong comparative risk (...) aversion under rank-dependent utility. This is our main result. From this and other findings, we draw two novel conclusions. First, under expected utility, weak and strong comparative risk aversion are characterized by the same condition over finite domains. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Second, under expected utility, weak comparative risk aversion is characterized by the same condition when the utility functions have finite range and when they have convex range. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Thus, considering comparative risk aversion over finite domains leads to a better understanding of the divide between expected and non-expected utility, more generally, the structural properties of the main models of decision-making under risk. (shrink)

In Richard Bradley’s book, Decision Theory with a Human Face, we have selected two themes for discussion. The first is the Bolker-Jeffrey theory of decision, which the book uses throughout as a tool to reorganize the whole field of decision theory, and in particular to evaluate the extent to which expected utility theories may be normatively too demanding. The second theme is the redefinition strategy that can be used to defend EU theories against the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, a strategy (...) that the book by and large endorses, and even develops in an original way concerning the Ellsberg paradox. We argue that the BJ theory is too specific to fulfil Bradley’s foundational project and that the redefinition strategy fails in both the Allais and Ellsberg cases. Although we share Bradley’s conclusion that EU theories do not state universal rationality requirements, we reach it not by a comparison with BJ theory, but by a comparison with the non-EU theories that the paradoxes have heuristically suggested. (shrink)

On peut considérer comme relevant de « l'impuissance de Dieu » le thème de l'absence de Dieu et de l'abandon de l'homme en présence de Dieu chez Georges Bataille. Cette réflexion sur le sentiment d'absence est ce qui permet d'échapper à la confusion théologique traditionnelle du sacré et de l'utile. Cet athéisme de la peur de la mort est à la base de l' anthropologie de Bataille. The themes of God's absence and of man abandoned in the presence of (...) God in the work of Georges Bataille may be viewed as part of the larger theme of « God's impotence ». These reflections regarding the sense of [His] absence allow us to go beyond the traditional theological confusion between the sacred and the useful. Such atheism of the fear of death is fundamental to Bataille's anthropology. (shrink)

Welfarism, a position which for a long time enjoyed a hegemonic status in the field of normative economics, holds that the sole ethically relevant information for assessing social states of affairs pertains to individual utilities. Serge-Christophe Kolm presents the Equal-Labour Income Equalization model very explicitly and repeatedly as breaking with the still dominant tradition of welfarism. This paper explores the meaning of this distancing from welfarism found in the ELIE model. After having provided conceptual clarifications concerning both ELIE and welfarism, (...) we discuss various opposing aspects of this model of income redistribution to welfarism. We show that the refusal of welfarism by the ELIE model does not depend mainly on its axiomatic features, but on its deontological perspective. (shrink)

James Cain issues forth a two-pronged attack against classical forms of act utilitarianism, elucidating objections from infinite utility streams and distributive justice through his novel examples.1 In his first example, we are to imagine an infinite number of immortals, living on an infinitely long street (Elm Street), bracing to suffer an infinite amount of migraine pain with the onset of this horrific disease. Left untreated, the disease would wreak havoc among our immortals in the following way. Year 1: P1 Year (...) 2: P1, P2, P3 Year 3: P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7 Year 4: P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P10, P11, P12, P13, P14, P15.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:104 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY thus cast into the depths of skepticism. Because of his acquaintance with the skeptical literature Chilling-worth rejected the first alternative. Arguments concerning the fallibility of the senses and reason and the complexity of reality itself were too strong to be ignored. However, he was also unwilling to accept the second alternative. He developed instead a middle position. In his Religion of Protestants (London, 16S8) he (...) develops a position based on an appeal to common-sense and a doctrine of levels os evidence and certainty. Theological problems are to be solved in the same manner as problems of ordinary men in ordinary situations. Any claim to revelation, for example, is to be evaluated as any other problem, by examining the adequacy of the testimony and the reliability of witnesses. Hence the sense of mystery, of the revealedness of revelation is lost. Depending on whether one has good or poor evidence for a proposition one can be more or le~ certain of it. In most cases, one's certainty of religious propositions is of the same sort as that of the carpenter or pilot in their respective trades-not absolute certainty but certainty enough to assure good practical results. Hence religious belief is adequate if it serves to turn one from vice to virtue. Since religious truth is no longer unique, either with respect to evidence or certainty, it is available to all who are honest in their pursuit of it. Thus the epistemological justification for the democratization of religion of which Lichtenstein makes so much is provided a generation before More published his major works. My criticism of the book, then, is not that Lichtenstein attributes the de-emphasis of reason, loss of mystery, etc., of eighteenth-century thought solely to, More (though since he writes primarily on only one man one sometimes gets that impression) but that his account of the milieu from which More springs and of which he is only a part is inadequate. But for all that the book is well worth reading. HENRY G. VAN LEEUWs Hanover College Pascal. By Jean Steinmann. New edition revised and enlarged. ([Brus~ls]: Desclge De Brouwer [1962]. Pp. 378, illus. Bfr. 240.) Sorte de testament spirituel du critique tragiquement et prgmaturgment disparu, la seconde 6~dition du Pascal de Steinmann constitue sans doute la synth~se la plus agrgable et commode qui existe actuellement de la vie, de roeuvre et de la rgputation de Pascal. Entre les nombreux auteurs qui ont successivement attirg la plume rive et fgconde de Steinmann, Pascal est, en effet un de ceux avec qui il avait le plus de familiaritg. Ecrivain, th~logien, mais surtout exegete, Steinmann a d'ailleurs su mieux que presque tous ses pr~d~cesseurs, caractgriser la sensibilitg biblique de Pascal et en souligner l'importance. Inversement, il marque le caract~re peu philosophique de l'Apologi'e et voit (~t notre sens avec raison) la principale originalitg de son auteur dans le fair qu'il a cherch~ ~ mener au christianisme par la psychologie et par l'histoire, non par la metaphysique. Le chapitre le plus neuf de Steinmann est enfin celui que traite de l'histoire posthume de Pascal, sorte de bibliographie comrfientge qui sera certainment fort utile ~t celui qui abordera l'immense litt~rature publige ~ son sujet. Une rgaction en pattie l~gitime contre le clichg romantique de l'"inquigtude pascalienne " entra~ne Steinmann ~t trop insister apr~s B~guin, sur un,dogmatisme" (p. 308) d'ailleurs rattach6 ~ l'h6r6dit~ paternelle dont nous doutons qu'elle aft 6t6 dominante dans ]e cas de Pascal. On regrette aussi l'ignorance de l'article d'Et. Gilson sur "ab~tir" BOOK REVIEWS t05 (p. 254), des insuflisances au sujet du p~ht~ originel (p. 253), l'aflirmation erron~e du caract~re spontan~ de la confession au P. Beurrier (p. 207 n.) et surtout le lapsus Pinthard pour Pinthereau (pp. 363, $78). A c6t~ du petit Pascal de Jean Mesnard, cla~ique dans les universitY, le present ouvrage n'en contribuera pas moins ~ r~pondre dans un tr~s large cercle une connaissance de l'auteur des Pens~es enrichie par la sympathie. JZAN... (shrink)

Theorists have consistently maintained that the most plausible forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic if and only if indeterminism is true. This standard position, however popular, lacks sufficient motivation. Assume determinism to be true and an attempt will be made to show that attractive forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic - and not for reasons related to our epistemic limitations either. -/- Here it is argued that all extant objective formulations of consequentialism fail to deliver the normative implications (...) that the spirit of objective consequentialism requires. My argument rests upon the claim that certain pairs of subjunctive conditionals with identical antecedents and incompatible consequents are such that neither of the pair is true. -/- Upon leveling the objection, the concept of an "objective" subjunctive probability is introduced and utilized in the transformation of a subjective version of expected act utility consequentialism into an objective version, one that is capable of dealing with the difficulties posed by the objection. I end by indicating some ways in which the closest thing to a plausible, objective form of consequentialism might be developed. (shrink)

Les machines ne sont pas seulement d'utiles instruments de travail mais aussi le fruit des fantasmes les plus irrationnels. L'homme a toujours projeté sur elles ses rêves de maîtrise du temps et de l'espace : Icare, Galatée, etc. Aujourd'hui, la cybernétique et la robotique considèrent les machines comme des véhicules infaillibles du progrès. Infaillibles et neutres. Alors que ces nouvelles divinités pourraient bien nous ouvrir les portes de l'enfer. Cette critique du prométhéisme technicien nous déniaise et nous met en garde (...) : c'est la plus étayée et la plus pertinente depuis celle de Jacques Ellul. Jean Brun est l'un des philosophes français les plus originaux et les plus réputés dans le monde universitaire. Le grand public l'ignore encore, parce qu'il s'inscrit contre toutes les modes engendrées par la dictature des sciences humaines. Sa réflexion sur la nudité de l'âme contemporaine emprunte à Kierkegaard, à Berdiaev et à Chestov. En outre, sa plume dédaigné d'utiliser le jargon des jargonneurs ; il écrit pour être compris. (shrink)

This text is a set of reflections about a book that had been translated in French, published of late and that collected an article and a book of ethics written by J. Harsanyi. Harsanyi’s aim was to understand and make understood the ethical considerations implied or supposed by game theory; whether its authors were aware of that or not. He does it by the means of a bundle of theses, the ones included in Kant’s works -provided they were criticized enough-, (...) the others in Smith’s works and others again in Bayes, whose way of practicing mathematics is clearly perceived by Harsanyi as linked to an explicitly utilitarian philosophy, but the affinity of which we have recognized as having acquaintance with some considerations of Montaigne in his _ Essays _. So, our own aim was to place Harsinyi’s work in a longer tradition than the Kantian and English-speaking ones as Harsanyi probably believed and suggested to have believed it sufficient with regard to the exclusivity of his references. This c... (shrink)

L'œuf de ver à soie qui se prête à de nombreuses recherches génétiques et physiologiques a été assimilé à un volume géométrique simple afin qu'on puisse calculer aisément l'aire de sa surface totale et son volume. On a d'abord cherché à justifier le modèle géométrique proposé grâce à une étude expérimentale et statistique. On a ensuite établi les formules mathématiques utiles. Enfin on a discuté de l'approximation donnée par ces formules et de leur signification biologique.The egg of the silkworm which (...) permits a lot of genetical and physiological researches has been assimilated to a simple geometric volume, so that the area of its total surface and its volume might be easily calculated. First we have tried to justify the geometrical model which is proposed by means of an experimental and statistical study. We have then demonstrated the useful mathematical formulas. Finally we have discussed the approximation given by these formulas and their biological significance.Das Seidenraupenei, das viele genetische und physiologische Forschungen ermöglicht, hat man mit einem einfachen geometrischen Modell verglichen, um seine ganze Fläche und sein Volumen leicht rechnen zu können. Zuerst hat man versucht, das vorgeschlagene geometrische Modell dank einer experimentalen und statistischen Arbeit zu rechtfertigen. Dann sind die nötigen mathematischen Formeln festgesetzt worden. Zuletzt hat man die durch diese Formeln gegebenen Annäherungen und ihre biologischen Bedeutung erörtert. (shrink)

Les philosophes écrivent avec une aisance surprenante, presque sans retenue pourrait-on dire. Par ailleurs, ils semblent faire usage d’une force d’affirmation qui peut paraître énigmatique. Ils sont ainsi portés à soutenir des choses qui vont contre le sens commun, qui sont même manifestement fausses, mais jouissent malgré tout de prestige et de légitimité. On ajoutera que peu d’entre eux sont enclins à s’expliquer clairement sur ce qui les fait philosopher. Eh bien, entrons dans l’ambiance, dans l’état psychologique et intime où (...) se forge une philosophie. On y découvrira peut-être l’une des plus anciennes formes d’addiction psychique. Quelle est alors la drogue philosophique ? Plus précisément, en quelle manière la philosophie peut-elle relever d’une ivresse, d’un vertige comparable à un état narcotique ? Bien entendu, il faut s’empresser de relever la part d’humour de cette approche. Elle n’en est pas moins utile, car elle aide à s’approprier le geste philosophique. La philosophie pourrait ainsi se défaire de son visage d’aristocratie intellectuelle. (shrink)

Il ne s'agit pas seulement ici de rendre compte de la philosophie de la technique que l'on trouve chez Platon et chez Simondon, et de quelques autres parmi les plus importantes, mais d'affronter véritablement la question : qu'est-ce que la technique? On voudrait faire apparaître d'abord le caractère exemplaire et décisif de Platon pour la compréhension de ce qu'a été la réalité technique de son temps aussi bien que pour la compréhension, aujourd'hui encore, de la réalité technique actuelle, des problèmes (...) qui sont liés à son identification comme telle et à la démarche qui convient pour son étude. C'est aller contre la tradition qui en fait un ignorant et un ennemi de la technique, préoccupé avant tout d'un monde d'Idées 'coupées' du monde sensible. Cette tradition, quasiment aussi ancienne que Platon lui-même, est toujours vivante, fondée désormais sur une représentation de la technique qui se voudrait moderne (la technique comme 'application de la science'). C'est un des intérêts de la pensée de la technique de Gilbert Simondon (prolongeant et systématisant une tradition qui passe en France notamment par Henri Bergson et Georges Canguilhem), que de délivrer de l'idée précipitée selon laquelle l'essence de la technique serait d'être une application de la science, idée dont la faiblesse est la plus évidente quand il s'agit d'une époque où la science n'existait pas encore au sens actuel. La lecture de Platon n'est pas seulement libérée par la compréhension de la technique que propose Simondon, elle est elle-même une préparation très utile à la lecture de ce dernier, reposant sur des exemples plus simples. Ce qu'apprend une philosophie de la technique, on le voit exemplairement chez Platon et chez Simondon, n'est pas seulement comment organiser des concepts et des idées (dont l'importance politique et sociale est évidente), c'est comment regarder précisément le réel, penser son existence et son évolution."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

En 1814, Jeremy Bentham entreprend la rédaction de Chrestomathia, qui expose le savoir qu'il est utile d'apprendre. Mais ce texte est plus généralement une organisation entière du savoir de son temps à partir d'une «théorie des fictions », qui est à la fois une réflexion sur les concepts et une critique des nomenclatures. L'article qui suit s'intéresse particulièrement à la cinquantaine de pages consacrées aux mathématiques dans un ouvrage qui porte sur toutes les sciences du début du XIXe siècle (...) et critique l' Encyclopédie de Diderot et D'Alembert. L'une des idées les plus originales développées par l'auteur et dont on trouvera un écho lointain chez Gaston Bachelard est celle d'un conflit entre les concepts et la façon dont ils sont désignés par les mots. Signifiés, signifiants et concepts dérivent les uns par rapport aux autres en des sens que nul ne peut contrôler, pas même les savants; ce qui rend l'éducation durablement difficile. (shrink)

L’œuvre de Bentham repose sur quelques paradoxes étonnants. Le premier est que le plaisir est la clé de voûte du système des arts et des sciences et pourtant ce système ne donne lieu à aucune esthétique qui ait l'ampleur de la réflexion de l'auteur sur le droit, la politique, l’éthique, les sciences, les techniques, et même sur la religion. Le second est que l'on a souvent opposé l'utilité à la beauté et bien des auteurs ont vu dans la recherche de (...) l'utilité une enquête incompatible avec la recherche du beau. Mais il n'y a guère de raison à donner pour justifier cette opposition : une chose peut être utile et belle ; une chose belle a au moins l'utilité de sa beauté puisqu'elle produit un plaisir. Le troisième est que l'analyse que Bentham mène à propos du plaisir et de la douleur est assez incertaine ; tantôt le plaisir est tenu pour aussi réel que la douleur, mais, à d'autres moments, la douleur est plus réelle que le plaisir. Le quatrième tient à la difficulté de nier radicalement qu'il y ait des bons goût et des mauvais goûts ; la notion de goût implique cette différence. Enfin, nous avons trouvé si peu de raison qui permette d'exclure les beaux arts du champ de la réflexion utilitariste que nous nous sommes risqués, à partir de quelques éléments donnés par Bentham, à esquisser une esthétique. Il nous paraît toutefois qu'une esthétique utilitariste reste à concevoir. (shrink)

Il s'agit en l'espèce du Marx auteur d'une thèse de doctorat sur la Différence de la philosophie de la nature chez Démocrite et chez Épicure. On ne tient plus cet écrit pour un simple travail scolaire, destiné à satisfaire les exigences d'un stupide examen, selon l'expression de B. Bauer. Il s'est taillé une place dans le corpus épicurien, figurant par exemple dans la bibliographic de Bréhier-Schuhl, alors que l'ouvrage érudit de Goedeckemeyer sur le même thème n'y apparaît pas. Marx y (...) a mis explicitement en parallèle le post-hégélianisme, outre qu'il a consacré une note aux deux factions qui composaient la postérité de Hegel. Son travail est un document fort utile pour éclairer l'actualité post-hégélienne et singulièrement, en ce qui le concerne, ce qu'il appelle lui-même le passage de la discipline à la liberté. (shrink)