This article maps the components of telephone tutorial conferences used for distance learning in higher education. Using conversation analysis we identified four common sequences of TTCs as `calling in'; `agenda-setting'; `tutorial proper'; and `closing down'. Patterns of student participation look similar to those in face-to-face tutorials and the degree of interaction during `calling-in' and agenda setting does not foretell student participation in the `tutorial proper'. Student participation was related to differences in `communicative formats' adopted by tutors and students for different (...) purposes. These findings have helped us reflect on our communicative practices as university teachers and indicate that TTCs are functionally comparable with face-to-face tutorials in higher education settings. (shrink)

Recent philosophy of mind has had a mistaken conception of the nature of psychological concepts. It has assumed too much similarity between psychological judgments and those of natural science and has thus overlooked the fact that other people are not just objects whose thoughts we may try to predict and control but fellow creatures with whom we talk and co-operate. In this collection of essays, Jane Heal argues that central to our ability to arrive at views about others' thoughts (...) is not knowledge of some theory of the mind but rather an ability to imagine alternative worlds and how things appear from another person's point of view. She then applies this view to questions of how we represent others' thoughts, the shape of psychological concepts, the nature of rationality and the possibility of first person authority. This book should appeal to students and professionals in philosophy of mind and language. (shrink)

This paper investigates three morphosyntactic alternations in Estonian – those between the exterior locative cases allative, adessive and ablative and the corresponding postpositionspeale‘onto’,peal‘on’ andpealt‘off’. Based on the Complexity Principle (e.g., Rohdenburg, Günter. 2002. Processing complexity and the variable use of prepositions in English. In Hubert Cuyckens & Günter Radden (eds.),Perspectives on prepositions, 79–100. Tübingen: Niemeyer), we expect cognitively more complex constructions to use more explicit (i.e., morphologically more substantial) marking by means of a postposition. Further, we expect variation to be (...) conditioned similarly in all three semantic categories. For each of the three alternations, a random sample of the two outcomes (case vs. postposition) from the Estonian National Corpus is used, resulting in 3,000 data points. Using properties of the Landmark phrase as independent variables in Bayesian mixed-effects logistic regression models, we predict the choice of postpositions over case-marked realisations. Of the patterns found, only the frequency-related one supports our complexity-related hypothesis. We conclude that the Complexity Principle, in its general form, has little explanatory power for the Estonian constructions at hand and, in particular, that the derived principle of ‘analytic support’ is not generally applicable. We show, however, that the grammatical knowledge of Estonian exterior locative cases and the corresponding postpositions is regulated by our three factors in a relatively uniform way. (shrink)

This collection of essays by one of the foremost Kant scholars of our time is a welcome and timely addition to the literature. Henrich is a very prolific scholar, and the lack of English translations of most of his works may account in some measure for the fact that there has been surprisingly little sustained engagement with them by Anglo-American scholars, especially those working on Kant’s ethics. It is to be hoped that this volume will help provoke such an engagement.

This book introduces the experience and process of gestation into the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, Levinas and Derrida as a feminist project of maternal emancipation.

Bailey (2021) offers a clever argument for the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility based on the nature of intrinsic intentions. The argument is mistaken on two counts. First, it is invalid. Second, even setting that first point aside, the argument proves too much: we would be blameworthy in paradigm cases of non-blameworthiness. I conclude that we cannot reason from intentions to responsibility solely from the “inside out”—our possessing a blameworthy intention cannot tell us whether this intention is also blameworthy (...) in deterministic worlds. (shrink)

In 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the "Human Cloning Prohibition Act" and President Bush announced his decision to allow only limited research on existing stem cell lines but not on "embryos." In contrast, the U.K. has explicitly authorized "therapeutic cloning." Much more will be said about bioethical, legal, and social implications, but subtleties of the science and careful definitions of terms have received much less consideration. Legislators and reporters struggle to discuss "cloning," "pluripotency," "stem cells," and "embryos," and (...) whether "adult" are preferable to "embryonic" stem cells as research subjects. They profess to abhor "copying humans" or "killing embryos." Do they know what they are talking about? Do we? This paper explores the historical, philosophical, and scientific contexts that inform this heated discussion. (shrink)

Problem: if God has middle knowledge, he should actualize a world containing only persons whom he knows would freely choose heaven. Thus there should be no hell. Craig offers an answer to this problem in his article “ ‘No Other Name’: a Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation Through Christ.” Craig is mainly concerned to give a logically possible defense of hell, though he thinks his suggestion does not lack the sort of plausibility needed for a theodicy. I (...) consider various objections to the latter assessment. My conclusion is that, although Craig’s argument is implausible as a theodicy of conservative exclusivist soteriology, it is useful for less traditional ideas of hell. (shrink)

This paper seeks to highlight the benefits of prioritizing moderate African communitarian principles as partly demonstrated in the HIV prevention strategies implemented in Uganda in the late 1980s. Pertinent lessons could be drawn so as to achieve the HIV prevention targets envisioned in the post-2015 development era. Communitarianism emphasizes the importance of communities as part of healthy human existence. Its core ethical values include the virtues of generosity, compassion, and solidarity. Persuasion through communication, consensus through dialogue, and the awareness and (...) commitment to responsibilities towards other members of the community, are chief practices relied upon to achieve appropriate social behaviour. All these elements signify individual rootedness in communities and contribute to the healthy existence of its members. Communitarianism is usually classified as either authoritarian/radical or responsive/moderate, depending on the primacy given to either community interests or the individual will and rights. Moderate communitarianism recognizes the individual's capacity for moral reasoning, virtue and free choice. The ensuing form of society is deemed more ethical as it relies on education in the virtues, moral persuasion and informal social controls, without stifling individual identity, agency, and capacity for self-determination. If moderate African communitarianism, in particular, can to a certain extent be associated with the significant aspects of Uganda's HIV prevention strategies in the stated period, then its present-day relevance for HIV prevention and other public health interventions may be emphasized accordingly. This applies especially in view of the ongoing efforts to achieve a balance between individual and collective interests in bioethics. (shrink)

An analysis of the Christian writings of Edith Stein helps to show how her philosophical training enabled her to develop a Christian epistemology and concomitant metaphysics. Special emphasis is placed on some of her shorter works in their translation by Hilda Graef.

An analysis of the Christian writings of Edith Stein helps to show how her philosophical training enabled her to develop a Christian epistemology and concomitant metaphysics. Special emphasis is placed on some of her shorter works in their translation by Hilda Graef.

I construct and describe an epistemology for the religious – a naturalized epistemology – based on recent work in epistemics. Two points of view exemplary of religious thought are analyzed , and the normative/descriptive distinction in epistemology utilized to bolster the contention that the religious requires a less normative, more descriptive concomitant epistemology. I conclude that our reluctance to grapple with difficult ontological questions is directly related to the standard normative epistemology of the Anglo‐American analytic tradition, and I also conclude (...) that tradition is of little use to us in attempting to develop an epistemology of the religious. (shrink)

I construct and describe an epistemology for the religious – a naturalized epistemology – based on recent work in epistemics. Two points of view exemplary of religious thought are analyzed (Wisdom's and work taken from Kierkegaard), and the normative/descriptive distinction in epistemology utilized to bolster the contention that the religious requires a less normative, more descriptive concomitant epistemology. I conclude that our reluctance to grapple with difficult ontological questions is directly related to the standard normative epistemology of the Anglo‐American analytic (...) tradition, and I also conclude that tradition is of little use to us in attempting to develop an epistemology of the religious. (shrink)

Depending on the realist or instrumentalist twist that is given to positivism, interesting arguments can be made for both causal and classical theories of reference with regard to the use of scientific terms in the language of theory. But my claim is that the rigid foundationalism that supports the theoretical terms via the correspondence rules of the Received View undercuts the notion that it is possible to argue coherently for a causal theory of reference as allied to a positivistic view.

Depending on the realist or instrumentalist twist that is given to positivism, interesting arguments can be made for both causal and classical theories of reference with regard to the use of scientific terms in the language of theory. But my claim is that the rigid foundationalism that supports the theoretical terms via the correspondence rules of the Received View undercuts the notion that it is possible to argue coherently for a causal theory of reference as allied to a positivistic view.

Bringing to bear two major lines of argument, I claim that foundationalism is vitiated by its reliance (in its various forms) on privileged access, and by its noninstantiability. The notion of privileged access is examined, and the status of propositions said to be evocative of privileged access addressed. Noninstantiability is viewed through the current project of naturalizing epistemology, and naturalized alternatives to the rigorous foundationalism of the normative epistemologists are brought forward.

In 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the "Human Cloning Prohibition Act" and President Bush announced his decision to allow only limited research on existing stem cell lines but not on "embryos." In contrast, the U.K. has explicitly authorized "therapeutic cloning." Much more will be said about bioethical, legal, and social implications, but subtleties of the science and careful definitions of terms have received much less consideration. Legislators and reporters struggle to discuss "cloning," "pluripotency," "stem cells," and "embryos," and (...) whether "adult" are preferable to "embryonic" stem cells as research subjects. They profess to abhor "copying humans" or "killing embryos." Do they know what they are talking about? Do we? This paper explores the historical, philosophical, and scientific contexts that inform this heated discussion. (shrink)