O presente relato nasce da participação no curso de extensão “Educação e Diversidade: dialogando com os saberes dos povos tradicionais”, realizado pela Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro – UERJ, oferecido pelo grupo interinstitucional África. O relato tem como objetivo refletir sobre o encontro com as matemáticas dos povos tradicionais, proporcionado pelo curso, e como essas matemáticas podem colaborar na formação de licenciandos em matemática dentro de uma matriz étnico-racial.

: While putting forward the proposal of a “philosophy of technology in the nominative case,” grounded on the concept of Neoenvironmentality, this paper intends to argue that the best definition of our current age is not “Anthropocene.” Rather, it is “Technocene,” since technology represents here and now the real “subject of history” and of nature, i.e. the environment where man has to live.This proposal culminates in a new definition of man’s humanity and of technology. Switching from natura hominis to conditio (...) humana, the peculiarity of man can be defined on the basis of an anthropic perimeter, the core of which consists of man’s worldhood: man is that being that has a world, while animal has a mere environment. Both man’s worldhood and animal’s environmentality are derived from a pathic premise, namely the fundamental moods that refer them to their respective findingness.From this anthropological premise, technology emerges as the oikos of contemporary humanity. Technology becomes the current form of the world – and so gives birth to a Technocene – insofar as it introduces in any human context its ratio operandi and so assimilates man to an animal condition, i.e. an environmental one. Technocene corresponds on the one side to the emergence of technology as environment and on the other to the feralization of man. The spirit of Technocene turns out to be the complete redefinition of the anthropic perimeter.While providing a non-ideological characterization of the current age, this paper proposes the strategy of an ‘anthropological conservatism,’ that is to say a pathic desertion understood as a possible condition for the beginning of an authentic Anthropocene, i.e. the age of an-at-last-entirely-human-man. (shrink)

While putting forward the proposal of a “philosophy of technology in the nominative case,” grounded on the concept of Neoenvironmentality, this paper intends to argue that the best definition of our current age is not “Anthropocene.” Rather, it is “Technocene,” since technology represents here and now the real “subject of history” and of (a de-natured) nature, i.e. the (neo)environment where man has to live.This proposal culminates in a new definition of man’s humanity and of technology. Switching from natura hominis to (...) conditio humana, the peculiarity of man can be defined on the basis of an anthropic perimeter, the core of which consists of man’s worldhood: man is that being that has a world (Welt), while animal has a mere environment (Umwelt). Both man’s worldhood and animal’s environmentality are derived from a pathic premise, namely the fundamental moods (Grundstimmungen) that refer them to their respective findingness (Befindlichkeit).From this anthropological premise, technology emerges as the oikos of contemporary humanity. Technology becomes the current form of the world – and so gives birth to a Technocene – insofar as it introduces in any human context its ratio operandi and so assimilates man to an animal condition, i.e. an environmental one. Technocene corresponds on the one side to the emergence of technology as (Neo)environment and on the other to the feralization of man. The spirit of Technocene turns out to be the complete redefinition of the anthropic perimeter.While providing a non-ideological characterization of the current age, this paper proposes the strategy of an ‘anthropological conservatism,’ that is to say a pathic desertion understood as a possible (pre)condition for the beginning of an authentic Anthropocene, i.e. the age of an-at-last-entirely-human-man. (shrink)

The paper will examine the critical psychoanalytical model of emancipation proposed by Herbert Marcuse. I will show that Marcuse’s critical model has two moments; one that I call negative, formulated around the idea of repressive sublimation—as developed by Marcuse in One-Dimensional Man—and another one that I call normative, which finds its roots in a very peculiar reading of Freudian narcissism and leads to the idea of nonrepressive sublimation. By this reading of Marcuse, I hope to circumscribe the role of psychoanalysis (...) in the redefinition of the actual tasks of Critical Theory. (shrink)

Na Política, III, 9, Aristóteles desaprova a distribuição de poder da constituição democrática dizendo que esta serve ao fim da amizade, a saber, a convivência, mas não ao fim político. Nosso propósito aqui é procurar esclarecer por que uma comunidade política não é, sem qualificação, uma comunidade de amigos, utilizando-nos da definição e análise aristotélica da amizade na Ética Nicomaqueia, VIII. O resultado obtido é que toda associação, inclusive a política, tem um tipo de amizade que lhe é relativa, determinado (...) pelo seu fim e pela distribuição das funções e das vantagens. A associação política tem por fim algo diverso da mera convivência. Por isso, é na medida em que a distribuição é feita para obter esse fim que existe alguma amizade entre os membros da associação política e não na medida em que esses querem simplesmente conviver uns com os outros, como implicitamente suposto na distribuição democrática. (shrink)

This paper presents and discusses Karl Löwith’s anthropological critique of existential analytic that is formulated in his Habilitation thesis (Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen, 1928), where he develops an anthropological counter-paradigm, i. e.Mitanthropologie, in opposition to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Given the extent and the complexity of such a subject, I will limit the present inquiry to two specific topics: theMiteinandersein(Being-with-one-another) and above all theSein zum Tode(Being-towards-death). In practice, I will first explain the basic features of Mitanthropologie together with (...) the crucial critique that it levels atBeing and Time. I will follow by outlining the importance of theTodesfrage(the question of death) within the existential analytic by means of a comparison between Heidegger’sBeing-towards-deathand Kierkegaard’sSickness unto death(Krankheit zum Tode). Finally, I will expound Löwith’s objection toBeing-towards-death, which is expressed in the alternative formulaFreiheit zum Tode(Freedom-towards-death). (shrink)

In this essay the author examines Sartre's attitude toward Marxism as related to his existentialism and his approach to history. Existentialism, from a methodological point of view, has been of much avail as an “ideology” rooted in personal freedom. Still, judging it from a Marxist point of view, Sartre has criticized existentialism for a) its theoretical limits (it is abstract, nonhistorical, non-dialectic); and b) its ethical and political “faults,” since it is self-defeating and almost exclusively leaning toward privacy. And yet (...) one has to note how Sartre neglected to point out that existentialism's theoretical limits are due not only to its non-dialectical foundations but also to its nonscientific character and its hidden religiousness. Moreover, Sartre has not properly considered its historical value as a struggle against metaphysical thought and against a farfetched use of science. Basically — and apart from the views stated in such articles as “Les Communistes et la paix” — Sartre's Marxism is, from a political and ideological standpoint, strongly biased toward Soviet Marxism and socialism, since its main emphasis is anti-dogmatic and humanistic. Above all, this basic attitude could be explained by the negative influences of some historical and political events of the ‘40’s and ‘50’s on the development of his thought. As a matter of fact, his Marxism grew up against the background of Soviet politics in the Stalin and post-Stalin eras. Therefore, he refuses to accept any dogmatic and deterministic images of Marxism; instead of dogma he affirms the relevance of problems; in lieu of given truths, a concern for moral demands. In so doing, Sartre has based his Marxism more on the subjective praxis than on nature and history naturalistically viewed. (shrink)

Proposing to examine syntheses of manifold experiences of the contemporary philosophical panorama, Michel Foucault’s “critical ontology of actuality” culminates in the elaboration of an epistemology of the human sciences starting from their irreversible modern twist. Among the various possible ways of characterizing this epistemology—equipped with its own modus operandi: the archaeological-genealogical method—is to see it as the result of a reflection on the topic of temporality. In particular, it is a reflection on historical temporality as «knowledge of time», that is (...) organized into two different yet complementary modalities, two historical heterochronies that can be defined as evenemential time and epistemic time. The first, acephalous and atelic, proves discontinuous, traced back to pure becoming. The second corresponds to the necessary disciplining of this original shapeless material by means of the solidification of structures that each time produce an equilibrium among the instances of knowledge and power. Yet these structures, too, remain subjected to that historic-temporal change to which they have attributed an order. Such an interpretation of time implies a metamorphosis of the notion of subject that, within an overall anti-humanistic perspective, goes from its death as the cogito to its rebirth in the form of an ethical-aesthetic subject: no longer the atemporal guarantor of the order of the real, but rather something committed to a risky exercise of its own freedom as care of the Self. (shrink)

This paper takes as its starting point the argument from Eudemian Ethics II,1 which introduces as premisses conclusions from the previous chapters, namely, the chief good of human beings is an end and everybody judges speculative wisdom, moral virtue and pleasure to be ends, either all or some of them. These two claims allow Aristotle to conclude that the most desirable of all goods is in the soul and to proceed arguing to his main conclusion in terms of the ergon, (...) function or characteristic activity, of the soul. It should be noticed, though, that if the ergon of the human soul can explain speculative wisdom and moral virtues to be ends, the same is not so easily defensible in the case of pleasure. In fact, to take pleasure as end seems to take a subjective satisfaction with no matter what as end. Now, the ergon of the soul cannot explain pleasure as an end in this unrestricted way. To solve this difficulty, this paper seeks to interpret a prior passage, I, 5, 1215b15-1216a10, as responsible for restricting the range of pleasures that can be counted as finalities to human beings. (shrink)

This book presents a philosophical journey into the Anthropocene that views this geological epoch as the potential métarécit of our age and the planetary framework within which technology becomes the environment for human life. The appropriate name for this epochal phenomenon is, as a result, not Anthropocene, but Technocene.

Name through identity and history... metaphysics as condition; cooperation, not elimination: recognizing the other; concern as a fact and as a value; emotions and time; sense and nonsense are some of the themes touched upon in the volume.--Translated from inside flap of cover.

Workers can be fired from jobs, citizens sent to jail, and adolescents more likely to experience depression, all because of algorithms. Algorithms have considerable impacts on our lives. To increase user satisfaction and trust, the most common proposal from academics and developers is to increase the transparency of algorithmic design. While there is a large body of literature on algorithmic transparency, the impact of unethical data collection practices is less well understood. Currently, there is limited research on the factors that (...) affect users’ trust in data collection practices and algorithmic transparency. In this research, we explore the relative impact of both factors as they relate to important outcome measures such as user’s trust, comfort level, and moral acceptability. We conducted two pilot studies to learn what real users consider to be ethical and unethical data collection practices, as well as high and low transparency for algorithms. We then used these findings in a 2 × 2 design to examine how transparency and the acceptability of data collection practices impact users’ acceptance, comfort, and trust in algorithms. Our results suggest that the singular emphasis on algorithmic transparency may be misplaced. Given the difference in their impact to increase acceptance, trust, and user satisfaction, a more effective strategy would be to also understand and abide by users’ views of ethical data collection practices. (shrink)

Este livro apresenta-se como o resultado da contribuição de professores e pesquisadores de diversos campos da filosofia e de diferentes universidades brasileiras durante a ocasião do I Encontro "Vozes femininas na Filosofia", ocorrido em junho de 2017, na UFRGS, em Porto Alegre, RS. Nossa motivação parte da constatação que a área de filosofia nas universidades brasileiras sofre uma evidente crise de representatividade: tanto nos cursos de graduação como nos programas de pós-graduação em filosofia, nos quais menos de 30% são mulheres, (...) entre docentes e discentes. Procura-se, por meio dos textos organizados neste volume, entender a produção e a contribuição de filósofas cujas presenças se mostram diminuídas – senão totalmente esquecidas – na história de filosofia e na atualidade. (shrink)

SÍNTESE - A partir do exemplo da cera, na Segunda Meditação, Descartes demonstra a diferença entre os conceitos de imaginação e entendimento, para responder à questão sobre o que se conhece da cera com tanta distinção, a qual em última análise é: o que conheço de mim com tanta distinção? Para saber o que conhece, é preciso saber através de qual faculdade conhece, se pela imaginação, ou pelo entendimento. Com o objetivo de chegar a tais conceitos, serão vistos (...) os termos compreensão e concepção nas versões latina e francesa das Meditações. Por fim, se concluirá que o conhecimento não se dá pela imaginação, mas sim pelo entendimento. (shrink)

El objetivo de este breve artículo es definir las propiedades mágicas de la imagen de Eros hecha de cera que nos presenta la canción 11 del corpus anacreóntico. Dado que el término παντορέκτης en particular ha generado al menos dos explicaciones diferentes, argumentaremos a favor del sentido de 'todopoderoso', considerando para ello algunos casos similares de construcción de figuras mágicas en otros textos, así como el contexto de la propia poética anacreóntica. Our aim is simply to define the magical (...) qualities of a wax effigy depicting Eros as presented in the eleventh song of the anacreontic corpus. Since two different meanings are given to the word παντορέκτης , we will argue that its sense here is 'all-doing', basing ourselves on the construction of similar magical figurines as described in other texts, as well as on the context of the anacreontic poetics. (shrink)

Em harmonia com sua tese acerca do conhecimento de um modo geral, Tomás de Aquino sustenta que o conhecimento que o intelecto tem de si é também dependente dos sentidos. Segundo Tomás, há pelo menos dois modos de o intelecto se conhecer (ambos em virtude do ato do intelecto de conhecer): o conhecimento singular da existência do intelecto e o conhecimento universal da natureza do intelecto, isto é, o conhecimento de seus princípios de operações, ambos dependentes, ainda que de modo (...) remoto, das percepções sensíveis. Apresento uma leitura da Segunda Meditação segundo a qual Descartes inicia seu projeto de recusa do modelo tomista-aristotélico de conhecimento. Ele demonstra não só a incorporeidade do todo da alma mas, mais ainda, demonstra que embora o conhecimento da existência e o da natureza do intelecto consistam no conhecimento de suas operações fundamentais — a saber, conceber, julgar e inferir — esse conhecimento não tem origem em qualquer impressão sensível. Ao contrário: ele é prioritário a estas e se dá mesmo à revelia do que é dado por elas. (shrink)

The use of human language is a hallmark of human consciousness, even when it is not used publicly. Inner speech is the way humans consciously communicate with themselves and arguably a key factor contributing to the formation of more self-aware selves. From the perspective of cognitive science and artificial cognitive architectures, inner speech can be also seen as a meta-management system that modulates some cognitive processes of the subject. In this paper, we describe a preliminary version of a computational model (...) of inner speech generation based on the cognitive architecture CERA-CRANIUM. This inner speech generation method is illustrated using a video game non-player character as the subject of the first-person narratives to be produced. We also use this model of inner speech generation to discuss the possibilities of using such a first-person narrative stream as a meta-control input to the artificial cognitive architecture. We argue that this verbal input might be used as an integrated self-explanation of the agent in the world and thus contribute to the formation of self. (shrink)

We answer a question of Ambos-Spies and Kuˇcera in the affirmative. They asked whether, when a real is low for Schnorr randomness, it is already low for Schnorr tests.

Si quisiéramos agrupar en torno a preguntas algunos de los principales núcleos de la filosofía de Plotino, esas preguntas podrían ser las siguientes: “¿quiénes somos?”, “¿de dónde venimos?” y “¿hacia dónde vamos?”. A lo largo de las _Enéadas_ el Licopolitano se vale de metáforas locativas y temporales para dar cuenta de la unidad subyacente a todas las almas y de la búsqueda que el alma humana debe emprender para regresar a esa unidad. Nuestro filósofo puntualiza que la unidad no se (...) encuentra ni “fragmentada” ni “recortada” (como la de una cera que se puede dividir en varios trozos o la de un vino que se puede verter en distintas copas) sino que es indivisible (_améristos_) y también diversificada, parangonable a la de los distintos teoremas de una ciencia, los cuales dan cuenta cada uno a su manera de la totalidad de la disciplina. A su vez también realiza una diferenciación entre capacidades (_dýnamis_) del alma que remiten al cuerpo y otra que se halla separada de lo corpóreo y ejerce la contemplación (_nóesis_) de la Inteligencia. En el caso particular del ser humano ocurriría que no posee registro de la contemplación que su propia “alma superior” lleva a cabo, por lo cual necesita reponerla. Allí radica la finalidad de la filosofía, que se reviste de una dimensión teórica (la dialéctica) y de una práctica (el cultivo de las virtudes inferiores y de las superiores en la medida que vaya perfeccionándose en la dialéctica). El sabio sería entonces quien ha conseguido adecuar sus pensamientos y sus acciones a su actividad noética, ha alcanzado la felicidad y está en condiciones de experimentar la unión mística con lo Uno. Podemos entonces señalar la contemplación, la virtud y la felicidad como tres importantes motivaciones detrás del pensamiento de Plotino. (shrink)

El trabajo se propone abordar, de manera general, algunas de las metáforas relativas a la infancia que han sido parte de los modos en que la sociedad moderna se ha representado a las niñas y los niños (tablas rasas, ceras blandas, esponjas). Estas representaciones presentes en el imaginario cultural dominante determinaron, de manera significativa, no sólo los modos de relación concreta entre adultos y niños, sino también expectativas, condiciones y normativas del sistema educativo. Asimismo, se alude en el artículo a (...) la concepción de infancia que está a la base del Programa de Filosofía para Niños y a una de sus categorías fundamentales, la comunidad de indagación, que producen una suerte de inversión en las valoraciones habituales respecto de los modos de entender la construcción del conocimiento y el régimen de influencias e interacciones entre adultos y niños. (shrink)

L’arte della memoria è uno degli archetipi della cultura occidentale fin dall’antica Grecia: è stato Platone ad ‘inventare’ l’immagine dell’anima come blocco di cera, su cui le sensazioni si imprimono come segni di sigilli; ed è stato poi Aristotele a riprendere in parte questo modello, arricchendolo però di temi fondamentali. Ma anche in epoche successive l’arte della memoria ha svolto una funzione fondamentale intrecciandosi a temi sia epistemologici che di schietta natura metafisica. Questo volume, frutto di un seminario tenuto (...) alla Scuola Normale nel settembre 2006, intende ripercorrere alcune delle principali stazioni della riflessione sulla memoria fra antichità e mondo moderno chiedendosi se, e in quale misura, questa relativa continuità di approccio si debba ad un consapevole attingere alla tradizione platonica e aristotelica; se, e in quale misura, elementi comuni o varianti del modello iniziale siano riportabili alle metafore adottate, sin da subito, per la descrizione dei processi mentali – riconducibili in ogni caso all’idea comune di ‘tracce’ che la sensazione imprime nell’anima. (shrink)

The commentators for the most part observe a religious silence on pars extrema; yet there is a difficulty, as the meaning required ‘the least important part’, or ‘the merest fringe’, is hardly justified by usage. The words should mean ‘the last part’ (cf. Cic. Verr. 2. 1. 36. 92 ‘in codicis extrema cera’, 2. 2. 78.

Neste artigo abordaremos como a inspeção do espírito ocorre tratando a percepção da cera como um poder intelectual de conhecer, em vista da natureza do ego cogitans, na medida que a faculdade do entendimento e a faculdade da vontade operam por complementaridade. Para tanto, abordaremos a Meditação Segunda, sobretudo a segunda parte desta meditação, com complementos explicativos de outras meditações e obras do filósofo, de forma a mostrarmos que a questão da correção dos sentidos, diante do impasse epistêmico ocasional (...) na apreensão dos dados sensíveis, remete implicitamente ao jogo operativo da teoria cartesiana das faculdades. (shrink)

Trata-se de analisar uma “cena” pedagógica, a do truque do pato de cera, exposta no livro III do Emílio. Ali o autor tem a oportunidade de se dedicar à “parte mais útil” de seu livro e mostrar de como podem ser aplicadas as máximas do livro III.

Ante estas obras de Victoria Diehl es fácil pensar en conocidos modelos anatómicos en cera o en la iconografía de Venus y Evas de las que un vistazo rápido a cualquier libro de historia del arte nos mostraría múltiples variantes. Algo de todo ello hay aquí. Pero también hay algo que hace que los espectadores se detengan a pensar. Algo más allá de lo reconocible que hace que las lenguas del pasado se muevan a un ritmo actual. Hermes, al (...) trasladar sus mensajes los interpreta, los adapta al interlocutor y al medio; los transforma, los traduce, los recrea. Y logra ponernos en movimiento. [...]. (shrink)

"Orpheos Bakkikos: La cruz desaparecida". La pequeña piedra de Orpheos Bakkikos grabada con la representación de una crucifixión, se ha perdido desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial. A principios del siglo pasado, la piedra se consideraba original, pero en la década de 1920 surgieron dudas sobre su de 1920 surgieron dudas sobre su autenticidad debido a su clasificación como paleocristiana. la actualidad. Los argumentos a favor y en contra de la se examinan los argumentos a favor y en contra de la (...) autenticidad del artefacto. que la aporía puede resolverse no considerando la piedra unilateralmente como órfica o cristiana, sino situándola en su contexto histórico original. contexto histórico original. La argumentación de apoyo va desde el culto imperial romano a través de los Iobakchoi atenienses del siglo II d.C., así como de los siglo II d.C., así como a los poetas romanos y a los Cultores Liberi de la época de Augusto, hasta los funerales de Julio César, donde una efigie de cera del asesinado, que se parece mucho a la "figura crucificada" del grabado de Orpheos Bakkikos en un tropaeum cruciforme y se mostraba a la gente. Sobre estas bases se establecen hipótesis que explican tanto la aplicación de la piedra Orpheos Bakkikos como crucifixum signum en el ápice del flamen Divi Iulii, que se ha conservado en los tocados del Papa y los Patriarcas, así como el origen de los crucifijos articulados, que se han transmitido desde la Antigüedad y que se utilizan hasta hoy durante la Semana Santa. (shrink)