This This paper examines the acceptance and criticism of Zhuzi(朱子)’s Zhonghe(中和) theory in the Choseon Jingxue(經學) of the 16th and 17th Centuries. In order to discuss the Zhuzi(朱子)’s Zhonghe(中和) theory, I first thought that the conceptual analysis of Doctrine of the Mean(中庸) is necessary for the ‘喜怒哀樂之未發謂之中, 發而皆中節謂之和’. As a result of this analysis, it was confirmed that the concept of Zhonghe(中和) of Doctrine of the Mean(中庸) was basically a matter of feeling. This indicates that the Zhonghe(中和) idea of Doctrine (...) of the Mean(中庸) takes the issue of feeling more important than reason. This point can be understood as a dimension of the same context in that Western thought emphasizes reason and Eastern thought emphasizes emotion. It is judged that the Zhonghe(中和) idea of Doctrine of the Mean(中庸) centering on this feeling of appreciation has led to the time of the Lijizhushu(禮記注疏). This Zhonghe(中和) thought based on emotion of Doctrine of the Mean(中庸) is newly interpreted by the Cheng-Zhu School(程朱學). Especially, the recognition of ‘Zhong(中)’ in the Weifa(未發) as Li(理) can be called a great change in the mind-nature theory(心性論) of Doctrine of the Mean(中庸). This interpretation of Zhonghe(中和) was largely accepted in the 16th and 17th century Choseon Dynasty, and the representative character is Cho Ik(趙翼). On the other hand, there was also a person who did not accept this interpretation of Zhonghe(中和) as it was. The representative figure is Park Sedang. Park Sedang was unable to accept Zhu Xi’s philosophical interpretation of Weifa(未發) in his perception of Zhonghe(中和) theory. He recognized that in human mind there could hardly be a state of Weifa(未發) in which a glimmer of thought does not arise. This is why he did not accept Zhu xi’s philosophical interpretation of considering the state of 'Weifa(未發) as ‘Jiran-Budong(寂然不動)’. I think that Park Sedang's view on Zhonghe(中和) is closer to the previous Zhonghe theory(中和舊說) of Zhu Xi. (shrink)

정체전중변(正體傳重辨) 3편과 논문 6편을 우리말 로 옮기고 주를 달았다.

Matti Eklund (2017) has argued that ardent realists face a serious dilemma. Ardent realists believe that there is a mind-independent fact as to which normative concepts we are to use. Eklund claims that the ardent realist cannot explain why this is so without plumping in favor of their own normative concepts or changing the topic. The paper first advances the discussion by clarifying two ways of understanding the question of which normative concepts to choose: a theoretical question about which concepts (...) have the abstract property of being normatively privileged and a further practical question of which concepts we are to choose even granting some concepts are thus privileged. I argue that the ardent realist’s best bet for answering the theoretical question while avoiding Eklund’s dilemma is to provide a real definition of this property. I point out the difficulties for providing such a definition. I then argue that even with an answer to the theoretical question, the ardent realist faces a further dilemma in answering the practical question. In sum, though I see no knock-down argument against ardent realism, it may nonetheless die a death by a thousand cuts. I close by considering a deeper reason for why ardent realism is so difficult to defend: every argument starts somewhere. It is unclear how there can be an Archimedean point that makes no reference to any normative concepts that can nonetheless be employed to convince everyone to adopt ours. I then briefly propose two options for someone still inclined towards realism: (i) accept that our normative concepts are normatively privileged without attempting to explain why this is so, or (ii) be less ardent and accept a perspective-dependent account of normativity. (shrink)

What is the relation of love and pedagogy? Two recent phenomena have called into question whether love has any place within pedagogy at all: teacher‐student sexual scandal and the standardization movement. As love walks the thin line between inspiration and sex, and as standardization has assumed love to be synonymous with bias, it has become more important than ever to provide a clear account of love and its relation to teaching. For this account, I turn to Lacanian psychoanalysis and, in (...) particular, to Lacan's contentious claim that “There is no such thing as a sexual relationship.” Through an explication of Lacan's position on love, I conclude that love not only has a place within pedagogy but is necessary for it. (shrink)

Big data and artificial intelligence (“AI”) promise to transform virtually all aspects of biomedical research and health care (Matheny et al. 2019), through facilitation of drug development, diagno...