A well-known difficulty of the interdisciplinary dialogue beyond the limits of particular disciplines is the lack of common ground regarding their metaphysical and methodological assumptions and commitments. This is particularly evident for the precarious relationship between science and religion. In a 2016 conference entitled “The Many Faces of Panentheism” held in Zurich, and now in this introduction as well as this section, we try to counteract this situation by choosing a focus theme located at the interface between nature and the (...) divine. Thus, key perspectives, arguments, and implications of panentheism are introduced not only from one selected point of view but in relation to others. This allows us to explore territory beyond the boundaries of disciplinary backgrounds and to address intellectual and practical consequences for current debates. (shrink)

Traditionally, Demea is considered to be the weakest character in Hume’s famous Dialogues concerning Natural Religion; the stage is completely dominated by Cleanthes’ optimistic theism and by Philo’s skeptical critical manoeuvres against that. Contrary to this traditional approach, however, the ‘orthodox’ Demea will be defended here by maintaining that Demea contributes—though neither consciously intended nor recognized by Hume—the most interesting observations concerning religious belief. He points to a position lying beyond the metaphysical fantasies of theism (in league with its successors, (...) the “friends of Cleanthes”) on the one hand and Philo’s destructiveness, which seems to amount to a moralized minimal version of faith on the other. It will be clear that this defense is not exegetically orientated, but rather reacts to a constellation personalized in Hume’s ‘casting’ that lets us see on which topics we shall continue to work theologically as well as philosophically today. Accordingly, a conceptual critique of Cleanthes and Philo will be elaborated, using three concrete examples to show what religious belief lying beyond metaphysical hopes that explain God as a (quasi)person, as well as reductionist concessions that regard ‘God’ merely as an expression of a moral attitude, could look like. Thus Demea represents a ‘postmetaphysical’ image of religious belief—and, eventually, we are invited to belong to the “friends of Demea”. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Ist im Akt der Vergebung zugleich ein Element des Vergessens enthalten? In welchem Verhältnis stehen Vergebung und Vergessen? Und vergisst selbst Gott, wenn er vergibt? Den konstruktiven Konnotationen des Vergessens nachzugehen, scheint mit der Pflicht des Erinnerns zu kollidieren. Daher wird in einem ersten Teil im Gespräch mit Nietzsche herausgearbeitet, in welcher Hinsicht Menschen auf das Vergessen angewiesen sind. In einem zweiten Teil wird die komplizierte und verzweigte Grammatik des Vergessens expliziert. Auf dieser Basis kann in einem dritten theologischen (...) Teil die riskante Frage beantwortet werden, in welcher Hinsicht Gott vergisst, wenn er vergibt. Dazu wird die These ausgearbeitet, wonach einerseits die Vergebung der einzige Grund des Vergessens sein darf, um einer blinden Ignoranz vorzubeugen, und wonach andererseits das Vergessen eine mögliche Folge der Vergebung sein kann, damit ein Miteinander nicht bleibend vergiftet sei, sondern als tatsächlich befreit erlebt werden kann. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 57 Heft: 3 Seiten: 318-341.