A response to Lindsay Craig's essay, The So-Called Extended Synthesis and Population Genetics.

In “A Tension in the Strong Program: The Relation between the Rational and the Social”, Shahram Shahryari (2021) advances the following thesis: In his Strong Program in the sociology of science, David Bloor blames traditional philosophy of science for adopting a dualist strategy in explaining scientific developments, as it employs rational explanation for successful science and social explanation for flawed science. Instead, according to Bloor, all scientific developments should be explained monistically, i.e. in terms of social causes. This is also (...) referred to as the Symmetry Principle, and it is a key tenet in the Strong Program. The author detects a tension here, as Bloor apparently asserts that traditional philosophy of science deploys two kinds of explanation, and simultaneously insists that there is only one kind, i.e. social explanation. (shrink)

Is corporate giving a matter of sporadic and altruistic generosity? Or should it be seen more as “a product to be marketed to the public”? The author is Lecturer in International Business in the Department of Commerce of the University of Birmingham, Ashley Building, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT.

Gerd Buchdahl; XIV—The Relation Between ‘Understanding’ and ‘Reason’ in the Architectonic of Kant's Philosophy1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume.

A prominent approach to scientific explanation and modeling claims that for a model to provide an explanation it must accurately represent at least some of the actual causes in the event's causal history. In this paper, I argue that many optimality explanations present a serious challenge to this causal approach. I contend that many optimality models provide highly idealized equilibrium explanations that do not accurately represent the causes of their target system. Furthermore, in many contexts, it is in virtue of (...) their independence of causes that optimality models are able to provide a better explanation than competing causal models. Consequently, our account of explanation and modeling must expand beyond the causal approach. (shrink)

In this paper, I first argue against various attempts to justify idealizations in scientific models that explain by showing that they are harmless and isolable distortions of irrelevant features. In response, I propose a view in which idealized models are characterized as providing holistically distorted representations of their target system. I then suggest an alternative way that idealized modeling can be justified by appealing to universality.

I. Reputed shortcomings of Descartes as philosopher of science.II ‘Knowledge’ in mathematics and in physics. The ‘ontological’ postulates of Descartes's philosophy and philosophy of physics.III. The ‘foundations of dynamics’: ‘Newton's First Law of Motion’ and its status.IV. Descartes's conception of ‘hypothesis’: the competing claims of the ideal of the a priori in physics and the conception of retroductive inference. V. Descartes's notion of ‘analysis’. The distinction between ‘procedure’ and ‘inference’. The notion of ‘induction’ and ‘understanding through models’: ‘Snell's Law of (...) Refraction’. (shrink)

Some patients who have been diagnosed as “dead by neurologic criteria” continue to exhibit certain brain functions, most commonly, neuroendocrine functions. This preservation of neurologic function after the diagnosis of “brain death” or “brainstem death” is an ongoing source of controversy and concern in the medical, bioethics, and legal literatures. Most obviously, if some brain function persists, then it is not the case that all functions of the entire brain have ceased and hence, declaring such a patient to be “dead” (...) would be a false positive, in any nation with so-called “whole brain death” laws. Furthermore, and perhaps more concerning, the preservation of any brain function necessarily entails the preservation of some amount of brain perfusion, thereby raising the concern as to whether additional areas of neural tissue may remain viable, including areas in the brainstem. These and other considerations cast significant doubt on the reliability of diagnosing either “brain death” or “brainstem death.”. (shrink)

Brain dead organ donors are the principal source of transplantable organs. However, it is controversial whether brain death is the same as biological death. Therefore, it is unclear whether organ removal in brain death is consistent with the ‘dead donor rule’, which states that organ removal must not cause death. Our aim was to evaluate the public9s opinion about organ removal if explicitly described as causing the death of a donor in irreversible apneic coma. We conducted a cross-sectional internet survey (...) of the American public (n=1096). Questionnaire domains included opinions about a hypothetical scenario of organ removal described as causing the death of a patient in irreversible coma, and items measuring willingness to donate organs after death. Some 71% of the sample agreed that it should be legal for patients to donate organs in the scenario described and 67% agreed that they would want to donate organs in a similar situation. Of the 85% of the sample who agreed that they were willing to donate organs after death, 76% agreed that they would donate in the scenario of irreversible coma with organ removal causing death. There appears to be public support for organ donation in a scenario explicitly described as violating the dead donor rule. Further, most but not all people who would agree to donate when organ removal is described as occurring after death would also agree to donate when organ removal is described as causing death in irreversible coma. (shrink)

The Leuphana Semester at Leuphana University Lüneburg, together with the module “Science bears responsibility” demonstrate how innovative methods of teaching and learning can be combined with the topic of sustainable development and how new forms of university teaching can be introduced. With regard to module content, it has become apparent that, due to the complexity of the field of sustainability, a single discipline alone is unable to provide analyses and solutions. If teaching in higher education is to adequately deal with (...) this complexity, then it is necessary to develop inter- and transdisciplinary approaches that go beyond a purely specialist orientation. (shrink)

In this volume the author tackles this problem in a rigorous analysis which begins with the general dynamics of living systems and leads the reader step-by-step ...

Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart invites readers to embark on a new journey into a land of rationality that differs from the familiar territory of cognitive science and economics. Traditional views of rationality tend to see decision makers as possessing superhuman powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and all of eternity in which to ponder choices. To understand decisions in the real world, we need a different, more psychologically plausible notion of rationality, and this book provides it. It is about (...) fast and frugal heuristics--simple rules for making decisions when time is pressing and deep thought an unaffordable luxury. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices, classifications, and predictions by employing bounded rationality. But when and how can such fast and frugal heuristics work? Can judgments based simply on one good reason be as accurate as those based on many reasons? Could less knowledge even lead to systematically better predictions than more knowledge? Simple Heuristics explores these questions, developing computational models of heuristics and testing them through experiments and analyses. It shows how fast and frugal heuristics can produce adaptive decisions in situations as varied as choosing a mate, dividing resources among offspring, predicting high school drop out rates, and playing the stock market. As an interdisciplinary work that is both useful and engaging, this book will appeal to a wide audience. It is ideal for researchers in cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology, and cognitive science, as well as in economics and artificial intelligence. It will also inspire anyone interested in simply making good decisions. (shrink)

Many accounts of scientific modelling assume that models can be decomposed into the contributions made by their accurate and inaccurate parts. These accounts then argue that the inaccurate parts of the model can be justified by distorting only what is irrelevant. In this paper, I argue that this decompositional strategy requires three assumptions that are not typically met by our best scientific models. In response, I propose an alternative view in which idealized models are characterized as holistically distorted representations that (...) are justified by allowing for the application of various modelling techniques. (shrink)

An original argument about how scientific models often times distort reality rather than accurately reflect it. And it's this distortion that often gives scientific models their epistemic power.

The established view regarding ‘brain death’ in medicine and medical ethics is that patients determined to be dead by neurological criteria are dead in terms of a biological conception of death, not a philosophical conception of personhood, a social construction or a legal fiction. Although such individuals show apparent signs of being alive, in reality they are dead, though this reality is masked by the intervention of medical technology. In this article, we argue that an appeal to the distinction between (...) appearance and reality fails in defending the view that the ‘brain dead’ are dead. Specifically, this view relies on an inaccurate and overly simplistic account of the role of medical technology in the physiology of a ‘brain dead’ patient. We conclude by offering an explanation of why the conventional view on ‘brain death’, though mistaken, continues to be endorsed in light of its connection to organ transplantation and the dead donor rule. (shrink)

Under the influence of a reading style that Avital Ronell has called “narcoanalysis,” this article performs a reading of addiction and humility through David Foster Wallace's novel Infinite Jest. Exploring both addiction and humility through the vector of habit, I argue that both habits indicate the non-self-sufficiency of a subject exposed to affection from outside. But while I position addiction alongside humility, both as habits, I also argue that humility parasitizes the totalizing logic of addictive habit. Neither identical to nor (...) simply the opposite of addiction, humility exploits addiction's structure of uncontrollable relationality. Even addiction depends on the affectability or rhetoricity of a subject always already exposed in language. Humility holds this rhetoricity open. (shrink)

Within the highly organized nuclear structure, specific nuclear domains (ND10) are defined by accumulations of proteins that can be interferon-upregulated, implicating ND10 as sites of a nuclear defense mechanism.Compatible with such a mechanism is the deposition of herpesvirus, adenovirus, and papovavirus genomes at the periphery of ND10. However, these DNA viruses begin their transcription at ND10 and consequently initiate replication at these sites, suggesting that viruses have evolved ways to circumvent this potential cellular defense and exploit it. Other ND10-associated proteins (...) belong to ubiquitin-related pathways. These findings, together with the accumulation of various overexpressed cellular and viral proteins, suggest that ND10 function as nuclear dumps or as nuclear depots. Consistent with the recruitment or deposition of various proteins and viral genomes adjacent to ND10, ND10 themselves may only be protein accumulations at specific but as yet undefined nuclear deposition sites. The concept of specific nuclear deposition sites may explain the juxtaposition of various nuclear bodies and allows testable predictions about a potential supramolecular regulatory mechanism whereby proteins are selectively segregated or released by global changes induced in nuclear functions such as viral infections, stress, or hormonal induction. BioEssays 20:660–667, 1998.© 1998 John Wiley & Sons Inc. (shrink)

Within the highly organized nuclear structure, specific nuclear domains (ND10) are defined by accumulations of proteins that can be interferon-upregulated, implicating ND10 as sites of a nuclear defense mechanism.Compatible with such a mechanism is the deposition of herpesvirus, adenovirus, and papovavirus genomes at the periphery of ND10. However, these DNA viruses begin their transcription at ND10 and consequently initiate replication at these sites, suggesting that viruses have evolved ways to circumvent this potential cellular defense and exploit it. Other ND10-associated proteins (...) belong to ubiquitin-related pathways. These findings, together with the accumulation of various overexpressed cellular and viral proteins, suggest that ND10 function as nuclear dumps or as nuclear depots. Consistent with the recruitment or deposition of various proteins and viral genomes adjacent to ND10, ND10 themselves may only be protein accumulations at specific but as yet undefined nuclear deposition sites. The concept of specific nuclear deposition sites may explain the juxtaposition of various nuclear bodies and allows testable predictions about a potential supramolecular regulatory mechanism whereby proteins are selectively segregated or released by global changes induced in nuclear functions such as viral infections, stress, or hormonal induction. BioEssays 20:660–667, 1998.© 1998 John Wiley & Sons Inc. (shrink)

In the debate regarding the different possibilities for gene therapy, it is presupposed that the manipulations are limited to the nuclear genome (nDNA). Given recent advances in genetics, mitochondrial genome (mtDNA) and diseases must be considered as well. In this paper, we propose a three dimensional framework for the ethical debate of gene therapy where we add the genomic type (nDNA vs. mtDNA) as a third dimension to be considered beside the paradigmatic dimensions of target cell (somatic vs. germ-line) and (...) purpose (therapeutic vs. enhancement). Somatic gene therapy can be viewed today as generally accepted, and we review t he contemporary arguments surrounding it on the basis of bioethical-pragmatic, socio-political and deontological classifications. Many of the supposed ethical questions of somatic gene therapy today are not new; they are well-known issues of research ethics. We also critically summarize the different international perspectives and the German ethical discussion regarding manipulations of germ-line cells. (shrink)

Evidence-based recommendations for lifestyles to promote healthy cognitive aging root in reductionistic studies of mostly physical measurable factors with large effect sizes. In contrast, most people consider factors like autonomy, purpose, social participation and engagement, etc. as central to a high quality of life in old age. Evidence for a direct causal impact of these factors on healthy cognitive aging is still limited, albeit not absent. Ultimately, however, individual lifestyle is a complex composite of variables relating to both body and (...) mind as well as to receiving input and generating output. The physical interventions are tied to the more subjective and mind-related aspects of lifestyle and wellbeing in the idea of the “embodied mind,” which states that the mind is shaped by and requires the body. The causality is reciprocal and the process is dynamic, critically requiring movement: the “embodied mind” is a “embodied mind in motion.” Hiking, playing musical instruments, dancing and yoga are examples of body–mind activities that assign depth, purpose, meaning, social embedding, etc. to long-term beneficial physical “activities” and increase quality of life not only as delayed gratification. The present motivational power of embodied activities allows benefiting from the side-effects of late-life resilience. The concept offers an access point for unraveling the mechanistic complexity of lifestyle-based prevention, including their neurobiological foundations. (shrink)

A “universalist” policy on brain death holds that brain death is death, and neurologic criteria for death determination are rightly applied to all, without exemptions or opt outs. This essay argues that advocates of a universalist brain death policy defend the same sort of coercive control of end-of-life decision-making as “pro-life” advocates seek to achieve for reproductive decision-making, and both are grounded in an illiberal political philosophy. Those who recognize the serious flaws of this kind of public policy with respect (...) to abortion must apply the same logic to brain death. (shrink)

The controversy over brain death and the dead donor rule continues unabated, with some of the same key points and positions starting to see repetition in the literature. One might wonder whether some of the participants are talking past each other, not all debating the same issue, even though they are using the same words (e.g., “death”). One reason for this is the complexity of the debate: It’s not merely about the nature of human life and death. Interwoven into this (...) debate are deep philosophical issues on realism, the normative/descriptive distinction, the relation of thought and language to the world, the mind–body problem, personhood, moral status, and the ethics of killing. There are also social and legal .. (shrink)

John P. Lizza has long been a major figure in the scholarly literature on criteria for death. His searching and penetrating critiques of the dominant biological paradigm, and his defense of a theory of death of the person as a psychophysical entity, have both significantly advanced the literature. In this special issue, Lizza reinforces his critiques of a strictly biological approach. In my commentary, I take up Lizza’s challenge regarding a biological concept of death. He is certainly right to point (...) out that science is not value-free; however, this does not imply that there cannot be a characterization of biological death that can be shown to be superior to other concepts. After characterizing and justifying such a theory of biological death, I show that patients who meet the diagnostic criteria for brain death are unequivocally biologically alive. However, with respect to concepts of personhood and related ideas, I urge the acceptance of a pluralism of such concepts for matters of public policy. (shrink)

Recently philosophers of science have begun to pay more attention to the use of highly idealized mathematical models in scientific theorizing. An important example of this kind of highly idealized modeling is the widespread use of optimality models within evolutionary biology. One way to understand the explanations provided by these models is as a censored causal explanation: an explanation that omits certain causal factors in order to focus on a modular subset of the causal processes that led to the explanandum. (...) In this paper, I first argue that the censored causal model approach fails to establish a permanent explanatory role for optimality models in biology and mischaracterizes the explanatory virtues of biological optimality modeling. In addition, I argue that many biological optimality explanations cannot be characterized as censored causal explanations. In response, I propose an alternative approach that analyzes optimality models’ reliance on synchronically representing a system’s constraints and tradeoffs as well as their employment of various kinds of idealization in order to provide equilibrium explanations. (shrink)