Provides an interpretation of Plato's Euthydemus as a unified piece of literature, taking into account both its dramatic and its philosophical aspects.

In Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates raises the question whether piety is coextensive with justice, or a part of it (11e4-12a2; cf. 12c10-d3). Euthyphro chooses the latter option, and seeks to determine the part of justice that piety happens to be. Scholars have debated fiercely about whether Socrates shares this view (Calef 1995a; McPherran 1995; Calef 1995b). This paper argues that, if Euthyphro is to remain consistent throughout the dialogue, coextensiveness must be favored over the part-of-justice view. If this is so, then (...) the Euthyphro is also consistent with Socrates’ defense of the unity of the virtues in Plato’s Protagoras. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

This paper argues against two commonly held views on the nature of courage and its relationship with virtue in Plato’s Laches. These views are the following: First, Laches’ and Nicias’ accounts of courage should be read as complementary, in the sense that each presents one of the two components of courage. Second, Socrates rejects the unity of virtue he defends in the Protagoras, endorsing instead the view that courage is only a part of virtue. In this paper, I aim to (...) show that the reader of the Laches is invited to endorse Nicias’ unitary understanding of courage as knowledge of good and evil and, as a consequence of this, to grant the unity of virtue. (shrink)

This paper aims to shed light on a difficult passage from Plato’s Alcibiades, in which Socrates presents an analogy between vision and knowledge. It argues that we can make sense of some puzzling Socratic claims if we acknowledge that the analogy points to the Theory of Forms. In urging Alcibiades to come to know himself, then, Socrates is urging him to come to know the Forms.

This paper aims to show that laughter and play are employed as interconnected motifs with a specific function in Plato’s Gorgias. I argue that the repeated and seemingly disconnected references to things identified as laughable and to attitudes identified as playful are in fact a systematic attempt to call into question conventional assumptions about the role of philosophy in general and the occasionally playful attitude of Socrates in particular. Socrates - and philosophy - may appear laughable, but the truly laughable (...) ones are the very opponents of philosophy who adopt a mocking attitude towards it. (shrink)