Are fanatical beliefs rational? This paper examines this question. After outlining two arguments for the rationality of fanatical beliefs, based respectively on what I call the "crippled epistemology" explanation and the "echo chambers" explanation, the paper rejects these arguments by appeal to considerations related to higher-order evidence. Then it explains what defending the rationality of fanatical beliefs actually requires. From this, it derives the practical conclusion that radicalization can be prevented and the growth of fanaticism stalled by preventing the encroachment (...) of "fragile values.". (shrink)

This book is a study of ancient views about 'moral luck'. It examines the fundamental ethical problem that many of the valued constituents of a well-lived life are vulnerable to factors outside a person's control, and asks how this affects our appraisal of persons and their lives. The Greeks made a profound contribution to these questions, yet neither the problems nor the Greek views of them have received the attention they deserve. This book thus recovers a central dimension of Greek (...) thought and addresses major issues in contemporary ethical theory. One of its most original aspects is its interrelated treatment of both literary and philosophical texts. The Fragility of Goodness has proven to be important reading for philosophers and classicists, and its non-technical style makes it accessible to any educated person interested in the difficult problems it tackles. This new edition features an entirely new preface by Martha Nussbaum. (shrink)

This book is a study of ancient views about "moral luck." It examines the fundamental ethical problem that many of the valued constituents of a well-lived life are vulnerable to factors outside a person's control, and asks how this affects our appraisal of persons and their lives. The Greeks made a profound contribution to these questions, yet neither the problems nor the Greek views of them have received the attention they deserve. This updated edition contains a new preface.

It is perhaps our noblest cause, and certainly one of our oldest: to end suffering. Think of the Buddha, Chuang Tzu, or Marcus Aurelius: stoically composed figures impervious to the torments of the wider world, living their lives in complete serenity—and teaching us how to do the same. After all, isn’t a life free from suffering the ideal? Isn’t it what so many of us seek? Absolutely not, argues Todd May in this provocative but compassionate book. In a moving examination (...) of life and the trials that beset it, he shows that our fragility, our ability to suffer, is actually one of the most important aspects of our humanity. May starts with a simple but hard truth: suffering is inevitable. At the most basic level, we suffer physically—a sprained ankle or a bad back. But we also suffer insults and indifference. We suffer from overburdened schedules and unforeseen circumstances, from moral dilemmas and emotional heartaches. Even just thinking about our own mortality—the fact that we only live one life—can lead us to tremendous suffering. No wonder philosophies such as Buddhism, Taosim, Stoicism, and even Epicureanism—all of which counsel us to rise above these plights—have had appeal over the centuries. May highlights the tremendous value of these philosophies and the ways they can guide us toward better lives, but he also exposes a major drawback to their tenets: such invulnerability is too emotionally disengaged from the world, leading us to place too great a distance between ourselves and our experience. Rather than seeking absolute immunity, he argues most of us just want to hurt less and learn how to embrace and accept what suffering we do endure in a meaningful way. Offering a guide on how to positively engage suffering, May ultimately lays out a new way of thinking about how we exist in the world, one that reassures us that our suffering, rather than a failure of physical or psychological resilience, is a powerful and essential part of life itself. (shrink)

This paper explores civility as a virtue for individuals within the sphere of civil society. Civil society is conceived as consisting of voluntary associations regulated by persuasion, praise, and shame. The virtue of civility is a key value for members of the associations of civil society. The paper considers circumstances in which institutions of civil society breakdown and in which unscrupulous and un-civil operators take advantage of more civil members. While admitting that civility is a fragile virtue, the paper (...) concludes that best solution to threats to civility is to avoid cynicism and to cultivate common-sense moral behavior that models civility. (shrink)

Sparked by the recent threats to an open and pluralistic society in both Europe and the United States, The Fragility of Tolerant Pluralism is an exploration of social and political philosophy. Using the early sixteenth century as a lens to view our own struggles with multiple visions of a good society, the book looks at tolerant pluralism in the light of the twin challenges of resurgent nationalisms and Islamist terrorism. The book makes a case not only for social toleration, but (...) for a deep pluralism that both values and celebrates difference. It also suggests that the radical sects in Europe in the early sixteenth-century challenged the political and religious monisms of both Catholic and Protestant territories, hence planting the seeds of tolerant pluralism. The struggles faced in the sixteenth-century both reflect and inform our own pressing concerns today and as such, The Fragility of Tolerant Pluralism draws six lessons for our current situation. (shrink)

Being attentive to the needs of others, feeling responsible for each other, and taking care are necessary elements for the good life. Care, however, is a fragile activity: it is hard to predict its results. In this article, Homer's story of the Phaeacians bringing Odysseus back to Ithaca is interpreted to investigate what care could be when we admit the fragility of care. We consider two theoretical perspectives on care to interpret the story, namely Martha Nussbaum’s Aristotelian ethics, and (...) the Ethics of Care approach of authors like Ruddick, Sevenhuijsen, Tronto, Verkerk and others. In the first approach, the emphasis is on the attitude of care; in the second, on care as a social practice. Following Nussbaum, the caring response of the Phaeacians can be understood as an example of what Aristotle called ‘practical rationality’. The unexpected result of their care – they come into conflict with Poseidon – shows the fragility of human life and the tragic condition of humanity. According to Nussbaum, one should take responsibility for the fact that choosing for the one implies neglecting the other . From the perspective of Ethics of Care, the caring response is not so much the result of individual virtues; it is rather an element of a care practice that motivates people to act in conformity with basic values like solidarity and responsibility. The fragility of care is regarded as an ordinary quality of praxis and humanity rather than something essentially tragic. In the process of caring, misfortunes can never be totally prevented. Whenever they happen, they should be used as a way to learn and develop more adequate ways of handling the situation. The comparison of the two perspectives, both inspired by Aristotle's philosophy, gives rise to a richer view of the fragility of care. (shrink)

The appreciation, conservation, and reconstruction of ruins, deteriorating buildings, and archaeological sites of historical, religious or cultural value, as well as their safeguarding, lead to a complex set of issues and considerations. This brief paper suggests that a deeper understanding of the various models of heritage management can enhance acceptance of the different practices of heritage care. The fragility of heritage sites and of heritage models urges us to look for viable answers to global ethical and aesthetic questions regarding the (...) management of heritage sites. *. (shrink)

This article explores the propensity of Iliadic landscape similes to encourage reflections on human fragility. Landscape in the similes is usually interpreted as a medium which conveys a consistent symbolic value (for example storms as the hostility of nature); however, landscape is often a more flexible medium. By offering close readings of three Iliadic similes (winter torrents at 4.452–6, snowfall at 12.279–89 and clear night at 8.555–9), this article argues that landscape allowed the poet to frame the main narrative in (...) various ways, both helping the listener to imagine described events and interrupting the listener's immersion in the main narrative. While many have analysed how similes offer analogies to the main narrative, the ways in which the same simile can also disrupt and reframe the narrative are less understood. This article observes that shifts in narrative space and time played a key role in changing the perspective of the listener. Taking a broadly phenomenological approach, it proposes that embodied descriptions of space, which recreate the experience of the moving body in landscape, invite the listener to consider the temporal scale of the natural world. By looking at how landscape in select similes shifts the listener's spatial and temporal experience, this article argues that landscape contributes to the wider Iliadic theme of human fragility. In particular, it identifies the potential for landscape similes to minimize the scale of human experience, question the possibility of human agency, and reveal the limitations of human perspectives and knowledge. (shrink)

In this article, I provide a philosophical analysis of the nature and role of perceived identity threats in the genesis and maintenance of fanaticism. First, I offer a preliminary definition of fanaticism as the social identity-defining devotion to a sacred value that demands universal recognition and is complemented by a hostile antagonism toward people who dissent from one’s group’s values. The fanatic’s hostility toward dissent thereby takes the threefold form of outgroup hostility, ingroup hostility, and self-hostility. Second, I provide (...) a detailed analysis of the fears of fanaticism, arguing that each of the three aforementioned forms of hostile antagonism corresponds to one form of fear or anxiety: the fanatic’s fear of the outgroup, renegade members of the ingroup, and problematic aspects of themselves. In each of these three forms of fear, the fanatic experiences both their sacred values and their individual and social identity as being threatened. Finally, I turn to a fourth form of fear or anxiety connected to fanaticism, namely the fanatic’s anxiety of and flight from the existential condition of uncertainty itself, which, at least in some cases, ground the fanatic’s fearfulness. (shrink)

Hume’s short and unlucky relation with Rousseau is a famous episode in the biography of these two towering figures of the Enlightenment. Undoubtedly, Hume’s fierce reaction towards the betrayal of Rousseau mirrors his high esteem of friendship as such. Though Hume never elaborated a systematic account of friendship, his writings contain numerous references to the pivotal role of this ”calm passion’ and ”virtue’ as a source of personal happiness and social harmony. This article reconstructs the encounter and quarrel with Rousseau (...) in order to better understand Hume’s views on the value and fragility of friendship. Hume appears to defend a rather classical account of friendship that is deeply influenced by Aristotle and Cicero, but at the same time bears witness to the particularity of 18th century Enlightenment culture. (shrink)

My discussion in this lecture is structured as follows. In section 1 I consider the nature of philosophical enquiry and its affinity to liberalism. In section 2 I lay out some of the basic components of liberal theory and explore their interrelations. In section 3 I discuss two challenges to liberalism: one concerning the conception of liberty which it involves and one concerning the way in which it introduces the idea of legitimate political authority. In section 4 I suggest that (...) these problems, to do with the values of liberalism, arise on the basis of a prior conception of individuals which is in need of modification. In a brief concluding section 5 I indicate the need for a post-liberal political theory. (shrink)

My discussion in this lecture is structured as follows. In section 1 I consider the nature of philosophical enquiry and its affinity to liberalism. In section 2 I lay out some of the basic components of liberal theory and explore their interrelations. In section 3 I discuss two challenges to liberalism: one concerning the conception of liberty which it involves and one concerning the way in which it introduces the idea of legitimate political authority. In section 4 I suggest that (...) these problems, to do with the values of liberalism, arise on the basis of a prior conception of individuals which is in need of modification. In a brief concluding section 5 I indicate the need for a post-liberal political theory. (shrink)

This study investigates the significance of understanding police perspectives on community policing as a means of addressing insecurity, particularly within the context of localised and asymmetrical conflicts. It highlights the pivotal role of the police in shaping community security and the substantial impact they can have (positive or negative) in fragile environments. The study contends that the localised nature of the community policing effectively addresses security and development issues and empowering citizens. Qualitative interviews were conducted with senior police in (...) Islamabad, to assess the implementation and potential impacts of community policing in Pakistan’s Federal Capital Territory. The findings reveal how the historical foundations of police structures and operations – which date back to the colonial period – have led to the promotion of fear, mistrust and manipulation under successive regimes. Despite these challenges, the findings are promising highlighting enhanced human security through context-specific community policing. Finally, the paper argues that the movement towards community-oriented policing marks a departure from the control of elites within state systems, and encourages values such as local ownership, social cohesion, mutual engagement, accountability and agency. These developments have profound implications for global security and justice. (shrink)

As is well known, Alan Turing drew a line, embodied in the "Turing test," between intellectual and physical abilities, and hence between cognitive and natural sciences. Less familiarly, he proposed that one way to produce a "passer" would be to educate a "child machine," equating the experimenter's improvements in the initial structure of the child machine with genetic mutations, while supposing that the experimenter might achieve improvements more expeditiously than natural selection. On the other hand, in his foundational "On the (...) chemical basis of morphogenesis," Turing insisted that biological explanation clearly confine itself to purely physical and chemical means, eschewing vitalist and teleological talk entirely and hewing to D'Arcy Thompson's line that "evolutionary 'explanations,'" are historical and narrative in character, employing the same intentional and teleological vocabulary we use in doing human history, and hence, while perhaps on occasion of heuristic value, are not part of biology as a natural science. To apply Turing's program to recent issues, the attempt to give foundations to the social and cognitive sciences in the "real science" of evolutionary biology (as opposed to Turing's biology) is neither to give foundations, nor to achieve the unification of the social/cognitive sciences and the natural sciences. (shrink)

Fragile states have been raising increasing concern among donors since the mid-2000s. The policies of the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis have not excluded fragile states, and this source has provided financing for these countries according to standardized procedures. They represent interesting cases for exploring the meaning and role of measurement in a globalized context. Measurement in the field of HIV/AIDS and its treatment has given rise to a private outsourcing of expertise and auditing, thereby (...) creating a new form of value based on the social process of registration and the creation of realities produced by the intervention itself. These “scriptural economies” must be questioned in terms of the production of knowledge, but also in terms of social justice. Governing HIV/AIDS treatments by numbers in a fragile state is explored in this article through the experience of the Central African Republic in terms of epidemiology and access to antiretroviral drugs. The unexpected effects of performance-based programs in this context underline the need for global health governance to be re-embedded into a social justice framework. (shrink)

This Dissertation argues for a care-centrically grounded account of relational personhood and widely realized diachronic personal identity. The moral distinction between persons and non-persons is arguably one of the most salient ethical lines we can draw since many of our most fundamental rights are delineated via the bounds of personhood. The problem with drawing such morally salient lines is that the orthodox, rationalistic definition of personhood, which is widespread within philosophical, medical, and colloquial spheres, excludes, and thereby de-personifies, a large (...) number and a great variety of human beings such as neonates, young children, the elderly who suffer from dementia, individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, and patients in vegetative states. The reconceptualization of personhood necessary for a more inclusive definition ought to originate with an appropriate moral grounding. To this end, this Dissertation grounds the notion of personhood in the care ethical sphere, thereby emphasizing the role of care relations in the maintenance of the moral consideration of vulnerable individuals. This Dissertation argues that grounding the concept of a person in care relations entails a relational account of personhood, which, along with the insights of the Extended Mind and Social Manifestation Theses, leads to an extended and externalized understanding of diachronic identity, which allows fragile people to be held in their personal identities even if they themselves lack the capacities usually associated with moral personhood. As we trace a person’s identity through time, we track the various relational properties, which constitute personal narratives and thus act as a glue that binds such dynamic and often unique properties into stable, trackable narratives. Since care relations are morally relevant on a care-centric account of personhood, what is lost in cases where such care relating ceases is not merely of sentimental value, but of great moral importance as well. Morally meaningful care relations are not replaceable, and, by extension, neither are the narratives that are constituted by such unique and irreplaceable instances of relating. This Dissertation argues that the constitutive care relational nature of personal narratives makes such narratives irreplaceable and is precisely what makes persons so morally precious. (shrink)

THE THEME, "The Intelligibility of Nature," is exceedingly broad. It stretches like a vast domain in which one can only hope to leave a few footprints, some fragile impressions that are all but lost in the expanse. In attempting to understand the natural world, the enterprise that is most familiar to many of us is inherited from the Greeks and their Latin heirs, both classical and mediaeval, and this enterprise continues in our own day in the form of the (...) modern sciences of nature. Nowadays, we are more informed about the knowledge acquired by the Egyptians, Babylonians, and others prior to the Greeks. We are more conscious of the achievements of the Chinese in physics and the Indians in mathematics. And we are more aware of the medical and zoological lore present in oral traditions, such as those of Africa. Moreover, we are only now beginning to appreciate their contributions and their potential for new forms of enquiry, including other ways of approaching nature. The terms in which the topic is here designated, however, are conceived in Greek and expressed in Latin. Nevertheless, even within this cultural tradition of natural enquiry, the topic is quite broad enough. Like a grammarian of old parsing a sentence, I am forced to begin by distinguishing parts of the theme. (shrink)

This paper examines the logic and morality of the German Stem Cell Act of 2002. After a brief description of the law’s scope and intent, its ethical dimensions are analysed in terms of symbolic threats, indirect consequences, and the encouragement of immorality. The conclusions are twofold. For those who want to accept the law, the arguments for its rationality and morality can be sound. For others, the emphasis on the uniqueness of the German experience, the combination of absolute and qualified (...) value judgments, and the lingering questions of indirect encouragement of immoral activities will probably be too much. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper examines the logic and morality of the German Stem Cell Act of 2002. After a brief description of the law's scope and intent, its ethical dimensions are analysed in terms of symbolic threats, indirect consequences, and the encouragement of immorality. The conclusions are twofold. For those who want to accept the law, the arguments for its rationality and morality can be sound. For others, the emphasis on the uniqueness of the German experience, the combination of absolute and (...) qualified value judgments, and the lingering questions of indirect encouragement of immoral activities will probably be too much. (shrink)

The following article is a reflection on the value of peace, a term often attributes to the absence of war or the lack of violence, conflict, suppression or, in short, phenomena considerer opposite to peace. But, is this really how peace should be defined? It is a fact that peace, be it personal inner peace or peace within a society, is constantly threatened, attacked, violated, and destroyed by a variation of causes: the failure to keep a promise, the breach of (...) a contract, obtained by illegitimate means, economical ambitions, diverse geo-political strategies, anarchy, social pressure, the lack of understanding on an interpersonal level, a family crisis, immaturity, unemployment, acts of injustice, poverty, the failure to adapt, discrimination, migration, terrorism, arms trafficking, civil wars, the threat of a world war and the usage of weapons of mass destruction, etc.; factors that take away peace, among men and women, societies, and entire countries. But…what is peace? Why do we struggle so much to obtain it? Why is it so appreciated by the majority mankind? Why have humanists, philosophers, politicians, civil right organizations, and men of good will in general dealt with this topic in such an extended manner? Why it has written so much about peace? Why peace is so fragile? These are some of the questions that I will try to answer in this contribution, using some of the texts of St. Augustine, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel as reference. (shrink)

The analytical tension between legal norms, moral values, and national interests seems no uncharted territory in political science, but has found very little interest in legal academia. For lawyers, moral values and national interests are largely “unknowns,” dealt with by other disciplines. Looking a bit deeper, the picture becomes more nuanced, however. As part of a roundtable on “Balancing Legal Norms, Moral Values, and National Interests,” this essay argues that norms, values, and interests are not different (...) universes of legal normativity, morality, and specific interests, but are interrelated concepts. Values clearly influence norms and often underpin them, while seemingly concrete norms (rules) are themselves often fragile constructs trying to balance competing interests. Value systems are quite diverse within societies, and this is even truer for interests; each society is a dynamic system of social interaction where conflicting interests are constantly playing out. In a way, underlying conflicts of values and interests are constantly being renegotiated in the legal system, with the norms enshrined in the text of statutes and treaties serving to constitute transitory reference points. (shrink)

Who is the human being? A powerful, enhanceable biological organism, which techniques and artifacts can augment or a disembodied spirit damned to be influenced by its fragile body? In Defense of the Human Being accounts for both perspectives existing in the contemporary debate on the human and provides us with an answer: we should conceive of “ … the human person as a physical or embodied being, as a free, self- determining being, and ultimately as an essentially social being (...) connected with others.” (p. 2). Temporality, embodiment, relationality, vulnerability: we need to take into account these features and embrace them, even though this means to accept that we cannot live forever, we cannot rely on machines only, but we have to fulfil our existence. (shrink)

Central to Levinas’ “phenomenological” approach to ethics is his identification of an “infinite signification” in the human face. This insistence on the appearance of an infinitely signifying phenomenon has led many, notably Dominique Janicaud, to decry Levinas’ work as anti-phenomenological: little more than a novel approach to metaphysics. A significant element of the phenomenological revolution, Janicaud insists, referencing Husserl and the early Heidegger for support, is grounded in the recognition that phenomena arise in and are circumscribed by finitude. Any reference (...) to an infinite phenomenon which breaks with apperception, he therefore concludes, necessarily breaks as well with the phenomenological tradition, signaling a reversion to idealism, metaphysics, and ultimately theology. As this paper will argue however, a close reading of Husserl reveals not only the recognition of infinite phenomena; but, more significantly, the possibility that all phenomena are potentially infinite. This means that in many ways Levinas is not only more faithful to Husserl’s project than is often admitted; but moreover, that Levinas’ work serves as a lens through which a hitherto under-emphasized element of Husserl’s work can be examined – an element which challenges the traditional critique of Levinas. What’s more, the possibility of infinite phenomena opened up in Husserl’s work, when read through Levinas’ analysis of the ethical significance of the infinite, creates the possibility of recognizing the potential ethical value of all objects, and not merely one object in particular: the human face. This possibility, as I will show, contributes to further blurring the already ambiguous distinction within Levinas between “good” and “bad” infinities – a blurring which, as I will argue, serves as a powerful heuristic in interpreting certain human pathologies, from obsessive compulsive disorder and certain forms of schizophrenia, to the temptation of evil. In this way, an analysis of the status of the infinite in Husserl and Levinas provides a purely phenomenological ground for exploring issues traditionally seen as the exclusive domain of metaphysics and theology. (shrink)

In the context of today.s moral and ecological crisis, and the accelerated advance of information and communication technologies, when human beings intensively experience their own fragility, a major question is that of well-being. That raises the issue of moral health, which represents, in an axiological and normative sense, a basis for the human being to find proper opportunities for remaking and protecting the beingness' equilibrium in face of a variety of risks in a society of excesses. We consider that a (...) significant element of moral health lies in the old Greek value of sophrosýne. In this essay, we highlight its meaning and role. We do this by reviving the core of a wise learning coming from Ancient philosophy about one of the moral excellences. Sophrosýne is approached as a necessary factor in human well-being; it is pursued in the prophylactic and therapeutic potential for the maintenance of human health; finally, it is developed inits fundamental action of allowing happiness in a well-functioning and self-fulfilling life of the human being. (shrink)

This article reports on qualitative research conducted in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, among researchers and gate-keepers of health facilities in the province. Results suggest disparate but not irreconcilable perceptions of the social value of research in provincial health facilities. This study found that researchers tended to emphasize the contribution of research to the generation of knowledge and to the health of future patients while gate-keepers of health facilities tended to emphasize its contribution to the healthcare system and to current patients. Furthermore, (...) relations between research stakeholders were perceived to be somewhat fragile, making it difficult for stakeholders to achieve consensus about the social value of research, as well as on ways to maximize value. Interventions to negotiate a shared perspective on the social value of research would appear to be warranted, and the findings of this study suggest some focus areas for such intervention. (shrink)

This is a fresh and stimulating analysis of the esthetic experience in terms of the import it gives to the role of "affective hazard" in the constitution of the esthetic form. The author, who comes with a background in English literature, proposes that all esthetic experiences have one common feature, their form as felt unity which endows the object with a value that distinguishes it from other objects. The experiencer as one of the terms of the relationship is confronted with (...) a manifold of elements one of which stands out in a hazardous way as an impediment to the union of the terms. Its very hazardousness, however, impregnates the whole structure, and in spite of an apparent obstruction to the order it actually bestows a balance and symmetry that would otherwise be lacking. There is a bending, but no breaking; the fragility itself is a necessary precondition for the form that constitutes the esthetic experience marking the object as a potentiality for some form yet unactualized but implicitly determined. The scholastic notion of being is evident in Slattery’s analysis of form as the principle of "unity," "intelligibility," and "determination." Rather than emphasize the static quality of things she chooses to focus on the object as both open and closed; open to receive many forms but closed in that it is only actualized as one form by a mind who at will chooses it from a manifold of other possible forms which it rejects. Unlike the Aristotelian form which inheres in the thing independent of the experiencer the form in the esthetic object is constituted by an experiencer who is an active participant in the relationship. This active term also confers upon the object its value which defines it as an object of esthetic quality. Interspersed throughout the book are descriptive analyses of various esthetic forms that illustrate what Slattery means by the decisive role of "affective hazard," and it is here that she is at her best. So well does she capture the essence of the dynamic richness peculiar to the esthetic object that she evokes in the reader an affective excitement and an awareness of a felt unity. This in itself verifies her thesis, and we could only have wished that she furnished us with more of the heightening experiences.—K. R. M. (shrink)

In this paper I explore privacy as a concept that becomes relevant and sometimes necessary under specific circumstances, but unnecessary in others. Privacy, I suggest, can be thought of as the right to be left alone and is integral to related concepts such as freedom, liberty, and independence. In light of the ongoing expansion of data-mining technologies, business models, and emerging modes of governance, I suggest that privacy is simultaneously more necessary and more at risk than ever. Privacy, in other (...) words, is fragile and must be appreciated, understood, and defended. At the same time, privacy is increasingly an obstacle for businesses, governments, and financial interests, all of whom are eager to extract our data, manage our expectations, and shape and control our desires. To achieve their objectives, I describe how these organizations have long used propaganda and persuasive techniques to shape and manage the opinions, values, and expectations of the public. These days, I argue, the meaning of privacy is being made to evolve in order to bolster these organizations’ interconnected efforts to expand their power and control and to pave the way for the imposition of digital IDs. I also reflect on the way propaganda is being used today, the ways it has been described in the past, and the ways it will evolve in the future—either in defense of freedom, liberty, and independence, or in service of organizations intent on expanding their power and control over managed populations. (shrink)

This article explores a modern approach to childhood that abandons the traditional view of children in western societies as inferior, fragile and vulnerable. The modern approach explored in this paper takes a plural perspective in the conception of children as people who are able to think for themselves and who have the absolute right to participate in the affairs that affect them. This modern approach is related in this study to the free-rangers thesis, in which childhood is interpreted as (...) a process of maturation and not as a stage of life, which is the conception linked to the traditional percepcion of childhood in the western societies. In the framework of formal education, this modern approach to childhood is related to Freire’s liberating education and the proposals for the school of philosophy with children in which philosophical practices are encouraged from an early age, thereby stimulating a much more active role for children in schools and giving their voice due recognition. So, this study highlights the importance of promoting liberating education in schools with the aim of making every effort to subvert the traditional roles of both teachers and pupils in formal education to give a more active role to children. In thi sense, this paper calls for the activity of philosophy whith children and encourages the idea of putting philosophy at the service of schools to give children’s voices greater value. (shrink)

Brown examines the types of scene that exist, along with related concepts such as authenticity and the 'really' real. It also explores the effectiveness of scenes in spreading new actions and ideas, as welll as their role in both facilitating 'difference' and introducing originality and newness in modern society. Finally, the book deals with the fragility of scenes, why they can often become subsumed by normality and how this might be prevented.

The transformation of forests to agriculture is a dominant theme in human history, previously associated with progress, increasingly associated with local and global danger. A workshop at the Smithsonian Institution brought together scholars interested in one very large and fragile deltaic forest system of international importance: the Sundarbans. We found that land-hungry peasants are not quite the villain of the piece, as often portrayed; destruction and deterioration of the forest reflected pre-colonial dynamics of community and state formation, colonial land (...) and forest policy, international economics, and failure to solve international commons dilemmas. Preservation of the remaining Sundarbans depends on profound shifts in values concerning nature as well as changes in political structure and national economic pressures. Conventional wisdom in the form of the “tragedy of the commons” in explaining environmental degradation stands in need of revision. (shrink)

Ethical reasoning of all types is anthropocentric, in that it is addressed to agents, but anthropocentric starting points vary in the preference they accord the human species. Realist claims about environmental values, utilitarian reasoning and rights-based reasoning all have difficulties in according ethical concern to certain all aspects of natural world. Obligation-based reasoning can provide quite strong if incomplete reasons to protect the natural world, including individual non-human animals. Although it cannot establish all the conclusions to which anti-speciesists aspire, (...) it may establish many of them with some clarity. (shrink)

In December 2017, Law 219/2017, ‘Provisions for informed consent and advance directives’, was approved in Italy. The law is the culmination of a year-long process and the subject of heated debate throughout Italian society. Contentious issues are addressed in the law. What emerges clearly are concepts such as quality of life, autonomy, and the right to accept or refuse any medical treatment – concepts that should be part of an optimal relationship between the patient and healthcare professionals. The law maximizes (...) the value of the patient’s time to decide. Every patient is allowed to make choices for the present as well as for the future, conceived as a continuation of the present, and to decide what comes next, based on what he/she already knows. The law identifies three distinct but converging paths towards the affirmation of a care relationship based on reciprocal trust and respect: the possibility to consent to or refuse treatment, the shared care planning, and advance directives. The fundamental point to emerge from the new Italian law is that consensus is an essential connotation of the treatment relationship. Consensus is not limited to the acceptance/rejection of medical treatment but is ongoing. It is projected into the future through shared care planning and advance directives which act as tools for self-determination and the manifestation of the beliefs and preferences of persons unable to express their will. These principles are in line with the idea of appropriate care as evaluated from two different perspectives, one of scientific adequacy and the other commensurate with the individual’s resources, fragility, values, and beliefs. Surely, however, the new law is not the end of the matter on issues such as conscientious objection, which is deeply rooted within the Italian cultural and political debate. In this regard, healthcare institutions and policymakers will be called upon to develop and implement organizational policies aimed at the management of foreseeable conscientious objection in this field. (shrink)

We argue that the fragility of contemporary marriages—and the corresponding high rates of divorce—can be explained (in large part) by a three-part mismatch: between our relationship values, our evolved psychobiological natures, and our modern social, physical, and technological environment. “Love drugs” could help address this mismatch by boosting our psychobiologies while keeping our values and our environment intact. While individual couples should be free to use pharmacological interventions to sustain and improve their romantic connection, we suggest that they (...) may have an obligation to do so as well, in certain cases. Specifically, we argue that couples with offspring may have a special responsibility to enhance their relationships for the sake of their children. We outline an evolutionarily informed research program for identifying promising biomedical enhancements of love and commitment. (shrink)

The value of epistemic trust has been neglected, as Townsley rightly observes, but I think a virtue epistemology of the kind I endorse is well suited to provide a framework for understanding it. The Cassandra of Greek legend illustrates the complex relationships among epistemic and non-epistemic goods, as well as the fragility of knowledge. I think her case leads us to a more radical conclusion than the one Townsley proposes.

Jeffrey Friedman’s Power Without Knowledge argues forcefully that there are inherent limitations to the predictability of human action, due to a circumstance he calls “ideational heterogeneity.” However, our resources for predicting human action somewhat reliably in the light of ideational heterogeneity have not been exhausted yet, and there are no in-principle barriers to progress in tackling the problem. There are, however, other strong reasons to think that disagreement among epistocrats is bound to persist, such that it will be difficult to (...) decide who has “the right answer” to a given technocratic problem. These reasons have to do with competing visions of the good society, fact/value entanglement, and the fragility of the facts of the social sciences. (shrink)

The article critically covers the current issues of "value-driven management" and the creative economy. Analyzing the concept of a "fragile and incomprehensible" (BANI) world, the author conclude that the widely proclaimed era of the knowledge economy is nothing more than utopia. A value-based transformation is possible if it is approached in a comprehensive and systemic way, which requires large-scale transformations initiated and supported by the power structures. The author believe that the creative economy is more extensive than the traditional (...) one, and its development potential is rather limited. The paradigm of "commercial creativity", in fact, is aimed at providing employment and meeting the needs of the population of the "golden billion" countries. Статья в критическом ключе освещает актуальные вопросы «ценностного менеджмента» и креативной экономики. Анализируя концепцию «хрупкого и непостижимого» (BANI) мира, автор приходит к выводу, что широко провозглашенная эра экономики знаний — не более чем утопия. Ценностная трансформация возможна, если подход к ней будет комплексным и системным, для чего требуются масштабные преобразования, инициируемые и поддерживаемые властными структурами. Креативная экономика, как полагает автор, в большей степени экстенсивна, чем традиционная, а потенциал ее развития весьма ограничен. Парадигма «коммерческого креатива», по сути, нацелена на обеспечение занятости и удовлетворение потребностей населения стран «золотого миллиарда». (shrink)