The purpose of this study is to explore the ethical orientations of Taiwan's school leaders by means of a questionnaire survey of 573 school leaders. A multidimensional ethical framework, including utilitarianism, justice, care, critique, and virtue, was used. The results demonstrate that the most frequent ethical orientation of Taiwan's school leaders is justice. Second, the ethical orientation of Taiwan's school leaders is influenced by Confucian ethics to some degree, especially in terms of virtue ethics. However, the ethical orientation of school (...) leaders significantly varies depending on gender, age, position, years of teaching experience, and educational administration ethics training. (shrink)

Objectives: Neuroplastic changes that drive recovery of shoulder/elbow function after stroke have been poorly understood. The purpose of this study was to determine the relationship between neuroplastic brain changes related to shoulder/elbow movement control in response to treatment and recovery of arm motor function in chronic stroke survivors.Methods: Twenty-three chronic stroke survivors were treated with 12 weeks of arm rehabilitation. Outcome measures included functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) for the shoulder/elbow components of reach and a skilled motor function test (Arm (...) Motor Abilities Test, AMAT), collected before and after treatment.Results: We observed two patterns of neuroplastic changes that were associated with gains in motor function: decreased or increased task-related brain activation. Those with significantly better motor function at baseline exhibited a decrease in brain activation in response to treatment, evident in the ipsilesional primary motor and contralesional supplementary motor regions; in contrast, those with greater baseline motor impairment, exhibited increased brain activation in response to treatment. There was a linear relationship between greater functional gain (AMAT) and increased activation in bilateral primary motor, contralesional primary and secondary sensory regions, and contralesional lateral premotor area, after adjusting for baseline AMAT, age, and time since stroke.Conclusions: Recovery of functional reach involves recruitment of several contralesional and bilateral primary motor regions. In response to intensive therapy, the direction of functional brain change (i.e., increase or decrease in task-related brain recruitment) for shoulder/elbow reach components depends on baseline level of motor function and may represent either different phases of recovery or different patterns of neuroplasticity that drive functional recovery. (shrink)

The question of whether there is identity between erroneous thinking and existence is attributable to the question of whether there is identity between thought and existence. As has been pointed out, denial of the identity between erroneous thinking and existence leads to negation of the identity between thought and existence and also to recognition of the identity between partial thinking and existence. Some comrades recognize the identity between thought and existence, on the one hand, and deny the identity between erroneous (...) thinking and existence, on the other. This is contradictory. The question of whether there is identity between erroneous thinking and existence is in fact the question of whether the law of the unity of opposites can be applied to the relationship between thought and existence, between correct thinking and existence, and between erroneous thinking and existence. This is also the question of whether we have to stick to the Marxist theory of reflection, that is, the question of whether the Marxist theory of reflection can be applied to correct thinking and erroneous thinking. In other words, this is the question of whether erroneous thinking can reflect and react on objective existence. (shrink)

In this paper, the fixed-time practical bipartite tracking problem for the networked robotic systems with parametric uncertainties, input disturbances, and directed signed graphs is investigated. A new fixed-time estimator-based control algorithm for the NRSs is presented to address the abovementioned problem. By applying a sliding surface and the time base generator approach, a new stability analysis method is proposed to achieve the fixed-time practical bipartite tracking for the NRSs. We also derive the upper bound of the convergence time for employing (...) the presented control algorithm to solve the practical bipartite tracking problem and further demonstrate that the convergence time is independent of the initial value. Finally, the simulation examples are given to verify the effectiveness of the presented algorithms. (shrink)

AbstractExtant research has demonstrated that underdog expectations—individuals’ perceptions that others view them as unlikely to succeed—can have positive implications for motivating performance. In this paper, we draw on self-determination theory to examine how and when underdog expectations can have detrimental consequences for both the employee and the organization. Specifically, we propose that underdog expectations can decrease employees’ need fulfillment, which in turn leads to more cheating behavior. Furthermore, we theorize that the indirect effect of underdog expectations on cheating behavior via (...) need fulfillment is weaker when general self-efficacy is high than when it is low. Results from two studies using complementary designs support our predictions. Overall, our research demonstrates a potential dark side to underdog expectations and also contributes to the behavioral ethics literature. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to investigate the applicability of the planned behavior theory model and TPB-6 model of enhanced physical exercise in college students, and to explore the role of exercise commitment in the relationship between exercise intention and behavior, so as to provide theoretical and empirical support for college students to promotion exercise. The study participants were 581 college students are investigated with Theory of Planned Behavior Scale, Exercise Commitment Scale, and Physical Activity Rating Scale. Results showed (...) that the explanatory power of the TPB to exercise intention and exercise behavior is 0.70 and 0.52, respectively, and exercise intention was the primary factor to predict exercise behavior of college students. The Model fit of TPB-6 model is acceptable, compared with TPB 5-factor model, the predictive power of TPB-6 on behavioral intention increases from 70.0 to 75.0%, and the predictive power towards behavior raises from 52.0 to 59.0%. Exercise commitment has a partial mediating effect between exercise intention and behavior, which accounts for 26.89% of the total effect, but it has no moderating effect. In conclusion, this research demonstrates the TPB-5 model has good applicability among the college students, with exercise commitment variables, exercise intention can better predict college students’ exercise behavior, which can be used as the theoretical basis for the intervention on their exercise behavior. (shrink)

Does phenomenal force, the distinctive phenomenology attributed to perceptual experience, really form an integral part of the latter? If not, what implications does it have for perceptual justification? In this paper, I first argue for a metacognitive account, according to which phenomenal force constitutes a separate, metacognitive state. This account opens up a previously unexplored path for challenging phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, which has been a prominent theory of perceptual justification over the past two decades. Moreover, I investigate several alternative (...) possibilities in which phenomenal force might still be deemed as significant, but ultimately demonstrate that its epistemic role remains marginal at best. (shrink)

Psychological research has discovered that episodic memories are constructive in nature. This paper examines how, despite being constructive, episodic memories can provide us with justification for beliefs about the past. In current literature, two major approaches to memorial justification are internalist foundationalism and reliabilism. I first demonstrate that an influential version of internalist foundationalism, dogmatism, encounters problems when we compare certain types of memory construction with cognitive penetration in perception. On the other hand, various versions of reliabilism all face skeptical (...) challenges. I propose an alternative, two-factor theory that recognizes an epistemic distinction typically overlooked by dogmatism and reliabilism. Although our account leaves certain aspects unspecified, it is an important step forward. (shrink)

According to phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, perceptual experiences can give us immediate justification for beliefs about the external world in virtue of having a distinctive kind of phenomenal character—namely phenomenal force. I present three cases to show that phenomenal force is neither pervasive among nor exclusive to perceptual experiences. The plausibility of such cases calls out for explanation. I argue that contrary to a long-held assumption, phenomenal force is a separate, non-perceptual state generated by some metacognitive mechanisms that monitor one’s (...) first-order mental processes and states. This new account advances our understanding of the nature of phenomenal force. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Cognitive penetrability refers to the possibility that perceptual experiences are influenced by our beliefs, expectations, emotions, or other personal-level mental states. In this paper, I focus on the epistemological implication of cognitive penetration, and examine how, exactly, aetiologies matter to the justificatory power of perceptual experiences. I examine a prominent theory, according to which some cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences are like conclusions of bad inferences. Whereas one version of this theory is psychologically implausible, the other version has sceptical consequences. (...) In the second half of the paper, I suggest an alternative theory, drawing on recent empirical research on imagining-perception interaction and the epistemology of imagining. (shrink)

This study offers an embodied, action-oriented perspective on metaphor. It weaves together 3 theoretical ideas: (a) Lakoff & Johnson's (1980a, 1980b, 1980c; Lakoff, 1993) idea that metaphors are cross-domain conceptual mappings, (b) Lakoff & Johnson's (1999) idea that individuals are coupled to the world through embodied interactions with the environment, on which their sense of what is real is based, and (c) Gibbs's (1999) nascent idea that metaphors can be off-loaded into the cultural world. I argue that metaphors, as cross-domain (...) mappings, can be directly realized in the coupling of the external settings that frame and sustain one's activities and what people, individually and collectively, do to and in the world. A comparison of conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending theory is made from this perspective. I argue that the blending theory is overly stretched when it is applied to an analysis of metaphorical activity that can be jointly explained by cross-domain mappings and the external structures that constrain and modulate the activity. As for the conceptual metaphor theory, I argue that the theory is overly restrictive if domains are construed exclusively in neural terms. (shrink)

The autophagy initiation complex is brought about via a highly ordered and stepwise assembly process. Two crucial signaling molecules, mTORC1 and AMPK, orchestrate this assembly by phosphorylating/dephosphorylating autophagy‐related proteins. Activation of Atg1 followed by recruitment of both Atg9 vesicles and the PI3K complex I to the PAS (phagophore assembly site) are particularly crucial steps in its formation. Ypt1, a small Rab GTPase in yeast cells, also plays an essential role in the formation of the autophagy initiation complex through multiple regulatory (...) pathways. In this review, our primary focus is to discuss how signaling molecules initiate the assembly of the autophagy initiation complex, and highlight the significant roles of Ypt1 in this process. We end by addressing issues that need future clarification. (shrink)

We tend to think that perceptual experiences tell us about what the external world is like without being influenced by our own mind. But recent psychological and philosophical research indicates that this might not be true. Our beliefs, expectations, knowledge, and other personal-level mental states might influence what we experience. This kind of psychological phenomena is now called “cognitive penetration.” The research of cognitive penetration not only has important consequences for psychology and the philosophy of mind, but also has interesting (...) epistemological implications. According to the Downgrade Thesis, some cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences give their subjects less justification for believing their penetrated contents than perceptual experiences that are unpenetrated to represent those contents would usually give. In this paper, I propose an innovative argument for the Downgrade Thesis. First, I develop a positive account of how some cognitive penetration works, according to which cognitive states influence perceptual experiences by triggering some imaginings. Second, I argue that imaginings do not give their subjects justification for believing their contents. I apply this epistemology of imagining to cognitive penetration, and argue that because of the role that imaginings play, some cognitively penetrated experiences also give their subjects less justification for believing their penetrated contents. (shrink)

Tye argues that visual mental images have their contents encoded in topographically organized regions of the visual cortex, which support depictive representations; therefore, visual mental images rely at least in part on depictive representations. This argument, I contend, does not support its conclusion. I propose that we divide the problem about the depictive nature of mental imagery into two parts: one concerns the format of image representation and the other the conditions by virtue of which a representation becomes a depictive (...) representation. Regarding the first part of the question, I argue that there exists a topographic format in the brain but that does not imply that there exists a depictive format of image representation. My answer to the second part of the question is that one needs a content analysis of a certain sort of topographic representations in order to make sense of depictive mental representations, and a topographic representation becomes a depictive representation by virtue of its content rather than its form. (shrink)

In this paper, we conduct an in-depth study of Japanese keyword extraction from news reports, train external computer document word sets from text preprocessing into word vectors using the Ship-gram model in the deep learning tool Word2Vec, and calculate the cosine distance between word vectors. In this paper, the sliding window in TextRank is designed to connect internal document information to improve the in-text semantic coherence. The main idea is to use not only the statistical and structural features of words (...) but also the semantic features of words extracted through word-embedding techniques, i.e., multifeature fusion, to obtain the importance weights of words themselves and the attraction weights between words and then iteratively calculate the final weight of each word through the graph model algorithm to determine the extracted keywords. To verify the performance of the algorithm, extensive simulation experimental studies were conducted on three different types of datasets. The experimental results show that the proposed keyword extraction algorithm can improve the performance by a maximum of 6.45% and 20.36% compared with the existing word frequency statistics and graph model methods, respectively; MF-Rank can achieve a maximum performance improvement of 1.76% compared with PW-TF. (shrink)

The coal industry exercises a pervasive influence upon mining communities in Appalachia even though it makes minimal contributions to employment. Miners rarely participate in movements that fight against coal companies for better working conditions. One explanation for this paradox is the depletion of social capital. In this article, I first use the existing body of literature to build a theoretical framework for discussing bonding social capital. Second, I analyze how the United Mine Workers of America in Harlan County, Kentucky at (...) the beginning of the twentieth century worked to generate social capital. The results show that these coalfield residents demonstrated a high degree of social capital in terms of a strong shared sense of reliability and a dedication to collective activities and intimate networks. The union during that period engaged in strategies that were instrumental in creating this high level of social capital: holding regular meetings, organizing collective actions, promoting collective identity, and electing charismatic leaders. (shrink)

This paper explores how to explain the applicability of classical mathematics to the physical world in a radically naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics. The applicability claim is first formulated as an ordinary scientific assertion about natural regularity in a class of natural phenomena and then turned into a logical problem by some scientific simplification and abstraction. I argue that there are some genuine logical puzzles regarding applicability and no current philosophy of mathematics has resolved these puzzles. Then I introduce (...) a plan for resolving the logical puzzles of applicability. (shrink)

Explanation to 500 questions on Western philosophy, philosophers, and their works.

What are thought experiments? How and why do they work? What do they reveal about the nature of rationality? These are the problems that I attempt to solve in my inquiry. ;Regarding the first problem, my preliminary answer can be stated as follows: Thought experiments are our imaginative explorations of new ways to experience and understand our world. It is my conviction that the ability to try out new ways of experiencing and understanding various phenomena is essential to the growth (...) of our knowledge and is constitutive of our sense of meaningfulness in our world. This conviction is the guiding idea of my study. ;This conviction is debatable. It cannot be the starting point of my argument. My tactic, rather, is to select and examine certain kinds of thought experiments, to show how and why they work, and to uncover the rationality that supports their implementation. I will show that the rationality is not specific to thought experimentation but is constitutive of all sorts of human organizing activities. The importance of a proper analysis of thought experiment is that it can give us an insight into human rationality in general. ;Thought experiments have played a central role in scientific development in human history. Yet almost nobody has any insight into how and why they work. But now recent research on cognition, especially research on meaning, imagination, concepts, reasoning, and cognitive development has begun to shed light on the imaginative structure of thought experiments. Therefore, we now have a means to begin to analyze the central mechanism of thought experimentation. My inquiry suggests what such an analysis would look like. (shrink)

Tye argues that visual mental images have their contents encoded in topographically organized regions of the visual cortex, which support depictive representations; therefore, visual mental images rely at least in part on depictive representations. This argument, I contend, does not support its conclusion. I propose that we divide the problem about the depictive nature of mental imagery into two parts: one concerns the format of image representation and the other the conditions by virtue of which a representation becomes a depictive (...) representation. Regarding the first part of the question, I argue that there exists a topographic format in the brain but that does not imply that there exists a depictive format of image representation. My answer to the second part of the question is that one needs a content analysis of a certain sort of topographic representations i n order to make sense of depictive mental representations, and a topographic representation becomes a depictive representation by virtue of its content rather than its form. (shrink)

We study type 1 premice equipped with supercomplete extenders. In this paper, we show that such premice are normally iterable and all normal iteration trees of type 1 premice has a unique cofinal branch. We give a construction of an KC type model using supercomplete type 1 extenders.

I argue that the most popular versions of naturalism imply nominalism in philosophy of mathematics. In particular, there is a conflict in Quine's philosophy between naturalism and realism in mathematics. The argument starts from a consequence of naturalism on the nature of human cognitive subjects, physicalism about cognitive subjects, and concludes that this implies a version of nominalism, which I will carefully characterize. The indispensability of classical mathematics for the sciences and semantic/confirmation holism does not affect the argument. The disquotational (...) theory of reference and truth is discussed but rejected. This argument differs from the Benacerrafian arguments against realism, because it does not rely on any specific assumption about the nature of knowledge or reference. It differs from the popular objections to the indispensability argument for realism as well, because it can admit both indispensability and holism. This argument motivates a new, radically naturalistic and nominalistic approach to philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

The dissertation studies the mathematical strength of strict constructivism, a finitistic fragment of Bishop's constructivism, and explores its implications in the philosophy of mathematics. ;It consists of two chapters and four appendixes. Chapter 1 presents strict constructivism, shows that it is within the spirit of finitism, and explains how to represent sets, functions and elementary calculus in strict constructivism. Appendix A proves that the essentials of Bishop and Bridges' book Constructive Analysis can be developed within strict constructivism. Appendix B further (...) develops, within strict constructivism, the essentials of the functional analysis applied in quantum mechanics, including the spectral theorem, Stone's theorem, and the self-adjointness of some common quantum mechanical operators. Some comparisons with other related work, in particular, a comparison with S. Simpson's partial realization of Hilbert's program, and a discussion of the relevance of M. B. Pour-El and J. I. Richards' negative results in recursive analysis are given in Appendix C. ;Chapter 2 explores the possible philosophical implications of these technical results. It first suggests a fictionalistic account for the ontology of pure mathematics. This leaves a puzzle about how truths about fictional mathematical entities are applicable to science. The chapter then explains that for those applications of mathematics that can be reduced to applications of strict constructivism, fictional entities can be eliminated in the applications and the puzzle of applicability can be resolved. Therefore, if strict constructivism were essentially sufficient for all scientific applications, the applicability of mathematics of mathematics in science would be accountable. The chapter then argues that the reduction of mathematics to strict constructivism also reduces the epistemological question about mathematics to that about elementary arithmetic. The dissertation ends with a suggestion that a proper epistemological basis for arithmetic is perhaps a mixture of Mill's empiricism and the Kantian views. (shrink)

After Liberation I did not undertake a really serious criticism of my past philosophical thought. It basically remained in my mind unchanged. I thought that if I simply did not concern myself with it any longer, it would be fine. In fact, that did not work. Even when you don't want to be concerned with something like that, it will concern itself with you. This was my thought system, and by my not thoroughly criticizing it, it remained my world view. (...) When someone has a particular world view, he inevitably looks at the world through that world view, as if he were wearing a pair of colored glasses. Everything he sees is inevitably distorted accordingly. I thought that in my further studies of the history of Chinese philosophy I could simply ignore my own philosophical thought. But wearing that pair of glasses, it was impossible to look at the history of Chinese philosophy without distortion. (shrink)

In 1925, I went to Yanjing University to teach courses in the history of Chinese philosophy. It was from this period on that I began to seriously study the history of Chinese philosophy. At the time, this was not what I really wanted to do. I had originally wanted to work with bourgeois philosophy in preparation for founding a system of my own. To work in the history of Chinese philosophy was at the time, I felt, a kind of academic (...) duty, a kind of burden. But after working with it for awhile, I felt that there was also much that could be done in this field of the history of Chinese philosophy. That is to say, while lecturing on the history of philosophy, I also found it possible to develop my own idealist philosophical thought. (shrink)

© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.Genetic studies have identified single nucleotide polymorphisms associated with the risk of prostate cancer. It remains unclear whether such genetic variants are associated with disease aggressiveness. The NCI-SPORE Genetics Working Group retrospectively collected clinicopathologic information and genotype data for 36 SNPs which at the time had been validated to be associated with PC risk from 25,674 cases with PC. Cases were grouped according to race, Gleason score and aggressiveness. Statistical analyses were used to compare the frequency (...) of the SNPs between different disease cohorts. After adjusting for multiple testing, only PC-risk SNP rs2735839 was significantly and inversely associated with aggressive and high-grade disease in European men. Similar associations with aggressive and high-grade disease were documented in African-American subjects. The G allele of rs2735839 was associated with disease aggressiveness even at low PSA levels in both European and African-American men. Our results provide further support that a PC-risk SNP rs2735839 near the KLK3 gene on chromosome 19q13 may be associated with aggressive and high-grade PC. Future prospectively designed, case-case GWAS are needed to identify additional SNPs associated with PC aggressiveness. (shrink)

There are three major theses in Plantinga’s latest version of his evolutionary argument against naturalism. (1) Given materialism, the conditional probability of the reliability of human cognitive mechanisms produced by evolution is low; (2) the same conditional probability given reductive or non-reductive materialism is still low; (3) the most popular naturalistic theories of content and truth are not admissible for naturalism. I argue that Plantinga’s argument for (1) presupposes an anti-materialistic conception of content, and it therefore begs the question against (...) materialism. To argue for (2), Plantinga claims that the adaptiveness of a belief is indifferent to its truth. I argue that this claim is unsupported unless it again assumes an anti-materialistic conception of content and truth. I further argue that Plantinga’s argument for (3) is not successful either, because an improved version of teleosemantics can meet his criticisms. Moreover, this version of teleosemantics implies that the truth of a belief is (probabilistically) positively related to its adaptiveness, at least for simple beliefs about physical objects in human environments. This directly challenges Plantinga’s claim that adaptiveness is indifferent to truth. (shrink)

This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach to philosophy of mathematics. It belongs (...) to anti-realism, but can meet those challenges and can perhaps convince some realists, at least those who are also naturalists. (shrink)

In a recent debate, Rosenberg claims that only the methods of natural science can deliver genuine knowledge, while Williamson rejects Rosenberg’s extreme methodological naturalism and insists that we have genuine philosophical and humanistic knowledge not achievable by hard-scientific methods alone. This paper responds to the debate. I will argue that physicalism, together with contemporary neurocognitive and evolutionary knowledge, implies that some of our intuitions and mental simulations used in the humanities and philosophy are justified methods for achieving knowledge but are (...) practically irreplaceable with hard-scientific methods. That is, extreme methodological naturalism is in conflict with physicalism. The argument also shows that some moderate version of methodological naturalism can be consistent with physicalism. Physicalism is the strong version of ontological naturalism and is supposed to be accepted by strongly committed naturalists like Rosenberg. Therefore, to be self-consistent, these naturalists should adopt physicalism plus a moderate version of methodological naturalism, rather than Rosenberg’s extreme version. (shrink)

The class origins of my neo-rationalism were very clear to others. But for myself, it was only after going through the examination and analysis mentioned above that it became clear to me. But even though I do now have a sense that this is true, my understanding is certainly still quite lacking. I can at least say that I do feel that the criticism in recent years of various comrades concerning this aspect of my philosophical thought has been basically correct. (...) I understand that fully now. (shrink)

In 1923, there was a debate in Chinese philosophical circles on the view of life [also known as the science versus metaphysics controversy]. In the introduction to A View of Life, I described the situation at the time.

A pathogenic connection between autoreactive T cells, fungal infection, and carcinogenesis has been demonstrated in studies of human autoimmune polyendocrinopathy-candidiasis-ectodermal dystrophy as well as in a mouse model in which kinase-dead Ikkα knock-in mice develop impaired central tolerance, autoreactive T cell–mediated autoimmunity, chronic fungal infection, and esophageal squamous cell carcinoma, which recapitulates APECED. IκB kinase α is one subunit of the IKK complex required for NF-κB activation. IKK/NF-κB is essential for central tolerance establishment by regulating the development of medullary thymic (...) epithelial cells that facilitate the deletion of autoreactive T cells in the thymus. In this review, we extensively discuss the pathogenic roles of inborn errors in the IKK/NF-κB loci in the phenotypically related diseases APECED, immune deficiency syndrome, and severe combined immunodeficiency; differentiate how IKK/NF-κB components, through mTEC, T cells/leukocytes, or epithelial cells, contribute to the pathogenesis of infectious diseases, autoimmunity, and cancer; and highlight the medical significance of IKK/NF-κB in these diseases. IKK/NF-κB regulates the expression of many genes that encode proteins involved in many crucial biological functions, such as immunity, tissue homeostasis, and fungal/bacterial/viral infections. Also, IKKα plays anti-tumor activities in many organs independently of NF-κB pathways. Thus, an inborn error in one of these gene loci can cause severe human diseases through these complicated mechanisms. (shrink)

This paper considers how players of Magic: The Gathering (MTG) limited draft turn their acquired gameplay style or disposition (their MTG “gamer habitus”), with respect to drafting, into an object of knowledge. This is done in order to then consciously rework it, to respond to new formats and to the changing metagame. I will focus on a particular case study: how streamer Chord_O_Calls' instructional video shows his own re-evaluation of certain cards. Evidently, it is a process requiring reflexivity, although I (...) aim to be specific with regard to the particular “form of reflexivity” involved. I distribute this outward to the MTG “habit assemblage” (an ensemble of techniques, things, relations) and argue that any individual player's instantiation of this reflexivity involves a practice-based synthesis of paratexts from the MTG habit assemblage that is not codified but is shaped by the assemblage. This leads to a consideration of the “intelligence” and limits of not only particular habits but that of the MTG “habit assemblage” itself. I argue that the broader socio-technical significance of the form of reflexivity that is being proliferated here is one which is defined by its flexibility, by an attentional style of delayed and shifting categorization. (shrink)