The article aims to reconstruct (on the basis of some rarely studied passages of the Protagoras and Theaetetus, as well as some doxographical evidence) the theory of the Protagorean dialeghesthai, and shows its connections with other areas (linguistic, theory of law and hermeneutics) of Protagoras’ thought. This theory is related to the distinction between the competitive and the dialectical use of the discourse. The latter is constructive and involves an application of the principles of the orthoepeia to dialectical argumentation, in (...) order to strengthen its logical and linguistic rigor, and elaborate exemplary speeches on topics of law, politics, ethics. Divenuto partecipe di una sorte divina, l’uomo, a causa della sua parentela con la divinità, fu, in primo luogo, il solo tra gli esseri viventi a credere negli dèi, e a imprendere a elevare altari e statue delle divinità; in seguito, egli articolò ben presto la voce e le parole per mezzo dell’arte, inventò abitazioni, vesti, calzature, coperte e gli alimenti che provengono dalla terra. (shrink)

This article reconstructs the work of John Moles, eminent classicist with a wide range of interests, as a historian of ancient philosophy. The article focuses on Moles’ studies of Dio Chrysostom, Cynicism, and Aristotle’s Poetics. In particular, the article presents Moles’ ever original interpretations, based on an exceptional knowledge of the ancient sources and modern scholarship. The article highlights the fundamental characteristics of Moles’ approach to the history of ancient philosophy, which is grounded in a firm historical basis and in (...) detailed, acute, and always rigorously demonstrative analyses of texts. Moles’ contribution to the history of ancient philosophy is marked by strong ethical motivations and a commitment to trace in classical texts not just mere data, but rather values and ideas to be preserved and reflected upon. (shrink)

In modern studies it has been largely denied that the so-called “secret doctrine” (which would be more correct to call “private teaching”) of the Theaetetus can be traced back to Protagoras. However, reasons why this doctrine can not be his own, have never been explained. At the same time, an appropriate justification of the hypothesis that it would be considered a pure Platonic creation has never been offered, nor was explained why it would be attributed to followers of Protagoras, but (...) not to Protagoras himself. This article examines the Platonic text in an analytical way, shows how Plato repeatedly attributes to the sophist of Abdera the content of this doctrine, and, based on fragments of Protagoras and other doctrines related to him by ancient sources, it is evident that nothing in Protagorean concepts comes into conflict with Theaetetus so-called “secret doctrine”, and how actually is completely coherent with it. (shrink)

This paper offers a detailed analysis of the first part of Hippias's speech in Plato's Protagoras (337 С 5-E 2). The aim of this analysis is to show the very richness of political notions and implications of Hippias's purpose, which one can be almost considered a sort of 5th century ВС philosophical hetairies's manifesto. Our analysis clarifies the meaning of Hippias's nomos/physis antithesis and it focuses on the philosophical value of these two terms. We try to reconstruct Hippias's conception of (...) positive law and to specify the concept of wise men's relationships and affinity. That, however, does not support the idea of a cosmo-politanism grounded on mankind's universal relationship. Hippias's position – which has to be grasped on the basis of Hippias's ontology explained by an important passage of Plato's Hippias Major – rather sustains the idea of a sort of "aristocratic cosmopolitanism" connected to the philosophical hetairies: that implies the recognition of verified and enhanced differences. (shrink)

This paper argues that the strong relationship between moral truth and knowledge is the main feature of Socrates’ philosophy and what makes him the real discoverer of ethics. In particular, this point explains the peculiar knowledge model adopted by Socrates, who, while admitting to be aware of his ignorance, shows instead his deep knowledge in a series of philosophical domains. Moreover, all this process makes the Socratic concept of anthropine sophia something dynamic and essential for philosophical inquiry. At the beginning, (...) the paper also provides a new look at the so-called Socratic question. (shrink)

Euthydemus is included neither in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker by Diels–Kranz nor in Sofisti. Testimonianze e frammenti by Untersteiner nor in Early Greek Philosophy by Laks and Most. Likewise, the great twentieth century works on the Sophists do not give space to him, at best mentioning him briefly. Yet Euthydemus is the author of a fragment, which was quoted by Plato in his Cratylus, and on which again there is no modern study. This paper sets out to study this fragment (...) in depth, to review and discuss the various translations, both existing and possible, to study the context of Plato’s quotation, to clarify the exact meaning and the theoretical scope of this important fragment, and lastly to place Euthydemus in the Protagorean tradition, of which he is a notable product. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) (151 E-152C); as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils (152C-160D). Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on the relationships between language, definition and being in Antisthenes. I start from Plato’s Sophist 251b–c, in which the reference to the ὀψιμαθεῖς stands out, and I conclude that it is not possible to identify these characters with Antisthenes. The conception of ὀψιμαθεῖς provides for the exclusive legitimacy of identical judgments, exploiting in an eristic sense an evident Eleatic legacy. But this position, rather than concordances, reveals serious opposition to what is surely known to us (...) of the logical and linguistic doctrines of Antisthenes. The most explicit testimony about the relationship between language and being in Antisthenes is handed down by Porphyry, who attributes to Antisthenes the equation λέγειν = λέγειν τι = λέγειν τὸ ὄν. My analysis intends to show that this equation is assumed by Antisthenes through a Socratic mediation and has a double objective: to ensure an objective reference of language, as opposed to Gorgias’ self-referential conception of language, and to nullify the antilogy, which is typical of sophistic argumentation. To it Antisthenes contrasts the ἐπίσκεψις τῶν ὀνομάτων, which is a development of Socratic ἐξετάζειν, and whose aim is to reach, at the end of the examination, no longer just a ὁμολογία, but a definition valid once and for all. Antisthenes is aware that there is a distinction between essence and quality, and with this, he moves a first important step beyond the univocal conception of being proper to Parmenides. The doxography will sum up Antisthenes’ position by describing him as the first philosopher to advance a definition of logos, i. e., definition. He bases his theory of definition on the identification of that attribute which is ἴδιον καὶ οἰκεῖον of the proposed object. Antisthenes coined the phrase τὸ τί ἦν to designate what the predicate is meant to say in a definition, i. e., the proper quality. This expression does not seem to identify the general notion of a predicate as such, but rather to indicate the determination or qualification necessary to actually define the object in question. In the final part of my article, I examine some testimonies that show how, with his theory of definition, Antisthenes is, and was considered already in antiquity, the precursor of the Stoic theory of definition, whose objective is, according to Chrysippus’ formula, to provide the explanation of what is proper (ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις). (shrink)

In this paper I examine the testimonium of Aristotle’s Rhetoric concern­ing Diogenes the Cynic. This piece of evidence is the most ancient source of Diogenes and proves that Aristotle was familiar with his writings. I also study the testimonium on Diogenes that is hand­ed down by Theophrastus, which confirms the interest of the ancient Peripatos in this philosopher. Finally, I examine a passage of Book 1 of the Politics where Aristotle refers to the thesis on the aboli­tion of money. I (...) argue that such a thesis could be ascribed to Diogenes. In particular, I attempt to demonstrate that several theses of political philosophy put forward by Diogenes should be considered as constitut­ing a polemical overthrow of the corresponding theses of Aristotle in Book 1 of his Politics. (shrink)

With the use of a particular metaphor, which appears at the end of the Cratylus and is taken up with perfect symmetry at the beginning of the Theaetetus, Plato certainly wanted to indicate the succession of Cratylus–Theaetetus as an order for reading the two dialogues, which Trasillus faithfully reproduced in structuring the second tetralogy of Platonic dialogues. The claim of the theory of ideas, with which the Cratylus ends, must therefore be considered the background in which to place not only (...) the analysis of the name carried out in the Cratylus, but also the discussion and criticism of the epistemological theories examined and refuted in the Theaetetus. The transition from the discussion of the name to that of the logos is another important theoretical element that connects the two dialogues. Another one is the theory of knowledge, already precisely elaborated in the Cratylus, and taken up and deepened in the Theaetetus. Finally, the theme of false and error is a third theoretical element common to the two dialogues, which, starting from Euthydemus, finds its solution in the Sophist. (shrink)

La polémique contre les oracles développée par Œnomaos de Gadara n’a jamais été reconstituée. Nous nous proposons de la reconstruire et de montrer que cette polémique et celle contre le fatalisme développée par le même Œnomaos sont intriquées et se soutiennent réciproquement. Notre analyse se divise en deux parties : dans la première, nous reconstituons les principes exégétiques de la critique des oracles, tels qu’ils apparaissent dans les chapitres 19-36 du livre V de la Praeparatio evangelica d’Eusèbe ; dans la (...) seconde, nous reconstituons les arguments qu’élabore Œnomaos dans le long chapitre 7 du livre VI du même ouvrage pour reduire à néant la prétention des oracles à être, avant même que véridiques, significatifs, apophantiques, doués de sens. (shrink)

The question of the method was central in the thought and teaching of Prodicus. We have abundant information on this method but it is, probably, closely connected to various other issues, on which we are less well informed. The right method to solve diverse linguistic problems comprised two moments and not just one as it frequently assumed. Similarly, the terms orthotes and diairesis of names, which appear in the sources, do not designate one single and simple procedure, but rather a (...) double and more complex one, which is reconstructed in this article and whose objectives are clarified. (shrink)

Cet article se propose de mettre en lumière la centralité du thème de la vie, et du rapport entre vie et pensée, dans la philosophie de Socrate. Ce thème est étroitement lié chez Socrate à la justification du sens de sa propre philosophie, qui repose non pas sur un certain « mode de vie », mais sur une série de principes théoriques forts et clairement définis. Or ces principes ne peuvent se réaliser que lorsqu’ils trouvent leur matière d’actualisation et leur (...) instrument de contrôle dans la réalité de la vie. Cela implique l’élaboration d’un nouveau concept de « vie », ainsi que du concept fondamental de « vivre en philosophant » : ce dernier indique une sorte de déplacement continu du plan de la pensée au plan de la vie, et vice versa, du particulier à l’universel, et vice versa, car seul, chacun des deux est insuffisant. (shrink)

Dans les Grenouilles, Aristophane reproche à Socrate de mépriser la musique. Cette étude vise à montrer que Xénophon et Platon ont répondu à Aristophane. Dans le Banquet de Xénophon, Socrate accorde une grande importance à la musique et à la danse et il y applique une esthétique conforme à celle qu’il a lui-même exposée dans les Mémorables. Le Banquet de Xénophon renferme également des allusions critiques à deux autres pièces d’ Aristophane, soit les Nuées et les Cavaliers. Dans le Phédon, (...) Socrate obéit au rêve qui lui enjoint de composer de la « musique », que Platon assimile en fait à la philosophie elle-même.In Frogs, Aristophanes blames Socrates for spurning music. The aim of this paper is to show that Xenophon and Plato answered Aristophanes’ charge. In Xenophon’s Symposium, Socrates attaches great value to music and dance, and he applies the esthetic theory he had set out in Memorabilia. Xenophon’s Symposium also contains critical allusions to two other of Aristophanes’ plays, Clouds and Knights. In Phaedo, Socrates obeys the dream that orders him to compose « music », which Plato reduces to philosophy itself. (shrink)

Les origines de la réflexion sur la musique dans la Grèce ancienne sont à chercher non dans la philosophie, mais dans la tradition poétique. Partant de la reconstruction des fonctions fondamentales de la musique et des différentes valeurs esthétiques assignées au chant dans les poèmes homériques, cet article reconstruit le développement des idées, thèmes et concepts esthétiques dans la réflexion des poètes sur leur propre art, leur méthode et leur style de composition, au fil d’un itinéraire philosophique qui va d’Hésiode (...) à Lasos d’Hermione et à Pratinas. La réflexion ultérieure des philosophes sur la musique ne naît pas de nulle part, mais, comme le montrent plusieurs exemples spécifiques, présuppose ces étapes complexes, riches et pour ainsi dire préliminaires. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) ; as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils. Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken.In that part of the dialogue where the question is under examination whether or not knowledge and perception are the same, Socrates uses an idealized concept of knowledge. That is, he restricts the use of the word by setting down what he will consider to be the essential characteristics of knowledge, the sufficient and necessary conditions of its being instantiated. An excellent piece of philosophical procedure. (shrink)

Antisthène (444-365 av. J.-C.) est le fondateur de l'école cynique. Cet ouvrage restitue la vraie figure d'Antisthène, altérée par la tradition qui le présente abusivement comme un sophiste, un éristique ou un théoricien de la légitimité exclusive des jugements d'identité. L'auteur le replace dans la lignée socratique et décrit sa réflexion sur la philosophie du langage et la sophistique.

Because anticipated and retrospective regret play important roles in practical deliberation and motivation, better understanding them can illuminate the contours of human agency. However, the possibility of self-ignorance and the fact that we change over time can make regret—especially anticipatory regret—not only a poor predictor of where the agent will be in the future but also an unreliable indicator of where the agent stands. Granting these, this paper examines the way in which prospective and, particularly, retrospective regret can nevertheless yield (...) important insight into the sorts of creatures we are, both generally and individually. The experience of retrospective regret can show a person she values something in a way she did not know or that she is (or was) a different person than she had thought, insights which can factor into forward-looking, or prospective, deliberation. Such instances of revelatory regret reveal something to the agent about herself as agent. I examine two cases of agential self-ignorance. In the first, the experience of regret reveals what the agent values, not only to others but even to the agent himself. In the second, the agent anticipates experiencing regret for an action but does not experience the regret, suggesting that the agent did not value the rejected alternative in the way she thought. Anticipatory regret is forward-looking and can play an important role in practical deliberation. But insofar as anticipatory regret flows from one’s imperfect judgment and prospection about oneself, retrospective regret can be an important corrective in helping the agent understand her own standpoint. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je me propose de reconstruire le cadre général de la pensée politique protagoréenne et de dégager ses conditions de possibilité à partir d’une analyse du mythe et des déclarations exposées dans le Protagoras. J’essaierai de montrer que la conception protagoréenne est axée sur les notions de loi et de citoyen d’une part, et sur la relation que le sophiste d’Abdère établit entre loi et nature de l’autre. Protagoras est le premier penseur dans l’histoire de la philosophie grecque (...) qui est en mesure de distinguer le niveau du social (marquant la deuxième phase du développement de la vie humaine) et le niveau du politique (marquant la troisième phase, représentée par la fondation de la cité). Dans ce cadre, j’établirai un parallélisme entre la conception protagoréenne et le concept kantien d’« insociable sociabilité ». J’articulerai enfin cette conception à la définition du sophiste qu’offre Protagoras dans le Théétète, en vue de mettre en évidence le rôle directif du sophiste par rapport au dèmos et son intervention active dans le processus de constitution de la loi, et d’éclaircir ainsi son rapport à la démocratie athénienne. (shrink)

Démontre en quoi Platon pourrait être considéré comme une source pour comprendre et mieux connaître les philosophes qui l'ont précédé.

We investigate whether ordinary quantification over objects is an extensional phenomenon, or rather creates non-extensional contexts; each claim having been propounded by prominent philosophers. It turns out that the question only makes sense relative to a background theory of syntax and semantics (here called a grammar) that goes well beyond the inductive definition of formulas and the recursive definition of satisfaction. Two schemas for building quantificational grammars are developed, one that invariably constructs extensional grammars (in which quantification, in particular, thus (...) behaves extensionally) and another that only generates non-extensional grammars (and in which quantification is responsible for the failure of extensionality). We then ask whether there are reasons to favor one of these grammar schemas over the other, and examine an argument according to which the proper formalization of deictic utterances requires adoption of non-extensional grammars. (shrink)

My discussion addresses the differences between analytic and continental philosophy concerning the use of logic and exact reasoning in philosophical practice. These differences are mainly examined in the light of the controversial dominance of Hegel's concept of logic (and theory of concept) in twentieth-century continental philosophy. The inquiry is developed in two parts. In the first (Sections 1-2), I indicate some aspects of the analytic-continental divide, pointing to the role that the topic 'logic and philosophy' plays in it. In the (...) second part (Sections 3-6), I give a short account of the views of logic which are typical of the three main trends of continental philosophy (see Table 1). I also suggest how, with the aid of some typical analytical devices, some continental 'anti-logical' attitudes may be corrected, on their own terms. (shrink)