ABSTRACT As parents become increasingly able to make genetic trait selections on behalf of their children, they will need ethical guidance in deciding what genetic traits to select. Dena Davis has argued that parents act unethically if they make selections that constrain their child's range of futures. But some selections may expand the child's range of futures. And other selections may shift the child's range of futures, without either constraining or expanding that range. I contend that not only would parents (...) act unethically if they make selections that constrain the range of their child's futures, they would act unethically if they make selections that shift the range of their child's futures, because selections that shift the range of the child's futures would allow parents to over‐determine their child's futures. Thus, I contend that parents would act ethically only if they make selections that expand their child's range of futures. (shrink)

In a recent case, parents of a profoundly developmentally disabled child asked physicians to use high-dose oestrogen to inhibit the growth of their child in the interests of allowing better care of her as she ages. The physicians asked whether such an intervention would be ethically acceptable. Such an intervention would seem to violate the rights of the child to bodily integrity and to normal growth, making the intervention ethically objectionable. But in this paper, I argue that in some rare (...) instances, a developmentally disabled child may have only a minimal right against interference with her growth. In those instances, parents may be acting ethically if they use medical interventions to inhibit the growth of their child for the purposes of facilitating better care. But they may so intervene only when the child's disabilities are so profound that the child has no personal interest in developing an adult size and when the intervention is the least intrusive means available for facilitating the care of the child. (shrink)

This dissertation considers the bases upon which ethical assessments of parental genetic trait selections for their children can be made. It argues that if parents engage in genetic trait selections, they must act to expand their child's range of open futures, not to constrict their child's range of open futures or to differentially shift their child's range of open futures. It contends that other proposed distinctions, including distinctions between normal and diseased states and between treatment selections and enhancement selections, do (...) not provide a sound basis for making ethical assessments of parental genetic trait selections. It contends that children have a right to an open future that parents hold in trust for their children and that parents must respect in making genetic trait selections.It considers examples of possible parental genetic trait selections regarding children's hearing, height and visual acuity. Finally, it addresses a number of concerns about and objections to this proposed basis for ethical assessment and to parental genetic trait selection generally but concludes that none of these concerns or objections are fatal the approach that if parents use parental genetic trait selection, they must do so in ways that expand their child's range of open futures. (shrink)