THE fifteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica is another of the projects undertaken by philosophers Robert M. Hutchins and Mortimer Adler. Hutchins chaired the Board of Editors, while Adler served as director of planning. This latest edition has the distinction of being the largest single private publishing venture in history, involving a thirty-two million dollar investment, over fifteen years of effort, and many thousands of consultants and contributors. This essay will attempt to assess philosophy’s share in so massive (...) an undertaking. (shrink)

This paper takes James David Forbes’ Encyclopaedia Britannica entry, Dissertation Sixth, as a lens to examine physics as a cognitive, practical, and social enterprise. Forbes wrote this survey of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century mathematical and physical sciences between 1852 and 1856, when British “physics” was at a pivotal point in its history, situated between a field identified by its mathematical methods – originating in France – and a discipline identified by its university laboratory institutions. Contemporary encyclopedias provided a nexus (...) for publishers, the book trade, readers, and men of science in the formation of physics as a field. Forbes was both a witness, whose account of the progress of physics or natural philosophy can be explored at face value, and an agent, who exploited the opportunity offered by the Encyclopaedia Britannica in the mid nineteenth century to enroll the broadly educated public and scientific collective, illuminating the connection between the definition of physics and its forms of social practice. Forbes used the terms “physics” and “natural philosophy” interchangeably. He portrayed the field as progressed by the natural genius of great men who curated it within an associational culture that engendered true intellectual spirit. Although this societal mechanism was becoming ineffective, Forbes did not see university institutions as the way forward. Instead, running counter to his friend William Whewell, he advocated inclusion of the mechanical arts, and a strictly limited role for mathematics. He revealed tensions when the widely accepted discovery-based historiography conflicted with intellectual and moral worth, reflecting a nineteenth-century concern with spirit that cuts across twentieth-century questions about discipline and field. (shrink)

Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer The materials translated in the body of this volume date from 1927 through 1931. The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article and the Amsterdam Lectures were written by Edmund Hussed (with a short contribution by Martin Heideg ger) between September 1927 and April 1928, and Hussed's marginal notes to Sein und Zeit and Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik were made between 1927 and 1929. The appendices to this volume contain texts from both Hussed and (...) Heidegger, and date from 1929 through 1931. As a whole these materials not only document Hussed's thinking as he approached retirement and emeri tus status (March 31, 1928) but also shed light on the philosophical chasm that was widening at that time between Hussed and his then colleague and protege, Martin Heidegger. 1. The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article Between September and early December 1927, Hussed, under contract, composed an introduction to phenomenology that was to be published in the fourteenth edition ofthe Encyclopaedia Britannica (1929). Hussed's text went through four versions (which we call Drafts A, B, C, and D) and two editorial condensations by other hands (which we call Drafts E and F). Throughout this volume those five texts as a whole are referred to as "the EB Article" or simply "the Article. " Hussed's own final version of the Article, Draft D, was never published of it appeared only in 1962. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl obdržel v roce 1927 nabídku od Jamese Louise Garvina, britského editora Encyclopædia Britannica, ať napíše pro novou, tehdy čtrnáctou edici článek „Fenomenologie“. Garvin stanovil rozsah článku na 4000 slov a termín vydání na září roku 1929. Husserl pracoval na článku v časovém rozmezí mezi zářím a prosincem roku 1927, během kterého vyhotovil celkem čtyři verze. Husserl požádal o spolupráci na prvních třech verzích svého žáka Martina Heideggera, který toho času zastával profesorský stolec na univerzitě v Marburku. Heidegger (...) strávil v říjnu 1927 u Husserla několik dní, během kterých intenzivně pracovali na řečeném článku. Nicméně jejich spolupráce vedla ke vzájemnému profesnímu odcizení, protože práce na formulování článku dala vytanout nepřekonatelným obsahovým diferencím mezi oběma filosofy. Na základě Heideggerových nepřijatelných návrhů a připomínek Husserl nakonec sepsal finální, čtvrtou verzi článku již sám. Tuto poslední verzi čítající 7000 slov pak Husserl předal oxfordskému učenci Christopheru V. Salmonovi, který ji měl zkrátit a přeložit do angličtiny. Salmon sice v únoru roku 1928 opravdu dodal do redakce EB text čítající 3844 slov bez bibliografie, ovšem nejednalo se vpravdě o překlad, nýbrž dost svévolnou parafrázi. Tato podoba Husserlova článku se pak objevovala ve čtrnácté edici EB, jež se vydávala až do roku 1974, jen do roku 1956, kdy byla nahrazena článkem napsaným Johnem N. Findlayem. Původní podoba Husserlova článku byla poprvé zveřejněna až roku 1962 v rámci jeho sebraných spisů známých pod označením Husserliana, podle jejichž IX. svazku jsme vyhotovili předložený překlad z německého jazyka. Podle této edice rovněž uvádíme paginaci, která je uvedena v hranatých závorkách, přičemž stránkový přechod indikuje v textu umístěná značka |.U příležitosti 80. výročí Husserlova skonu, který připadl na rok 2018, bylo naším záměrem připomenout přínos a odkaz tohoto našeho krajana tím, že napravíme absenci překladu jeho patrně nejvíce instruktivního, přehledného a programového textu, který byť ve zkomolené podobě anglického „překladu“, po dlouhou dobu seznamoval učenou veřejnost s tím, co je to fenomenologie. (shrink)

This was edited by the scientist Sir David Brewster (1781-1868) and published in 1830 by William Blackwood (1808-1830). Organised alphabetically, with more than 150 contributors and 360 copperplate illustrations, the encyclopedia was particularly notable for its scientific articles - such as those on electromagnetism and the polarization of light - many of which were written by Brewster himself. Brewster's efforts meant that Scotland had produced a worthy complement, or even rival, to the original Encyclopaedia Britannica.

This article explores how Mortimer J. Adler's philosophy of history, as it developed from the 1930s through the 1950s, affected the construction of Encyclopedia Britannica's Great Books of the Western World and the same set's Syntopicon. A thorough examination of Adler's influences (e.g. Arthur O. Lovejoy, Jacques Maritain, and Columbia University faculty) demonstrates that his philosophy of history derived from a coincidental confluence of developments in the fields of literature, history, and philosophy. Adler's processing of these trends reveals both (...) irony and paradox, and also explains some philosophical objections articulated by later foes of the great books idea. (shrink)

According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, abstraction refers to the cognitive process of isolating, or 'abstracting', a common feature or relationship observed in a number of things, or the product of such a process. New World Encyclopaedia describe abstraction in philosophical terminology as the thought process wherein ideas are distanced from objects. Abstraction uses a strategy of simplification that ignores formerly concrete details or leaves them ambiguous, vague or undefined. Abstract thinking, as opposed to concrete thinking, has no application (...) in 'the real world' unless adapted to certain circumstances. For this reason, abstract thinking can be regarded as limited in capacity to affect change. Yet, abstract thinking can be seen as a basis for major transformation. Problem solving often involves combining abstract and concrete reasoning. This article will reflect on how abstract thinking can be seen as a basis for transformation. Drawing from examples from my own artistic practice, I will look at how repetition, as a means of abstract thinking, can be seen as a tool for bridging and repositioning perspectives. (shrink)

THE TEXT In the summer semester of 1925 in Freiburg, Edmund Husserl delivered a lecture course on phenomenological psychology, in 1926127 a course on the possibility of an intentional psychology, and in 1928 a course entitled "Intentional Psychology. " In preparing the critical edition of Phiinomeno logische Psychologie (Husserliana IX), I Walter Biemel presented the entire 1925 course as the main text and included as supplements significant excerpts from the two subsequent courses along with pertinent selections from various research manuscripts (...) of Husserl. He also included as larger supplementary texts the final version and two of the three earlier drafts of Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article, "Phenomenology"2 (with critical comments and a proposed formulation of the Introduction and Part I of the second draft by Martin Heidegger3), and the text of Husserl's Amsterdam lecture, "Phenomenological Psychology," which was a further revision of the Britannica article. Only the main text of the 1925 lecture course (Husserliana IX, 1-234) is translated here. In preparing the German text for publication, Walter Biemel took as his basis Husserl's original lecture notes (handwritten in shorthand and I Hague: Nijhoff, 1962, 1968. The second impression, 1968, corrects a number of printing mistakes which occur in the 1962 impression. 2 English translation by Richard E. Palmer in Journal o{ the British Society {or Phenomenology, II (1971), 77-90. 3 Heidegger's part of the second draft is available in English as Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. John N. Deely and Joseph A. (shrink)

It is undeniable that computer technology has had a major impact on how we engage enquiry. We use computer devices to store information that helps us in our daily lives—just think of the contacts on your phone and whatever calendar app you might use to keep track of your schedule. Furthermore, people enjoy easy and quick access to a wide range of reliable online resources such as Nature, Reuters, and Encyclopedia Britannica through their laptops or smartphones. Powerful search engines (...) such as Google open up the door to swaths of information, enabling people easily to acquire a wide range of true beliefs through reliable means about all kinds of subject matters. However, what is the status of such true beliefs? In particular, once beliefs cease to be occurrent, do we still have non-occurrent beliefs, and, if true and reliably sustained, do they still qualify as knowledge? If they do, we would have cases of extended belief and knowledge, as these computer devices go beyond onboard capacities such as perception and memory. However, unlike our beliefs and desires, many information-storing apps and resources do not have the capacity automatically to “update” their information in light of new information. Moreover, wouldn’t extended belief and knowledge lead to massive cognitive bloat—an unpalatable explosion of belief and knowledge completely detached from an ability naturally to recall the relevant information? It would seem so given the wide variety of storage repositories and devices at one’s fingertips. Doesn’t cognitive bloat threaten to undermine the notion of expertise? Is it really possible to become an expert on a given topic by simply and easily looking up information via one’s smartphone and saving it? And where, now, would we place cognitive effort—steps taken by individuals to commit details to memory, to apply knowledge, to deliberate, and to assess and reflect? In “Extended Knowledge Overextended?”, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen and Jens Christian Bjerring offer a comprehensive discussion of extended belief and knowledge. They criticize two recent attempts to mitigate concerns about cognitive bloat by arguing that their effectiveness is contingent on the current state of technology—in particular, the fact that computer devices are currently external to us. However, if computer devices seamlessly integrated with our own onboard capacities—the so-called neuromedia—become reality, it may be much more difficult to resist extended belief and knowledge and, with them, massive cognitive bloat. (shrink)

In Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology, Joseph J. Kockelmans provides the reader with a biographical sketch and an overview of the salient features of Husserl's thought. Kockelmans focuses on the essay for the Encyclopedia Britannica of 1928, Husserl's most Important effort to articulate the aims of phenomenology for a more general audience. Included are Husserl's text -- in the original German and in English translation on facing pages -- a synopsis, and an extensive commentary that relates Husserl's work as a whole (...) to the essay for the Encyclopedia. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:.. MERELY A MAN OF LETTERS" an interview with Jorge Luis Borges* Philosophy and Literature: Why don't you tell us about some of the philosophers who have influenced your work and in whom you have been the most interested? Jorge Luis Borges: Well, I think that's an easy one. You might talk in terms of two: Berkeley and Schopenhauer. But I suppose Hume might be worked in also, because, (...) after all, Hume refutes Berkeley. Really, he comes from Berkeley—even if Berkeley comes from Locke. You might think of Locke, of Berkeley, and of Hume as being three links in an argument..... But I suppose that when someone refutes someone else in philosophy, he is carrying on the argument. P&L: And Schopenhauer? Borges: Schopenhauer is very different from Hume. Of course, Schopenhauer had his idea of the Will. That is not to be found in Hume.... The case of Berkeley was different. I suppose he thought of God as being aware of all things all the time, if I don't get him wrong. If we go away, does this room disappear? No, because God is thinking about it. Now, in the case of Schopenhauer, I was rereading Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, The World as Will and Idea, and I was rather taken aback, or baffled I should say, puzzled by something that keeps on recurring in Schopenhauer. Of course it may have been a slip of the pen, but as he goes back to it, and as he was a very careful writer, I wonder if it is a slip of the pen. For example, Schopenhauer begins by saying that the universe, the stars, the spaces in between, the planets, *On April 14, 1976, two editors of Philosophy and Literature, along with an interested colleague, interviewed Jorge Luis Borges at Michigan State University, where he held a position as visiting professor for the winter term. These remarks are edited from the transcript of that conversation. 337 338Philosophy and Literature this planet, those things, have no existence—except in the mind which perceives them. But then, to my surprise—and I suppose you can explain this to me, since you are philosophers and I am not—what Schopenhauer says is that all those things have no existence except in the brain. And that the universe—I remember these words, I don't think I'm inventing them now—"ist ein Gehirnphänomen," that the world is a cerebral phenomenon. Now, I was baffled. Because, of course, if you think of the universe, I suppose the brain is as much a part of the external world as the stars or the moon. The brain after all is a system of visual, of tactile, perceptions. He keeps on insisting on the brain. I don't think, for example, that Bishop Berkeley insists on the brain, or Hume, who would have insisted on the mind, consciousness. P&L: People sometimes say that they see Berkeley in stories like "Orbis Tertius." Borges: Yes, I suppose they do. Well, of course. But in that story I was led by literary means also. P&L: How do you distinguish the literary from the philosophical means in that story? Could you explain that? Borges: Very easily.... Encyclopedias have been my chief reading. I have always been interested in encyclopedias. I used to go to the Biblioteca National in Buenos Aires—and since I was so shy, I felt I could not cope with asking for a book, so I looked on the shelves for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I would pick up any chance volume and I would read it. One night I was richly rewarded, because I read all about the Druses, Dryden and the Druids—a treasure trove, no?—all in the same volume, "Dr-." Then I came to the idea of how fine it would be to think of an encyclopedia... a very rigorous one of course, of an imaginary world, where everything should be linked. For example, you would have a language and then a literature, and then a history and so on. Then I thought I would write a story of a fancy encyclopedia. Of course that would require many different people to write it... (shrink)

No responsible philosopher can escape reflecting upon the unique character and problems of contemporary atheism. And Philosophy Today is happy for the opportunity to present the following essay by Etienne Gilson in this area. Not only because he is one of the eminent scholars of our day but especially because hisdeep knowledge of medieval thought gives him an uncommon perspective for his personalized reflections on either the idea of God or the difficulties of atheism.The following article is reprinted from Great (...) Ideas Today 1969, copyrighted 1969 by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. (shrink)

Borges has a rare ability to put wild ideas into detective stories with reporting style. At least that is the impression that we got on his short stories. In particular, one of his short story is worthnoting: Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius. The story told us about a mysterious country called Uqbar, in apparently an unofficial reprint of Encyclopedia Britannica. It also tells about Tlon, a mysterious planet, created purely by imaginative minds. While this story clearly criticizes Berkeley view and (...) may be not related to our daily reality, a reinterpretation of this story leads us to a long standing discourse in the philosophy of science: to how extent the entire modern physics follow such a Berkeley-antirealism tendency? This paper is intended to bring this subject into our attention. We will also discuss shortly on antirealism in certain trends in theoretical physics and cosmology. (shrink)

Von Walchs Philosophischem Lexicon bis Zedlers Universal-Lexicon, von Diderots und D’Alemberts Encyclopédie bis zur Encyclopaedia Britannica: alle bedeutenden frühmodernen Wörterbücher und Enzyklopädien haben sich ziemlich viele Definitionen angeeignet, die der hugenottische Gelehrte Étienne Chauvin (1640 – 1725) in den beiden Ausgaben seines Lexicon philosophicum (1692 und 1713) bereits formuliert hatte. Chauvin verglich als erster die scholastische Tradition mit den Theorien der neuen Denker wie Descartes, Gassendi und deren Anhänger. Sein Werk befasst sich ausführlich mit der Naturphilosophie und beschreibt (...) naturwissenschaftliche Instrumente und Experimente. Erstaunlicherweise sind der komplexe Aufbau, die Quellen und die Nachwirkung von Chauvins Wörterbuch noch nie gründlich untersucht worden. Die vorliegende umfassende Studie über die Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie und Ideen wirft ein helles Licht auf die „République des lettres“ zwischen dem Ende des 17. und dem Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts. Sie behandelt Metaphysik, Logik, Ethik und anthropologische Themen sowie den Widerstreit zwischen alten und neuen Ansichten über die Natur. ---STIMMEN ZUM BUCH--- „Das Buch selbst bietet aber einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Aufklärungs- und Philosophie- bzw. Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Frühaufklärung sowie der Bildungsgeschichte Preußens. […] [Das Buch] bietet als solches auch aufschlußreiche Bausteine für das Projekt eines Vokabulars der europäischen Philosophien, dem man sich eben auch durch das Studium einschlägiger Lemmata alter Lexika nähern kann.“ (Till Kinzel, Informationsmittel (IFB), März 2017) From Walch’s Philosophisches Lexicon to Zedler’s Universal-Lexicon, from Diderot’s and D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, all major early modern dictionaries and encyclopedias incorporate some of the definitions given by the Huguenot savant Étienne Chauvin (1640 - 1725) in the two editions of his Lexicon philosophicum (1692 and 1713). For the first time, Chauvin placed the scholastic tradition side by side with the theories of new thinkers like Descartes, Gassendi and their followers. His work covers natural philosophy extensively, describing scientific instruments and experiments. Surprisingly enough, the complex architecture of Chauvin’s dictionary, its sources, and its fortune have never been thoroughly investigated before. The present, broad study in the history of philosophical terminology and ideas casts light on the culture of the “République des lettres” between the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century. It deals with metaphysics, logic, moral, and anthropological themes, and the clash between ancient and modern visions of nature. (shrink)

die Produktion allgemeiner, alle Wissensgebiete abdeckender Enzyklopädien im 18. Jahrhundert markiert den Beginn der modernen Wissensgesellschaft. Enzyklopädisten aller Länder bemühten sich um die Definition des allgemein Interessanten – nicht in Theorien, sondern in erfolgreich vermarkteten enzyklopädischen Werken. Ein genauer Blick auf einschlägige Schriften der Aufklärungsepoche wie Chambers' Cyclopaedia, Diderots Encyclopédie, Zedlers Universal-Lexicon oder die Encyclopaedia Britannica zeigt den Kampf um neue Ideen eng verschränkt mit der Bemühung um redaktionelle Exzellenz. Insbesondere die mit Abstand größte damals abgeschlossene Enzyklopädie, das (...) Universal-Lexicon, erweist sich als Musterbeispiel für vielfältige Strategien, die Lesererwartungen in das enzyklopädische Schreiben einzubinden. Das 68-bändige Mammutwerk wird hier erstmals exemplarisch analysiert. Was das Universal-Lexicon auszeichnet, wird durch seine Größe verraten und gleichzeitig verdeckt: Hier werden andere Lexika und zahlreiche andere Quellenwerke ab- und umgeschrieben. Der Text des Universal-Lexicons ist eine Kompilation, eine Montage, das Ergebnis einer komplexen Redaktion. Dabei kann man an vielen Artikeln erkennen, dass für die Leser geschrieben wird. Die medizinischen Artikel beispielsweise sind besonders praktisch ausgerichtet. Die – häufig erstmaligen – Artikel über Länder und Städte sind deutlich von einer mitteleuropäischen Perspektive geprägt. Erstaunlicherweise werden die Leser sogar ausdrücklich eingeladen, Texte einzusenden. Das Universal-Lexicon verdankt sich einer Gruppe anonym gebliebener Aufklärer, die sich – kaum anders als heute die Wikipedianer – für die Verbreitung des allgemeinen Wissens einsetzten. (shrink)

This time Pritchard is on a rescue mission. Veritism is besieged and he rises to defend it. I do agree with much in his Veritism, but I demur when he adds: “So, the goodness of all epistemic goods is understood instrumentally with regard to whether they promote truth”. If Big Brother brainwashes us to believe the full contents of The Encyclopedia Britannica, then even if we suppose those contents to be true without exception, that would not make what they (...) do an unalloyed good thing, not even epistemically. But it does seem to promote truth. What might then diminish Big Brother’s action so much, so as to make it so deplorable epistemically after all, despite how powerfully it does instrumentally promote truth. At a minimum we need to say more about the relations between epistemic goods and truth, so as to better understand how it is that the epistemic good is made so good by what specific relation to the truth. I lay out a way to understand Veritism so that it can say more about the relations between epistemic goods and truth, thus enhancing our understanding of epistemic normativity. And in a second part I lay out a solution to Linda Zagzebski’s Swamping problem for reliabilism. I argue that it is a problem for process reliabilism, but not for a virtue epistemology that accepts a kind of reliabilism, but in an agential telic framework, and not in a process framework. So, I lay out one way to be a “veritist”, by defending explicitly its Axiological side, and by implication its Conceptual side as well. I have raised questions for Pritchard’s own defense and have offered in each case an alternative defense that I believe fits the words of his formulations, and is in their spirit as well. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.4 (2001) 651-664 [Access article in PDF] Walter Charleton and Early Modern Eclecticism Eric Lewis The publication of Michael Albrecht's Eklektik (1994) revived a small amount of scholarly interest in an early modern "movement" with a lineage that can be traced back to Clement of Alexandria, who described a method of constructing a philosophical system by selecting among different philosophical sects. 1 Not (...) surprisingly, the reception of Albrecht's work demonstrated the complexities associated with identifying the "movement" and categorizing those who labeled themselves "eclectic" philosophers; that is, those who seemed to expound a system of philosophy assimilated from ancient and modern sources. The difficulties involved with defining "eclecticism" and applying the term to early modern natural science is further complicated by the tendency for "eclectics" to categorize their contemporaries in ways that are counterintuitive to our modern sensibilities. 2 Nevertheless, the proponents of this patchwork style of natural science are interesting precisely because they give us a glimpse into their interpretation of the state of philosophy and its relation to history during a time when the authority of The Philosopher was falling under ever increasing scrutiny.The recent literature on philosophic eclecticism largely ignored the English context where rising sentiment against sectarianism influenced the formation of the Royal Society. 3 The perceived chaos of a nation divided and redivided by the multiplication of religious associations produced a plethora of proposals for the restoration and maintenance of intellectual and social order. In particular the problems of religious and political order motivated certain members of the [End Page 651] "Newcastle Circle" (largely Royalists) to construct philosophical methodologies at least congruent with their ideological commitments to social stability. Thomas Hobbes, Margaret Cavendish, and her close friend the physician Walter Charleton each offered his and her own style of natural science. 4 Both Hobbes and the Duchess of Newcastle were excluded from participating in the community of natural philosophers formed in 1660; yet Charleton became a founding member of the Royal Society that year. Despite relative neglect, Charleton's importance to understanding the development of modern natural science in England should not be overlooked; and particularly his prescribed method of doing natural philosophy needs more attention. 5 Like the radically different methods developed by Margaret Cavendish and Thomas Hobbes, Charleton's eclecticism should be viewed as an exhaustive effort to prescribe a remedy to the perceived threat of rampant sectarianism. 6 Unlike Hobbes and Cavendish, however, Charleton saw authoritarianism and dogmatism as the greatest challenge to order, and found the solution to that challenge in mitigated skepticism and a style of philosophy that did not make an epistemic differentiation between the novel philosophies of his day and those of the ancients.Despite being a prolific writer, having a considerable reputation as a physician and placing himself in the center of the English community of natural scientists, Walter Charleton has been mostly ignored by modern scholars. In part this lack of attention can be attributed to the common view that he never developed a comprehensive philosophy nor maintained consistent metaphysical commitments. References to him claim that he was an "intellectual barometer of the age," 7 and his work has been described as "important as a case study in the reception of a mechanical philosophy." 8 His name is virtually absent from discussions concerning scientific methodology, though he is often described as a Renaissance [End Page 652] alchemical philosopher who fell under the influence of mechanistic atomism and the experimental agenda of a fledgling society of natural philosophers. Most accounts simply portray Charleton as a converted follower of the novel philosophy rather than as a novel thinker.The failure to see Charleton as more than a converted empiricist and mechanist likely results from the opinion that eclecticism does not constitute a philosophical method as much as it constitutes the last refuge for scholars during periods of intellectual crisis. The article on eclecticism in Encyclopedia Britannica (fourteenth edition) states: Eclecticism always tends to spring up after a period of vigorous constructive speculation, especially in the later stages of a controversy between... (shrink)

In 1928 Edmund Husserl wrote that “The ideal of the future is essentially that of phenomenologically based (“philosophical”) sciences, in unitary relation to an absolute theory of monads” (“Phenomenology”, Encyclopedia Britannica draft) There are references to phenomenological monadology in various writings of Husserl. Kurt Gödel began to study Husserl’s work in 1959. On the basis of his later discussions with Gödel, Hao Wang tells us that “Gödel’s own main aim in philosophy was to develop metaphysics—specifically, something like the monadology (...) of Leibniz transformed into exact theory—with the help of phenomenology.” (A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy, p. 166) In the Cartesian Meditations and other works Husserl identifies ‘monads’ (in his sense) with ‘transcendental egos in their full concreteness’. In this paper I explore some prospects for a Gödelian monadology that result from this identification, with reference to texts of Gödel and to aspects of Leibniz’s original monadology. (shrink)

Esta introdução descreve os mais importantes dados biográficos da vida e da obra do físico teórico austríaco Ludwig Boltzmann (1844-1906). As principais contribuições científicas de Boltzmann situam-se nos domínios da teoria cinética dos gases e mecânica estatística, da qual ele foi um dos fundadores. A tese de que as teorias científicas são representações dos fenômenos naturais é encontrada em todos os artigos de Boltzmann. No verbete "modelo", ela é apresentada de modo mais organizado, o que o torna uma peça fundamental (...) para a compreensão do pensamento filosófico do físico austríaco. O verbete, publicado na famosa enciclopédia Britannica, foi escrito para o público em geral. Ainda assim, Boltzmann não se eximiu de tomar partido em favor do uso de modelos. Estes últimos não apenas seriam inevitáveis, mas necessários, uma vez que tornavam possível o aperfeiçoamento contínuo da ciência. This introduction describes the most important biographical details of the life and work of the Austrian theoretical physicist Ludwig Boltzmann (1844-1906). The main scientific contributions of Boltzmann can be found in areas such as the kinetic theory of gases and statistical mechanics, of which he was one of the co-founders. The thesis that scientific theories are representations of natural phenomena is found in all philosophical articles by Boltzmann. In the entry "model", published in the celebrated Encyclopedia Britannica, the thesis is presented in a more organized way, making it the keystone to understand the philosophical thought of the Austrian physicist. Although the entry was written for the general public, in it Boltzmann did not refrain from taking sides as far as the use of models is concerned. According to him, the latter would not only be inevitable, but in fact necessary, since they would made possible the continuous improvement of science. (shrink)

o an outsider, nothing might seem more ridiculous than the spectacle of grown men and women sitting around a conference table soberly discussing what would happen if a volume of the Encyclopedia Britannica were dropped down a black hole. Yet this very question lies at the heart of the "information paradox," a seeming contradiction to the laws of physics that is causing scientists to re-examine some of their most basic assumptions about how the universe is made.

Origin of Geometry and Origin of the Work of Art: Reduction, Truth, and History in Husserl and Heidegger Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry and Heidegger’s The Origin of the Work of Art were surprisingly developed in parallel and deal with the same subject, the question of the origin: of a science, in one case, and of the artwork, in the other. From their comparison, the different conception that Husserl and Heidegger have of origin and truth clearly emerge. It concerns what (...) Heidegger identified as the real point of his divergence from Husserl, when they tried to write the entry “Phenomenology” for the Encyclopaedia Britannica, namely the method of reduction. For Husserl, the reduction opens up a material content, an essence, which ensures the persistence of truth in historical transmission, beyond linguistic variability, as happens in geometry; for Heidegger, reduction brings to light the ontological and, we might say, grammatical condition of truth, that is, its being an event and giving rise to an original syntax, to a world. This is the function of the work of art, whose essence consists in its mere being-made, in its being, that is, a work: the actualization of a possibility. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:An Interdisciplinary Proposal for Employing Film to Release the Imaginations of Preservice TeachersHaroldo Abraam Fontaine (bio)IntroductionQuestions regarding the proper role of the arts in education have occupied many thinkers throughout the ages, no less than the likes of Plato and Rousseau. Like them, several have argued that paintings, for example, are mere re-presentations of and certainly not, to borrow a term from Kant, the "thing-in-itself." From a Platonic and (...) Rousseauian perspective, those who behold images and conclude that the "thing-in-itself" (on all occasions) and its rendition on canvas in sundry lines and colors are indistinguishable—indeed, they cannot be—would be led astray from the truth in pursuit of shadows, or worse still, would contribute to the moral collapse of the polis. Yet, that's what I propose in this essay. More precisely, I want to reject Plato's claim that art is imitation of what is. Like Parmenides before me, I argue that his heroic pursuit of the form of the Good depends on a set of unproven assumptions concealed in the cloak of an infinite regress. In the absence of such an unhypothetical first principle—and the cornerstone of the Republic—Plato's lofty fortress collapses, and we are left to our Sisyphean tasks, yet hopeful in the power of our imaginations to set us free to pursue our self-appointed ends. Indeed, imagination's province is the arts, now emancipated from mere imitation and free to lay claim to what is. To their company the twentieth century added the cinema, which soars from the Republic's rubble and steads the identity-constructing enterprise in a manner without historical precedent, thus becoming a legitimate object of rational analysis regarding the "reminiscences of the suffering and … complaints" of the downtrodden.1 For reasons I will discuss below, professors [End Page 58] of education should help preservice teachers to develop their skills and capacities to support such analysis, lest the latter's future students assimilate images uncritically at their peril.The Arts, UnleashedPlato's theory of Forms is arguably the lynchpin of his metaphysical vision. As I understand it, the Good is the fundamental (ethical) principle toward which all social activity points, including education. Given the ethical nature of the Good, education is necessarily character education, in which the student's rational moral personality, and hence his felicity, is fashioned accordingly. As such, a student's (and a city's) success depends on his or her rational insight into the true nature and scale of the Good—that is, s/he must be able to distinguish between the apparent and the real. At these extremes lie national dissolution on the one hand, and the nation's integrity on the other.At the pinnacle of Plato's city sit the philosopher-kings, who administer justice in conformity with the Good. Having transcended the supposed illusions of the physical world, they are said to commune with the Forms directly. The Good, Plato might say, is the Form in, of, and by which all other forms participate. Socrates's (or rather Plato's, or is it Socrates's, or is it Plato's …) method is "to set down some one particular form for each of the particular 'manys' to which we apply the same name,"2 for example, "tree." The form, or rather the universal, precedes and is the metaphysical pattern after which the "manys"—that is, the particulars—are fashioned. What, then, is it that the philosopher-kings commune with? What treeness, if you will, is it that the many trees participate in? Enter Parmenides' twofold objection.In his article on Plato in the 2004 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, Jonathan Barnes noted:(Plato's) doctrine of participation … does not really reconcile unity with plurality since it leads to a perpetual regress. It says that the many things that have a common predicate, or characteristic, participate in, or imitate, a single Form. But the Form itself also admits of a common predicate, and therefore a second Form must exist, participated in alike by the sensible things and the first Form, and so on, endlessly. Second, a graver difficulty is that the relations between... (shrink)

IntroductionIn this paper I would like to compare two forms of utilitarianism: the late eighteenth-century doctrine systematized by Jeremy Bentham and the philosophy advocated by its most visible contemporary proponent, Peter Singer . Here is how the latter introduces the former in the headword “Ethics” of the Encyclopaedia Britannica:[…] Jeremy Bentham is properly considered the father of modern Utilitarianism. It was he who made the Utilitarian principle serv..

This research explores temporal concept drift and temporal alignment in knowledge organization systems. A comparative analysis is pursued using the 1910 Library of Congress Subject Headings, 2020 FAST Topical, and automatic indexing. The use case involves a sample of 90 nineteenth-century Encyclopedia Britannica entries. The entries were indexed using two approaches: 1) full-text indexing; 2) Named Entity Recognition was performed upon the entries with Stanza, Stanford’s NLP toolkit, and entities were automatically indexed with the Helping Interdisciplinary Vocabulary application, using (...) both 1910 LCSH and FAST Topical. The analysis focused on three goals: 1) identifying results that were exclusive to the 1910 LCSH output; 2) identifying terms in the exclusive set that have been deprecated from the contemporary LCSH, demonstrating temporal concept drift; and 3) exploring the historical significance of these deprecated terms. Results confirm that historical vocabularies can be used to generate anachronistic subject headings representing conceptual drift across time in KOS and historical resources. A methodological contribution is made demonstrating how to study changes in KOS over time and improve the contextualization historical humanities resources. (shrink)

In an article in the Classical Quarterly of October, 1911, Mr. Guy Dickins criticized certain views put forward by Mr. Cornford, by the writer of the article on Greek History in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and by myself, on the statements made by Thucydides as to the cause or causes of the Peloponnesian War. Mr. Dickins makes three statements as to the views which he supposes me to hold. Not one of the three statements is even approximately correct.

Though little known today, David Fordyce was one of the leading figures of the outburst of intellectual activity that culminated in the Scottish Enlightenment. His Elements of Moral Philosophy was one of the most widely circulated texts in moral philosophy in the second half of the eighteenth century. Apart from a very expensive facsimile edition, there has never been a modern edition of The Elements of Moral Philosophy. Moreover, the lectures in A Brief Account have never before been published. The (...) significance of The Elements is evidenced by the fact that it was the principal work in the curriculum in moral philosophy throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. It was also included practically verbatim in the first edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. (shrink)

There will be more philosophy than physics in this paper for I make no pretentions to an expert knowledge of physics. Categories are, however, in my line; and here I may have some insight.In the theory of relativity much depends upon the conception of the velocity of light in empty space. Such is the expression Einstein employs. If this velocity is to be a quantity independent of the choice of the inertial system to which it is referred, no absolute meaning (...) can be assigned to the conception of the simultaneity of events that occur at points separated by a distance in space. Rather a special time must be allocated to every inertial system. “It is in consequence of this that space and time are welded together into a uniform four-dimensional continuum.” Thus succinctly does Einstein express the c hoice in his article in the Encyclopedia Britannica. (shrink)

This paper explores the status of language and suffering in recovery from psychosis from a transcendentally-informed phenomenological perspective. We suggest that each of these concepts can apply both to the illness itself and to the person with the illness. The relationship between the two will be one focus of this discussion. The other focus will be on the various ways in which phenomenological approaches to psychopathology have understood the nature of this relationship; a relationship characterized by different meanings of the (...) term "immanence." Drawing inspiration from a Borges poem and from Husserl's debate with Heidegger over the content of his "Phenomenology" article for the Encyclopedia Britannica, we argue that it is misleading, as well as unhelpful, to continue to focus on deficits and dysfunction while ignoring the person's hopes, strengths, assets, and agency. As long as there remains no cure for psychosis, we conclude that it is more effective to promote recovery among people with psychosis than to remain focused on reducing, minimizing, or eliminating their disorder. (shrink)

Mill (1773-1836), British philosopher, political theorist, historian and psychologist was largely responsible for organizing the influential group of Bentham followers that became known as the 'philosophical radicals', which included David Ricardo, Joseph Hume, J. R. McCulloch, George Grote and John Austin. A prolific writer, Mill is remembered mainly as Bentham's chief disciple; for his influence on the radicals and in particular his son John Stuart Mill, the prominent utilitarian thinker. Thoemmes Press are making available two key philosophical works by this (...) eminent early nineteenth-century intellectual figure. A Fragment on Mackintosh is an important work in which Mill attacks Sir James Mackintosh, a leading Whig apologist and critic of the philosophical radicals. Mill defends the utilitarian ethical theory against Mackintosh's article on ethics in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. A Fragment colourfully demonstrates Mill's belief that the proper aim of human actions and practices was the promotion of human happiness and is a lucid illustration of his psychological and ethical theories. Privately printed in 1830 and subsequently published in 1835 (the delay was due to Mackintosh's death), this rare dissertation is a key work for all scholars of ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2602\REVIEWS.262 : 2007-01-24 01:12 Reviews 187 NUCLEAR WAR AND WORLD CITIZENSHIP Chad Trainer 1006 Davids Run Phoenixville, pa 19460, usa [email protected] Robert Hinde and Joseph Rotblat. War No More: Eliminating Conflict in the Nuclear Age. London and Sterling, Va.: Pluto P., 2003. Pp. x, 228. £40.00; us$50.00; isbn 0745321925 (hb). £11.99; us$17.95 (pb). ast year marked the 50th anniversary of the Russell–Einstein Manifesto, Lwhich sought (...) to put the world on guard against the hydrogen bomb’s dangers. The last surviving signatory to the manifesto was Joseph Rotblat, who died on 31 August 2005. In 1995, Rotblat and the Pugwash Conferences were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. During World War ii, Joseph Rotblat participated in the Manhattan Project to develop an atomic bomb. An Encyclopaedia Britannica article on his Nobel prize explains that “Although he was uncomfortable about participating in the creation of an atomic bomb, Rotblat initially believed that the weapon would be used only to deter a German threat. After learning in 1944 that it would be used to contain the Soviet Union, a World War ii ally, he left the project….” Upon returning to England in 1945, Rotblat left defence work for medical research. He served as founding secretary-general and later as president of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, which began in 1957 and at which key scientists and others from different countries could confer about the peril of nuclear weapons facing the world. As a medical physicist at London University’s St. Bartholomew’s Hospital Medical College (1950–76), Rotblat directed attention toward the biological hazards of nuclear radiation and the severity of fallout from atmospheric testing. He worked closely with Russell in the 1950s and early ’60s and still visited him in his last years. (See his “Personal Reminiscences”, Russell, 18 [1998]: 5–24.) The book’s co-author, Robert Hinde, is the author of numerous books and articles in psychology. The book addresses the planet’s current state in terms of weapons of mass destruction. It features many tables and charts on matters ranging from the varying levels of the super-powers’ nuclear warhead stockpiles to the principal nuclear arms control treaties to estimates of military deaths in individual wars during the last 60 years. Since this book is an earnest endeavour to address the issue of weapons of mass destruction, many of its most fundamental prescriptions sound basic, even _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2602\REVIEWS.262 : 2007-01-24 01:12 188 Reviews somewhat banal. To be sure, the authors acknowledge that “Any attempt to discuss ways of preventing war must address very basic issues, and in so doing lays itself open to accusations of mushy idealism” (pp. 214–15). In War No More the authors opt to err in the direction of moral truisms as a small price to pay if there is a chance of contributing to a discussion eventually compelling the world’s political leaders to heed such moral considerations. In the prevention of conflict, “Often the success of such efforts may be unknown to the wider world just because the criterion of success is simply that nothing happens” (p. 198). Hinde and Rotblat urge their readers to understand the absolute need to abolish war if humanity is to endure in this nuclear age. Their position is that “the very possession of nuclear weapons is immoral. Their enormous destructive power, inflicted on civilians even more than on the military, would make their use unforgiveable” (p. 139). The authors expressly credit Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein with having taken the initiative for international action on this front (p. 189). And as was the view of Russell and Einstein 50 years earlier, Hinde and Rotblat proclaim in their book that “The only solution is international agreement on the total abolition of nuclear weapons” (p. 139). Hinde and Rotblat concede the ease with which people can be pessimistic about the prospects of abolishing war. However, the formidable challenge posed by such a task is deemed “no excuse for inaction”. They cite historic instances in which humanity has... (shrink)

This book was written with my University of Mississippi "Philosophy of Religion" students in mind. Many of them have no prior experience with philosophy. That is why Chapter One begins with a crash course in philosophy, with an emphasis on the basic concepts in logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. While not all students may need to cover that material, quite a few will. And for the rest, a refresher never hurts. I am sure this applies to many "Philosophy of Religion" courses (...) taught elsewhere. With that in mind, instructors are advised to begin with Chapter One. The subsequent chapters have been arranged in sequence, with each chapter building on the prior ones. However, the chapters are not that tightly bound, so instructors could cover the chapters out of sequence without much disruption. Key terms are underlined. Sometimes the key terms also occur with an associated hyperlink. Other terms have a hyperlink without a corresponding key term. In the print the hyperlink is included as a footnote, in the ebooks the term is hyperlinked [Production - check the ebooks will have hyperlinbks - amend wording here if not]. In general, the hyperlinks follow a pattern. First, key terms are often linked to entries in online academic encyclopedias - either The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, or The Encyclopedia Britannica. [Students are recommended also to consult The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967), edited by Paul Edwards; it is still an excellent resource and has entries corresponding to many key terms. Almost every university library has a copy.] Second, named individuals are sometimes linked to an encyclopedia entry. In both sorts of cases, the URL is provided in an endnote at the end of each chapter. No other description of the contents of the web page will be given. In most other cases, a short description of the contents of the web page is provided in the endnote. Each chapter includes an annotated bibliography for more advanced material. Helpful material is also available on the website for this book. This material includes a glossary, a sample syllabus (with recommended readings), study questions, and a test bank, among other features. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:.. MERELY A MAN OF LETTERS" an interview with Jorge Luis Borges* Philosophy and Literature: Why don't you tell us about some of the philosophers who have influenced your work and in whom you have been the most interested? Jorge Luis Borges: Well, I think that's an easy one. You might talk in terms of two: Berkeley and Schopenhauer. But I suppose Hume might be worked in also, because, (...) after all, Hume refutes Berkeley. Really, he comes from Berkeley—even if Berkeley comes from Locke. You might think of Locke, of Berkeley, and of Hume as being three links in an argument..... But I suppose that when someone refutes someone else in philosophy, he is carrying on the argument. P&L: And Schopenhauer? Borges: Schopenhauer is very different from Hume. Of course, Schopenhauer had his idea of the Will. That is not to be found in Hume.... The case of Berkeley was different. I suppose he thought of God as being aware of all things all the time, if I don't get him wrong. If we go away, does this room disappear? No, because God is thinking about it. Now, in the case of Schopenhauer, I was rereading Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, The World as Will and Idea, and I was rather taken aback, or baffled I should say, puzzled by something that keeps on recurring in Schopenhauer. Of course it may have been a slip of the pen, but as he goes back to it, and as he was a very careful writer, I wonder if it is a slip of the pen. For example, Schopenhauer begins by saying that the universe, the stars, the spaces in between, the planets, *On April 14, 1976, two editors of Philosophy and Literature, along with an interested colleague, interviewed Jorge Luis Borges at Michigan State University, where he held a position as visiting professor for the winter term. These remarks are edited from the transcript of that conversation. 337 338Philosophy and Literature this planet, those things, have no existence—except in the mind which perceives them. But then, to my surprise—and I suppose you can explain this to me, since you are philosophers and I am not—what Schopenhauer says is that all those things have no existence except in the brain. And that the universe—I remember these words, I don't think I'm inventing them now—"ist ein Gehirnphänomen," that the world is a cerebral phenomenon. Now, I was baffled. Because, of course, if you think of the universe, I suppose the brain is as much a part of the external world as the stars or the moon. The brain after all is a system of visual, of tactile, perceptions. He keeps on insisting on the brain. I don't think, for example, that Bishop Berkeley insists on the brain, or Hume, who would have insisted on the mind, consciousness. P&L: People sometimes say that they see Berkeley in stories like "Orbis Tertius." Borges: Yes, I suppose they do. Well, of course. But in that story I was led by literary means also. P&L: How do you distinguish the literary from the philosophical means in that story? Could you explain that? Borges: Very easily.... Encyclopedias have been my chief reading. I have always been interested in encyclopedias. I used to go to the Biblioteca National in Buenos Aires—and since I was so shy, I felt I could not cope with asking for a book, so I looked on the shelves for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I would pick up any chance volume and I would read it. One night I was richly rewarded, because I read all about the Druses, Dryden and the Druids—a treasure trove, no?—all in the same volume, "Dr-." Then I came to the idea of how fine it would be to think of an encyclopedia... a very rigorous one of course, of an imaginary world, where everything should be linked. For example, you would have a language and then a literature, and then a history and so on. Then I thought I would write a story of a fancy encyclopedia. Of course that would require many different people to write it... (shrink)