According to the perceptual-attentional limitations hypothesis, the confusion between expressions of disgust and anger may be due to the difficulty in perceptually distinguishing the two, or insufficient attention to their distinctive cues. The objective of the current study was to test this hypothesis as an explanation for the confusion between expressions of disgust and anger in adults using eye-movements. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to identify each emotion in 96 trials composed of prototypes of anger and prototypes of disgust. (...) In Experiment 2, fixation points oriented participants’ attention toward the eyes, the nose, or the mouth of each prototype. Results revealed that disgust was less accurately recognised than anger (Experiment 1 and 2), especially when the mouth was open (Experiment 1 and 2), and even when attention was oriented toward the distinctive features of disgust (Experiment 2). Additionally, when attention was oriented toward certain zones, the eyes (which contain characteristics of anger) had the longest dwell times, followed by the nose (which contains characteristics of disgust; Experiment 2). Thus, although participants may attend to the distinguishing features of disgust and anger, these may not aid them in accurately recognising each prototype. (shrink)

Panmicropsychism is the view that the fundamental physical ingredients of our universe are also its fundamental phenomenal ingredients. Since there is only a limited number of fundamental physical ingredients, panmicropsychism seems to imply that there exists only a small set (palette) of basic phenomenal qualities. How does this limited palette of basic phenomenal qualities give rise to our rich set of experiences? This is known as ‘the palette problem’. One class of solutions to this problem, large-palette solutions, simply denies that (...) the palette is limited. These solutions assume that all types of phenomenal qualities (color, sound, odor, taste, etc., and presumably also types not experienced by humans) were created fully formed at the birth of our universe. On this view, brains evoke conscious experiences by sampling primordial, preexisting phenomenal spaces. My main claim in this paper is that, by analogy with the mathematical description of the fundamental physical ingredients of our universe, which exhibits simplicity, symmetry, and beauty, panmicropsychists should expect the mathematical description of the fundamental phenomenal ingredients of our universe to exhibit similar features. The goal of this paper is to exemplify this claim using what is arguably the simplest of all types of phenomenal qualities—color. Specifically, I utilize phenomenological data on color to construct the maximally symmetric mathematical description of phenomenal color space. I then show that this mathematical description is isomorphic to the mathematical description of two-state quantum systems in a mixed state. Based on this isomorphism, I suggest that color may be the phenomenal dual aspect of two-state quantum systems. (shrink)

This volume contains four lectures that were offered by members of Yale University who have been engaged in studying Kant in the conviction that his ideas and reasonings are of particular value for us in our modern world.

I put forward and defend the thesis that psychophysical supervenience in its full generality can be satisfactorily supported if and only if one is willing to make one or another of some substantial assumptions about the nature of mental and physical properties. I first deal with the “if” part of the claim by presenting and considering the Assumptions. I then argue for the inadequacy of suggestions of support for PS that do not require any of the Assumptions. Finally, I show (...) that as a result of a PS claim is made potentially stronger than what it would be if were false. (shrink)

I put forward and defend the thesis (Th) that psychophysical supervenience (PS) in its full generality can be satisfactorily supported if and only if one is willing to make one or another of some substantial assumptions (the Assumptions) about the nature of mental and physical properties. I first deal with the “if” part of the claim by presenting and considering the Assumptions. I then argue for the inadequacy of suggestions of support for PS that do not require any of the (...) Assumptions. Finally, I show that as a result of (Th) a PS claim is made potentially stronger than what it would be if (Th) were false. (shrink)

I put forward and defend the thesis (Th) that psychophysical supervenience (PS) in its full generality can be satisfactorily supported if and only if one is willing to make one or another of some substantial assumptions (the Assumptions) about the nature of mental and physical properties. I first deal with the “if” part of the claim by presenting and considering the Assumptions. I then argue for the inadequacy of suggestions of support for PS that do not require any of the (...) Assumptions. Finally, I show that as a result of (Th) a PS claim is made potentially stronger than what it would be if (Th) were false. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Prenant comme point de départ un article récent de Neil Campbell, j'examine la question de savoir si la survenance psychophysique peut assurer la dépendance psychophysique. Mes thèses principales sont que contrairement à ce que croit Campbell, il n'est pas clair que Kim ait montré de manière convaincante que les formulations de la survenance psychophysique en termes de propriétés soient inadéquates pour expliquer la dépendance psychophysique; la pertinence des difficultés soulevées par Kim tient surtout à la conception que l'on se (...) fait, d'abord de la notion de dépendance qui est en jeu, puis d'autres notions également, comme celle d'explication; pour quelqu'un qui est convaincu par les problèmes de Kim, il n'est pas clair—contrairement à ce que suggère Campbell—que le passage d'une survenance au niveau des propriétés à une survenance au niveau des prédicats, comme celle de Davidson, puisse être d'une quelconque utilité; donc ce qui importe à notre problème n'est pas de savoir si nous avons affaire à une survenance au niveau des propriétés ou à une survenance au niveau des prédicats, mais c'est plutôt la façon dont on conçoit la notion de dépendance dans ce contexte, et d'autres notions telles que celle d'explication. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉPrenant comme point de départ un article récent de Neil Campbell, j'examine la question de savoir si la survenance psychophysique peut assurer la dépendance psychophysique. Mes thèses principales sont que contrairement à ce que croit Campbell, il n'est pas clair que Kim ait montré de manière convaincante que les formulations de la survenance psychophysique en termes de propriétés soient inadéquates pour expliquer la dépendance psychophysique; la pertinence des difficultés soulevées par Kim tient surtout à la conception que l'on se fait, (...) d'abord de la notion de dépendance qui est en jeu, puis d'autres notions également, comme celle d'explication; pour quelqu'un qui est convaincu par les problèmes de Kim, il n'est pas clair—contrairement à ce que suggère Campbell — que le passage d'une survenance au niveau des propriétés à une survenance au niveau des prédicats, comme celle de Davidson, puisse être d'une quelconque utilité; done ce qui importe à notre problème n'est pas de savoir si nous avons affaire à une survenance au niveau des propriétés ou à une survenance au niveau des prédicats, mais c'est plutôt la façon dont on conçoit la notion de dépendance dans ce contexte, et d'autres notions telles que celle d'explication. (shrink)

The following statement is a report of the Committee on Philosophy in Education of the American Philosophical Association and was approved by the Association's Board of Officers in December, 1958. The Committee was composed of the following: C. W. Hendel, Chairman, H. G. Alexander, R. M. Chisholm, Max Fisch, Lucius Garvin, Douglas Morgan, A. E. Murphy, Charner Perry and R. G. Turnbull. Primary responsibility for the preparation of this report belonged to a subcommittee composed of R. G. Turnbull, Chairman, (...) and C. W. Hendel. (shrink)

Hering’s opponent-colors theory suggests that our color sensations are produced by three mechanisms: a red–green mechanism, a yellow–blue mechanism, and a white–black mechanism. The first two mechanisms give rise to our sensations of hued colors; the third mechanism gives rise to our sensations of hueless colors. Noticeably, whereas the pair of colors produced by each of the hued mechanisms do not mix to yield a phenomenal intermediate (i.e., there are no greenish reds, reddish greens, yellowish blues, or bluish yellows), the (...) colors produced by the hueless mechanism, white and black, do have a phenomenal intermediate—gray. This different behavior of the white–black mechanism poses a problem for Hering’s theory. Several attempts to fix this problem have been suggested. This paper focuses on the suggestion made by Paul Heggelund a century after Hering proposed his theory. In Heggelund’s amendment of Hering’s theory, the hueless colors are not confined to the one-dimensional gamut between black and white, but rather require two components for their full description: a light–dark (or luminous–black) component, where light and dark are mutually exclusive sensations, and a white component, which doesn’t have an opponent counterpart. Here I show that although Heggelund’s theory indeed provides a solution to the problem that the hueless colors pose to Hering’s theory, it is not self-consistent. I go on to revise Heggelund’s theory to obtain a consistent opponent-colors theory. (shrink)

The total value set of a working individual consists of three components: personal, professional and organizational values. In the light of the changing health care environment, the individual nurse manager’s values may no longer be applicable for coping with the needs of the work environment. For many nurses who developed their values in keeping with the humanistic tradition, the ‘new’ organizational values may create confusion, frustration and conflict. The purpose of this study was to determine if the organizational domain in (...) the value sets of Israeli middle nursing managers in acute care hospitals reflect the process of shifting values needed in today’s management roles. Analysis of the results revealed that head nurses did not yet fully internalize the ‘new’ organizational values. Implications of the results for planning undergraduate and graduate programmes are detailed. (shrink)

I show that the mathematical description of opponent-colors theory is identical to the mathematical description of two-state quantum systems in a mixed state. Following the principles of dual-aspect theory of phenomenal consciousness, which predicts an exact correspondence between a system’s phenomenal states and the objective states of its underlying physical substrate, I suggest that color sensations are phenomenal dual aspects of two-state quantum systems in a mixed state. Since nothing in this hypothesis suggests that what brings about the phenomenal experience (...) that is dual to two-state quantum systems is the two-dimensionality of these systems, it is natural to generalize this hypothesis and suggest that other types of phenomenal experience (e.g., taste, odor, sound) are phenomenal dual aspects of quantum systems of higher dimensionalities. Finally, I propose that the two-state quantum systems that give rise to color in the brain are two-state ion-channels. (shrink)

So far no clear explication of the notion of realization has been offered, in spite of the frequent uses of the notion in the literature to discharge important jobs, such as that of accounting for the causal efficacy of the mental in a physical world, and that of providing a viable characterization of physicalism, and/or psychophysical reduction. I put forward an account of realization as an identity-like relation. I argue that such account has the following advantages: it provides a picture (...) under which it makes sense to use the same term, i.e. 'realization', to pick out relations that differ in their relata, as it happened in the original uses of the term 'realization'; it helps to understand how well, if at all, some appeals to realization in the literature can discharge the jobs mentioned; more generally, it makes clear what realization can do. \\\ Hasta el momento no se ha expuesto detalladamente ninguna explicación clara de la nocion de realización, a pesar de que se usa con frecuencia en los textos filósoficos para desempeñar funciones importantes, como explicar la eflcacia causal de lo mental en un mundo fisico, y proporcionar una caracterización viable del fisicalismo, y/o de la reducción psicofisica. Presento una explicación de la realización como una relatión del tipo de la identidad. Sostengo que tal explicación tiene las siguientes ventajas: ofrece una caracterización dentro de cuyo marco resulta razonable usar el mismo termino, i.e., "realización", para distinguir relaciones que difieren en sus relata, como sucedió cuando se usó originalmente el termino "realizacion"; ayuda a comprender hasta que punto la realizacion que se invoca en algunos textos filosoficos puede desempeñar correctamente las tareas mencionadas; mas en general, aclara qué puede hacer la realización. (shrink)

I consider the position (which I call‘the triad’) according to which physicalism is a reductive claim which is capturable in terms of the idea (the ‘nothing buttery’ idea) that there is nothing but/nothing over and above the physical, an idea which, in its turn, is meant to be capturable in terms of a determinate form of supervenience. (Physicalism is then meant to be capturable in terms of the form of supervenience in question.) I argue that there is a tension in (...) the triad. The notion of ‘nothing buttery’ required has features which can't be captured by the supervenience of the triad. Hence, one cannot have both physicalism as nothing‐buttery‐reductive and physicalism as supervenience of the kind in question. If one wants to hold onto the idea of physicalism as nothing‐buttery‐reductive, one must be prepared to identify physicalism with a much stronger claim than one might have originally thought, a claim that can't be captured by the supervenience of the triad. (shrink)