Une philosophie atteste sa grandeur en affrontant les questions les plus difficiles. Donc, au premier chef, celle du Temps. Aussi est-ce dès 1904-1905, à Göttingen, que Husserl tenta une analyse phénoménologique du temps, en lui appliquant les concepts fondamentaux d'intentionnalité et de réduction. En 1916, Edith Stein, alors assistante de Husserl, entreprit d'éditer ces cours, et de les compléter par d'autres textes, postérieurs (1905-1910). Ce n'est pourtant qu'en 1928 que l'entreprise aboutit, quand Heidegger, qui venait de publier Etre et (...) Temps (1927), édita pour la première fois les Leçons. Il déclarait en ouverture : " Ce qui est décisif dans ce travail, c'est la mise en relief du caractère intentionnel de la conscience et, d'une façon générale, la clarté croissante que reçoit l'intentionnalité dans son principe (...). Aujourd'hui encore cette expression n'est pas un mot de passe, mais le titre d'un problème central. " Bien qu'une édition plus complète soit, grâce aux soins de R. Boehm, parue depuis dans les Husserliana (Bd. X, 1966), la traduction d'H. Dussort reste un outil de travail inappréciable, puisqu'elle donne accès à un texte qui fut, en 1928, à la fois un achèvement de la pensée de Husserl, un hommage rendu par Heidegger à son maître, et, sans doute, leur ultime croisement - à savoir une rencontre et indissolublement un éloignement. (shrink)

Husserls Studien zum inneren Zeitbewusstsein bilden in ihrer chronologischen Folge sachlich und historisch entscheidende Teilschritte auf dem Weg zur Grundlegung der Phänomenologie. In Ergänzung zu der berühmten Erstedition des Textes der von Edith Stein redigierten Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins, die Martin Heidegger 1928 im Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung herausgab, bieten die hier nach den originalen Manuskripten aus dem Nachlass versammelten Texte aus den Jahren 1893–1917 die Möglichkeit, die Fortschritte Husserls in der Analyse des Zeitbewusstseins auch (...) in aller Strenge methodisch nachzuvollziehen. Im Unterschied zu der ersten Ausgabe dieser Texte in der Philosophischen Bibliothek von 1985 (PhB 362), die sich auf die Präsentation der aus dem Nachlass edierten Texte beschränkte, enthält diese Neuausgabe nun auch den von Edith Stein redigierten Text von 1928, der auf Manuskripten zu einer Göttinger Vorlesung im Wintersemester 1904/05 und ausgewählten Nachträgen bis zum Jahre 1910 beruht und seinerzeit große Beachtung fand, in manchen Teilen aber ohne die Hinzuziehung der Texte aus dem Nachlass nicht hinreichend transparent wird und seine Theorie in wesentlichen Punkten sogar als widersprüchlich erscheinen lässt. Eine fruchtbare Auseinandersetzung mit dieser Theorie muss sich daher im besonderen Maße auf die hier edierten ergänzenden Manuskripte stützen. (shrink)

In queste pagine è delineata la vicenda esistenziale e intellettuale di Edith Stein. Donna straordinaria, è stata capace di racchiudere nella sua persona molte "possibili" vite. Le ha realizzate come ebrea e cattolica, fenomenologa e filosofa cristiana, docente e monaca carmelitana, agnostica e santa. Si tratta di un processo vitale dagli apparenti salti qualitativi, i quali si volgono all'ascolto di un medesimo nucleo identitario. Questa viva "formazione di sé" ha condotto Edith Stein a una "donazione di sé", culminata (...) nell'Olocausto. Il Diario di Edith si sovrappone ai pensieri di Angela Ales Bello, in veste di narratrice d'eccezione. Con la sentita partecipazione della narratrice, e insieme mantenendo il distacco critico della studiosa, viene scoperta la storia di un'anima. Le emozioni e le conquiste intellettuali trovano una sintesi grazie al peculiare approccio ai "fenomeni" che Edith Stein aveva appreso alla scuola di Edmund Husserl, di Tommaso d'Aquino e di Teresa D'Avila. Sintesi mirabile di pensatori che "si danno la mano" al di là dello spazio e del tempo--Front flap. (shrink)

This initial volume of the Collected Works of Edith Stein offers, for the first time in English, the unabridged biography of Edith Stein (Teresa Benedicta of the Cross), depicting her life as a child and young adult. Her text ends abruptly because the Nazi SS arrested, then deported, her to the Auschwitz concentration camp in 1942. Edith Stein is one of the most significant German women of the 20th century. At the age of twenty-five she became the (...) first assistant to Edmund Husserl, the founder of Phenomenology. She was much in demand as a writer and lecturer after her conversion from atheism to Catholicism. Later, as a Discalced Carmelite nun, she maintained her intellectual pursuits until she, like so many others, became a victim of the Nazi persecution that raged across Eastern Europe. By making this landmark work available in English, the Institute of Carmelite Studies provides an eye-witness account of persons and activities on the scene at the time when psychology and philosophy became separate disciplines. In addition to photographs and a map, this volume is enhanced with a preface, the foreword and afterword, notes, and a list of places associated with Edith Stein’s life. It is our aim that these, together with Edith Stein’s text, may help bring into relief the many background details of the rich autobiographical work she has left us. (shrink)

Inhalt: - Die weltanschauliche Bedeutung der Phänomenologie - Husserls Phänomenologie - Gegensatz zwischen Husserl und Scheler - Das Weltbild der drei Philosophen - Natur und Übernatur in Goethes Faust - Einfluß auf das Weltbild der Zeit - Zwei Betrachtungen zu Edmund Husserl - Die Seelenburg - Martin Heideggers Existentialphilosophie - Wiedergabe des Gedankenganges - Die vorbereitende Analyse des Daseins - Dasein und Zeitlichkeit - Was ist das Dasein? - Die ontische Struktur der Person und ihre erkenntnistheoretische Problematik - Aus (...) dem Buch: - "Der Katholik hat es verhältnismäßig leicht damit, weil seine Glaubenslehre ihm ein geschlossenes Weltbild gibt. Aber auch dieses Erbgut muß man sich erwerben, persönlich aneignen, um es zu besitzen. Wer das tut und sich sein Weltbild rein auf Grund der Glaubenslehre gestaltet, von dem kann man sagen, daß er eine religiöse Weltanschauung habe. Wer außerhalb der Kirche steht oder zwar in ihr aufgewachsen ist, aber es unterlassen hat, sich ihr Weltbild persönlich anzueignen und gar nicht ahnt, was ihm in seinem Glaubensgut gegeben ist, der hat es schwerer, denn er muß sich erst danach umtun, aus welchen Quellen er seine Weltanschauung schöpfen soll." - Edith Stein (1891-1942), war eine deutsche Philosophin und Frauenrechtlerin jüdischer Herkunft, die 1922 zur katholischen Kirche konvertierte und 1933 Unbeschuhte Karmelitin wurde. In der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus wurde sie "als Jüdin und Christin" zum Opfer des Holocaust. Sie wird in der katholischen Kirche als Heilige und Märtyrin der Kirche verehrt. Teilen der evangelischen Kirche gilt sie als Glaubenszeugin. Papst Johannes Paul II. sprach Teresia Benedicta vom Kreuz am 1. Mai 1987 selig und am 11. Oktober 1998 heilig. Sie gilt als Brückenbauerin zwischen Christen und Juden. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene por objetivo presentar las incidencias que Edith Stein debió sortear durante su trato personal y profesional con Edmund Husserl en torno a la revisión, selección, ordenamiento y publicación de sus notas acerca del trabajo del filósofo alemán. En especial, centramos nuestro estudio en la contribución más sustantiva de Edith Stein en la obra de Husserl, a saber, la constitución de la realidad anímica en la empatía que consuma la consideración de la naturaleza psíquica (...) y sirve de puente desde lo psicológico a lo espiritual. Esa contribución agrupa las indagaciones de Edith Stein sobre el cuerpo y la empatía como requisitos para la constitución, el «intercambio de lugares» y para zanjar el dilema respecto del idealismo del que Husserl era acusado por sus críticos y que ella insistía en que el Maestro afrontara. Se sintetiza la solución steiniana como sigue: entre la naturaleza material y la espiritual ahora el factor mediador no es la lógica racional sino un aspecto de la propia naturaleza: lo psíquico, es decir, la sensibilidad del cuerpo vivo. Husserl, en cambio, quería hacer de la constitución un pre-requisito para la encarnación individual. Confiamos en que nuestro trabajo muestre el espíritu de colaboración fraterna que existía entre la santa del Carmelo y su querido Maestro. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to analyze the way in which Edith Stein describes the human subject throughout her research, including her phenomenological phaseand the period of her Christian philosophy. In order to do this, I trace essential moments in Husserl’s philosophy, showing both Stein’s reliance upon Husserl andher originality. Both thinkers believe that an analysis of the human being can be carried out by examining consciousness and its lived experiences. Through suchan examination Stein arrives at (...) the same conclusion as Husserl, namely, that the human subject is formed of body, psyche, and spirit (Geist). Stein’s originalityconsists in a further development of the complexity of the human being. She maps this out, providing detailed analyses of the I, the soul, the spirit, and, ultimately,the person. She makes use of medieval philosophical anthropology, including that of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine of Hippo. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to analyze the way in which Edith Stein describes the human subject throughout her research, including her phenomenological phaseand the period of her Christian philosophy. In order to do this, I trace essential moments in Husserl’s philosophy, showing both Stein’s reliance upon Husserl andher originality. Both thinkers believe that an analysis of the human being can be carried out by examining consciousness and its lived experiences. Through suchan examination Stein arrives at (...) the same conclusion as Husserl, namely, that the human subject is formed of body, psyche, and spirit (Geist). Stein’s originalityconsists in a further development of the complexity of the human being. She maps this out, providing detailed analyses of the I, the soul, the spirit, and, ultimately,the person. She makes use of medieval philosophical anthropology, including that of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine of Hippo. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to analyze the way in which Edith Stein describes the human subject throughout her research, including her phenomenological phaseand the period of her Christian philosophy. In order to do this, I trace essential moments in Husserl’s philosophy, showing both Stein’s reliance upon Husserl andher originality. Both thinkers believe that an analysis of the human being can be carried out by examining consciousness and its lived experiences. Through suchan examination Stein arrives at (...) the same conclusion as Husserl, namely, that the human subject is formed of body, psyche, and spirit (Geist). Stein’s originalityconsists in a further development of the complexity of the human being. She maps this out, providing detailed analyses of the I, the soul, the spirit, and, ultimately,the person. She makes use of medieval philosophical anthropology, including that of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine of Hippo. (shrink)

Il mio scopo in questo articolo è mettere d'accordo l'analisi sulle questioni antropologiche e metafisiche di E. Husserl ed E. Stein. Per realizzare questo compito è necessario spiegare il significato del metodo fenomenologico, prima di tutto in Husserl e poi in E. Stein, mettendo in luce la novità del suo approccio della conoscenza dell'essere umano, del mondo e di Dio. Il saggio è suddiviso in quattro parti; due sono dedicate all'investigazione dell'essere umano di Husserl e Stein e (...) due allo sviluppo dei loro temi metafisici. Leggendo il primo topico scopriamo una significante connessione tra i due pensatori; leggendo il secondo, notiamo che è possibile trovare un approccio metafisico della realtà persino in Husserl ed um originale sviluppo dei temi nell'analisi della Stein, collegandoli con la filosofia e la teologia medievale. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to deal with E. Husserl’s and E. Stein’s analyses on the anthropological and metaphysical questions. To perform this task it is necessary to explain the meaning of the phenomenological method, first of all in Husserl and then in E. Stein, underscoring the novelty of their approach to the knowledge of human being, world and God. The essay is divided in four parts; two are dedicated to Husserl’s and Stein’s investigation on the (...) human being and two to their development of metaphysical themes. Regarding the first topic we discover a significant connection between the two thinkers, regarding the second one we notice that it is possible to find a metaphysical approach to reality even in Husserl and an original development of the theme in Stein’s analysis linked up with the medieval philosophy and theology. (shrink)

Este artículo discute las considerables semejanzas entre las concepciones de la persona defendidas por Husserl, Scheler y Stein, según las cuales la persona es un valor absoluto que se ejercita en tomas de posición. Para los fenomenólogos clásicos, la ética concierne a la persona en su totalidad, incluyendo las dimensiones afectiva y racional, el intelecto y el corazón, así como la volición. Las personas se distinguen por su agencia libre, por su capacidad para reconocer normas, y por su habilidad (...) para interactuar responsablemente con otros agentes personales en el contexto del mundo-de-la-vida comunitario e histórico. (shrink)

This essay argues that Stein’s view of the state can overcome Husserl’s skepticism about the state being an authentic, intense community rooted in solidarity while not negating his hope for the advent of a genuinely ethical, rational culture. Whereas Husserl places rationality and freedom within the framework of culture proper and not in the state, Stein sees the state as an extension of persons that can give the state its own free, deliberating and rational Ich kann.

El presente artículo aborda el espinoso debate idealismo-realismo que surgió al interior de la escuela fenomenológica entre Edmund Husserl y sus alumnos. Luego de una primera contextualización del problema, se examina la posición de Edith Stein respecto de la mencionada cuestión y del discutido idealismo husserliano, y se muestra cómo la fenomenóloga vuelve a dimensionar el rol del yo en la actividad cognoscitiva: no ya como sujeto absoluto e incondicionado del conocimiento, sino como creatura finita y limitada que (...) se relaciona con un mundo trascendente, independiente de la actividad de la conciencia. (shrink)

Phenomenology, understood as a philosophy of immanence, has had an ambiguous, uneasy relationship with transcendence, with the wholly other, with the numinous. If phenomenology restricts its evidence to givenness and to what has phenomenality, what becomes of that which is withheld or cannot in principle come to givenness? In this paper I examine attempts to acknowledge the transcendent in the writings of two phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein (who attempted to fuse phenomenology with Neo-Thomism), and also consider (...) the influence of the existentialist Karl Jaspers, who made transcendence an explicit theme of his writing. I argue that Husserl does recognize the essential experience of transcendence within immanence; even the idea of a physical thinghas “dimensions of infinity” included within it. Similarly, he asserts profoundly that every “outside” is what it is only as understood from the inside. Jaspers toomakes the experience of transcendence central to human existence; it is the very measure of my own depth. For Edith Stein, everything temporal points towardthe timeless structural ground which makes it what it is. Transcendence is an intrinsic part of being itself. Furthermore, the very lack of self-sufficiency of my own self shows that the self requires a ground outside itself, in the transcendent. There is strong convergence between the three thinkers studied on the concept of transcendence, which is indeed a central, if largely unacknowledged, concept in phenomenology both in Husserl and his followers (Stein), but also, throughJaspers, in Heidegger. (shrink)

Ist die Wahrheitsfrage nur ein begriffliches Ereignis oder will sie auf ganz andere Horizonte der menschlichen Existenz verweisen? Um den umfassenden Sinn der Wahrheitsthematik zur Sprache zu bringen, wird der vielversprechende philosophische Ansatz der Husserlschulerin und Phanomenologin Edith Stein herangezogen. In ihrer intensiven Auseinandersetzung mit der Griechischen und Mittelalterlichen Philosophie versucht diese den transzendentalphilosophischen Ansatz, den Ansatz einer christlichen Philosophie und der Scholastik zu ihrer Zeit in eine fruchtbare Begegnung zu bringen. Wir werden Augenzeugen einer existentiellen und philosophisch hochmotivierten (...) Auseinandersetzung mit der Moderne, die im Ergebnis zu einer ontologisch-metaphysischen Wirklichkeitslehre fuhrt. Es bleibt dabei zu beachten, dass die Husserlschulerin den Realismus bei Thomas von Aquin sehr viel enger und insofern fur eine christliche Philosophie fruchtbarer nachvollzieht als andere entsprechende Ansatze dies tun.". (shrink)

Edith Stein claims that communal experiences are not reducible to the collection of individual experiences directed to the same object or upon the same content. Based on this intuition she gives a phenomenological description of the intentional structure that is proper to communal experiences regarding to their content, mode, and subject. While expanding on her attempts to reassess Husserl’s description of intentionality in an original social-ontological framework, I will stress her precious distinction between individual consciousness and communal stream of (...) experience. I will argue that, if Stein defines the being of the community through its the communal stream of experience, the latter has to be interpreted through Husserl’s teleological concept of ideal multiplicity of experiences. Discussing Stein’s account both against the background of the methodology of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and contextualizing it within the social-ontological struggle that took place in Germany during the Great War, I will focus on her description of we-intentionality and aim to unearth its phenomenological core as well as its methodological limits. (shrink)

In this chapter, Edith Stein offers an analysis of empathy with others, which she sees as a fundamental trait of the human being. In her view, empathy is a condition of possibility for sociality and sympathy, rather than the other way around. She grounds empathy in human embodiment, more precisely in the way in which the human being is embodied mind and minded body. Stein’s work on empathy represents a pathbreaking contribution to phenomenology and shows how she makes (...) active use of and goes beyond the works of Edmund Husserl, Alexander Pfänder, and others. (shrink)

Edith Stein lived an unconventional life. Born into a devout Jewish family, she drifted into atheism in her mid teens, took up the study of philosophy, studied with Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, became a pioneer in the women's movement in Germany, a military nurse in World War I, converted from atheism to Catholic Christianity, became a Carmelite nun, was murdered at Auschwitz-Birkenau in 1942, and canonized by Pope John Paul II.

Gerda Walther[aut] Walther, Gerda has no developed account of empathyEmpathy; rather, she draws from the writings of early phenomenologists and psychologists on empathy. Generally, for Walther[aut]Walther, Gerda, empathy is an act of mind that permits the understanding of another’s consciousnessConsciousness and experienceExperience. Edith Stein[aut]Edith Stein, in many respects, lays the ground for a phenomenological account of empathy. Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s treatment of intersubjectivityIntersubjectivity and the nature of intersubjective acts such as empathy draws greatly from Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund. (...) There exist three primary sources for Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s analysis of empathy, all of which were written while Stein[aut]Stein, Edith was still in direct contact with Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund either as his student, assistant or as a private researcher attempting to habilitate. The primary and better known source is Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s doctoral dissertation published originally in 1917, titled On the Problem of Empathy\”On the Problem of Empathy”, by Stein, Edith. The text, which is the only extant portion of her doctoral dissertation, sets the stage for Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s later work on the subject. Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund was pleased by Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s selection of the topic, but he wanted her to give more of a historical overview, with special reference to Lipps[aut]Lipps, Hans’ work. Hence, the text is replete with discussions of notable philosophers like Scheler[aut]Scheler, Max, Dilthey[aut]Dilthey, Wilhelm, and Lipps[aut]Lipps, Hans. The second major work that addresses empathy is to be found in Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities\”Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities”, by Stein, Edith. This work was published in Volume V of Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund’s Jahrbuch and consists of two principal texts: PsychicCausalityCausalityPsychic and Individual and Community. This text comes from Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s period during and after her assistantship with Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund. The text is largely, but not exclusively, based on her work on Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund’s Ideen II. The last source is Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s research manuscript titled, Einführung in die Philosophie. (shrink)

This article describes the place occupied by Edith Stein's philosophy in the early phenomenological movement, in relation to the most important philosophers of this philosophy: Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Martin Heidegger.

In the following paper we will attempt to analyze and reconstruct Edith Stein’s interpretation of Husserl’s “transcendental idealism,” notably, the reason why, in her opinion, the latter ended up embracing that specific philosophical position. As will soon become apparent, according to Stein, Husserl misunderstands the peculiar ontological structure of individual essences and, in particular, the specific connection with reality that they carry within themselves. Without raising the question of whether Stein’s own understanding of transcendental idealism perfectly corresponds (...) with Husserl’s, we will confine ourselves to discussing, first, the wider context within which she tackles it and, second, the relation between Husserl’s idealism and the formal-ontological issue of how to characterize the internal content of individual essences. No matter what we think of Stein’s critical assessment, her approach has the great and undeniable merit of forcing the “interpreter” to face the problem of the tight connection between the transcendental dimension and the eidetic dimension of Husserl’s thought. (shrink)

Edith Stein came to phenomenology after beginning her university studies in psychology. She struggled with the inability of psychology to justify and delineate its founding principles. She found in Edmund Husserl, though his sustained criticisms of psychologism, the possibility of a phenomenological ground for psychology. This article demonstrates how Stein, drawing from but also distancing herself from Husserl, justifies the possibility of a phenomenological psychology framed within a personalist structure of subjectivity and sociality.

A continuación, los lectores encontrarán una breve introducción acerca de los objetivos y los resultados alcanzados en este número especial sobre los orígenes de la filosofía fenomenológica. Los textos presentados muestran la fecundidad en las relaciones académicas e internacionales que Eikasía, Revista de Filosofía, lleva impulsando en los últimos quince años. La calidad y originalidad de esta propuesta la convierten en una referencia bibliográfica en el panorama actual de la filosofía en español.

La filosofía cristiana de Stein surgió en el campo de tensión marcado por la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl y la enseñanza de Tomás de Aquino. El primero la fascinó por su ética de pensamiento riguroso y honesto, y el segundo por su clara concepción del campo de trabajo común para la razón y la fe. De este modo, Stein, a su vez, ideó la confrontación entre Husserl y Tomás, con la esperanza de que la filosofía se acercara (...) así a su ideal. Pues la filosofía siempre ha querido ser una teoría del ser cerrada y posiblemente coherente, cuyos enunciados estén definitivamente demostrados. Sin embargo, según Stein, sólo puede ser una teoría de este tipo si tiene en cuenta lo que dice la teología sobre el ser y, más concretamente, sobre su causa. En la filosofía de Stein en el estado cristiano, se pueden ver constantemente influencias tanto de Husserl como de Tomás. Al mismo tiempo, Stein propone su propia concepción de la filosofía y, por tanto, estas influencias se elevan muy por encima de ella. El artículo pretende describir el camino intelectual de Stein hacia esta filosofía, las influencias de Husserl y Tomás en su enfoque teórico de la filosofía cristiana, así como en sus investigaciones prácticas en el marco de la filosofía cristiana, y especialmente la peculiaridad de la filosofía de Stein. (shrink)

This paper reviews the concept of ‘essence’ in Edmund Husserl and Thomas Aquinas as found presented by Edith Stein in her Festschrift article, ‘Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas: Attempt at a Comparison,’ in the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung (1929, 370). The aim of the paper is to perform an analysis of Stein’s understanding of the principal similarities and differences in the understandings of essence found in the writings of Husserl and Aquinas, (...) and primarily in terms of the immediacy of the intuition or cognition of essences. I begin by a basic analysis of this commonality and difference with a focus on the interweaving of the following themes: essence and existence; essence and sensual knowledge; essence and its objective ground; essence as intuited, as actively acquired and as passively received; insight into essence, immediate and mediate knowledge. Despite certain misunderstanding arising between the phenomenological movement and the scholastic tradition in this sphere, Stein recognises a number of points of agreement, namely, 1) the beginnings of all knowledge in sense experience, 2) the intellectual ‘work’ (erarbeiten) that is required to achieve a clear vision of essences, and 3) the finally passive nature of the act of understanding. I critically analyse each of these enumerated points of agreement towards clarifying how Stein conceives of the possibility of using the phenomenological method for achieving an understanding of essences coherent with a Thomistic metaphysical worldview, and how she parses and explains the further disagreements over the question of the mediacy or immediacy of human knowledge of essences of different kinds. (shrink)

This paper emanates from the concept of empathy as understood by the German philosopher Edith Stein. It begins by highlighting different interpretations of empathy. According to the German philosopher Martin Buber, empathy cannot be achieved as an act of will. In contrast, the psychologist Carl Rogers believes that empathy is identical with dialogue and is the outcome of a cognitive act of active listening. The empathy concept of Edith Stein, philosopher and follower of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, goes (...) beyond these conflicting views and offers a more complex interpretation, with relevance for both healthcare and nursing education. When studying Stein's three‐level model of empathy, a field of tension between perspectives of closeness and distance becomes apparent. The paper concludes by suggesting Stein's model of empathy as a strategy to overcome the tension and meet the demands of empathy. (shrink)

This book examines the phenomenological anthropology of Edith Stein. It specifically focuses on the question which Stein addressed in her work Finite and Eternal Being: What is the foundational principle that makes the individual unique and unrepeatable within the human species? Traditional analyses of Edith Stein's writings have tended to frame her views on this issue as being influenced by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, while neglecting her interest in the lesser-known figure of Duns Scotus. Yet, as this (...) book shows, with regard to the question of individuality, Stein was critical of Aquinas' approach, finding that of Duns Scotus to be more convincing. In order to get to the heart of Stein's readings of Duns Scotus, this book looks at her published writings and her personal correspondence, in addition to conducting a meticulous analysis of the original codexes on which her sources were based. Written with diligence and flair, the book critically evaluates the authenticity of Stein's sources and shows how the position of Scotus himself evolved. It highlights the originality of Stein's contribution, which was to rediscover the relevance of Mediaeval scholastic thought and reinterpret it in the language of the Phenomenological school founded by Edmund Husserl. (shrink)

The phenomenological movement originates with Edmund Husserl, and two of his young students and collaborators, Edith Stein and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, made a notable contribution to the very delineation of the phenomenological method, which pushed phenomenology in a “realistic” direction. This essay seeks to examine the decisive influence that these two thinkers had on two specific areas: the value of the sciences and certain metaphysical questions. Concerningthe former, I maintain that Stein, departing from a philosophical, phenomenological analysis of (...) the human being, is interested particularly in the formation of the cognitive value of the human sciences. Regarding the latter, Conrad-Martius, given her knowledge of biology, tackled the question of the role and meaning of the sciences of nature. The second question, related to metaphysical themes, became a specific and relevant object of research for both women phenomenologists.It will be investigated by comparing two works, one by each thinker, namely, the Metaphysische Gespräche by Conrad-Martius and Potenz und Akt by Edith Stein. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe Jewish-Catholic philosopher and Carmelite Edith Stein offers a rich notion of love, based on an original phenomenology, which resulted from an active engagement with her teachers Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, and was later enriched and deepened by incorporating religious philosophical and theological ideas. In order to locate Stein’s original thinking, the essay will first introduce the two thinkers by whom she was most clearly influenced, and show how Stein contrasted the ‘nothing’, as it is (...) presented in Husserl’s other pupil Martin Heidegger’s existentialist analysis, with the fullness of being to which the human person aspires, and which is given through love. Her phenomenological thinking, based on the intersubjective approach to its object, ultimately leads Stein to a triple philosophical statement about love: Love is a principle of being, a principle of knowledge and a principle of relationship. The passage through theology verifies what has been said philosophically about its relationship to God, in whom love ultimately finds its completion. The three basic principles of love complement and correct each other, to the point not only of issuing in an analysis of the phenomenon ‘love’ but of also opening up an ethics of love. (shrink)

This book explores the phenomenological investigations of Edith Stein by critically contextualising her role within the phenomenological movement and assessing her accounts of empathy, sociality, and personhood. Despite the growing interest that surrounds contemporary research on empathy, Edith Stein’s phenomenological investigations have been largely neglected due to a historical tradition that tends to consider her either as Husserl’s assistant or as a martyr. However, in her phenomenological research, Edith Stein pursued critically the relation between phenomenology and psychology, (...) focusing on the relation between affectivity, subjectivity, and personhood. Alongside phenomenologists like Max Scheler, Kurt Stavenhagen, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Stein developed Husserl’s method, incorporating several original modifications that are relevant for philosophy, phenomenology, and ethics. Drawing on recent debates on empathy, emotions, and collective intentionality as well as on original inquiries and interpretations, the collection articulates and develops new perspectives regarding Edith Stein’s phenomenology. The volume includes an appraisal of Stein’s philosophical relation to Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, and develops further the concepts of empathy, sociality, and personhood. These essays demonstrate the significance of Stein’s phenomenology for contemporary research on intentionality, emotions, and ethics. Gathering together contributions from young researchers and leading scholars in the fields of phenomenology, social ontology, and history of philosophy, this collection provides original views and critical discussions that will be of interest also for social philosophers and moral psychologists. (shrink)