In seiner letzten Schrift unternimmt Husserl den Versuch, auf dem Wege einer teleologisch-historischen Besinnung auf die Ursprünge unserer kritischen wissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Situation die Notwendigkeit einer transzendentalphänomenologischen Umwendung der Philosophie zu begründen. Er geht von seinem Begriff der "Lebenswelt" aus und entwickelt eine auf diesen Zentralbegriff seiner Spätphilosophie gegründete eigenständige Einleitung in die transzendentale Phänomenologie.

Science in a new sense arises in the first instance from Plato's establishing of logic, as a place for exploring the essential requirements of "genuine" ...

In den Bernauer Forschungsmanuskripten nimmt Husserl seine frühere, in Husserliana Band X dokumentierte Phänomenologie der formalen Struktur des inneren Zeitbewusstseins neu auf. Dabei stehen die Fragen, welche die Anwendung des Schemas `Auffassung - Auffassungsinhalt' auf das Zeitbewusstein und die Gefahr des unendlichen Regresses betreffen, noch immer im Vordergrund. Es ergeben sich aber auch entscheidende neue Einsichten. Diese betreffen vor allem das auf die Zukunft gerichtete `protentionale' Zeitbewusstsein in seiner Verflechtung mit der `Retention' der Vergangenheit sowie eine spezifisch noematische Bestimmung der (...) Zeitmodalitäten, die zu einer neuen Phänomenologie der Individuation führt. Auch dem Zusammenhang zwischen zeitlichem Urstrom und ichlicher Zeitigung widmet Husserl erstmals eingehende Untersuchungen. Insgesamt handelt es sich bei den vorliegenden Nachlasstexten um eine Phänomenologie des Zeitbewusstseins in einer neuen, `genetischen' Perspektive, die sich nicht nur am Paradigma der Wahrnehmung orientiert, sondern auch den Akten der Erinnerung und der Phantasie Aufmerksamkeit schenkt. (shrink)

These lectures are the first extensive application of Husserl's newly developed genetic phenomenology to perceptual experience & to the way in which it is connected to judgments & cognition. Students of phenomenology will find this work indispensable.

Der vorliegende Band enthält den Text der vierstündigen Vorlesung, die Husserl im Wintersemester 1908/09 unter dem Titel "Alte und neue Logik" in Göttingen gehalten hat. Es handelt sich bei dieser Vorlesung zum einen um eine Umarbeitung und Neugestaltung seiner Logikvorlesung von 1902/03, die im Band 2 der Materialien veröffentlicht wurde, zum anderen um eine Vorstufe der in Band XXX der Gesammelten Werke unter dem späteren Titel "Logik und Allgemeine Wissenschaftslehre" veröffentlichten Vorlesung "Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie" von 1910/11. Husserl (...) konfrontiert in der Vorlesung nicht, wie der Titel anzukündigen scheint, die traditionelle Logik mit den zeitgenössischen Reformversuchen dieser Logik, sondern er entwickelt in kritischer Abwehr des Psychologismus, zu dem er ausdrücklich auch Brentanos Reform der Logik rechnet, seine eigene Konzeption der reinen Logik. Konstitutiv für diese Konzeption ist die Zweischichtung in Bedeutungslehre als reine Formenlehre der logischen Bedeutungen ("reine Grammatik") und Geltungslehre. Die konkreten Ausführungen sind vor allem einer umfassenden Darstellung der Formenlehre sowie der kritischen Erörterung von bedeutungstheoretischen Streitfragen gewidmet. (shrink)

An important philosophical issue in the study of addiction is what difference the fact that a person is addicted makes to attributions of autonomy (and responsibility) to their drug-oriented behavior. In spite of accumulating evidence suggesting the role of emotional dysregulation in understanding addiction, it has received surprisingly little attention in the debate about this issue. I claim that, as a result, an important aspect of the autonomy impairment of many addicted individuals has been largely overlooked. A widely shared assumption (...) in the philosophical literature is that for addiction to impair a person’s autonomy it has to make them (in some sense) take drugs against their will. So-called “willing addicts” are therefore usually seen as exempted from the autonomy impairment believed to characterize “unwilling addicts”, the latter being those who ‘truly want’ to stop using drugs but find their attempts repeatedly derailed by failures of self-control. In this article, I argue that the association between addiction and emotional dysregulation shows why this assumption is false. Emotional dysregulation is not only consistent with the possibility that many addicts take drugs ‘willingly’, it supports the hypothesis that they use drugs because they truly want to. The article proposes an explanation for why emotional dysregulation should nevertheless be seen as an aspect of their loss of control and an important reason why they have impaired autonomy. I end by exploring some implications of this account for addict’s decision-making capacity when they are prescribed the drugs to which they are addicted. -/- . (shrink)

Intentionnalité et être au monde. Husserl. Edmund4070.

Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.

Impairment of self-control is often said to be a defining feature of addiction. Yet many addicts display what appears to be a considerable amount of control over their drug-oriented actions. Not only are their actions clearly intentional and frequently carried out in a conscious and deliberate manner, there is evidence that many addicts are responsive to a wide range of ordinary incentives and counter-incentives. Moreover, addicts have a wide variety of reasons for using drugs, reasons which often seem to go (...) a long way towards explaining their drug-oriented behavior. Many use drugs, for example, to cope with stressful or traumatic experiences. In this article I argue that some standard philosophical explanations of addicts’ impairment of self-control are inadequate, and propose an alternative. (shrink)

What is self-control and how does the concept of self-control relate to the notion of will-power? A widespread philosophical opinion has been that the notion of will-power does not add anything beyond what can be said using other motivational notions, such as strength of desire and intention. One exception is Richard Holton who, inspired by recent research in social psychology, has argued that will-power is a separate faculty needed for persisting in one's resolutions, what he calls 'strength of will'. However, (...) he distinguishes strength of will from self-control. In this paper I argue that will-power is essential also to a certain form of self-control. I support this claim by arguments showing that the traditional philosophical accounts of self-control run into difficulties because they pay insufficient attention to will-power as an independent source of motivation. (shrink)

This book makes available to the English reader nearly all of the shorter philosophical works, published or unpublished, that Husserl produced on the way to the phenomenological breakthrough recorded in his Logical Investigations of 1900-1901. Here one sees Husserl's method emerging step by step, and such crucial substantive conclusions as that concerning the nature of Ideal entities and the status the intentional `relation' and its `objects'. Husserl's literary encounters with many of the leading thinkers of his day illuminates both the (...) context and the content of his thought. Many of the groundbreaking analyses provided in these texts were never again to be given the thorough expositions found in these early writings. Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics is essential reading for students of Husserl and all those who enquire into the nature of mathematical and logical knowledge. (shrink)

Russian translation of Gettier E. L. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? // Analysis, vol. 23, 1963. Translated by Lev Lamberov with kind permission of the author.

Deliberation incompatibilism is the view that an agent being rational and deliberating about which of (mutually excluding) actions to perform, is incompatible with her believing that there exist prior conditions that render impossible the performance of either one of these actions. However, the main argument for this view, associated most prominently with Peter van Inwagen, appears to have been widely rejected by contemporary authors on free will. In this paper I argue first that a closer examination of van Inwagen's argument (...) shows that the standard objections are based on a misunderstanding of the notion of ‘deliberation’ presupposed in this argument. Second, I attempt to strengthen the case for deliberation incompatibilism by offering a different argument in its support. (shrink)

Husserls Studien zum inneren Zeitbewusstsein bilden in ihrer chronologischen Folge sachlich und historisch entscheidende Teilschritte auf dem Weg zur Grundlegung der Phänomenologie. In Ergänzung zu der berühmten Erstedition des Textes der von Edith Stein redigierten Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins, die Martin Heidegger 1928 im Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung herausgab, bieten die hier nach den originalen Manuskripten aus dem Nachlass versammelten Texte aus den Jahren 1893–1917 die Möglichkeit, die Fortschritte Husserls in der Analyse des Zeitbewusstseins auch in (...) aller Strenge methodisch nachzuvollziehen. Im Unterschied zu der ersten Ausgabe dieser Texte in der Philosophischen Bibliothek von 1985 (PhB 362), die sich auf die Präsentation der aus dem Nachlass edierten Texte beschränkte, enthält diese Neuausgabe nun auch den von Edith Stein redigierten Text von 1928, der auf Manuskripten zu einer Göttinger Vorlesung im Wintersemester 1904/05 und ausgewählten Nachträgen bis zum Jahre 1910 beruht und seinerzeit große Beachtung fand, in manchen Teilen aber ohne die Hinzuziehung der Texte aus dem Nachlass nicht hinreichend transparent wird und seine Theorie in wesentlichen Punkten sogar als widersprüchlich erscheinen lässt. Eine fruchtbare Auseinandersetzung mit dieser Theorie muss sich daher im besonderen Maße auf die hier edierten ergänzenden Manuskripte stützen. (shrink)

In Perplexity in the Moral Life Santurri discusses how situations of moral perplexity are to be construed and how the interpretation of these situations might be constrained by the presuppositions of Christian ethics.

An approach to emotion is described in which emotions are defined as states elicited by instrumental reinforcers, that is, by stimuli that are the goals for action. This leads to a theory of the evolutionary adaptive value of emotions, which is that different genes specify different goals in their own self-interest, and any actions can then be learned and performed by instrumental learning to obtain the goals. The brain mechanisms for emotion in brain regions such as the orbitofrontal and anterior (...) cingulate cortex provide a foundation for understanding the neural basis of emotion. Classically conditioned effects may modulate the actions initiated by this system. In addition to this instrumental learning system, some stimuli may elicit responses, for example approach, withdrawal, or fixed action patterns, but intervening states are not required for this type of adaptive response. In addition, a rational thought system involved in multistep planning can allow gene-specified goals to be deferred or avoided in order to achieve longer-term types of goals that may be more advantageous to the individual than to the genes. (shrink)

The problem of weakness of the will is often thought to arise because of an assumption that freely, deliberately and intentionally doing something must correspond to the agent's positive evaluation of doing that thing. In contemporary philosophy, a very common response to the problem of weakness has been to adopt the view that free, deliberate action does not need to correspond to any positive evaluation at all. Much of the support for this view has come from the difficulties the denial (...) of it has been thought to give rise to, both with respect to giving an account of weakness, as well as explaining the future-directed nature of intentions. In this paper I argue that most of these difficulties only arise for one particular version of the view that free, deliberate action must correspond to a positive evaluation, a version associated with Donald Davidson's account of weakness. However, another version of this view is possible, and I argue that it escapes the standard objections to the Davidsonian account. (shrink)

Some authors have argued that, in order to give an account of weakness of the will, we must assume that the mind is divisible into parts. This claim is often referred to as the partitioning claim. There appear to be two main arguments for this claim. While the first is conceptual and claims that the notion of divisibility is entailed by the notion of non-rational mental causation (which is held to be a necessary condition of weakness of the will), the (...) second is explanatory and claims that the notion of divisibility is required for the causal explanation of weak-willed action. In this paper I want to argue that the partitioning claim remains unsupported, no matter how it is interpreted, and that weakness of the will can be made perfectly good sense of without the idea that the mind is divisible into parts. In fact, there are available various explanatory models each of which characterizes different psychological mechanisms that may be involved in weakness of will, none of which depends on any claims about mental division. I describe three familiar mechanisms and argue that weakness of will may occur as the result of any one of them. (shrink)

Sir Edmund Leach argues that doctors in the modern world, fortified by the traditional concept that the life of the sick person must at all costs be preserved, are to some extent guilty of the false antitheses current today between youth and age. Moreover youth means health, age illness and senility. Until this imbalance is corrected society will be in danger of `a kind of civil war between the generations'. Society must be taught again that mortality cannot be avoided (...) or conquered by medical science, and at the same time that `health' is not enshrined in the young alone. (shrink)

In recent years, virtue theories have enjoyed a renaissance of interest among general and medical ethicists. This book offers a virtue-based ethic for medicine, the health professions, and health care. Beginning with a historical account of the concept of virtue, the authors construct a theory of the place of the virtues in medical practice. Their theory is grounded in the nature and ends of medicine as a special kind of human activity. The concepts of virtue, the virtues, and the virtuous (...) physician are examined along with the place of the virtues of trust, compassion, prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and effacement of self-interest in medicine. The authors discuss the relationship between and among principles, rules, virtues, and the philosophy of medicine. They also address the difference virtue-based ethics makes in confronting such practical problems as care of the poor, research with human subjects, and the conduct of the healing relationship. This book woith the author's previous volumes, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice and For the Patient's Good, are part of their continuing project of developing a coherent moral philosophy of medicine. (shrink)

Klarheit in betreff dieser Sätze anstrebt, d. i. Einsicht in das Wesen der bei dem Vollzug und den ideal-möglichen Anwendungen solcher Sätze ins Spiel tretenden Erkenntnisweisen und der mit diesen sich wesensmäßig konstituierenden Sinngebungen und objektiven Gel- 1 11 S tungen • Sprachliche Erörterungen gehören r nun sicherlich zu den 1 r philosophisch I unerläßlichen Vorbereitungen für den Aufbau der [A 4] reinen Logik, weil nur durch ihre Mithilfe die eigentlichen Objekte der logischen Forschung und, in weiterer Folge, die wesentlichen (...) Arten und Unterschiede dieser Objekte zu unmißverständlicher 10 Klarheit herauszuarbeiten sind. Es handelt sich dabei aber nicht um 12 grammatische Erörterungen im r empirischen, auf irgendeine historisch gegebene Sprache bezogenen Sinn, sondern um Erörterun gen jener allgemeinsten Art, die zur weiteren Sphäre einer objekti ven Theorie der Erkenntnis und, was damit innigst zusammen- 13 15 hängt, einer rreinen Phänomenologie der Denk- und Erkenntniserlebnisse gehören. rDicse, wie die sie umspannende reine Phänomenologie der Erlebnisse überhaupt, hat es ausschließlich mit den in der Intuition erlaßbaren und analysierba ren Erlebnissen in reiner Wesensallgemeinheit zu tun, nicht aber mit 20 empirisch apperzipierten Erlebnissen als realen Fakten, als Erlebnis sen erlebender Menschen oder Tiere in der erscheinenden und als Erfahrungsfaktum gesetzten Welt. Die in der Wesensintuition direkt erfaßten Wesen und rein in den Wesen gründenden Zusammenhän ge bringt sie deskriptiv in Wesensbegriffen und gesetzlichen 25 Wesensaussagen zu reinem Ausdruck. Jede solche Aussage ist eine 1 14 apriorische im vorzüglichsten Sinne des Wortes. (shrink)

This chapter describes a perspective on emotion, according to which emotions are: 1. Designed to function in a social context: an emotion is often an act of relationship reconfiguration brought about by delivering a social signal; 2. Forms of skillful engagement with the world which need not be mediated by conceptual thought; 3. Scaffolded by the environment, both synchronically in the unfolding of a particular emotional performance and diachronically, in the acquisition of an emotional repertoire; 4. Dynamically coupled to an (...) environment which both influences and is influenced by the unfolding of the emotion We draw heavily on ‘transactional’ accounts of emotion proposed by some contemporary psychologists. Although these authors do not, to our knowledge, conceive their work as a contribution to the ‘situationist’ literature that is the focus of this volume, we contend that their proposals constitute a fairly exact, affective parallel to situationist ideas about cognition. The primary aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that a situated approach to emotion already exists and is backed by a substantial experimental literature. (shrink)

A familiar objection to restrictive consequentialism is that a restrictive consequentialist is incapable of having true friendships. In this paper I distinguish between an instrumentalist and a non-instrumentalist version of this objection and argue that while the restrictive consequentialist can answer the non-instrumentalist version, restrictive consequentialism may still seem vulnerable to the instrumentalist version. I then suggest a consequentialist reply that I argue also works against this version of the objection. Central to this reply is the claim that a restrictive (...) consequentialist is capable of true friendship if the value she aims for is not merely seen as a function of her self-regarding desires, but includes as a central constituent a form of objective value often referred to as 'flourishing' or 'self-realization'. (shrink)

Suppose an agent has made a judgement of the form, 'all things considered, it would be better for me to do a rather than b (or any range of alternatives to doing a)' where a and b stand for particular actions. If she does not act upon her judgement in these circumstances would that be a failure of rationality on her part? In this paper I consider two different interpretations of all things considered judgements which give different answers to this (...) question, one suggested by Donald Davidson, the other by Paul Grice and Judith Baker. I argue that neither interpretation is adequate. However, a third interpretation that combines features of the Grice/Baker view with the Davidsonian view is possible. In the final section of the paper I defend this interpretation against two objections. (shrink)

The relation between mental states and brain states is important in computational neuroscience, and in psychiatry in which interventions with medication are made on brain states to alter mental states. The relation between the brain and the mind has puzzled philosophers for centuries. Here a neuroscience approach is proposed in which events at the sub-neuronal, neuronal, and neuronal network levels take place simultaneously to perform a computation that can be described at a high level as a mental state, with content (...) about the world. It is argued that as the processes at the different levels of explanation take place at the same time, they are linked by a non-causal supervenient relationship: causality can best be described in brains as operating within but not between levels. This allows the supervenient properties to be emergent, though once understood at the mechanistic levels they may seem less emergent, and expected. This mind-brain theory allows mental events to be different in kind from the mechanistic events that underlie them; but does not lead one to argue that mental events cause brain events, or vice versa: they are different levels of explanation of the operation of the computational system. This approach may provide a way of thinking about brains and minds that is different from dualism and from reductive physicalism, and which is rooted in the computational processes that are fundamental to understanding brain and mental events, and that mean that the mental and mechanistic levels are linked by the computational process being performed. Explanations at the different levels of operation may be useful in different ways. For example, if we wish to understand how arithmetic is performed in the brain, description at the mental level of the algorithm being computed will be useful. But if the brain operates to result in mental disorders, then understanding the mechanism at the neural processing level may be more useful, in for example, the treatment of psychiatric disorders. (shrink)

The relation between mental states and brain states is important in computational neuroscience, and in psychiatry in which interventions with medication are made on brain states to alter mental states. The relation between the brain and the mind has puzzled philosophers for centuries. Here a neuroscience approach is proposed in which events at the sub-neuronal, neuronal, and neuronal network levels take place simultaneously to perform a computation that can be described at a high level as a mental state, with content (...) about the world. It is argued that as the processes at the different levels of explanation take place at the same time, they are linked by a non-causal supervenient relationship: causality can best be described in brains as operating within but not between levels. This allows the supervenient (e.g., mental) properties to be emergent, though once understood at the mechanistic levels they may seem less emergent, and expected. This mind-brain theory allows mental events to be different in kind from the mechanistic events that underlie them; but does not lead one to argue that mental events cause brain events, or vice versa: they are different levels of explanation of the operation of the computational system. This approach may provide a way of thinking about brains and minds that is different from dualism and from reductive physicalism, and which is rooted in the computational processes that are fundamental to understanding brain and mental events, and that mean that the mental and mechanistic levels are linked by the computational process being performed. Explanations at the different levels of operation may be useful in different ways. For example, if we wish to understand how arithmetic is performed in the brain, description at the mental level of the algorithm being computed will be useful. But if the brain operates to result in mental disorders, then understanding the mechanism at the neural processing level may be more useful, in for example, the treatment of psychiatric disorders. (shrink)

In this companion volume to their 1981 work, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice, Pellegrino and Thomasma examine the principle of beneficence and its role in the practice of medicine. Their analysis, which is grounded in a thorough-going philosophy of medicine, addresses a wide array of practical and ethical concerns that are a part of health care decision-making today. Among these issues are the withdrawing and withholding of nutrition and hydration, competency assessment, the requirements for valid surrogate decision-making, quality-of-life determinations, (...) the allocation of scarce health care resources, medical gatekeeping, and for-profit medicine. The authors argue for the restoration of beneficence to its place as the fundamental principle of medical ethics. They maintain that to be guided by beneficence a physician must perform a right and good healing action which is consonant with the individual patient 's values. In order to act in the patient 's best interests, or the patient 's good, the physician and patient must discern what that good is. This knowledge is gained only through a process of dialogue between patient and/or family and physician which respects and honors the patient 's autonomous self-understanding and choice in the matter of treatment options. This emphasis on a dialogical discernment of the patient 's good rejects the assumption long held in medicine that what is considered to be the medical good is necessarily the good for this patient. In viewing autonomy as a necessary condition of beneficence, the authors move beyond a trend in the medical ethics literature which identifies beneficence with paternalism. In their analysis of beneficence, the authors reject the current emphasis on rights- and duty-based ethical systems in favor of a virtue-based theory which is grounded in the physician- patient relationship. This book's provocative contributions to medical ethics will be of great interest not only to physicians and other health professionals, but also to ethicists, students, patients, families, and all others concerned with the relationship of professional to patient and patient to professional in health care today. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In a series of experiments at the National Institute of Mental Health, the animal ecologist John B. Calhoun offered rats everything they needed, except space. The resulting population explosion was followed by a series of “social pathologies”—violence, sexual deviance, and withdrawal. This essay examines the influence of Calhoun's experiments among psychologists and sociologists concerned with the effects of the built environment on health and behavior. Some saw evidence of the danger of the crowd in Calhoun's “rat cities” and fastened (...) on a method of analysis that could be transferred to the study of urban man. Others, however, cautioned against drawing analogies between rodents and humans. The ensuing dispute saw social scientists involved in a careful negotiation over the structure and meaning of Calhoun's experimental systems and, with it, over the significance of the crowd in the laboratory, institution, and city. (shrink)