We argue that dominant research approaches concerning mental illness, which are centered on traditional categories of psychiatric classification as codified in the DSM-IV, have serious empirical, conceptual, and foundational problems. These problems have led to a classification scheme and body of research findings that provide a very poor map of the domain of mental illness, a map that, in turn, undermines clinical and research pursuits. We discuss some current efforts to respond to these problems and argue that the DSM-5 revision (...) process is not very promising, whereas the NIMH Research Domain Criteria initiative and some recent research in cognitive neuroscience fares better, although the latter remains potentially compromised by residual influences of the DSM-based approach. We conclude with some lessons and suggestions for the pursuit of alternative research pathways. (shrink)

Definition of the problem The umbrella term “explicability” refers to the reduction of opacity of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. These efforts are challenging for medical AI applications because higher accuracy often comes at the cost of increased opacity. This entails ethical tensions because physicians and patients desire to trace how results are produced without compromising the performance of AI systems. The centrality of explicability within the informed consent process for medical AI systems compels an ethical reflection on the trade-offs. Which (...) levels of explicability are needed to obtain informed consent when utilizing medical AI? Arguments We proceed in five steps: First, we map the terms commonly associated with explicability as described in the ethics and computer science literature, i.e., disclosure, intelligibility, interpretability, and explainability. Second, we conduct a conceptual analysis of the ethical requirements for explicability when it comes to informed consent. Third, we distinguish hurdles for explicability in terms of epistemic and explanatory opacity. Fourth, this then allows to conclude the level of explicability physicians must reach and what patients can expect. In a final step, we show how the identified levels of explicability can technically be met from the perspective of computer science. Throughout our work, we take diagnostic AI systems in radiology as an example. Conclusion We determined four levels of explicability that need to be distinguished for ethically defensible informed consent processes and showed how developers of medical AI can technically meet these requirements. (shrink)

In this richly detailed analysis, Barbara Von Eckardt lays the foundations for understanding what it means to be a cognitive scientist.

Recent work has demonstrated that the sense of agency is not only determined by efference-copy-based internal predictions and internal comparator mechanisms, but by a large variety of different internal and external cues. The study by Moore and colleagues [Moore, J. W., Wegner, D. M., & Haggard, P. . Modulating the sense of agency with external cues. Conscious and Cognition] aimed to provide further evidence for this view by demonstrating that external agency cues might outweigh or even substitute efferent signals to (...) install a basic registration of self-agency. Although the study contains some critical points that, so we argue, are central to a proper interpretation of the data, it hints at a new perspective on agency: optimal cue integration seems to be the key to a robust sense of agency. We here argue that this framework could allow integrating the findings of Moore and colleagues and other recent agency studies into a comprehensive picture of the sense of agency and its pathological disruptions. (shrink)

The aim of the study was to illustrate the impact of teachers’ implementation of differentiation and individualization on students’ perception of their inclusion regarding their social inclusion, emotional wellbeing and academic self-concept. The study sample comprised 824 third-to-eighth-grade students [255 males and 569 females ]. Around 10% of the sample had special educational needs. Students’ perceived inclusion levels and academic self-concept were examined with the Arabic version of the Perceptions of Inclusion Questionnaire. Students’ ratings of inclusive practices in their classroom (...) were examined using the Arabic version of the Inclusive Teaching Practices Scale. SEN students expressed lower perceived social inclusion, emotional inclusion, and academic self-concept in comparison with non-SEN students. Moreover, high levels of inclusive teaching practices strongly predicted students’ perceived emotional inclusion, social inclusion, and academic self-concept. The results of the study supported the importance of school-level inclusive teaching practices and their relation to students’ school experiences. It also highlighted the need for schools and teachers to work towards improved school-level inclusion experiences for SEN students. (shrink)

Ramsey (1997) argues that connectionist representations 'do not earn their explanatory keep'. The aim of this paper is to examine the argument Ramsey gives to support that conclusion. In doing so, I identify two kinds of explanatory need—need relative to a possible explanation and need relative to a true explanation and argue that internal representations are not needed for either connectionist or nonconnectionist possible explanations but that it is quite likely that they are needed for true explanations. However, to show (...) that the latter is the case requires more than a consideration of the form of explanation involved. (shrink)

Ramsey (1997) argues that connectionist representations ‘do not earn their explanatory keep’. The aim of this paper is to examine the argument Ramsey gives to support that conclusion. In doing so, I identify two kinds of explanatory need—need relative to a possible explanation and need relative to a true explanation and argue that internal representations are not needed for either connectionist or non‐connectionist possible explanations but that it is quite likely that they are needed for true explanations. However, to show (...) that the latter is the case requires more than a consideration of the form of explanation involved. (shrink)

This book explores the semantic and pragmatic mechanisms underlying grammaticalization. Regine Eckardt argues that language change frequently involves a structural reorganization at the phonological, morphological, and syntactic levels. Speakers not only master the structural aspect of such reanalyses, they also-as the author argues-keep a detailed mental record of what has happened to meaning. The author develops semantic reanalysis as the semantic correlate and tracks its effects in meaning change. Several case studies offer new insights in the architecture of conceptual (...) thinking that is part of the human language faculty. Professor Eckardt develops her approach in terms of formal semantic theory. She shows how neatly tailored analyses in truth-conditional compositional semantics can elucidate the structural mechanisms of meaning change. Her exposition is advanced in the context of several in-depth case studies containing data new to historical linguistics. This book will be of central interest to scholars and advanced students of historical and comparative linguistics and of formal semantics in departments of linguistics and philosophy. (shrink)

The majority of research investigating beliefs toward nonhuman animals has focused on vivisection or utilized populations with clear views on animal issues . Minimal research has been conducted on what personality factors influence a nonclinical or nonadjudicated population’s beliefs about the treatment of animals. The purpose of the present study was to examine the role of empathy and personality traits in attitudes about the treatment of animals in 241 undergraduate students. Results indicated that those with high levels of empathy held (...) more positive attitudes toward animals and more negative beliefs about animal cruelty than those with low levels of empathy. Some differences in participants’ specific attitudes toward animals were found. Limitations and implications for future research are reviewed. (shrink)

The aim of psychology is to understand the human mind and behavior. In contemporary psychology, the method of choice to accomplish this incredibly complex endeavor is the experiment. This dominance has shaped the whole discipline from the self-concept as an empirical science and its very epistemological and theoretical foundations, via research practice and the scientific discourse to teaching. Experimental psychology is grounded in the scientific method and positivism, and these principles, which are characteristic for modern thinking, are still upheld. Despite (...) this apparently stalwart adherence to modern principles, experimental psychology exhibits a number of aspects which can best be described as facets of postmodern thinking although they are hardly acknowledged as such. Many psychologists take pride in being “real natural scientists” because they conduct experiments, but it is particularly difficult for psychologists to evade certain elements of postmodern thinking in view of the specific nature of their subject matter. Postmodernism as a philosophy emerged in the 20th century as a response to the perceived inadequacy of the modern approach and as a means to understand the complexities, ambiguities, and contradictions of the times. Therefore, postmodernism offers both valuable insights into the very nature of experimental psychology and fruitful ideas on improving experimental practice to better reflect the complexities and ambiguities of human mind and behavior. Analyzing experimental psychology along postmodern lines begins by discussing the implications of transferring the scientific method from fields with rather narrowly defined phenomena—the natural sciences—to a much broader and more heterogeneous class of complex phenomena, namely the human mind and behavior. This ostensibly modern experimental approach is, however, per se riddled with postmodern elements: creating phenomena in an experimental setting, including the hermeneutic processes of generating hypotheses and interpreting results, is no carbon copy of “reality” but rather an active construction which reflects irrevocably the pre-existing ideas of the investigator. These aspects, analyzed by using postmodern concepts like hyperreality and simulacra, did not seep in gradually but have been present since the very inception of experimental psychology, and they are necessarily inherent in its philosophy of science. We illustrate this theoretical analysis with the help of two examples, namely experiments on free will and visual working memory. The postmodern perspective reveals some pitfalls in the practice of experimental psychology. Furthermore, we suggest that accepting the inherently fuzzy nature of theoretical constructs in psychology and thinking more along postmodern lines would actually clarify many theoretical problems in experimental psychology. (shrink)

To say that mental phenomena are self-intimating means, roughly, that there is no more to them than what meets the "inner" eye. Gilbert Ryle was the first to emphasize this as one of the central features of the classical Cartesian picture of mind. He wrote.

The aim of Schunn, Crowley and Okada's (1998) study is to address the question of whether the current state of cognitive science, as represented by Cognitive Science and the Cognitive Science Society, “reflects the multidisciplinary ideals of its foundation.” To properly interpret and respond to their results, we need to ask a prior question: What is cognitive science's multidisciplinary ideal? There are at least two conceptions—a “localist” conception, which seems to be implicit in Schunn, Crowley and Okada's discussion, and a (...) “holist” conception. I argue that while both have been endorsed by some cognitive scientists, there are reasons for preferring the holist conception. I then consider what Schunn, Crowley and Okada's findings tell us about the state of cognitive science in light of a holist approach and report on an analysis of the journal's contents which looks at the domain, subdomain, and cognitive capacity investigated. (shrink)

To say that mental phenomena are self-intimating means, roughly, that there is no more to them than what meets the "inner" eye. Gilbert Ryle was the first to emphasize this as one of the central features of the classical Cartesian picture of mind. He wrote.

When is it rational to pursue a research tradition? In Progress and Its Problems, Laudan suggests that if a research tradition RT has a higher rate of progress than any of its rivals, where the rate of progress of an RT is the problem solving effectiveness of its theories over time, then it is rational to pursue RT. In this paper I offer a number of criticisms of this suggestion, with special attention to the current controversy over the rational pursuability (...) of cognitive science. (shrink)

When is it rational to pursue a research tradition? In Progress and Its Problems, Laudan suggests that if a research tradition RT has a higher rate of progress than any of its rivals, where the rate of progress of an RT is the problem solving effectiveness of its theories over time, then it is rational to pursue RT. In this paper I offer a number of criticisms of this suggestion, with special attention to the current controversy over the rational pursuability (...) of cognitive science. (shrink)

People often make trait judgments about themselves and others. Social perception researchers have attempted to study the accuracy of such judgments. Such studies raise the philosophical/conceptual question of what it means to say that a person's judgment is accurate. Two attempts have recently been made to taxonomize current research in terms of the notion of accuracy which has been adopted. My aim in this paper is twofold: first, to argue that the proposed philosophical taxonomies are problematic and, hence, should be (...) abandoned, and second, to recommend adoption of an alternative "minimalist" notion of accuracy. (shrink)

In this accessible integration of psychology and theology, Marjorie Lindner Gunnoe offers a comprehensive understanding of personhood from both perspectives, examining the intersection of biblical perspectives with established theories of social development as proposed by Erik Erikson, B. F. Skinner, Evoluntionary Psychology, and more.

The project 'Facing Forward' started with a collaboration between five institutions: the Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam, the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis at the University of Amsterdam, De Appel arts centre, W139, the Stedelijk Museum Bureau Amsterdam and the art magazine Metroplis M. Having previously organized the lecture series and publications 'Right About Now: Art & Theory in the 1990s' (2005/2006) and 'Now is the Time: Art & Theory in the 21st Century' (2008/2009), the organizing committee decided to take the final (...) step in this timeline and turn its attention to the far horizon. Informed by a shared interest in the role that history, speculation, and utopianism play in the field of contemporary art and design (as well as the larger context of global, socio-economic and political developments), a selection of seven themes emerged from the conversations of the initial organizers. These would eventually shape the seven lecture and discussions events - collected in this volume of essays - publicized under the banner Art & Theory From a Future Perspective. A great number of internationally renowned speakers were invited to reflect on the proposed themes during often sold-out events, which were presented at the Oude Lutherse Kerk in Amsterdam in 2011/2012. Yet, however compelling our desire as organizers to go beyond the framework of contemporary events and the current interest, well-nigh obsession, with history, it is obviously an illusion to think that we can escape the past by means of a turn towards the future."--Page 8. (shrink)

The aim of Schunn, Crowley and Okada's (1998) study is to address the question of whether the current state of cognitive science, as represented by Cognitive Science and the Cognitive Science Society, “reflects the multidisciplinary ideals of its foundation.” To properly interpret and respond to their results, we need to ask a prior question: What is cognitive science's multidisciplinary ideal? There are at least two conceptions—a “localist” conception, which seems to be implicit in Schunn, Crowley and Okada's discussion, and a (...) “holist” conception. I argue that while both have been endorsed by some cognitive scientists, there are reasons for preferring the holist conception. I then consider what Schunn, Crowley and Okada's findings tell us about the state of cognitive science in light of a holist approach and report on an analysis of the journal's contents which looks at the domain, subdomain, and cognitive capacity investigated. (shrink)

This paper investigates the meaning of German selbst (≈ E N-self) in its intensifying use, and the relation of this selbst to the focus particle selbst (≈ E even). I propose that intensifying selbst denotes type-lifted variants of the identity function on the domain of individuals, and that the observed stress accents must be analysed in terms of by now well-established focus theories. This analysis covers the core range of data correctly, predicting obligatory stress on selbst, sortal restrictions, centrality effects, (...) and the distribution of examples that express some kind of surprise. Moreover, it allows for a treatment of the reanalysis of intensifying selbst into focus particle selbst that stipulates fewer historical accidents than previous accounts. (shrink)

Since the publication of Nikolas Rose’s ‘The Politics of Life Itself’ there has been vivid discussion about how biopolitical governance has changed over the last decades. This article uses what Rose terms ‘molecular politics’, a new socio-technical grip on the human body, as a contrasting background to ask anew his question ‘What, then, of biopolitics today?’ – albeit focusing not on advances in genetics, microbiology, and pharmaceutics, as he does, but on the rapid proliferation of wearables and other sensor-software gadgets. (...) In both cases, new technologies providing information about the individual body are the common ground for governance and optimization, yet for the latter, the target is habits of moving, eating and drinking, sleeping, working and relaxing. The resulting profound differences are carved out along four lines: ‘somatic identities’ and a modified understanding of the body; the role of ‘expert knowledge’ compared to that of networks of peers and self-experimentation; the ‘types of intervention’ by which new technologies become effective in our everyday life; and the ‘post-discipline character’ of molecular biopolitics. It is argued that, taken together, these differences indicate a remarkable shift which could be termed aretaic: its focus is not ‘life itself’ but ‘life as it is lived’, and its modality are new everyday socio-technical entanglements and their more-than-human rationalities of governance. (shrink)

Die um 1800 aufgeworfenen anthropologisch-psychologischen Fragestellungen sind Gegenstand dieses Buches. Sie bildeten einen wichtigen Bestandteil der damaligen Wissenschaftskultur und wurden unter Namen wie "Empirische Psychologie", "Erfahrungsseelenkunde", "Experimentalseelenlehre" oder auch "Seelenphysik" abgehandelt. Das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen einem empirisch-erfahrungswissenschaftlichen und einem apriorisch-fundamentalphilosophischen Zugang zur Anthropologie bzw. Psychologie, wie es sich besonders im Ereignisraum Weimar-Jena verdichtete, steht im Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung. Das Buch vermittelt ein differenziertes Bild des anthropologisch-psychologischen Diskurses in jener Phase der Kultur- und Wissenschaftsentwicklung, in der sich Aufklärung, Klassizismus, Klassik, Idealismus und (...) Romantik überlagerten. (shrink)