Animal Experimentation

. . Tom Beauchamp and David DeGrazia's principles do improve upon the 3Rs which don’t mention the need for benefits from animal experimentation, the need to compare these benefits to animal harms, and provide no hard limits on experimentation. -/- However, they present their principles as “useful” for people engaged in animal research and as a “philosophically sound” (p. 4) framework for a new ethic for animal research. Regrettably, I have doubts about both these overall claims and so am pessimistic (...) about the book. (shrink)

When it comes to invasive manipulation of animals on the biological level, reactions of disgust are common and often influential on people’s moral judgments. As a case in point, the Belgian Blue, a breed of hyper-enhanced cattle which will serve as a case study for the present article, has historically been met with revulsion. Traditionally, in bio- and animal ethics, this ‘yuck factor,’ has been denied any productive role in proper moral justification, since rationalism is still a dominant paradigm in (...) those disciplines. This is not surprising since rationalism offers the fulfilment of certain expectations we have of morality, like universality, intersubjective communicability, and objectivity. Increasingly, however, the preconceptions of rationalism have been brought into question, both through empirical as well as philosophical insights. In this paper, we will explore a way in which researchers who are, accordingly, critical of rationalism, and who wish to take seriously the role disgust plays in the formation of moral judgments when it comes to biological manipulation of animals, can do so without abandoning those virtues of rationalism which make it such an appealing position. We will do so by offering what we call a ‘tempered’ kind of rationalism, that is, one which conceives of rationality in the terms of Mary Midgley, not as distinct from, but as a possible function of, well-ordered emotion. (shrink)

Translation failure occurs when a treatment shown to be safe and effective in one type of population does not produce the same result in another. We are currently in a crisis involving the translatability of preclinical studies to human populations. Animal trials are no better than a coin toss at predicting the safety and efficacy of drugs in human trials, and the high failure rate of drugs entering human trials suggests that most of the suffering of laboratory animals is futile, (...) creating no commensurate benefit for human patients. Here, I argue that animal ethics committees have a role to play in getting us out of this crisis. Inadequate representation is a known contributor to translation failures and is a matter of both scientific and ethical concern. Ethical review committees have the authority to address it by reprioritising the values already enshrined in their guiding principles. (shrink)

Government authorities often view the 3Rs of “replace, reduce, refine” popularized by Russell and Burch as both a regulatory principle and a governance principle aimed at reducing the total amount of animal distress in science. They thus expect that the 3Rs should, in time, result in changes in total animal experimentation numbers. Communications by Swiss authorities provide stark examples of this expectation. But the 3Rs do not aim at affecting animal experimentation at the level of total numbers; rather, they focus (...) on study design in the individual case. While the underlying philosophy of the 3Rs indeed included a principle of seeking feasible overall reforms, this notion is completely absent in the 3Rs framework itself. Authorities need to stop treating the 3Rs as a means to reduce total distress and should instead invest resources into developing feasible and effective strategies for transformative governance in animal research. (shrink)

Depression is a widespread and debilitating disorder, but developing effective treatments has proven challenging. Despite success in animal models, many treatments fail in human trials. While various factors contribute to this translational failure, standardization practices in animal research are often overlooked. This paper argues that certain standardization choices in behavioral neuroscience research on depression can limit the generalizability of results from rodents to humans. This raises ethical and scientific concerns, including animal waste and a lack of progress in treating human (...) patients. To address these issues, animal ethics committees can establish reasonable expectations for preclinical research and highlight the impact of standardization on generalizability. Such efforts can help improve translation from animal models to human patients and ultimately benefit those suffering from depression. (shrink)

Although researchers generally take great care to ensure that human subjects do not suffer very serious harms from their involvement in research, the situation is different for nonhuman animal subjects. Significant progress has been made in reducing unnecessary animal suffering in research, yet researchers still inflict severe pain and distress on tens of thousands of animals every year for scientific purposes. Some bioethicists, scientists, and animal welfare advocates argue for placing an upper limit on the suffering researchers may impose on (...) animal subjects, with rare exceptions for research that promises critical social benefits. In this article, I argue against such an upper limit on harm on the grounds that researchers often can compensate animal subjects for their suffering, even severe and long-lasting suffering. If animal subjects receive adequate compensation for the harms they suffer, then there is no general limit on how much suffering researchers may impose on them for scientific purposes. (shrink)

Animal models have long been used to investigate human mental disorders, including depression, anxiety, and schizophrenia. This practice is usually justified in terms of the benefits (to humans) outweighing the costs (to the animals). I argue on utility maximization grounds that we should phase out animal models in neuropsychiatric research. Our leading theories of how human minds and behavior evolved invoke sociocultural factors whose relation to nonhuman minds, societies, and behavior has not been homologized. Thus it is not at all (...) clear that we are gaining the epistemic or clinical benefits we want from this animal-based research. (shrink)

This paper takes up Axel Honneth’s suggestion that we, in the 21st century Western world, should revisit the Marxian idea of reification; unlike Honneth, however, this paper applies reification to the ways in which humans relate to non-human animals, particularly in the context of scientific experiments. Thinking about these practices through the lens of reification, the paper argues, yields a more helpful understanding of what is regarded as problematic in those practices than the standard animal rights approaches. The second part (...) of the paper offers ways of overcoming reification that go beyond Honneth’s idea of recognition by introducing Iris Murdoch’s idea of attention. This proposed strategy makes the ethical relevance of reification more salient and makes it possible to counter reification through a practice such as attention which, unlike recognition, can be consciously established. (shrink)

It is seemingly bad for animals to have their desires modified in at least some cases, for instance where brainwashing or neurological manipulation takes place. In humans, many argue that such modification interferes with our positive liberty or undermines our autonomy but this explanation is inapplicable in the case of animals as they lack the capacity for autonomy in the relevant sense. As such, the standard view has been that, despite any intuitions to the contrary, the modification of animals’ desires (...) is not harmful (at least not in itself). In this article, I offer a different perspective on this issue, laying the foundations of a novel argument in defence of the view that animals _can_ be harmed by desire modification directly. I suggest that the modification of an animal’s desires (under certain circumstances) is harmful for that animal because it undermines their agency. (shrink)

This article considers the sexual politics of animal evidence in the context of German sexology around 1920. In the 1910s, the German-Jewish geneticist Richard B. Goldschmidt conducted experiments on the moth Lymantria dispar, and discovered individuals that were no longer clearly identifiable as male or female. When he published an article tentatively arguing that his research on ‘intersex butterflies’ could be used to inform concurrent debates about human homosexuality, he triggered a flurry of responses from Berlin-based sexologists. In this article, (...) I examine how a number of well-known sexologists affiliated with Magnus Hirschfeld, his Scientific-Humanitarian Committee, and later his Institute of Sexology attempted to incorporate Goldschmidt’s experiments into their sexological work between 1917 and 1923. Intersex butterflies were used to discuss issues at the heart of German sexology: the legal debate about the criminalisation of homosexuality under paragraph 175; the scientific methodology of sexology, caught between psychiatric, biological, and sociological approaches to the study of sexual and gender diversity; and the status of sexology as natural science, able to contribute knowledge about the sexual Konstitution of the organism. This article thus shows that butterfly experiments function as important and politically charged evidence for a discussion at the heart of the sexological project of those involved in the founding of the Institute of Sexology: the question of the nature and naturalness of homosexuality and its political consequences. In doing so, this article makes a case for paying attention to non-human actors in the history of sexology. (shrink)

An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals (human or nonhuman) to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it’s justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible (...) with recognizing the inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research. (shrink)

The ethics of using nonhuman animals in biomedical research is usually seen as a subfield of animal ethics. In recent years, however, the ethics of animal research has increasingly become a subfield within research ethics under the term “animal research ethics”. Consequently, ethical issues have become prominent that are familiar in the context of human research ethics, such as autonomy or self-determination, harms and benefits, justice, and vulnerability. After a brief overview of the development of the field and a discussion (...) of relevant theoretical ethical frameworks, I consider two of these issues, namely autonomy and self-determination on the one hand, and harms and benefits on the other hand. My concern is with philosophical and ethical issues, rather than animal research oversight. I focus my discussion on nonhuman primates, as the most plausible nonhuman candidates for this approach. I conclude that the approach, although promising, depends strongly on the moral status of nonhuman research subjects. (shrink)

This volume presents a framework of general principles for animal research ethics together with an analysis of the principles' meaning and moral requirements. Tom L. Beauchamp and David DeGrazia's comprehensive framework addresses ethical requirements pertaining to societal benefit and features a thorough, ethically defensible program of animal welfare. The book also features commentaries on the framework of principles by eminent figures in animal research ethics from an array of relevant disciplines: veterinary medicine, biomedical research, biology, zoology, comparative psychology, primatology, law, (...) and bioethics. (shrink)

One requirement for the formation of an Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee is that they include a community member who embodies the values of the general population. This study’s aim is to investigate whether community members use moral arguments when deliberating a case of nonhuman animals used in experimentation. To this end, we tested the responses of community members in a situation similar to those confronting members of IACUC. The participants’ evaluation of the protocol was consistent with the mandates (...) of IACUC. We also found that overall no moral argument played a significant role in their evaluation of a protocol. Only arguments based on loyalty to the human species played a moderate role in the evaluation of using animals in experimental research, in a way similar to using some moral arguments regarding the importance of human welfare to justify the use of animals in experimental research. (shrink)

In order to safeguard animal welfare, in many countries, researchers have to apply for a permit to carry out animal experiments, and this application is assessed by an animal experimentation committee. In this chapter, we zoom in on the assessment made by such committees. How do they weigh the justification of the goal of the experiments against the harm to the animals? What sort of moral dilemmas and institutional challenges do they face?

Conducting research on animals is supposed to be valuable because it provides information on how human mechanisms work. But for the use of animal models to be ethically justified, it must be epistemically justified. The inference from an observation about an animal model to a conclusion about humans must be warranted for the use of animals to be moral. When researchers infer from animals to humans, it’s an extrapolation. Often non-human primates are used as animal models in laboratory behavioral research. (...) The target populations are humans and other non-human primates. I argue that the epistemology of extrapolation renders the use of non-human primates in laboratory behavioral research unreliable. If the model is relevantly similar to the target, then the experimental conditions introduce confounding variables. If the model is not relevantly similar to the target, then the observations of the model cannot be extrapolated to the target. Since using non-human primates in as animal models in laboratory behavioral research is not epistemically justified, using them as animal models in laboratory behavioral research is not ethically justified. (shrink)

:In a recent paper in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics on the necessary conditions for morally responsible animal research David DeGrazia and Jeff Sebo claim that the key requirements for morally responsible animal research are an assertion of sufficient net benefit, a worthwhile-life condition, and a no-unnecessary-harm condition. With regards to the assertion of sufficient net benefit, the authors claim that morally responsible research offers unique benefits to humans that outweigh the costs and harms to humans and animals. In this (...) commentary we will raise epistemic, practical, and ethical challenges to DeGrazia and Sebo’s emphasis on benefits in the prospective assessment of research studies involving animals. We do not disagree with DeGrazia and Sebo that, at the theoretical level, the benefits of research justify our using animals. Our contribution intends to clarify, at the practical level, how we should understand benefits in the prospective assessment and moral justification of animal research. We argue that ASNB should be understood as an assessment of Expectation of Knowledge Production in the prospective assessment and justification of animal research. EKP breaks down into two further claims: that morally responsible research generates knowledge worth having and that morally responsible research is designed and executed to produce generalizable knowledge. We understand the condition called knowledge worth having as scientists’ testing a hypothesis that, whether verified or falsified, advances an important interest, and production of generalizable knowledge in terms of scientific integrity. Generalizable knowledge refers to experimental results that generalize to a larger population beyond the animals studied. Generalizable scientific knowledge is reliable, replicable, and accurately descriptive. In sum, morally responsible research will be designed and carefully executed to successfully test a hypothesis that, whether verified or falsified, advances important interests. Our formulation of EKP, crucially, does not require further showing that an experiment involving animals will produce societal benefits. (shrink)

Abstract:Human and animal research both operate within established standards. In the United States, criticism of the human research environment and recorded abuses of human research subjects served as the impetus for the establishment of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, and the resulting Belmont Report. The Belmont Report established key ethical principles to which human research should adhere: respect for autonomy, obligations to beneficence and justice, and special protections for vulnerable individuals and (...) populations. While current guidelines appropriately aim to protect the individual interests of human participants in research, no similar, comprehensive, and principled effort has addressed the use of (nonhuman) animals in research. Although published policies regarding animal research provide relevant regulatory guidance, the lack of a fundamental effort to explore the ethical issues and principles that should guide decisions about the potential use of animals in research has led to unclear and disparate policies. Here, we explore how the ethical principles outlined in the Belmont Report could be applied consistently to animals. We describe how concepts such as respect for autonomy and obligations to beneficence and justice could be applied to animals, as well as how animals are entitled to special protections as a result of their vulnerability. (shrink)

In the context of animal experimentation, laboratory workers fluctuate between seeing animals used in research as tools or objects and seeing them as sentient living beings. Most laboratory workers do not wholly lose their empathy and their ability to connect with other living beings. To deal with the fact that their job involves harming and killing animals on a regular basis, they employ various coping strategies, such as rationalizing the use of animals in research and minimizing their emotional attachment to (...) the animals. The evidence compiled in this article suggests that researchers, technicians, and caregivers who are involved in animal experimentation experience stress, anxiety, guilt, and trauma. I conclude that inflicting pain and death on nonhuman animals causes laboratory workers to suffer as well. Thus, in animal research, the suffering of nonhuman animals and humans is directly linked. The consideration of human suffering adds another dimension to ethical discussions of animal research, namely the relation between the suffering of human and nonhuman animals. A comprehensive ethical discussion of animal experiments should therefore include the suffering of nonhuman animals, the suffering of humans, and the relation between the two. (shrink)

In Principles of Animal Research Ethics, Tom Beauchamp and David DeGrazia (hereafter B&D) aim to replace the well-known “3Rs”—Replacing animal research with non-animal methods, Reducing the numbers of animals, and Refining experiments to reduce harms and improve welfare—as the guiding principles regulating animal research. . . B&D present their principles as “useful” for people engaged in animal research and as a “philosophically sound” (p. 4) framework for a new ethic for animal research. Regrettably, I have doubts about both these overall (...) claims and so am pessimistic about the book. (shrink)

In our paper, we argue for three necessary conditions for morally permissible animal research: (1) an assertion (or expectation) of sufficient net benefit, (2) a worthwhile-life condition, and (3) a no-unnecessary-harm/qualified-basic-needs condition. We argue that these conditions are necessary, without taking a position on whether they are jointly sufficient. In their excellent commentary on our paper, Matthias Eggel, Carolyn Neuhaus, and Herwig Grimm (hereafter, the authors) argue for a friendly amendment to one of our three conditions. In particular, they argue (...) for replacing the first condition—expectation of sufficient net benefit (ESNB)—with an expectation of knowledge production (EKP). In this reply, we will explain why we are open to this proposed amendment, but not yet convinced. (shrink)

Though there is a burgeoning interest in applied Buddhist ethics, Buddhist animal research ethics remains an underdeveloped area. In this paper I will explore how some central Buddhist ethical considerations can usefully engage our use of other animals (henceforth, animals) in science. As the scientific use of animals is broad, I will narrow my focus to laboratory science. I will show that, though a Buddhist abolitionism would not be unmotivated, it is possible to reject it. While doing so, it will (...) be important to resist emphasizing elements of Buddhist thought that merely provide reasons to adopt the dominant ethical framework governing laboratory animal research ethics, known as the 3Rs. Though I will suggest how a Buddhist animal research ethics can sometimes permit the use of animals in harmful research, it will also require ethical constraints that resonate with some of the more progressive elements in ‘Western’ bioethics. (shrink)

1. Insect sampling for the purpose of measuring biodiversity – as well as entomological research more generally – largely assumes that insects lack consciousness. Here, we briefly present some arguments that insects are conscious and encourage entomologists to revisit their ethical codes in light of them. 2. Specifically, we adapt the Three Rs, guidelines proposed in 1959 by WMS Russell and RL Burch that have become the dominant way of thinking about the ethics of using animals in research. 3. The (...) Three Rs specify the need to replace, reduce, and refine the use of animals in research, yet have received little attention in entomological circles, which is perhaps unsurprising given that Russell and Burch explicitly excluded invertebrates from their purview. 4. As a specific case, we consider issues of suffering and bycatch in the use of Malaise traps for insect sampling. 5. While we do not claim that entomologists have an obligation to adopt the Three Rs framework wholesale, we do suggest that there is reason to adopt it in a modified form to mitigate moral risk especially in the context of conservation. (shrink)

Regulatory ethical frameworks governing animal experimentation are a hallmark of modern biology. While most countries have ethical standards regarding the use of animals for scientific purposes, experiments involving insects are not included in these standards. With studies in recent years suggesting that insects may possess faculties akin to emotive states, there is growing discussion surrounding the ethical implications of scientific experimentation involving insects. This paper explores some of the current evidence for the ability of insects to experience emotive states and (...) highlights how current formal animal experimentation ethics frameworks are unnecessary for governing the use of insects for scientific purposes. At its conclusion, this paper discusses ways in which scientists can, and should, uniformly maximise the welfare of insects used in their experiments in a way that is of benefit to their science as well as to the dignity and welfare of their study organisms. (shrink)

_Animal Experimentation: Working Towards a Paradigm Change_ critically appraises current animal use in science and discusses ways in which we can contribute to a paradigm change towards human-biology based approaches.

A moral dilemma exists in biomedical research relating to the use of animal or human tissue when conducting scientific research. In human ethics, researchers need to justify why the use of humans is necessary should suitable models exist. Conversely, in animal ethics, a researcher must justify why research cannot be carried out on suitable alternatives. In the case of medical procedures or therapeutics testing, the use of animal models is often justified. However, in forensic research, the justification may be less (...) evident, particularly when research involves the infliction of trauma on living animals. To determine how the forensic science community is dealing with this dilemma, a review of literature within major forensic science journals was conducted. The frequency and trends of the use of animals in forensic science research was investigated for the period 1 January 2012–31 December 2016. The review revealed 204 original articles utilizing 5050 animals in various forms as analogues for human tissue. The most common specimens utilized were various species of rats, pigs, mice, and rabbits although different specimens were favored in different study themes. The majority of studies were conducted on post-mortem specimens. It is, however, evident that more needs to be done to uphold the basic ethical principles of reduction, refinement and replacement in the use of animals for research purposes. (shrink)

Some animal research is arguably morally wrong, and some animal research is morally bad but could be improved. Who is most likely to be able to identify wrong or bad animal research and advocate for improvements? I argue that philosophical ethicists have the expertise that makes them the likely best candidates for these tasks. I review the skills, knowledge and perspectives that philosophical ethicists tend to have which makes them ethical experts. I argue that, insofar as IACUCs are expected to (...) ensure that research is ethical, they must have philosophical ethicists as members. (shrink)

In Canada, all institutions that conduct publicly funded, animal-based research are expected to comply with the standards of the Canadian Council on Animal Care (CCAC). The CCAC promotes the use of animal alternatives, and uses the “3Rs” principles of Replacement, Reduction, and Refinement as a guiding ethical framework. To ensure these standards are strictly enforced, internal ethics committees at each institution are tasked with creating “Animal Use Protocol” (AUP) forms to be filled out by researchers and evaluated by the committees. (...) In this paper, we assess AUP forms from Canada’s top research universities to identify the extent to which they conform to, or advance, the 3Rs framework. Our results show various deficiencies that call into question the quality of information elicited by these forms. To remedy this, we recommend that the CCAC assume responsibility for creating a standardized 3Rs section to be used on all AUP forms. In addition, proposal forms and experimental results for all research at CCAC-certified institutions should be digitized and uploaded into a national database. We argue that this would offer higher quality information for researchers at the experimental design stage, while strengthening the CCAC’s mandate to be accountable to the Canadian public. (shrink)

Experimentation that uses non-human animals is justified by its defenders on the basis of the two-fold premise that: a) non-human animals make sufficient models of human biology and diseases, and b) non-human animals lack cognitive and emotional abilities that would require higher moral consideration. The irony with this defense is that experiments that use non-human animal subjects actually reveal how the opposite is in fact true. Medical experiments conducted on non-human animals reveal how similar they are to humans in their (...) ability to suffer, while also proving that they are unreliable for studying human diseases and improving human health. (shrink)

Animals are used in biomedical research to study disease, develop new medicines, and test them for safety. As the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics’ review Normalising the Unthinkable acknowledges, many great strides in medicine have involved animals. However, their contribution has not always been positive. Decades of attempts to develop treatments for diseases including asthma, cancer, stroke, and Alzheimer’s using animals have failed to translate to humans, leaving patients with inadequate treatments or without treatments at all. As Normalising the Unthinkable (...) points out, we have to confront the fact that animal research may have hindered progress, at least in some respects. For example, animal tests have been shown to have very little ability to predict the safety of medicines for human patients. A dramatic illustration of this failing is TGN1412, which almost killed 6 clinical trial volunteers in 2006, after crab-eating macaques showed the drug to be safe, even at massive doses. This failing contributes to adverse drug reactions, which are now one of the world’s leading causes of death, killing hundreds of thousands of people every year and hospitalizing millions. A revolution in science and technology has produced a new generation of more relevant and predictive tools, which could be used to create safer medicines more quickly and at less cost: a win-win situation that should be supported by everyone. The obstacle preventing this from happening is governments’ continued insistence on animal testing. Yet the evidence is clear that reliance on animals as surrogate humans puts patients at risk, can delay medical progress, and can cause effective treatments to be wrongly discarded. There is a compelling case to be made that animal research is an ethical issue for humans as well as for animals. (shrink)

The Weatherall report on the use of non-human primates in research was published in 2006. Its main conclusion was that there is a strong scientific case for the use of non-human primates in some cases, but the report stressed the importance of evaluating each case in the light of the availability of alternatives. In addition to arguing for the scientific necessity of using non-human primates in research, the report also provided an ethical justification. As could be expected, the report was (...) harshly criticised by animal rights groups, but in the academic literature, only two critical replies appeared. In what follows, I will describe the ethical justification for non-human primate research as it is laid out in the Weatherall report and then consider the criticism in the academic literature. I conclude that the report’s ethical justification for the use of non-human primates in research, in particular in basic neuroscientific research, has not been convincingly challenged by its critics. Since the criticism of the report is limited and represents only a small part of the academic discussion about the use of non-human primates in research, and a still smaller part of the ethical discussion about animal research, it is important that the discussion continue both at the academic and social level. (shrink)

Those who wish to abolish or restrict the use of non-human animals in so-called factory farming and/or experimentation often argue that these animal use practices are incommensurate with animals’ moral status. If sound, these arguments would establish that, as a matter of ethics or justice, we should voluntarily abstain from the immoral animal use practices in question. But these arguments can’t and shouldn’t be taken to establish a related conclusion: that the moral status of animals justifies political intervention to disallow (...) or significantly diminish factory farming and animal experimentation. In this paper, we set out to do two things: First, we argue that while the arguments mentioned above may establish the moral impermissibility or injustice of the practices they condemn, they are not sufficient to justify political interventions or social policies to abolish or restrict such practices. It is one thing to argue that some moral imperative or imperative of justice exists, and quite another thing to call for the use of political power to induce compliance with that imperative. Our second task is to assess the prospects for developing an argument that is sufficient to justify political interventions to restrict or abolish the use of non-human animals in factory farming or experimentation. Beyond establishing the immorality or injustice of animal consumption or experimentation, one must show that the interventions in question constitute legitimate use of political power. Would prohibiting or discouraging animal use be legitimate? We attempt to answer this question within the context of fundamental liberal constraints on the legitimate use of coercive political power. (shrink)

This article raises a legitimate concern for animals used in research in China. China does not have any anticruelty laws, but there are various regulations concerning the use of animals in research. More scientific experiments using animals are shifting from the West to China, where ethical rules and animal welfare laws are not as stringent as those in Western countries. The article focuses on animals in research in China by outlining the regulatory framework governing such animal use. It also raises (...) ethical issues for Western scientists doing animal research in China. (shrink)

While many attitudes towards animals changed in regard to cruelty in the eighteenth century, the question of animal experimentation and the exploitation of animals used in research continued to resonate well into the nineteenth century and continues unabated today. Historical legislative victories notwithstanding, cruelty to animals, including their treatment in factory farming, “entertainment” and their use in laboratory experiments and medical procedures continues to be the focus of animal rights and animal activism. This chapter examines the use of animals in (...) contemporary science where xenotransplantation, and bioengineering are on the rise. These practices require invasive experimental laboratory procedures, and while animal rights advocates and activists have been instrumental in challenging animal testing with regards to cosmetic use, drug testing, military field surgery and psychological experiments, research in bioengineering, cloning and xenotransplantation flourishes often beneath the radar of those who would oppose cruelty and the exploitation of animals for the benefit of humans. (shrink)

The use of non-human primates in biomedical research is a contentious issue that raises serious ethical and practical concerns. In the European Union, where regulations on their use are very tight, the number of non-human primates used in research has been in decline over the past decade. However, this decline has been paralleled by an increase in numbers used elsewhere in the world, with less regard for some of the ethical issues (e.g. genetic manipulations). There is evidence that researchers from (...) high-income countries (HICs), where regulations on the use of non-human primates are strict, may be tempted to conduct some of their experiments in countries where regulation is less strict, through new collaborative efforts. In collaborative ventures, equivalence in the application of ethical standards in animal research, regardless of location, is necessary to avoid this exploitation. (shrink)

The Weatherall Report claims that research on non-human primates is permitted and morally required. The argument rests on the following thought experiment: > The hospital fire : A hospital is on fire. Some of the residents are humans and others are non-human animals. You can only save one group. What do you do? Some people have the intuition that we should rescue the humans. According to the report, if we accept that human lives have priority over non-human lives in this (...) case, consistency requires us to support the use of non-human animals in research. This is because both cases are about saving human lives at the expense of the lives of non-human animals. Two critical replies appeared in the literature, by E J Moore1 and Muireann Quigley.2 In a recent paper3 Gardar Arnason claims that such objections fail. I will argue, however, that his assessment is unconvincing. The first objection pressed by Moore is that there are fundamental disanalogies between The hospital fire and biomedical research. In that scenario we face a life-or-death emergency situation whereas in biomedical research we do not. In such situations it may be justified to prioritise those closest to us (eg, species …. (shrink)

In the field of medically assisted reproduction (MAR), there is a growing emphasis on the importance of introducing new assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) only after thorough preclinical safety research, including the use of animal models. At the same time, there is international support for the three R’s (replace, reduce, refine), and the European Union even aims at the full replacement of animals for research. The apparent tension between these two trends underlines the urgency of an explicit justification of the use (...) of animals for the development and preclinical testing of new ARTs. Considering that the use of animals remains necessary for specific forms of ART research and taking account of different views on the moral importance of helping people to have a genetically related child, we argue that, in principle, the importance of safety research as part of responsible innovation outweighs the limited infringement of animal wellbeing involved in ART research. (shrink)

Christine M. Korsgaard presents a compelling new view of our moral relationships to the other animals. She offers challenging answers to such questions as: Are people superior to animals, and does it matter morally if we are? Is it all right for us to eat animals, experiment on them, make them work for us, and keep them as pets?

Research ethics is a core component of undergraduate psychology curricula, typically first encountered in introductory textbooks. Previous analyses of introductory textbooks focused on human research ethics. Given growing concerns about animal research—particularly among college students—we analyzed discussions of animal research ethics in 18 introductory psychology textbooks. Our results revealed that while most textbooks address this topic, defenses of animal use and mentions of oversight account for a majority of content, while discussions of ethics were lacking. We discuss implications of these (...) results and suggest improvements for engaging students to think critically about animal research ethics. (shrink)

I argue that, contrary to what Tom Regan suggests, his rights view implies that subsistence hunting is wrong, that is, killing animals for food is wrong even when they are the only available food source, since doing so violates animal rights. We can see that subsistence hunting is wrong on the rights view by seeing why animal experimentation, specifically xenotransplanation, is wrong on the rights view: if it’s wrong to kill an animal to take organs to save a human life, (...) it’s wrong to kill an animal to eat that animal to save a human life or improve human health. I discuss these arguments’ implications for animal rights-based vegan advocacy, insofar as some people claim that they don’t feel their best on vegan diets and so their eating meat is morally justified. I argue that such an attempt to justify consuming animal products fails on Regan’s rights view, but discuss some attempts to morally excuse such violations of animals’ rights. These attempts are inspired by Regan’s attempts at potentially excusing animal rights advocates’ using medications developed using animals. (shrink)

This paper argues that contemporary philosophical literature on meaning in life has important implications for the debate about our obligations to non-human animals. If animal lives can be meaningful, then practices including factory farming and animal research might be morally worse than ethicists have thought. We argue for two theses about meaning in life: that the best account of meaningful lives must take intentional action to be necessary for meaning—an individual’s life has meaning if and only if the individual acts (...) intentionally in ways that contribute to finally valuable states of affairs; and that this first thesis does not entail that only human lives are meaningful. Because non-human animals can be intentional agents of a certain sort, our account yields the verdict that many animals’ lives can be meaningful. We conclude by considering the moral implications of these theses for common practices involving animals. (shrink)

Educational institutions have a responsibility not only to provide a solid theoretical background on scientific phenomena, but to also frame them within the wider social context and highlight their numerous ethical implications. It is fundamental that tomorrow’s scientists be encouraged to develop an informed and critical approach towards scientific issues that, as in the case of animal experimentation, bring undeniable advantages to our society while carrying highly controversial moral implications. However, despite the considerable social and scientific relevance of the use (...) of animal models in biomedical research, there is a scarcity of scholarly literature exploring the topic from a pedagogical standpoint. The case study presented in this paper aims to investigate the effectiveness of role play simulation in promoting critical understanding of the use of animal models in biomedical research and its ethical implications. A simulation was set up in which first year undergraduate students took the role of delegates to a conference purportedly organised by the United Nations Ethics Office. The simulation included two electronic voting sessions, an open debate, and a keynote lecture. Post-session feedback indicated that most students found the simulation more engaging than a conventional lecture. A comparison of self-assessment questionnaires compiled at the start and at the end of the session indicated that students’ understanding of, and confidence in, the topic of animal experimentation had considerably increased after taking part in the simulation. (shrink)

In this chapter we outline the need to develop ethical frameworks to guide research on the role of animal-orientated health, therapeutic, and service interventions. We discuss findings from our research on uses of animals in therapeutic settings and benefits of human–canine interactions for human health. These stories from the field reveal that current ethics review processes do not recognise the animal as an equal partner in the potential reciprocal benefits and risks of therapeutic human–animal relationships. We explore how these review (...) processes frame research on the relationships between humans and non-human animals and use the ethical review system of Aotearoa/New Zealand as an example. We propose an ethical framework that goes beyond animal welfare legislation and recognises a range of non-human animal capacities. (shrink)

Forthy years after the issue of Animal Liberation (1975), this essay tries to make a critical assessment of the theses of Peter Singer on the moral status of animals, showing their historical evolution. Notwithstanding the limits of his utilitarian theoretical view, a good part of Singer’s moral reflection about animals reveals itself convincing and is finding some achievements in the positive legislation of a lot of countries. Following David DeGrazia, the author develops Singer’s theses in a gradualist direction, pointing out (...) that the problems of utilitarianism do not compromise the validity of the principle of equal consideration of interests, nor the main practical out-comes that the Australian philosopher draws from it. (shrink)

Leading animal models are powerful tools for translational research, but they also present obstacles. Poorly conducted preclinical research in animals is a common cause of translational failure, but even when such research is well-designed and carefully executed, challenges remain. In particular, dominant models may bias research directions, elide essential aspects of human disease, omit important context, or subtly shift research targets. Recognizing these stumbling blocks can help us find ways to avoid them: employing a wider range of models, incorporating more (...) realistic environmental conditions, better aligning studies between animals and patients, and focusing on human biology and therapeutic goals. Such changes are costly; but insisting it would be impractical or unrealistic to change strategies offers no way out of the current impasse. Rather, we must acknowledge the obstacles as well as the advantages presented by core models, and direct some of our investments in translational research toward getting around them. The dominance of biomedical research by a handful of animal models introduces subtle but significant obstacles to translation. Recognizing these obstacles is a critical first step toward finding ways around them; this paper describes how dominant models can create roadblocks, and suggests strategies to improve the efficiency of translation from animal models to humans. (shrink)