Authentic feelings like respect and similar moral emotions already start to develop in preverbal infants. However, our schooling systems offer only very few opportunities to train respectful behavior. Marsal, Dobashi, and Nowak introduce four interactive exercices in order to implement them in the moral and democratic education. All exercices are based on Martens’ Five Finger Method and on the didactic experiences made by authors in Germany, Japan, and Poland too.

A primary goal of this book is to enhance intercultural academic exchange and to encourage further research and practical work in this field.

Agents are often assumed to have degrees of belief (“credences”) and also binary beliefs (“beliefs simpliciter”). How are these related to each other? A much-discussed answer asserts that it is rational to believe a proposition if and only if one has a high enough degree of belief in it. But this answer runs into the “lottery paradox”: the set of believed propositions may violate the key rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure. In earlier work, we showed that this problem (...) generalizes: there exists no local function from degrees of belief to binary beliefs that satisfies some minimal conditions of rationality and non-triviality. “Locality” means that the binary belief in each proposition depends only on the degree of belief in that proposition, not on the degrees of belief in others. One might think that the impossibility can be avoided by dropping the assumption that binary beliefs are a function of degrees of belief. We prove that, even if we drop the “functionality” restriction, there still exists no local relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs that satisfies some minimal conditions. Thus functionality is not the source of the impossibility; its source is the condition of locality. If there is any non-trivial relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs at all, it must be a “holistic” one. We explore several concrete forms this “holistic” relation could take. (shrink)

The Christian does not live in a vacuum, says the author, but in a world of government, politics, labor, and marriage. Hence, Christian ethics cannot exist in a vacuum what the Christian needs, claims Dietrich Bonhoeffer, is concrete instruction in a concrete situation. Although the author died before completing his work, this book is recognized as a major contribution to Christian ethics. The root and ground of Christian ethics, the author says, is the reality of God as revealed in (...) Jesus Christ. This reality is not manifest in the Church as distinct from the secular world such a juxtaposition of two separate spheres, Bonhoeffer insists, is a denial of God's having reconciled the whole world to himself in Christ. On the contrary, God's commandment is to be found and known in the Church, the family, labor, and government. His commandment permits man to live as man before God, in a world God made, with responsibility for the institutions of that world. (shrink)

Called by Karl Barth the brilliant Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, this book is finally being recognized as Bonhoeffers magnum opus and one of the most important works of Christian ethics of the last century.

The widely discussed "discursive dilemma" shows that majority voting in a group of individuals on logically connected propositions may produce irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority voting by considering quota rules, which accept each proposition if and only if the number of individuals accepting it exceeds a given threshold, where different thresholds may be used for different propositions. After characterizing quota rules, we prove necessary and sufficient conditions on the required thresholds for various collective rationality requirements. We also consider sequential (...) quota rules, which ensure collective rationality by adjudicating propositions sequentially and letting earlier judgments constrain later ones. Sequential rules may be path-dependent and strategically manipulable. We characterize path-independence and prove its essential equivalence to strategy-proofness. Our results shed light on the rationality of simple-, super-, and sub-majoritarian decision-making. (shrink)

Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. (...) We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states. (shrink)

In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or implication preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there (...) are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (2002), Nehring (2006), Dietrich and List (2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (2010a). (shrink)

There is a prevalent notion among cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind that computers are merely formal symbol manipulators, performing the actions they do solely on the basis of the syntactic properties of the symbols they manipulate. This view of computers has allowed some philosophers to divorce semantics from computational explanations. Semantic content, then, becomes something one adds to computational explanations to get psychological explanations. Other philosophers, such as Stephen Stich, have taken a stronger view, advocating doing away with semantics (...) entirely. This paper argues that a correct account of computation requires us to attribute content to computational processes in order to explain which functions are being computed. This entails that computational psychology must countenance mental representations. Since anti-semantic positions are incompatible with computational psychology thus construed, they ought to be rejected. Lastly, I argue that in an important sense, computers are not formal symbol manipulators. (shrink)

We introduce a “reason-based” framework for explaining and predicting individual choices. It captures the idea that a decision-maker focuses on some but not all properties of the options and chooses an option whose motivationally salient properties he/she most prefers. Reason-based explanations allow us to distinguish between two kinds of context-dependent choice: the motivationally salient properties may (i) vary across choice contexts, and (ii) include not only “intrinsic” properties of the options, but also “context-related” properties. Our framework can accommodate boundedly rational (...) and sophisticatedly rational choice. Since properties can be recombined in new ways, it also offers resources for predicting choices in unobserved contexts. (shrink)

All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation require individual and collective judgment sets to be consistent and complete, arguably a demanding rationality requirement. They do not carry over to aggregation functions mapping profiles of consistent individual judgment sets to consistent collective ones. We prove that, whenever the agenda of propositions under consideration exhibits mild interconnections, any such aggregation function that is "neutral" between the acceptance and rejection of each proposition is dictatorial. We relate this theorem to the literature.

Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, (...) which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented” individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented” individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy. (shrink)

Recently, a number of philosophers of biology have endorsed views about random drift that, we will argue, rest on an implicit assumption that the meaning of concepts such as drift can be understood through an examination of the mathematical models in which drift appears. They also seem to implicitly assume that ontological questions about the causality of terms appearing in the models can be gleaned from the models alone. We will question these general assumptions by showing how the same equation (...) — the simple 2 = p2 + 2pq + q2 — can be given radically different interpretations, one of which is a physical, causal process and one of which is not. This shows that mathematical models on their own yield neither interpretations nor ontological conclusions. Instead, we argue that these issues can only be resolved by considering the phenomena that the models were originally designed to represent and the phenomena to which the models are currently applied. When one does take those factors into account, starting with the motivation for Sewall Wright’s and R.A. Fisher’s early drift models and ending with contemporary applications, a very different picture of the concept of drift emerges. On this view, drift is a term for a set of physical processes, namely, indiscriminate sampling processes. (shrink)

As concerns of the Earth heading towards environmental change is gaining more prominence, this article will introduce a pilot study intended to investigate the common ideas children have about nature and how such ideas emerge within a philosophical community of inquiry about nature. We are particularly interested in a cultural comparison between German and Canadian children in order to see if the different historical and cultural developments influence how children understand and feel about nature. This pilot study contributes towards a (...) greater understanding of the cultural differences underlying how children’s perceptions of nature are tied to their identity formation. Furthermore, the process of philosophical inquiry may lend sensitivity to how children reflect and feel as they grow in today’s culture focused on environmental sustainability and economic development. (shrink)

Promoting philosophical and ethical education in schools requires academic education of teacher candidates who are able to apply professional methods. In schools, information pills in contrast to the academy, advice philosophy and ethics need to be taught in a practical and interactive way.?Learning-by-doing?, more about as distinguished from philosophy according to the?scholastic concept?. Philosophy according to the?universal concept? deals with questions generally asked not only by philosophers, but by all thinking people.

The doctor-patient relationship is a crucial aspect of primary-care practice Research on associations between quality of care provision and burnout and empathy in a primary care setting could improve this relationship. Cross-sectional study of family physicians and nurses of twenty-two primary care centers in the health district of Lleida, Spain. Empathy and burnout were measured using the Jefferson Physician Empathy Scale and the Maslach Burnout Inventory, while quality of care delivery was evaluated using Quality Standard Indicator scores. JPSE and MBI (...) results were grouped into low, medium, and high scores to analyze associations with QSI scores and sociodemographic variables. The mean QSI score recorded for the family physicians and nurses was 665. Higher, albeit insignificant, QSI scores were observed for practitioners with high burnout. No differences were observed according to level of empathy. The differences with respect to sex, age, and area of practice were not significant. Practitioners with low empathy had higher QSI scores than those with high empathy while those with high burnout had higher scores than those with low burnout. Burnout and empathy did not significantly influence quality of care delivery scores in 22 primary care centers. More studies, however, are needed to investigate the unexpected trend observed that suggests that physicians and nurses with higher levels of burnout provide higher quality care. (shrink)

In solving judgment aggregation problems, groups often face constraints. Many decision problems can be modelled in terms the acceptance or rejection of certain propositions in a language, and constraints as propositions that the decisions should be consistent with. For example, court judgments in breach-of-contract cases should be consistent with the constraint that action and obligation are necessary and sufficient for liability; judgments on how to rank several options in an order of preference with the constraint of transitivity; and judgments on (...) budget items with budgetary constraints. Often more or less demanding constraints on decisions are imaginable. For instance, in preference ranking problems, the transitivity constraint is often contrasted with the weaker acyclicity constraint. In this paper, we make constraints explicit in judgment aggregation by relativizing the rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure to a constraint set, whose variation yields more or less strong notions of rationality. We review several general results on judgment aggregation in light of such constraints. (shrink)

Musica Poetica provides an unprecedented examination of the development of Baroque musical thought. The initial chapters, which serve as an introduction to the concept and teachings of musical-rhetorical figures, explore Martin Luther's theology of music, the development of the Baroque concept of musica poetica, the idea of the affections in German Baroque music, and that music's use of the principles and devices of rhetoric. Dietrich Bartel then turns to more detailed considerations of the musical-rhetorical figures that were developed in (...) Baroque treatises and publications. After brief biographical sketches of the major theorists, Bartel examines those theorists' interpretation and classification of the figures. The book concludes with a detailed presentation of the musical-rhetorical figures, in which each theorist's definitions are presented in the original language and in parallel English translations. Bartel's clear, detailed analysis of German Baroque musical-rhetorical figures, combined with his careful translations of interpretations of those figures from a wide range of sources, make this book an indispensable introduction and resource for all students of Baroque music. Dietrich Bartel is an associate professor in the Department of Music at Canadian Mennonite Bible College (affiliated with University of Manitoba). (shrink)

In der 1968 gegründeten Reihe erscheinen Monographien aus den Gebieten der Griechischen und Lateinischen Philologie sowie der Alten Geschichte. Die Bände weisen eine große Vielzahl von Themen auf: neben sprachlichen, textkritischen oder gattungsgeschichtlichen philologischen Untersuchungen stehen sozial-, politik-, finanz- und kulturgeschichtliche Arbeiten aus der Klassischen Antike und der Spätantike. Entscheidend für die Aufnahme ist die Qualität einer Arbeit; besonderen Wert legen die Herausgeber auf eine umfassende Heranziehung der einschlägigen Texte und Quellen und deren sorgfältige kritische Auswertung.

There are many possible ways to approach the topic of educational theory and critique. One could inquire into the meaning of critical phenomena and subject-matter in practical education and instruction, investigate the various forms of critique with the goal of determining the extent to which they assist in clarifying pedagogical action, or one could ask: ‘What is meant by critical educational research?’ and ‘How do the various approaches to this topic relate to one another?’. This article inquires into the relationship (...) between critique and negativity. Such a distinction is relevant for the practical, theoretical and research-oriented use of the various forms and subject matters of critique. This analysis of their relationship aims to clarify how the structure of human learning connects to that of pedagogical action; and, additionally, how the theoretical guidelines and orientation for pedagogical action relate to scientific analyses and research in education in a way that is productive. Distinctions made in thought, judgement and action are not simply delimiting positive characteristics. Such distinctions are at once mediated by the relations of knowledge and ignorance, ability and inability. Although ignorance and inability can be transformed into positive knowledge and ability, they are not superseded in the process. Ignorance and inability are, on the contrary, constitutive elements of learning. The possibility for transitions from ignorance and inability to knowledge and ability—a possibility that itself presupposes knowledge and ability—point to a form of negativity within the process of education (Bildung). This form of negativity relates to the human ability to learn (Bildsamkeit) and provides the definitive basis of human learning. A form of negativity constitutive of learning processes leads to one that grounds pedagogical processes. Pedagogical efficacy is mediated by a double negativity, comprised of both a universal and a particular form of negativity. The relation of negativity to learning and pedagogical efficacy, with specific reference to educational research studies on teaching and learning processes, is considered. A form of educational research that operates beyond fundamentalist criticisms—that is to say, criticisms based on unshakeable beliefs—and utilises issues arising from a pluralisation of critique to confront the pluralism of critical positions, is considered. The article closes with reflections on the relation between the Critical and the Uncritical. (shrink)

There are many possible ways to approach the topic of educational theory and critique. One could inquire into the meaning of critical phenomena and subject-matter in practical education and instruction, investigate the various forms of critique with the goal of determining the extent to which they assist in clarifying pedagogical action, or one could ask: ‘What is meant by critical educational research?’ and ‘How do the various approaches to this topic relate to one another?’. This article inquires into the relationship (...) between critique and negativity. Such a distinction is relevant for the practical, theoretical and research-oriented use of the various forms and subject matters of critique. This analysis of their relationship aims to clarify how the structure of human learning connects to that of pedagogical action; and, additionally, how the theoretical guidelines and orientation for pedagogical action relate to scientific analyses and research in education in a way that is productive. Distinctions made in thought, judgement and action are not simply delimiting positive characteristics. Such distinctions are at once mediated by the relations of knowledge and ignorance, ability and inability. Although ignorance and inability can be transformed into positive knowledge and ability, they are not superseded in the process. Ignorance and inability are, on the contrary, constitutive elements of learning. The possibility for transitions from ignorance and inability to knowledge and ability—a possibility that itself presupposes knowledge and ability—point to a form of negativity within the process of education (Bildung). This form of negativity relates to the human ability to learn (Bildsamkeit) and provides the definitive basis of human learning. A form of negativity constitutive of learning processes leads to one that grounds pedagogical processes. Pedagogical efficacy is mediated by a double negativity, comprised of both a universal and a particular form of negativity. The relation of negativity to learning and pedagogical efficacy, with specific reference to educational research studies on teaching and learning processes, is considered. A form of educational research that operates beyond fundamentalist criticisms—that is to say, criticisms based on unshakeable beliefs—and utilises issues arising from a pluralisation of critique to confront the pluralism of critical positions, is considered. The article closes with reflections on the relation between the Critical and the Uncritical. (shrink)

Tomus 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie.

The paper discusses conditions of the establishment, iteration, and structuring of concepts in the domain of law, argues for a cognitive or epistemic approach to the analysis and description of concepts, and demonstrates and discusses the advantages (as well as some shortcomings) of a certain kind of analysis of conceptual or epistemic structures, the frame-semantic analysis of concepts, exemplified by concepts of German statutory law. General social conditions of the constitution of concepts as structures of human knowledge are accounted for (...) as well as special conditions of institutional knowledge, concepts and concept-structures as relevant for the knowledge in (or of) law. (shrink)

A Contribution to the History of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry: On Projected Changes of the Institute into a Research and Development Center of the Army for Chemical Warfare also in Times of Peace 1916 and after 1933. — The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics and Electrochemistry, today named after its first director Fritz-Haber-Institut, was in the first World War a place of research on chemical warfare. Evidences in the Archive for the History of the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (...) show that it was planned during the war to continue research in this area in peacetime. To realize this Fritz Haber proposed to found a special Kaiser Wilhelm Institute. As this could not be accomplished the war ministry founded 6 million marks to establish an extra department in the KWI of Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry just before the end of the war. After Germany lost the war these were used for other research areas while work on chemical warfare was carried out elsewhere.When Fritz Haber resigned 1933 because of the race-laws of the nationalsocialists the war ministry in cooperation with the ministery for culture nominated an obliging scientist as director of the institute with the aim to take up again research in the area of chemical warfare despite of the opposition of the president of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft and the ministery of the interior. After that time until the end of the second world war 1945 a good part of the work carried out in the institute was done for the war ministry. (shrink)

There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties. Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal states or not? (...) Dretske and Tye disagree on this issue. We try to settle the dispute in favor of Dretske's theory. (shrink)

What is consciousness? Of course, each of us knows, privately, what consciousness is. And we each think, for basically irresistible reasons, that all other conscious humans by and large have experiences like ours. So we conclude that we all know what consciousness is. It's the felt experiences of our lives. But that is not the answer we, as cognitive scientists, seek in asking our question. We all want to know what physical process consciousness is and why it produces this very (...) strange, almost mysterious, phenomenon of felt experience. (shrink)